ALDI FILII

## CONTENTS

## THE CYCLE OF ROMAN HISTORY IN LIVY'S FIRST PENTAD[1]

Recent discussions about cyclical concepts of history in Classical Antiquity, including far-reaching reassessments of older generalizations, have overlooked the Roman historian, Livy.[2] Similarly, scholarship on Livy himself includes only occasional references to cyclical concepts like the recurring Etruscan *saecula* that may have influenced, indirectly, his accounts of specific episodes. These concepts, however, are not presented as central to the way in which Livy understood the larger course or pattern of Roman history itself.[3] Of course, the notion

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[1] Discussions about concepts of time in ancient historiography aside, Jane E. Philips, "Current Research in Livy's First Decade: 1959–1979," *ANRW* II:30:2 (1982) 998–1057 provides useful surveys of recent literature on many aspects of Livy touched on in the following article. The following works will hereafter be identified by the author's last name: J. Bayet, *Tite–Live, Histoire Romaine*, V (Paris 1959); C. Joachim Classen, "Romulus in der römischen Republik," *Philologus* 106 (1962) 174–204; T. J. Luce, "Design and Structure in Livy 5:32–55," *TAPA* 102 (1971) 265–302; T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of His History* (Princeton 1977); F. Münzer, "Furius" (44), *RE* 1.7.1, cols. 324–48; R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1–5* (Oxford 1965, repr. with corrections and addenda 1970); Sir Ronald Syme, "Livy and Augustus," *HSCP* 64 (1959) 27–87; Stefan Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford 1971).

I would like to express my thanks to Archibald W. Allen and Seth Schein who commented on earlier versions of this paper; to the faculty and graduate students of the Stanford University Classics Department who offered helpful responses to a lecture based on some of the material included here; to Norman O. Brown, whose skepticism has prompted me to more careful formulation of my argument; and to the readers and especially the Editor of *AJP*, whose careful and sympathetic criticisms helped me to make me important improvements in the argument presented here.

[2] An important collection of essays on this topic with references to earlier literature History and the Concept of Time," *History and Theory Beiheft* 6 (1966); an extensive w of that and other relevant literature is provided by Virginia Hunter, *Past and ess in Herodotus and Thucydides* (Princeton 1982), especially Ch. 5, "Cause, Event, Chronology in Relations to Process," pp. 176–225 and the section of Ch. 6 subtitled me, Process, and Explanation," pp. 237–64.

[3] Ogilvie 662; Syme 54–55; Bayet 128; Jean Hubaux, *Rome et Véies, Recherches la chronologie légendaire du moyen age romain* (Paris 1958) examines Livy Book 5 in

of historical recurrence is central to Livy's interpretation of the past.
This is familiar not only from the obvious doublets in his narrative, but
also from the great extent to which his accounts of early history reflect
his understanding of more recent events. But mere recurrence does not
constitute a cyclical pattern of history. An historical cycle implies a *spe-
cific sequence* of recurrent events with a clearly identifiable beginning
and end which together determine the course of the cycle and, above
all, through which the cycle may be seen to pass more than once.[1]

     In what follows, I shall attempt to substantiate two theses. The
first is that, taken together, the preface and the narrative of Livy's first
pentad imply the possibility that Roman identity and greatness may be
preserved indefinitely through successive reenactments of an historical
cycle that is exemplified in the first half of Roman history. My second
thesis is that the elaboration of this view of Roman history reflects sub-
stantial originality on Livy's part; it involves a systematic selection and
reshaping of traditional material and combines that, especially in the
central concept of refounding, with a synthesis of preoccupations dis-
tinctive to Livy's own age, a synthesis that must have been unprece-
dented in the literary tradition.


                                         I


     · Scholars have long observed that Livy's preface offers a distinctive
interpretation of the decline which he, along with his contemporaries,
perceived as the most important fact of recent Roman history (Ogilvie
23-25). Livy contrasts the vitality of early Rome to the degenerate, self-
destructive Rome of his own age, and he ascribes that contrast to the
influence of wealth and a human propensity to succumb to its attrac-
tions:

     aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla unquam res publica ne
     maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitate

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detail for evidence of an underlying Roman tradition about a Great Year, but he c
not connect that concept with a systematic plan and presentation of Roman history
Livy's part.
     [1]For clear reflections on how the specific concept of an historical cycle relate
other conceptions of historical recurrence, see Garry Trompf, *The Idea of Histor*
*Recurrence in Western Thought* (Berkeley 1979) presented in brief on pp. 2-3, the s
ject of elaboration and refinement throughout.

tam serae auaritia luxuriaque immigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu
paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit. Adeo quanto rerum minus,
tanto minus cupiditatis erat: nuper diuitiae auaritiam et abundantes
uoluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique
omnia inuexere.

(pref. 11-12)

In admitting the evils of greed and extravagance, Romans have at last
been overcome by a typical if not universal human weakness. Romans
are different from others only in that they have resisted the general pro-
cess of corruption longer than any people before them.

   This view, that Roman decline was due to the kind of self-indul-
gent extravagence that the prospect of wealth encourages, was certainly
not a new one at Rome,[5] but in the works of Livy's predecessors, most
notably Sallust, it had been coupled with a second, related explanation
for Roman decline. This was the idea that domestic tranquility de-
pended on the fear of an external enemy, *metus hostilis*, and that when
once that fear was removed (for Romans, by the destruction of their
arch-rival, Carthage, in 146 B.C.) citizens turned their energies to unre-
strained and violently destructive rivalries among themselves.[6] Livy's
omission of the *metus hostilis* explanation in his preface is conspicuous

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   [5] Polybius 18.34-35; 31.25.3-7; 39.1.10, regarding Rome specifically, and cf.
6.57.5-9, more generally; Posidonius, the presumed basis for Diodorus 37.2.3; Sallust
*BC* 11.4-5; *Hist.* 2 fr. 70M. D. C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Amsterdam
1966) 44 assigns the introduction of this idea into the historiographic tradition to "a sena-
torial tradition of the second century;" Luce (1977) 273 regards the Gracchan historian
Piso (fr. 38 = Pliny *NH* 17.244) as a direct influence on Livy and, emphasizing particu-
larly the association of luxury with foreign influence, calls attention to the anti-Helle-
nism of Cato the Elder (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22-23) and to Livy's use of *immigrare* in pref.
11. Two further surveys of ancient explanations for decline of the Republic are Iiro Ka-
janto, "Notes on Livy's Conception of History," *Arctos* 2 (1958) 55-63 and A. W. Lin-
tott, "Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic," *Historia* 21
(1972) 626-38. The tenth of the Twelve Tables, restricting conspicuous display at fu-
nerals, and subsequent laws governing conspicuous display of wealth (e.g., the *leges Op-
pia* of 215, *Orchia* of 182, *Fannia* of 161, *Antia* of 68 B.C.), although they may be under-
stood as efforts to control electioneering and the cultivation of *clientela*, nonetheless
suggest a strong popular disposition to regard luxury, or at least certain aspects of it, as
destructive to the community.

   [6] This idea is generally thought to have become important in the Roman historio-
graphic tradition due to the influence of Posidonius (see fr. 112.3-6 = Diod. 34.33.3-6);
see W. Schur, *Sallust als Historiker* (Stuttgart 1934) 64. M. Gelzer attributes it to Scipio
Nasica, "Nasicas Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos," *Philologus* 40 (1931)
277. For the idea as a Hellenistic commonplace, see Ogilvie, 94-95. See also the works
cited in note 5 above for further discussion.

for two reasons. The first is that he calls attention explicitly and emphatically to its companion explanation. Ogilvie (9, 23–25), in fact, regards the combination of the exclusive emphasis on *luxuria* with echoes of Sallustian diction in the preface as constituting a deliberate polemic by Livy against his older contemporary. The second reason why Livy's exclusive emphasis on *luxuria* in the preface stands out, at least in retrospect, is that the unifying effect of *metus hostilis* and the internal dissension among Romans when it is removed are, nonetheless, prominent and frequently recurring motifs in Livy's own narrative.[7]

Taken by itself, the emphasis of Livy's preface on the deleterious effects of *luxuria* certainly does not seem to anticipate a cyclical view of Roman history, but rather to suggest that Rome has reached a final nadir from which there can be no recovery. Indeed, Livy asserts that Rome has been reduced to such a point of hopeless chaos that her remedies have become as unendurable as her vices (pref. 9). Anyone familiar with Herodotus and the general view of history that he represents might easily assume on reading the preface that Livy saw Rome as simply the latest in an unending succession of nations, from the Lydia of Croesos on, that had grown soft with prosperity and had succumbed to younger, poorer, and more energetic nations on the rise.

However, such unqualified pessimism does not represent the whole of what Livy has to say in his preface. When he turns to the past as a welcome escape from the present, among other things that he finds there are examples of human behavior, examples, more specifically, both to be emulated and to be shunned: "inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae guod imitere capias, inde . . . quod vites" (pref. 10). He introduces the subject of these examples, moreover, by asserting that it is in such respects that our understanding is especially healing and fruitful: "Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum . . . ." (pref. 10). Contemplation of Rome's past, then, may show how to recover a former excellence, both for oneself and for the commonwealth. Such a recovery, of course, is contingent upon a correct understanding of the past lessons. It is not a sure thing, and Livy quite pointedly reserves judgment on the matter: it may prove that contemplation of the past will provide no more than a mental refuge from the present. But Livy has at least tentatively raised the possibility that it may have a more constructive value.

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[7] 1.19.4; 2.32.6, 39.7; 54.2; 3.9.1 et passim.

II

    This possibility is recalled and confirmed by the narrative of the
first pentad. Long before we come to the time for Livy to describe the
decline experienced in his own day and anticipated in his preface, we
learn that Rome had, in fact, experienced and recovered from a similar
decline once before. The narrative of Book 5, leading from the siege of
Veii through the Gallic sack of Rome, conforms to the very principles of
decline by which Livy explained the ills of his own age in the preface,
and, as does the preface, it neglects the *metus hostilis* theory.
    This neglect in the narrative of Book 5 is striking for two reasons.
For one, as previously mentioned, Livy himself appeals repeatedly to
the *metus hostilis* theory throughout his earlier narrative. But his fail-
ure to evoke *metus hostilis* to explain Roman decline after the defeat of
Veii is the more remarkable, because, of all the events recorded in the
first pentad, that decline would seem the most likely to invite such ex-
planation. As noted above, proponents of the *metus hostilis* explana-
tion for decline during the late Republic pointed to Rome's final de-
struction of her arch-rival, Carthage, as a turning point in Roman
fortunes. The defeat of Veii was an obvious choice for a precedent. Veii
had been Rome's first arch-rival; Livy himself sees the war between
Rome and Veii as a life and death struggle to determine which would
survive and which perish (5.1.1).
    As in the preface, so here, the conspicuous suppression of the *me-
tus hostilis* theory throws into relief an emphasis on the decisive influ-
ence of wealth on Roman morale. It is true, of course, that Rome was
plagued by partisan rivalry and by conflict between the orders after the
defeat of Veii, as indeed it had been since the inception of the Republic,
and it is true, also, that tribunician agitations and popular disfavor led
to the self-imposed exile of Camillus, whom Livy calls the Romans' "hu-
manam . . . opem, quae unà erat" against the Gauls (5.32.7; cf. 5.33.1),
and thereby played a decisive role in Rome's fate. But, as I shall argue
more fully below, that conflict and all other conflicts between patricians
and plebeians during this period originate with questions of wealth,
whether in the form of taxes, booty, land, or, eventually, the property
of Veii. If *metus hostilis* has any role in the course of events leading
from the conquest of Veii to the Gallic sack of Rome, it is a minor one,
clearly subordinate to the problems created at Rome by wealth or the
prospect of it. This emphasis on the role of *luxuria* can be shown not
only to be a unifying theme in Livy's narrative of Roman decline after

Veii, but also to be the expression of an original interpretation of that
decline: where Livy's narrative can be compared with others', it appears
repeatedly as the result of his own modification of received tradition.[8]

In Livy's narrative, civil disputes about money are associated with
Veii even before its capture: they begin with the proposal to make possi-
ble an extended siege of the city by introducing pay for military service.[9]
This innovation is opposed by tribunes not only because it is used to
justify year-round campaigns, but, more importantly, because it re-
quires taxation of the people.[10] Initial failure to collect this tax leads to
disorder among the unpaid troops besieging Veii (5.12.7). A crisis is
only narrowly averted by the election of a tribune with consular power
who is able to collect the taxes (5.12.13)—and there is speculation that
his election was possible because he had previously increased pay for the
equites (5.12.12). During this same period, the troops' preoccupation
with their own material advantage is so great that it undermines their
effectiveness. A Roman garrison at Anxur is careless of the town's de-
fense, admitting Volscian traders indiscriminately. When the guard is
overpowered and the town taken, however, Roman losses are small, be-

[8]Livy's interpretation of the reason for Roman decline after the defeat of Veii has
been variously perceived by previous scholars. Ogilvie 670 and G. Stübler, "Die Reli-
giosität des Livius," *Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft* 35 (1939) 583 89
both, although in different ways, conclude that Livy regards Roman decline and the
demoralization leading to it as penalties for having provoked divine envy; F. Klingner
reviewing Burck's *Erzählungskunst* in *Gnomon* 11 (1939) 583-86 sees the concept of
ὕβρις as the controlling idea in this part of Livy's narrative; Hubaux (note 3 above) and
Bayet 134-40, 143-55 see Livy as being influenced by a tradition, preserved in some of
Livy's sources, of an obscure fatality linking the destinies of Rome and Veii. None of
these explanations is necessarily inconsistent with the general outline of Livy's narrative
or with what can reasonably be conjectured about his sources, and it is in any event
unlikely that Livy himself would have adhered rigidly to any one schema. My argument
here is only that emphasis on the Romans' destructive preoccupation with wealth pro-
vides the single most pervasive and fully developed counterpart to their declining piety
and general morale. T. J. Luce (1971) 265-302 observes that Livy gives no *explicit* rea-
son for Roman behavior at several turning points and concludes that he offers no ex-
planation for the changes in Roman morale recorded in Book 5. Erich Burck, *Die
Erzählungskunst des T. Livius* (Berlin 1934 [1964]) 118-36 presents an extended analysis
of Livy's narrative in Book 5 that includes comparisons with the corresponding narratives
in Dionysius Halicarnassus and Plutarch, but his focus is on the character and role of
Camillus as the unifying figure of Book 5.

[9]Pay introduced, 4.59.11; greeted with unparalleled joy by plebeians, 4.60.1; op-
posed by tribunes on grounds it will necessitate a tax, 4.60.3-4; some plebeians per-
suaded by them, 4.60.5.

[10]5.10.3 10; 11.5; 12.3 and see references to Book 4, note 9 above.

cause all except the sick were, like sutlers (*lixae*), engaged in business (*negotiabantur*) in the neighboring territory (5.8.2-4).

The long delay in taking Veii is attributed to the fact that the Roman soldiers devote their entire energies (*tota vis*) to plundering the countryside (5.14.6-7). On the other hand, when some Etruscans plunder Roman territory, an initial reluctance to oppose them is overcome by an apparent desire for the recovery of booty rather than for honor or the common defense: the Romans recapture the goods taken by the Etruscans and redistribute them to their rightful owners, and they also find additional spoils from the sale of which they are able to distribute profits among themselves (5.16.2-7).[11] Against this rather unbecoming background one episode stands out in sharp relief. After a serious reversal at Veii, some equites offer to equip themselves with horses at their own expense, so that they can go to the aid of the Roman troops there; inspired by their example, the plebeians in the city rush to volunteer their services as well. The unexpected nature of such selflessness is reflected in the truly extravagant enthusiasm with which the Senators react. After tears of thankfulness, they vote to reward the volunteers with pay (5.7.5-13).

Veii itself is characterized as an *urbs opulentissima*,[12] and, in a version of events unique to Livy, Camillus anticipates trouble over distribution of its booty (5.20.1-4). He refers to the Senate the question of what to do with the anticipated booty. Livy then records two speeches in the ensuing debate, in the course of which Appius warns, unsuccessfully, against "auidas in direptiones manus otiosorum urbanorum" (5.20.6), and both speakers acknowledge the divisiveness that money brings into a community.[13] When the city is finally captured, however,

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[11] Contrast Diodorus 116.1 2, where in a similar episode Romans recapture booty from a Tyrrhenian raiding party, as in Livy, but it is the captured *arms* that the victorious troops distribute among themselves.

[12] 5.20.1; 21.17; 22.8. The city's wealth is also emphasized by Plutarch (*Cam.* 2.3), but he adds that at the time of the war with Rome, Veii's power was somewhat in decline (2.4). Note, too, that Livy associates wealth and impiety in his initial characterization of the Veientanes. They were unpopular among other Etruscans, he explains, because they had chosen to be ruled by a king a king, moreover, who "gravis iam . . . antea . . . fuerat opibus superbiaque, quia sollemnia ludorum . . . uiolenter diremisset . . ." (5.1.4 5).

[13] Ogilvie 673 regards the whole episode as "an interruption which conflicts sufficiently with the thread of the narrative . . . to show that L. has adopted it from a separate account."

the booty so exceeds Camillus' expectations, that he fears envy towards himself and Rome, and makes prayer to avert it (5.21.14–15).

As Momigliano has observed,[14] Camillus' sentiments at Veii "are clearly analogous to, and probably imitated from, the sentiments of Scipio Aemilianus over Carthage." When Scipio surveyed the ruins of Rome's great enemy, he is said to have been moved to tears by the reflection that all nations were destined to pass and that a time would come when Rome itself might be reduced to ruins.[15] But there are two significant differences between the Scipionic tradition and Livy's portrayal of Camillus. First, Camillus' fears are aroused not by the destruction of Veii *per se*, as Scipio's were by the destruction of Carthage, but by the unexpected richness of the captured city's booty. Second, Ogilvie (677) has noted that Livy, "adds one unusual feature which is absent from the other sources, even Val. Max. and Zonaras who are derived from him. Whereas the others concentrated exclusively on the envy of the gods, Livy associates with it the envy of man . . . . The effect is to focus attention on the theme of *praeda Veientana*. Livy eschews a divine in favour of a human explanation for Camillus' career."[16] In other words, it is the Romans' own susceptability to the attractions of luxury, not divine envy or the immutable laws of history, that will be responsible for Rome's undoing.

Greed and the claims of piety come into open conflict soon after the actual distribution of the Veientane booty. Even Camillus is not completely proof against the compromising atmosphere surrounding Veientane wealth: the triumph that he celebrates for his victory is of unprecedented splendor; during it, he seems to usurp Jupiter's role by riding in a chariot drawn by four white horses (5.23.4–6; cf. 5.28.1). Camillus' momentary excess is only incidental to the course of Roman fate, however. Although his triumph is the occasion for some popular resentment, Livy identifies Camillus' insistence on fulfilling his vow to offer one tenth of the spoils to Apollo as the major reason for increasing conflict between him and the people and for his ultimate departure from Rome (5.25.12; 32.8).

[11]A. Momigliano, "Camillus and Concord," *CQ* 36 (1942) 111–20, esp. pp. 112–13.

[15]There are three versions of Scipio's reflections at Carthage: Polybius 38.21; Appian *Lib.* 132 (included in Polybius 38.22); Diodorus 32.24. For discussion of the sources and their meaning see A. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967) App. IV, 282–87.

[16]For other versions of Camillus' prayer cf. D.H. 12.20; Zonaras 7.21; Val. Max. 1.5.2; Plut. *Cam.* 5.5–6 is ambiguous.

Livy is here following a tradition found in other sources as well, but his handling of detail is significantly different from others'. In Appian and Plutarch, Camillus makes his vow, then forgets it, and doesn't remember it until after the booty has been distributed.[17] The subsequent confusion and resentment caused by efforts to call back ten percent of each person's share is obviously Camillus' own fault. Livy, on the other hand, seeks to minimize Camillus' responsibility by having him refer the matter to the Senate (5.20.1–3); later it is the pontiffs who make the actual decision to fulfill the vow by calling in a tenth of each individual allotment (5.23.10–11).

But more important for the present argument than the fact that Livy clearly seeks to shift blame away from Camillus is the fact that his version places consistent emphasis on the greed of the Roman people generally. Thus, Livy is the only one to tell us that an *ingens multitudo* came from Rome to camp at Veii in anticipation of booty (5.21.1), that even though the profits from the sale of captives were the only monies deposited in the state treasury, the people were nonetheless resentful at this diminution of their booty (5.22.1), and that they felt no gratitude to Camillus for the generous booty that did fall to them (5.24.4–5). From this point in his narrative to Camillus' exile, Livy develops a picture of Rome embroiled in *multiplex seditio* (5.24.4–8) accompanied by *foeda certamina* and near riots (5.25.1–2) that are due entirely to two causes: dissatisfaction about distribution of booty and disagreement about whether part of the population should emigrate to Veii. If Camillus is at the center of both controversies, it is because he urges an extreme interpretation of his vow that would include land as well as moveable property in determining the tithe due to Apollo (5.25.4–8), and because he is a leader in the opposition to proposals for emigration (5.30.1–3).

These central issues, however, are presented as specific expressions of a pervasive demoralization caused by virtual obsession with personal gain. According to Livy, Camillus was elected to oppose what he rather vaguely calls the *largitio* of the tribunes (5.26.1); after the capture of Falerii he provoked renewed resentment among his troops when he followed the perfectly correct procedure of handing over to the quaestors everything of value captured in the enemy camp (5.26.8). Nor is Camillus the only focus for disputes about wealth. Opposition to the move to

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[17]Appian *It.* 8; Plut. *Cam.* 7.4; 8.2. D. H. 13.5 simply says that the tribunes prosecuted Camillus because they hated him, but he doesn't explain their reasons; Diodorus does not mention Camillus.

Veii is general among the patricians (5.25.13; 29.1-2). In the wide-
spread dissension on this issue, tribunes who advocate emigration are
reelected (5.29.1-2), while those oppose it are successfully prosecuted
and fined by their opponents, despite patrician support (5.29.6-10).[18]
Livy makes the pervasive influence of *luxuria* extend even to the kinds
of rewards granted for public service during this period of Roman his-
tory. Although an agreement is finally reached to pay the tithe to
Apollo from the public treasury,[19] a shortage of funds is not made up
until Roman matrons voluntarily contribute their personal jewelry. In
Livy, the Senate votes to honor this admirable selflessness with a reward
that reflects the self-importance of the aristocracy and their desire for
conspicuous display: the matrons are granted the right to appear in
four-wheeled chariots at festivals and games, in two-wheeled chariots
on other occasions (5.25.8-5).[20]

   This corrupting influence of greed and wealth come inevitably to
affect Roman foreign as well as domestic affairs. Just as Anxur had been
previously overrun because of Roman preoccupation with making
money, so now conflict over the question of emigration to Veientane
territory becomes so distracting that the Roman settlement of Vitella is
captured amidst the general confusion (5.29.3). More ominously, we
learn that when a certain Caedicius announces a portent of the Gauls'
approach, he is ignored *propter auctoris humilitatem* (5.32.7). By con-
trast, *ambitio, gratia*, and *opes* assure that the Fabii, whose improper
behavior toward the Gauls at Clusium was *contra ius gentium* (5.36.6
and cf. 36.1), not only escape censure before the Senate,[21] but are even
elected to high office by the Roman people.[22]

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[18]Ogilvie 692 calls attention to the historical improbability of the episode and its
"tendentious" nature.

[19]Contrast Plut. *Cam.* 8.2, where the citizens individually contribute their own
shares of the tithe.

[20]Again, contrast both Plutarch (*Cam.* 8.3), who makes the honor the right to
receive funeral elegies, and in Livy the later response to a similar self-sacrifice by Roman
matrons after the Gallic sack of Rome (5.50.7, and see my discussion p. 12 below).

[21]Ascribed to the influence of *ambitio*, which may suggest corrupt electioneering
(Plaut. *Am.* 76) as well as legitimate canvassing for votes.

[22]Ascribed to *gratia atque opes* (5.36.10). Contrast Plut. *Cam.* 18.2, which does
not explain why the Senate refers judgment on the Fabii to the people and which ascribes
the favorable treatment of the Fabii to the peoples' ὕβρις and impiety; Diod. 113.6,
which reports the intercession of a powerful (δυνατός) father; D. H. 13.19, which says
without explanation that the Senate delayed making a judgment.

As the Gauls actually approach Rome, the Romans fail to make adequate preparations for an attack (5.37.3; 39.2; 39.4) and fail to take the auspices before engaging the enemy (5.38.1). It is true that Livy does not account explicitly for those failures,[23] but at this point of his narrative he does not need to: the reason for them is clear enough. Since the first proposal to introduce pay for military service, the whole campaign against Veii and the subsequent concern for distribution of its booty and its lands have been accompanied by the increasingly disruptive and distracting influence of what Livy summed up in his preface as *auaritia luxuriaque* (pref. 11). The narrative of Book 5 has shown the desire for individual gain in repeated opposition to the claims both of civic duty and of piety. We have seen the direct influence of such general demoralization on Roman military performance in two minor defeats that anticipate the disaster at the Allia: when the Roman soliders' private commercial interests left Anxur open to attack and when political division at Rome over the question of emigration distracted attention from the proper defense of Vitella. Roman failings and their consequences at the Allia conform to a pattern that has become familiar in Book 5.

If the Romans' demoralization in Book 5 confirms Livy's introductory generalization about the corrupting influence of wealth, their subsequent recovery conforms to a second, complementary principle introduced in the preface: "quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat" (pref. 11). During the night following their disastrous losses at the Allia, when their fortunes seem most hopeless, the surviving Romans experience a sudden change of heart (5.39.8). Dawn finds them in as desperate straits as ever, but with a new spirit of determination and a new piety. Now honor and obligations to the gods become their first concerns and the real measures of value. Livy illustrates this change of perspective in two episodes that are familiar in general outline from Plutarch as well. In the first, the Flamen Dialis and the Vestal Virgins, "omissa rerum suarum cura" (5.40.7), devote their energies to saving what they can of the sacred objects in their care. As they are leaving the city, they come upon a plebeian who is fleeing in a wagon with his wife and children; the plebeian orders his family out to make room for the

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[23]Luce (1971) 270, 276; contrast Diod. 114, which shows the Romans making reasonable preparations for the Gauls' attack and therefore presumably losing to them simply because of Gallic superiority; Plut. *Cam.* 13.1 asserts that Roman defeat was the fulfillment of retribution for which Camillus prayed when he was driven into exile.

Vestals and their sacred objects (5.40.9-10).[24] In the second episode,
Manlius' heroic defence of the Capital is rewarded by his fellow de-
fenders with a spontaneous offering of their personal rations. Livy em-
phasizes the contrast between the small monetary value of the offering
and its great value as an expression of true self-sacrifice and respect
(5.47.7-8).[25]

Other details in Livy's narrative that underscore this change of at-
titude toward wealth do not have even approximate parallels in the
other extant sources. Thus, in contrast to Diodorus, who says that the
Romans gathered their most valuable moveables onto the Capitol for
protection (Diod. 115.4), Livy not only neglects any mention of the Ro-
mans' efforts to save their personal wealth, he actually emphasizes Ro-
man determination in the face of its loss.[26] When they are finally driven
by starvation to agree to ransom, Roman matrons once again donate
their jewelry, not because of an absolute shortage of funds (contrast
Plut. *Cam.* 8.3), but in order to make up the necessary amount *without
having to draw upon sacred treasures* (5.50.7). After the Romans have
recaptured their city, they reward the matrons, not with some privilege
connected with the display of wealth, as before, but rather with the
right to *laudationes* (5.50.7).

The Romans are still not completely impervious to the attractions
of Veii. As they survey the wreckage of their city, their thoughts turn
again to the idea of emigration. But when Camillus opposes the re-
newed proposals for resettlement in Veii, part of his argument rests on
the Romans' own change of heart and of fortune. He reminds his fellow
citizens that in adversity they had turned back to the gods whom they
had neglected before, even hiding the gods' sacred implements amid the
rubble of their own possessions, "in ruina rerum nostrarum" (5.51.9).
With the sack of Rome the roles of Gaul and Roman were reversed. The
Romans became strong with their renewed piety and the divine help
that it brought (5.51.9), while it was their opponents who were *caeci
auaritia* and who this time experienced "terrorem fugamque et
caedem," not the Romans (5.51.10).

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[24]Cf. Plut. *Cam.* 21.1, a rare instance where Plutarch, who mentions how the
plebeian removed his χρήματα from his wagon, as well as his wife and children, notices
attitudes toward wealth or material possessions and Livy does not.

[25]Cf. the corresponding account in Plutarch, *Cam.* 27.5, which does not com-
ment on the disparity between the monetary and the true value of the offering.

[26]The Romans are greatly distressed by the Gauls' calculated policy of destroying
selected portions of the city, but their determination to resist is unshaken (5.42.7-8).

Even if we assume that the correspondences between Livy and Plutarch, who most closely approaches Livy's emphasis on wealth, are due not to Livy's influence on the later writer, but instead to reliance on common sources (an assumption I am by no means convinced is justified); even if we concede that most of the themes and many of the details in Livy's account are derived from his sources, it is nonetheless clear that Livy imposed his own shape on that material and gave it his own meaning. By selection, arrangement, modification, and elaboration of received elements, he has made the corrupting influence of wealth and the greed it inspires a prominent theme in his narrative of Roman fortunes throughout Book 5: it becomes the background against which uncharacteristic Roman impiety and corruption are intelligible: Roman piety and material spirit only revive after the Romans have seen the destruction of their material wealth and have given up preoccupation with it.

As a consequence of his innovation, Livy has not only given this episode in Roman history a specific character, he has also given it a special place within the larger plan of his work and within the pattern of Roman history conveyed by that plan. This instance of Roman decline, in sharp contrast to the numerous reversals recorded in the previous narrative, has been made to exemplify the general process of decline sketched in the preface and, thereby, to anticipate the decline that Livy perceived in his own age.[27]

## III

Recurrent decline, however, is part of a larger pattern. Livy explicitly identifies Camillus' double saving of Rome as a refounding. After Romulus' death his troops had saluted him, the original *conditor urbis*, as "deum, deo natum, regem, parentemque urbis Romanae" (1.16.3). There is only one other occasion in the first pentad when Roman troops honor their commander with a comparable series of titles. This is after Camillus has driven out the Gauls and *his* troops salute *him* as "Romu-

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[27] Luce (1977) 250-75 argues that the fragments of Livy's later books provide sufficient evidence to conclude that he did, in fact, adhere to the views articulated in the preface when narrating the decline of the Republic in its last two centuries; Kajanto (note 5 above) 61-62 conjectures, although on very slight evidence, that *metus hostilis* may also have had a role in Livy's interpretation of events from 146 B.C. on.

lus ac parens patriae, conditorque alter urbis" (5.49.7).[28] Immediately
after reporting that unique series of titles awarded to Camillus by his
troops, Livy adds, "seruatam deinde bello patriam iterum in pace haud
dubie seruauit cum prohibuit migrari Veios" (5.49.8). Camillus accom-
plishes this second salvation of Rome through an impassioned speech
urging his fellow citizens to stay and rebuild their ruined city. Shortly
after he concludes it, while the *patres* are still debating their decision, a
centurion brings his patrol to a halt in the forum with the command,
"Signifier, statue signum; hic manebimus optime" (5.55.1). The centu-
rion's words are taken as an omen confirming Camillus' argument. A
brief paragraph noting the disorderly haste of the actual rebuilding
concludes the Book and the pentad. In the introduction to the following
Book, Livy says that he will now relate the deeds of Rome, "ab secunda
origine uelut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis" (6.1.3).

The passages that I have just surveyed frame and thereby empha-
size the speech that brings the fifth Book and the entire first pentad to
their dramatic end. Camillus' speech is important because it reveals the
distinctive elements that specifically link his achievement to the city's
original foundation, so that Camillus' salvation of the city also consti-
tutes a refoundation of it. Camillus, after all, was neither the first nor
the last Roman hero to save his city from foreign conquest. His speech
expresses the two overriding loyalties by which he distinguished himself
throughout his career: his loyalty to Rome and his loyalty to her gods.[29]
His special status as refounder in Livy depends, finally, on his success in
persuading his fellow Romans to share those loyalties.

In so doing, Camillus completes a pattern of specific achievements
that associate him simultaneously with the original founders of Rome
and with the leading statesman of Livy's own day, Augustus.[30] Camillus'

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[28]The closest parallel to Camillus' identification with Romulus in Livy is that of
A. Cornelius Cossus who was honored by his troops' "equating him" *(aequantes)* with
Romulus (4.20.2), but this identification was more limited than that of Camillus, recog-
nizing only that Cossus was the first commander after Romulus to win the *spolia opima*
and not extending to a whole series of titles as with Camillus. For the few other Romans
identified as *conditores* in the first pentad see notes 85 and 86 below.

[29]Ogilvie 742 observes of the speech, "Its contents recapitulate the contents of the
whole book and highlight the great moments of the narrative which L. has already
spread before us . . . ."

[30]Of the many parallels between Camillus, Romulus, and Augustus, the three that
I regard as essential to the concept of refoundation have generally been similarly re-
garded by recent scholars, although with inevitable differences of emphasis, supporting
detail, or precise formulation. See J. Hellegouarc'h, "Le principat de Camille," *REL* 48

expulsion of the Gauls from Rome is itself sufficient to establish him as defender of Romulus' city and as a worthy successor to that son of Mars by whom the city, according to Livy, was first "conditam ui et armis" (1.19.1).[31] Augustus, likewise, clearly sought to place himself in the first rank of Rome's heroic generals when in 29 B.C. he triumphed for victories in Dalmatia, Egypt, and at Actium, an unprecedented triple triumph which he celebrated, as Camillus had celebrated his triumph, with unprecedented splendor.[32]

It is characteristic of Livy's style, as I have tried to demonstrate in analyzing the narrative of decline after Veii, that such themes besides being introduced in their broad outlines are woven into the very fabric of the narrative, so that they are supported by a consistent pattern of detail. Thus, the basic commitment to Rome that Romulus, Camillus, and Augustus all reveal in their defense of the city is also characterized in more subtle and distinctive ways. When Cicero praised Romulus' choice of the site for Rome (*de Rep.* 2.3-6), he dwelt at length on the location's practical advantages. Once again, Livy's originality is apparent.[33] In describing Romulus' choice, Livy says nothing about rational calculations. Rather, he singles out Romulus' and Remus' emotional attachment to the site as the decisive factor:

> Romulum Remumque cupido cepit in iis locis ubi expositi ubique educati erant urbis condendae.
>
> (1.6.3)

Later he reminds us that Romulus' choice of site was determined by personal sentiment rather than by considerations of expediency: "Palatium primum, in quo ipse [Romulus] erat educatus, muniit" (1.7.3). At

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(1970) 112-32; Sir Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939 [1967]) 305-06; Syme 48, 55; Mario Mazza, *Storia e Ideologia in Tito Livio* (Catania 1966) 186-91; Giovanni Runchina, "Letteratura e Ideologia nell' Età Augustea," *Annali della Facoltà di Magistro dell' Università di Cagliari* N.S. 3 (1978-1979) 42. Some critics deny that Camillus should be read as prefiguring Augustus, most notably P. G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge 1961 [1970]) 16-17; Walsh, "Livy and Augustus," *ProcAfrClAss* 4 (1961) 26-37; H. J. Mette, "Livius und Augustus," *Gymnasium* 68 (1961) 269-85, repr. in *Wege zu Livius*, ed. E. Burck (Darmstadt 1967) 156ff.; Hans Peterson, "Livy and Augustus," *TAPA* 92 (1961) 440.

[31] For further parallels between Camillus and Romulus, see Bayet 154.

[32] Cf. Livy 5.23.3-4 on Camillus' triumph and, on Augustus', Dio 51.21, and see p. 18 below and note 45 below.

[33] Noted also by J. Heurgon. *Tite-Live, Ab Urbe Condita, Liber Primus* (Paris: 1970²) 40.

the beginning of Book 2 Livy expands on the importance of such emo-
tional attachment to place. He identifies the raising of families and
*caritas ipsius soli* as the two conditions essential for the creation of com-
munity among Rome's first settlers inasmuch as each *animos eorum
consociasset* (2.1.5).[34]

Camillus and Augustus also share a respect for this important as-
pect of Roman foundation. When he seeks to persuade his fellow citi-
zens to remain in Rome, Camillus does catalogue the practical advan-
tages of the city's location and in terms very reminiscent of Cicero
(5.54.4), but he confines himself to a brief survey only a few lines long
and he introduces that survey by recalling his own attachment to the site
of Rome:

> cum abessem, quotienscumque patria in mentem veniret, haec omnia oc-
> currebant, colles campique et Tiberis et adsueta oculis regio et hoc
> caelum sub quo natus educatusque essem
>
> (5.54.3).

He then expresses the hope that these same things will move his audi-
ence by their dearness, *caritate sua* (5.54.3).[35]

In this, he looks forward to Augustus, for Augustus, too, sought to
emphasize his own attachment to the site of Rome's original founda-
tion. Livy has Camillus ask, rhetorically, in the course of his speech:

> Si tota urbe nullum melius ampliusue tectum fieri possit quam casa illa
> conditoris est nostri, non in casis ritu pastorum agrestiumque habitare est
> satius inter sacra penatesque nostros quam exsulatum publice ire?
>
> (5.53.8)

A *casa Romuli* had been preserved on the Palatine down to Livy's own
day as a national monument.[36] Its post holes are still visible.[37] Augustus'
own home, well-known for its modesty by the standards of aristocratic
residences of that age (Suet. *Aug.* 7), has been identified with reason-

[34]On further development of this theme in Livy, see Jane E. Philips, "Livy and the
Beginning of a New Society," *CB* 55 (1979) 87-92; and see also Cicero *de Off.* 1.17.53 on
city and family as creating the greatest bonds among men.

[35]On this parallel between Camillus and Romulus see also M. Bonjour, "Les per-
sonnages feminines et la terre natale dans l'épisode de Coriolan (Liv. 2.40)," *REL* 53
(1975) 168-69.

[36]D. H. 1.79; Dio 54.29; 53.16.5 (quoted below); 48.43. Other authors, most no-
tably Virgil, *Aen.* 8.654 and Vitr. 2.1.5, place a *casa Romuli* on the Capitol.

[37]E. Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (London 1968²) II, 163-65.

able certainty by modern archaeologists.[38] It, too, is on the Palatine, actually within a few steps of Romulus' hut. In 29 B.C., perhaps deliberately calling attention to his residence in the very oldest part of town or to his determination to live *inter sacra sua*, Augustus also dedicated a temple to Apollo on the Palatine right next to his own modest residence and Romulus' hut.[39] Dio Cassius (53.16.5) asserts that Augustus' residence did, in fact, acquire "some reputation" from being on the Palatine "because of Romulus' having lived there before him."

In successfully opposing Titus Sicinius, the false *conditor* who would have displaced Romulus by leading an emigration of plebeians from Rome to Veii (5.24.11) and in later reminding Romans of their emotional attachments to the site of Rome, Camillus reconfirms his loyalty to Romulus' city and again anticipates Augustus. His actions shed light on one meaning of Romulus' rivalry with Remus: Romans must be one people, united in loyalty to one city. Concern that dissident Romans might attempt to establish an *altera Roma* to rival or perhaps eclipse the true Rome was also recurrent during the disorders of the late Republic,[40] and it was en element in the propaganda war between Augustus and Mark Antony. Augustus' supporters could claim that by defeating Antony he had prevented the transfer of Roman power to a new capital at Alexandria[41] — the Alexandria that Cleopatra had indiscretely styled Dēmos Romaiōn on her coins.[42]

Camillus' *pietas* likewise forms a conspicuous link between past and future. It makes him an obvious successor to Numa who, according to Livy, founded Rome anew (1.19.1). Numa's particular contribution to Rome was to complement Romulus' martial *uirtus* with his own *pietas*, so that a population hardened to the requirements of warfare might be restrained in peace by fear of the gods (1.19.4). Augustus also sought to complement a return to peace with a call to renewed *pietas*.

[38]Nash (note 37 above) I, 310.

[39]Ibid. 31–32.

[40]Petre Ceauşescu, "*Altera Roma* — Histoire d'une folie politique," *Historia* 25 (1976) 79–108, esp. 86–90.

[41]Mentioned explicitly in Dio 50.4.1 and see Ceauşescu ibid. for related concerns (Cleopatra, *Troia resurgens*) in which contemporary fear of the transfer of Roman power to the East was implicit. It is interesting to note, also, that the first words preserved on Camillus' elogium in the forum of Augustus are "Veios post urbem captam commigrari passus non est" ( *CIL* I[2] p. 191 no. 7 = Dessau 52).

[42]Lilly Ross Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Middletown, Conn. 1931) 127 and n. 55.

Just as Livy calls Camillus *diligentissimus religionum cultor* (5.50.1), so
he acknowledges Augustus by name as "templorum omnium condi-
torem ac restitutorem" (4.20.7).

Livy never explicitly acknowledges the parallels by which Augus-
tus may be associated with Camillus and, through him, with Romulus.
That does not mean that such parallels would not have been apparent
to Livy's audience.[43] Livy's reticence is, nonetheless, significant. He may
have begun composition of the first pentad as early as 31 B.C., shortly
after the battle of Actium; its initial publication was probably no later
than 27 B.C., certainly no later than 25 B.C.[44] Whatever the exact dates,
the first pentad must have taken on its essential shape during a period
when the main outlines of Augustan policy were being formulated and
made public, but before the specific nature of their realization had be-
come clear. The actual fulfillment of Camillus' role by Augustus re-
mained a possibility for which Augustus' propaganda offered promising
signs; it was still not a certainty. Livy's presentation of Camillus suggests
that Augustan policies can lead to a revitalization of the Roman people
and their rededication to essential Roman virtues, but it does not dem-
onstrate that they will necessarily do so.

Indeed, identification of Camillus and Augustus, whether poten-
tial or actual, need not preclude a complex attitude toward Augustus on
Livy's part. Livy normally eschews simple characterizations of the lead-
ing figures in Roman history; this is no less true of Rome's original
founder and refounder than it is of others. In contrast to Dionysius of
Halicarnassus (1.87.3-4) for example, he does not suppress the story of
Romulus' fratricide. He twice calls attention to the hybristic extrava-
gence of Camillus' triumph after Veii (5.23.5; 5.28.1)—a celebration in
which the triumphator's quadrigae with four white horses might suggest
comparison with Julius Caesar's triumph of 46 B.C. or, more generally,
with the unprecedented splendor of Augustus' own triumph in 29 B.C.[45]
Such elements in Livy's narrative are consistent with its publication at a
time when it could still serve as a guide to the new ruler (rather than as a
celebration of him), offering both *quod imitere capias* and *quod uites.*

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[43]See the remarks of Ogilvie 739, 670.

[44]For a survey of views on this dating see P. G. Walsh, "Livy," *Greece and Rome
Surveys in the Classics* 8 (1974) 6; add to his bibliography C. Cichorius, *Römische Stu-
dien* (Leipzig 1922) 261ff.

[45]Dio 51.4.4-5, 19, 20-21 and see Ogilvie 680 for other reasons why Camillus'
excesses might have suggested Augustus to the minds of Livy's contemporaries.

## IV

Neither the foregoing concept of refoundation nor the concept of recurrent decline that Livy suggests in the first pentad is sufficient by itself to constitute a cyclical sequence. For that, both concepts must be combined, each the necessary complement of the other. Just as Roman decline after the capture of Veii conforms to the pattern of decline that Livy ascribes to his own age in the preface, so the refounding of Rome by Camillus simultaneously recalls the original foundation of the city by Romulus and anticipates a similar achievement by Augustus. Thus, while Livy describes explicitly one sequence of foundation, decline, and refoundation from Romulus to Camillus, he implicitly suggests the possibility of a second sequence from the refoundation by Camillus through the decline of the late Republic described in the preface, to the possibility of a new refoundation by Augustus. This potentially recurrent sequence comprises a specific cycle of events in which the acquisition or prospect of wealth distracts Romans from their essential loyalties, traditional religion is neglected, Rome is threatened by foreign enemies, and there is danger that the city of Rome will be abandoned for a more splendid alternative by its own citizens, until a refounder appears who saves the city from its immediate perils, recalls its people to their traditional loyalties to place and to gods and, thus, reestablishes the community.[16]

This pattern has all the more the appearance of a cycle because at 5.54.5 Livy assigns Camillus' refoundation of Rome explicitly to the 365th year of the city, that is, to 390 B.C. Reckoning inclusively as the Romans did, that makes the period from Rome's founding to its refounding by Camillus exactly equal to the period from that refounding to 27 B.C., the most likely date for Livy's initial publication of the first pentad[17] and the certain date of Augustus' proclaimed restoration of

[16]Clearly, the duration of individual phases within Livy's cycles was not always the same: the decline after Veii was precipitous, that of the late Republic was conventionally regarded as extending over a century or more. But neither the inconsistent length of phases within a cycle nor that of entire cycles themselves is inconsistent with the idea of cyclical history. Unlike some philosophers, who were interested in measurable periods of time (however theoretical), historians of antiquity, as Hunter (note 2 above) 249, 253–54 has persuasively argued, were less concerned with "absolute" than with "relative" chronology, i.e., less with the duration of events or episodes than with their place in a predictable sequence.

[17]See note 44 above.

the Republic.[48] This assignment of Camillus' refounding to the 365th
year of the city occurs in the context of a chronology that is notoriously
confused and with reference to which Livy is at times inconsistent with
himself.[49] Explicit designation of the 365th year, then, cannot be un-
derstood as the consequence of an unquestioning adherence to some
simple chronological tradition. Neither can it represent endorsement of
a concept of the Great Year[50] or of some other rigid, cosmological
scheme, since Livy elsewhere in Book 5 is quite content to assign Camil-
lus' refounding in round numbers to Rome's 360th (5.40.1) or even
400th year (5.45.4).[51] In any event, a system of natural recurrence
would be inconsistent with Livy's reticence about the certainty of re-
founding in his own day and with his emphasis on human initiative.
Rather, explicit designation of the number 365 at this point in the nar-
rative serves a different function: it emphasizes Camillus' position at the
virtual mid-point of Roman history down to Livy's own day. The
present moment emerges, then, as a singularly fortuitous occasion for
the reenactment of Rome's previous refounding by Camillus. The pros-
pect of repeating the specific cycle of Roman history exemplified in the
first pentad cannot guarantee Rome's eternal greatness but does pro-
vide a reason to be hopeful.

It is this particular cycle, also, that makes possible Rome's eternal
greatness. In Book I we learn that Tarquinius Superbus planned to
make the Capitoline Hill the exclusive sanctuary of Jupiter by removing
all other shrines from it. When the auspices were taken preparatory to
the deconsecration of each shrine to be removed, they were favorable in
every case except one: the one exception was the shrine of Terminus,
god of Rome's boundaries. This was taken as a sign of Rome's perma-
nence (1.55.3–5) and is recalled by Camillus in his speech at Book
5.54.7. In Book 4 a tribune of the people named Canuleius argues pas-

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[48]Augustus, *RG* 34.1; Ovid *Fasti* 1.589; Velleius 2.89; Dio 53.4.

[49]Bayet 96–107, "Appendice 1. Difficultés éponymiques et chronologiques;" Ogil-
vie 749; see also M. Sordi, "Sulla Chronologia Liviana del IV Secolo," *Helikon* 5 (1965)
3 44.

[50]The thesis of Hubaux (note 3 above).

[51]It is salutory to remember that among adherents of Stoicism contemporary with
Livy (the most likely source for models of strict chronological recurrence) the prevailing
view seems to have been that events beneath the moon, i.e., on earth, did not conform to
the precise patterns that ordered events in the higher spheres, but were irregular (see the
summary of Stoic beliefs by Cicero, *DND* 2.51–56).

sionately that plebeians should be allowed to hold the highest offices of
the state. He recognizes that what he is demanding is unprecedented,
but denies that lack of precedent constitutes a legitimate obstacle.
Looking to the past, he points out that the original founders of Rome
were necessarily innovators. Then he looks to the future:

> Quis dubitat quin in aeternum urbe condita, in immensum crescente
> nova imperia, sacerdotia, iura gentium hominumque instituantur?
>
> (4.4.4)[52]

Near the beginning of Book 5 Livy records the gratefulness of the Senate
when equites and plebeians unexpectedly volunteer their services to
help Romans besieged outside of Veii. The Senators, among other ex-
pressions of gratitude, exclaimed that, "beatam urbem Romanam et
inuictam et aeternam illa concordia" (5.7.10). These intimations of
Rome's immortality are confirmed and explained by the potential for a
recurrence of the specific cycle of decline and renewal that is implicit in
Livy's narrative of early Roman history.

<div align="center">V</div>

The concept of this kind of potentially recurring cyclic is unprece-
dented in the historiographic tradition before Livy and attributes to
Rome a unique place in the history of nations. The idea that history is
characterized by recurrent patterns of rise and decline[53] is certainly fa-
miliar from the Greek historians, most notably Herodotus, Thucydides,
and Polybius. Whether or not we regard the patterns of historical recur-
rence elaborated by those authors as truly cyclical, we must, I think,
acknowledge that they differ from Livy's view of Roman history in two

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[52] Livy has Scipio also describe Rome as *in aeternum conditam*, 28.28.11.

[53] Not to be confused with numerous cosmological theories such as the Stoic *ec-
pyrosis*, the *apocatastasis* of the Chaldean astrologers, the Pythagorean *metacosmesis*,
Platonic theories of the Great Year, the concept of *palingenesia* found in the Sibylline
books. The separation of philosophical concepts of cyclical recurrence from the actual
practice of ancient historians is generally accepted by recent scholars: see the literature
cited in note 2 above and the further development of this view, although in my opinion
overstated, by J. de Romilly, *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors*
(Ann Arbor 1977), esp. ch. 1, "The Pattern of History," 1-19.

ways. First, they typically emphasize the fate of successive nations or
rulers, each one fulfilling the pattern of rise and decline once, then to
be replaced by a new nation or ruler that will repeat the familiar pat-
tern; they do not call our attention to the repeated rise and decline of
single nations.[54]

Related to that initial difference is the second: Livy's predecessors
devote their greatest attention to elaborating the course of national de-
cline and perhaps suggesting how it may be averted or delayed; Livy, as
we have seen, is also concerned with the reasons for national decline,
but his emphasis, in the first pentad at least, is on the possibility for
renewal. Thus, Rome, according to Livy, may achieve a distinction not
granted to any other nation by his Greek and Roman predecessors:[55]
Livy's history shows that Rome has the potential not only to survive for-
ever but to be reborn "uelut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque." Refoun-
dation, in the specific sense of restoring strengths embodied in an origi-
nal foundation, is the key to this renewal. It is through refoundation
that Rome can both survive and grow forever without losing its essential
identity. How Livy would have viewed the larger course of Roman his-
tory at the end of his life is a matter of debate owing to the fragmentary
nature of his later history, but the narrative of the first pentad builds to
an unambiguous climax not with Rome's destruction by the Gauls, but
rather with its dramatic refounding by Camillus and the hopeful possi-
bility of a second refounding under Augustus.

[54]The closest parallels to Livy in this regard are to be found in a few passages of
Plato ( *Laws* 3.676-83; *Timaeus* 22D-23A; *Critias* 111A-112A), Aristotle (esp. *Meteor.*
1.351b and *Pol.* 1269a ff.), and Polybius 6.5.5-6 expressing the hypothesis that in the
course of ages individual states might experience successive destructions and reconstruc-
tions; but the destructions those philosophers have in mind are cataclysmic natural disas-
ters that wipe out all traces of civilization, and the reconstructions involve not the rededi-
cation of a people to the distinctive national loyalties embodied in an original
foundation, but rather the reinvention of civilization and the civilized arts themselves.

[55]The Judaic concept of the chosen people, of course, represents quite a different
tradition. The whole question of the role for Livy of the gods, fate, and/or fortune in
Roman destiny is complex and remains controversial: see Philips (note 1 above) for sur-
veys of recent literature relating to the question. My own sympathies are with those who
feel that Livy places the primary responsibility for their destinies on the Romans them-
selves, not on some providence. See, e.g., pref. 7:

> et si cui populo licere oportet consecrare origines suas et ad deos referre auctores, ea belli
> gloria est populo Romano ut cum suum conditorisque sui parentem Martem potissimum
> ferat, tam et hoc gentes humanae patiantur aequo animo quam imperium patiuntur.

## VI

It is clear from the parallels that I have mentioned—between Camillus and Augustus, for example—that allusions to issues important in Livy's own day play a central role in revealing Livy's cyclical view of Roman history. In what follows I would like to suggest that Livy has not simply incorporated those contemporary preoccupations into some previously existing view of history or of the refounder's role in it. Rather, I believe, the interpretation of Roman history in Livy's first pentad grew out of those preoccupations and represents a particular synthesis of recent ideas, a synthesis that did not exist in the literary tradition before Livy. I will focus my argument on one aspect of the subject, the specific language by which Livy identifies Camillus as a refounder and his particular act of saving Rome as a refounding: that is, Camillus' title as "Romulus ac parens patriae conditorque alter urbis" (5.49.7) and the description of the city as *Roma renata* (6.1.3). Although this language was beginning to play an important role in honoring saviors of Rome at the end of the Republic, it had not yet been deployed systematically to identify a refounder in Livy's sense. I will begin by reviewing the foregoing titles and phrases individually.[56]

*Pater patriae* or *parens patriae* as a formal title is not to be confused with *pater* or *parens* used as an honorary epithet by itself: the former was a very late development; the latter has a long tradition. The antithesis, for example, between a tyrant and a good ruler who is viewed as a *pater* to his subjects, although first attested in Cicero (*de Domo* 94), may well have been immemorial (Weinstock 201). The informal honoring of a Roman hero simply as *pater* or *parens* was likewise presumably ancient: Romulus is addressed, "o pater, o genitor, o sanguendis oriundum," in a fragment of Ennius (*Ann.* 113, Vahlens). Individuals who saved a Roman army or part of it or who saved the life of a fellow citizen in battle were formally rewarded with special wreaths and honored as *patres* by those whom they had saved.[57] The first occurrence of the actual phrase *parens* or *pater patriae* is in Cicero (*Rab. perd.* 27), who says that we can truly call Marius, "patrem patriae, parentem . . . vestrae libertatis atque huiusce rei publicae;" but falls short of an

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[56]Although I do not agree with all of their conclusions, the following discussion is much indebted to Weinstock, esp. Chs. IX, "The Founder," and X, "The Father," 175-228 and to Classen.

[57]The evidence is collected and discussed by Weinstock 148-52, 163-67, 201.

unambiguous assertion that Marius ever received such titles, and we must consider the likelihood that Cicero is here attempting to find, or create, a precedent in the career of another *novus homo* for an honor that he hoped to receive himself.[58]

There is no doubt that Cicero was awarded that title by the Senate for suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy. Cicero himself recalls this honor frequently,[59] and Pliny asserts explicitly that Cicero was the first ever to receive the title officially.[60] Julius Caesar was the next to receive officially the title *pater patriae*, in 45 or 44 B.C.,[61] and after his death a cult to him *parenti patriae*, was established in the Forum.[62] Although Augustus refused to accept the title *pater patriae* officially until 2 B.C.,[63] he was so honored in poetry at least by 23 B.C.[64]

It is not surprising to find that the combination of extraordinarily powerful individuals and the disorders of the late Republic should stimulate special interest in the ideas of a hero who would protect the state with the kind of authority and beneficence that a *pater* extended over his dependents. The earliest ascriptions of the title *parens* or *pater patriae* to Romulus[65] and to Camillus,[66] all of which postdate the official award of the title to Cicero and all but one of which appear first in Livy, are, therefore, almost certainly deliberate anachronisms that reflect the

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[58] Elsewhere Cicero calls Marius *custos* (*in Cat.* 3.24; *p. Red. ad Quir.* 9) and *conservator* (*de Har. Resp.* 58; *pro Sest.* 37); see Weinstock 202–03 and Classen 186 for further discussion.

[59] *In Pis.* 6; *pro Sest.* 121; *ad Att.* 9.10.3; *Phil.* 2.12; and cf. Plut. *Cic.* 23.6.

[60] *NH* 7.117; cf. Appian *BC* 2.1.7. Weinstock 202 accepts this evidence; it is rejected by A. Alföldi, "Die Geburt der kaiserlichen Bildsymbolik. Kleine Beiträge zu ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte III: Parens Patriae, I (fin)," *MH* 10 (1953) 105, who thinks that Cicero was not the first so honored; Ogilvie 739, following Alföldi, is mistaken in claiming Pliny *NH* 22.10 as evidence that "*parens patriae* was first used loosely" of Fabius *cunctator*. Pliny speaks there only of *parens*, not *parens patriae*, and in connection with Fabius' receipt of the grass wreath, *corona obsidionalis*, from soldiers whom he had saved; it would have been they and their leader, not the Senate, who saluted Fabius as *pater*, and it is their *pater* he would be, not *pater* of the entire *patriae*.

[61] Appian *BC* 2.106.442; 144.602; Dio 44.4.4, and see Weinstock 220 n. 3 for further evidence from coins and inscriptions.

[62] Suet. *Caes.* 85; cf. *ILS* 72; Lucan 9.601.

[63] *RG* 3.5.1; Suet. *Aug.* 58.1f; Dio 55.10.10; see Weinstock 204 n. 2 for further evidence.

[64] Hor. *C.* 3.24.25; 1.2.50.

[65] Cic. *de Div.* 1.3; Livy 1.16.3; 16.6.

[66] Livy 5.49.7; 7.1.10; Plut. *Cam.* 1.1; Eutrop. 1.20.3.

special concerns of the late Republic and Livy's particular interpreta-
tions of the founding and refounding of Rome.[67]

Likewise, the idea that Rome's survival of a crisis was tantamount
to a rebirth could have been appropriate in many periods of her history,
but seems, in fact, to have crystallized in response to the repeated up-
heavals of the late Republic. Although Livy's actual metaphor for
Rome after its refounding as a city—"reborn," *renata*—is unique not
only in his history, but in all extant literature of the preclassical and
classical periods, it has virtual equivalents in the political propaganda
of the last forty years of the Republic. These equivalents begin with the
*Third Catilinarian Oration* where Cicero claims to have saved the city
from destruction by Catiline and his followers, and then goes on to say:

> Et si non minus nobis iucundi atque inlustres sunt ei dies quibus conserva-
> mur quam illi quibus nascimur, quod salutis certa laetitia est, nascendi
> incerta condicio et quod sine sensu nascimur, cum voluptate servamur,
> profecto, quoniam illum qui hanc urbem condidit ad deos immortalis
> benevolentia famaque sustulimus, esse apud vos posterosque vestros in
> honore debebit is qui eandem hanc urbem conditam amplificatamque
> servavit.
>
> *(in Cat. 3.2)*

Later, Cicero claimed that the day he persuaded the Senate to oppose
Catiline, that is the Nones of December 63 B.C., was a birthday, *dies
natalis*, of Rome (*Pro Flacc.* 102); and in a line that has given immea-
surable pleasure to his detractors throughout the ages, he exclaimed,
"O fortunatam natam me consule Romam" (fr. 17M).

Stefan Weinstock (188-91) argues that Caesar's celebration of the
*parilia* in 45 B.C. was intended to mark the rebirth of Rome. Later, his
assassins hoped that the Ides of March would be regarded as Rome's
new birthday.[68] It seems reasonable that the idea of the city's rebirth
would have been kept alive, at least vaguely, by early Augustan propa-
ganda; by Augustus' claim to have restored the Republic, by his restora-

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[67] The view, advanced by Münzer cols. 338-39 and accepted by Ogilvie 739, that
the titles *parens patriae* as well as *Romulus* and *conditor alter* were first assigned to
Camillus by the Sullan annalists, is based entirely on conjecture (Weinstock 202). For
arguments against a traditional association of *Romulus* and *pater patriae* and for an
attribution of that title to Romulus perhaps as late as Livy, certainly no earlier than the
Sullan annalists, see Classen 182-83 and 182, nn. 2 and 3.

[68] Appian *BC* 2.122.511; 3.35.141.

tion of the city's temples, by his general "urban renewal," by the annual celebration on the date of his first accession to office, and by his plans to inaugurate the beginning of a new age.

The interest of Livy and his contemporaries in the *conditor* both as founder and as refounder is the natural product of a chaotic age when the destiny of the state was in the hands of powerful individuals and there was, simultaneously, a particularly widespread and intense desire to fulfill the timeless hopes implicit in the metaphor of national rebirth: hopes of a fresh start, and of a return to the good old days and to innocence. The tradition of Rome's founding by Romulus was certainly very old, but exactly how old it was or what roles Romulus played in early legend are impossible to trace.[69] What is certain is that during the first century B.C. identification of a Roman leader with Romulus was an ambiguous distinction at best, more often associated with tyrannical aspirations than not.[70] Sallust has M. Aemilius Lepidus attack Sulla as *scaevus iste Romulus* (*or. Lep.* 5 = *Hist.* 1.55.5M).[71] When Pompey the Great was voted unprecedented powers in 67 B.C., C. Piso suggested that he would be assassinated as a tyrant, just as Romulus had been (Plut. *Pomp.* 25.9).

Cicero is the first in this century for whom we can be certain of a favorable identification with Romulus. In describing the rebirth of Rome under his leadership, he compared himself to the original founder, although without actually naming him (*in Cat.* 3.2). Critics replied by addressing him as *Romule Arpinas* (Sallust *Invect. in Cic.* 7).[72] Julius Caesar, also, made efforts to identify himself with Romulus, but primarily with Romulus-Quirinus, the god, not Romulus, the mortal founder.[73] It may have been those efforts that provoked Catullus to address him as *cinaede Romule* (29.5;9); they certainly were part of the program of self-glorification that made Caesar anathema to traditional Republicans and led to his assassination. Romulus' reputation was still

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[69]See Classen, esp. 174–80 for a survey of the earliest evidence and a conservative assessment of it.

[70]Classen, throughout; Weinstock 85 believes that the tide of opinion turned against him by the second century B.C.

[71]Classen 184–86 presents forceful arguments against taking this expression as evidence that Sulla had ever been formally identified with Romulus.

[72]On the authenticity and dating of Sallust's *Invective* and their relevance to interpreting the significance of *Romule Arpinas*, see Classen 183 n. 3.

[73]Weinstock 175–99, esp. 175–84 and Classen 192–201.

clearly ambiguous when Augustus was supposed to have considered that name as a title but rejected it, probably because of its dangerous associations with tyranny,[74] and internecine warfare.[75]

As noted above, Livy acknowledges the ambiguities of that reputation even as he emphasizes Romulus' role as founder and as model for subsequent refounders: he not only reports the murder of Remus (1.7.2)[76] and gives the story of Romulus' assassination by the Senators as a variant (1.16.4), he also expresses ambivalence toward stories of Romulus' divine origin (pref. 7; 1.4.2) and apotheosis (1.16.5–8). Even though Livy's portrayal of Romulus the founder may be connected with an ancient tradition, it reveals the historian deliberately taking a position among the diverse, often conflicting attitudes toward that figure that were current and still being worked out in his own age. It is only in the context of his own, consciously elaborated view of Romulus that Livy could present the identification of Camillus with him as an unambiguous honor in the eyes of his contemporaries.

In order to make a reasonable conjecture about the origins of the title *conditor alter* and the concept that it expresses in Livy, it is necessary to have some understanding of the related Hellenistic term, κτίστης and of the Latin *conditor* by itself. Κτίστης can denote the original founder of a community (Arist. fr. 484). Romans at the end of the Republic would have been equally or perhaps even more familiar with the term as an honorific title for one who had saved a community from destruction, that is, for a refounder in the general sense of national benefactor or savior.[77] There survive, for example, several inscriptions from Mitylene that honor Pompey the Great as σωτὴρ καὶ κτίστης (*I.G.* 12.2.202) and as εὐεργέτης καὶ σωτὴρ καὶ κτίστης.[78] In one inscription (*I.G.* 12.2.163) he is honored as κτίστης while Theophanes of Mitylene

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[71]Suet. *Aug.* 7.2; cf. Dio 53.16.7–8; Florus 4.12.66; Serv. *ad Aen.* 1.292.

[75]Horace *Ep.* 7.17–20, echoed in the ironic conclusions of *Virg. G.* 2.532–35 (for the interpretation of which see G. B. Miles, "*Georgics* 3.209–94: *Amor* and Civilization," *CSCA* 8 (1975) 177–97) and cf. *Aen.* 1.292.

[76]Ogilvie 54 contrasts this account of the fratricide, when contradictory attitudes toward Romulus were still unresolved, to later passages in Ovid and Virgil that were more favorable to Romulus because of Augustus' interest in the founder.

[77]Itrem, *RE* 8.1136; Chr. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte* (München 1956 = *Zetemata* 14) 204f.; on the relevance of κτίστης for understanding Latin terminology, Weinstock 177 and esp. Classen 181–83.

[78]*IG* 12.2.141; 163; 165; for further references, see Classen 181 n. 5.

is called κτίστης δεύτερος τῆς πατρίδος and Potamon, also of Mity-
lene, κτίστης τῆς πατρίδος. Plutarch later called Cicero σωτὴρ καὶ
κτίστης (*Cic.* 22). It is very difficult to believe that we would not have
heard from contemporary Latin sources, if Cicero had ever in fact re-
ceived the actual title *conditor* or *conditor alter*. The phrase σωτὴρ καὶ
κτίστης, therefore, must represent Plutarch's own interpretation of
other honors paid him — very likely it represents the Greek equivalent
for the title that Cicero did receive formally and did boast of in his
speeches and writings, *pater patriae*.[79] Insofar as the term suggests some
conception of refounder, it is simply a recognition, in the conventional
and limited Hellenistic sense, of Cicero's having saved Rome from de-
struction by the Catilinarians. Nothing in Plutarch's context gives it the
fuller sense that *conditor alter* acquires in Livy: one who not only saves
the city from destruction, but also renews specific loyalties that are em-
bodied in the original acts of foundation and remain essential to Ro-
mans' distinctive identity and greatness.

This is important to bear in mind when evaluating Plutarch's as-
sertion that Marius had been honored as τρίτον κτίστην (Plut. *Mar.*
27.9), especially since the statement might be interpreted to imply that
Camillus was already known as second founder in Marius' age. There is
general agreement that Camillus could not have been so honored in his
own time, and the Sullan annalists have been suggested as the source of
the tradition.[80] My own view is that the source is probably post-Cicero-
nian. To begin with, there is no evidence to confirm the award of some
such titles as *conditor* or *conditor alter* even to Marius. Again, silence is
eloquent. I have already noted that Cicero, probably eager to find a
precedent in the career of another *novus homo* for honors he himself
desired, claimed only that Marius could be called *pater patriae*, not
that he had actually received that title (*Rab. perd.* 27). Given the fact
that Cicero also compared himself tacitly to the founder of Rome (*in
Cat.* 3.2), it is difficult to imagine that he would have missed an oppor-
tunity to claim for himself the title *conditor*, if there had been a prece-
dent for such a title, and even more difficult to imagine that he would
have been silent about that precedent — especially if it had been associ-
ated with Marius. When Plutarch says that Marius was called κτίστης

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[79]On σωτὴρ καὶ κτίστης or πατὴρ καὶ κτίστης and *parens et custos* or *conservator
et parens* associated as equivalents, see C. J. Classen, "Gottmenschentum in der römis-
chen Republik," *Gymnasium* 70 (1963), App. I, pp. 335-6.

[80]Weinstock 177, following Münzer cols. 338 ff.; Ogilvie 739.

then, we should not take κτίστης as a precise translation of a title *condi-tor* actually awarded to Marius, any more than κτίστης represents that title actually awarded to Cicero.

Plutarch's designation of Marius as *third* founder need only reflect the obvious fact that the tradition of Camillus as *conditor alter* was known by the latter half of the first century A.D. when Plutarch wrote. Plutarch might have received his information about Camillus from Sullan annalists but the evidence of Cicero suggests a later source. Livy, whom we know Plutarch read,[81] is an obvious alternative. In any event, it is clear that Plutarch does not mean by κτίστης here what Livy means by *conditor alter*. Plutarch is explicit in saying that Marius was honored as τρίτον κτίστην because he had saved Rome from destruction by invading German tribesmen, the Cimbri. In other words, the title as applied to Marius explicitly and to Camillus implicitly means no more than "hero, savior" in accordance with Hellenistic convention; it provides no evidence for a concept of refounder in the fuller and more specific sense that *conditor alter* acquires in Livy.

In fact, it is very likely that the Latin term *conditor* was itself ambiguous until shortly before Livy began writing. Cicero, who, as we have seen, does suggest a comparison between himself and that unnamed hero "qui hanc urbem condidit" (*in Cat.* 3.2), nowhere actually describes Romulus as *conditor*. Rather, when he uses a title to identify Romulus as founder he does so with the phrase "princeps ille creator urbis" (*pro Balbo* 32). This is the more striking because Cicero does use the word *conditor* elsewhere for the organizer of a business (*pro Cluent.* 71) or of a banquet (*Red. Sen.* 15), but never for the founder of a city. It has been observed, moreover, that *conditor* in the sense that Livy uses it, of one who first establishes a community or an important public institution, does not occur in extant literature until after the death of Julius Caesar, but then occurs in that sense regularly.[82] This pattern of *conditor's* appearances has been interpreted as indicating that the term was first employed to mean 'founder' during or immediately after Caesar's lifetime and as a result of his propaganda.[83] This seems to me to be unlikely inasmuch as *condere* was the regular verb for the act of founding Rome — from the time of Ennius, at least.[84] Ennius' address to

[81] Plut. *Cam.* 6.2 refers explicitly to Livy 5.22.5.
[82] Sall. *Jug.* 89.4; Varro *RR* 3.1.6; Nep. *Timol.* 3.2; Verg. *Aen.* 8.313.
[83] Weinstock 183-84.
[84] *Ann.* 494, Vahlens = Varro *RR* 3.1.3; Suet. *Aug.* 7.

Romulus as *pater* and *genitor* notwithstanding (*Ann*. 113, Vahlens), it
is hard to imagine that the regular use of the verb *condere* had not sug-
gested the noun *conditor* well before Livy. There may be another expla-
nation for Cicero's avoidance of *conditor* and his use of *princeps ille
creator* for Romulus. By Cicero's day, members of the Roman aristoc-
racy would have been familiar, as has been observed, with the twin pos-
sibilities of κτίστης. Cicero's avoidance of *conditor*, his emphasis on
Romulus' primacy (*princeps*), and his use of the unambiguous epithet,
*creator*, make good sense as efforts clearly to set apart Romulus, the
actual founder of Rome, from other sorts of heroes who were honored as
'founders' in the Hellenistic tradition. Thus, the evidence from Cicero
suggests that even if *conditor* had been used in the strict sense of
'founder' before Cicero, it still may not have been clearly dissociated
from the ambiguities in the parallel Hellenistic term.

The regular use of *conditor* for 'founder' soon after Cicero would,
then, reflect a very recent specialization of the term and differentiation
of it from κτίστης. That such a process of differentiation and specializa-
tion would take place during this period, when Romans were especially
interested in the ideas of foundation and the founder, is certainly un-
derstandable, and there is some further evidence to support the hypoth-
esis, Virgil does not use *creator* at all; he uses *fundator* and *conditor*
once each and distinguishes between the two, using *fundator* for the
founder of Praeneste (*Aen*. 7.678), *conditor* for the founder of Rome
(*Aen*. 8.313). Livy eschews the synonyms for *conditor* used by Cicero
and Virgil. Moreover, he distinguishes, in general, between *auctores*,
especially the Senators, who are responsible for guidance of the state,
and *conditores*, responsible for creating its important institutions[85]
and, in particular, between *conditor*, the founder of the city ("condita
urbs conditoris nomine appellata" 1.7.3) and *auctor* for the progenitor

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[85]Senators as *auctores*, 1.17.9 et passim; others as *auctores*, e.g., Aeneas and An-
tenor as *auctores* of peace and the return of Helen at Troy (1.1.1); an *auctor concilii*
(1.51.4); Romulus himself as *auctor* of a new rite (1.10.6). In addition to Romulus,
Camillus, and Augustus, whose identification as *conditores* has already been discussed,
and Titus Sicinius (see note 86 below), the only individuals identified as *conditores* in the
first pentad are: Servius, honored for institution of the comitia centuriata as "conditor
omnis in ciuitate discriminis ordinumque" (1.42.4) and Appius Claudius, the decemvir,
honored by his nephew as "legum latorem conditoremque Romani iuris" (3.58.2). In
Book 8 Livy includes Brutus, the tyrannicide, in this distinguished company as *conditor
Romanae libertatis* (8.34.3).

of a clan ("quem Iulum eundem Iulia gens auctorem nominis sui nuncupat" 1.3.2).[86]

The first actual appearance of the phrase *conditor alter* in extant literature is in Livy, that is, shortly after *conditor* begins to appear regularly and unambiguously in the sense of 'original founder.' From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that there are good reasons to think that this late appearance of *conditor alter* is not a mere accident of literary survival, but the consequence, rather, of a very recent consolidation of notions about founding and refounding that preceded Livy and to which he himself made a significant contribution. We have reviewed a number of considerations that militate against locating the origins of the phrase *conditor alter*, especially as Livy uses it, before the Augustan Age: the ambiguous character of Romulus, whose role as founder was often subordinated to his role as tyrant; the tentativeness with which Cicero compares himself, tacitly and metaphorically, to Romulus the founder, and his failure to cite any precedent for such a comparison; the certain lateness of the one title that does suggest identification with the founder, *pater patriae*; and the probable lateness with which *conditor* emerged as a quasi-technical term clearly differentiated from its hellenistic counterpart.

Even after the last development, obstacles would have remained to the effective use of *conditor alter* to designate a refounder in Livy's sense. Once *conditor* had been accepted as equivalent to κτίστης in the restricted meaning of 'original founder,' it would be natural to take *conditor alter* as a way of expressing the familiar idea of 'founder' merely as benefactor or savior. Thus, if Livy does not rely on the simple combination of *conditor* and *conditor alter* to define the relationship between Romulus and Camillus, one reasonable explanation is that those titles, especially *conditor alter*, were not adequate by themselves to express the specific kind of relationship that he had in mind. Instead,

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[86]The one exception to this pattern occurs when Livy describes how the plebeians are prepared to abandon Rome for Veii under the leadership of Titus Sicinius, a false *conditor*:

> et T. Sicinium    is enim ex tribunis plebis rogationis eius lator erat – conditorem Veios sequantur, relicto deo Romulo, dei filio, parente et auctore urbis Romae.
>
> (5.24.11)

The use of *auctor* here as a synonym of *conditor* is due to the fact that *conditor* has just been used for Sicinius as the usurper of Romulus' position.

Livy had recourse to a combination of titles whose meaning in the con-
text of his narrative was clear and unambiguous, just as Cicero a gener-
ation earlier had had to rely on a combination of epithets in order to
identify Romulus unambiguously, not simply as national benefactor or
savior, but specifically as original founder.

As we have seen, Cicero used most, although not all, of the terms
under discussion. Always, though, he operated close to the Hellenistic
convention according to which one who saved his city from destruction
might receive the honorific title of founder. The various hints at the
idea of refounding in his speeches and letters were all associated with his
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy; he never brought them into
focus around a well-defined concept of refounding or of a refounder.
Julius Caesar likewise attempted to associate himself with many, if not
all, of the terms under discussion here,[87] even though *parens patriae*
was the only one of them that he ever adopted officia.ly.[88] Under his
direction they became part of an organized program that perhaps
aimed at his deification,[89] and that certainly aimed at his personal glori-
fication. But there is no evidence that they were related to any explicitly
articulated concept of Roman history, much less to a specifically cylical
concept of it. Livy, on the other hand, by relating those same terms to
central themes in his narrative, underscores the significance of those
themes and invests the terminology itself with new meaning.

## VII

We have seen, then, that the presentation of Rome's cyclical his-
tory in Livy's first pentad depends on a consistent pattern of detail,
unique to his narrative — as in the account of the Romans' decline after
they captured Veii — and on a specific deployment of terms, also un-
precedented — as in Livy's identification of the refounder. I would like
to conclude by observing that many of the themes central to Livy's cycli-
cal view of Roman history reflect concerns, some of which may have
recurred throughout Roman history, and all of which were especially
prominent during the last generation of the Republic, just before Octa-
vian entered upon his startling career.

[87]Surveyed in detail with references to previous scholarship in Weinstock, esp.
175 228.
[88]See note 61 above.
[89]The thesis to which Weinstock's entire book is devoted.

These concerns include a sense of general decline, a conviction that traditional virtues were being undermined by a new wealth and taste for luxury, a fear that Romans would abandon their city for a rival capital, a belief that the gods were being neglected and that disorder would continue until the gods once again received their due.[90] The terminology that Livy uses to identify refounder and refoundation reflects yet another characteristic of the late Republic, the increasing domination of Roman public life by charismatic leaders. One element that Livy and Augustus have in common is that each was the first in his own sphere to effect a systematic integration of late Republican concerns about decline and renewal on the one hand, with the emerging role of the charismatic leader in Roman politics on the other. Precisely because he and Augustus were products of the same age, it is impossible to determine the exact relationship between the development of Livy's ideas and Augustus' policies. What I hope to have demonstrated is that even as Augustus was the first to make such an integration of general concerns and personal leadership the basis for a successful political program, so Livy was the first to make it the basis for a systematic interpretation of Rome's past and its possible meaning for his own age.

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[90]A belief familiar from Hor. *C.* 3.6.1ff., but expressed before the Augustan Age by Varro who dedicated his *Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum* to Julius Caesar, *pontifex maximus* (Lact. *Div. Inst.* 1.6.7) with an exhortation to redress neglect of the gods (*Ant. Rer. Div.* 1, fr. 2aAg = Aug. *CD* 6.2) on whom Roman greatness depend (fr. 36Ag = Tert. *Apol.* 25).

# THE ROLE OF THE POET AND HIS SONG IN *NEMEAN* 1[1]

For the last thirty years critics attempting an interpretation of *Nemean* I have assumed the relevance of the myth to the program of the poem; all have agreed that the Heracles myth filling the second half contributes to the praise of Chromios in the first.[2] In the attempt to establish the unity of the ode, the interpreters have either pointed to a series of punctual correspondences between the careers of Chromios and Heracles[3] or, on a more abstract level, shown how the heroic accom-

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[1]In this paper I shall refer to the following translations and commentaries by the author's name. Where I omit page reference, the reader is directed ad loc. E. Boehmer, *Pindars sicilische Oden* (Bonn 1891); J. B. Bury, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* (London 1890); L. Cerrato, *Le Odi di Pindaro* III (Sestri Ponente 1918); L. Dissen on the *Nemeans* in A. Boeckh and L. Dissen, *Pindari opera quae supersunt* II, 2 (Leipzig 1821); L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar Translated in Rhythmical Prose with Literary Comments* (London 1930); C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Nemean and Isthmian Odes* (Cambridge 1883); G. Fraccaroli, *Le Odi e i Frammenti* II (Milan 1914); B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1899); F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880); A. Puech, *Pindare* III: *Néméennes* (Paris 1923). I shall cite the works of Pindar from the two vol. Teubner edition by B. Snell and H. Maehler (Leipzig 1980).

[2]Since the early fifties the following have offered more or less extensive treatments of the whole poem: J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, vol. 15 of the Martin Classical Lectures (Cambridge, Mass. 1955) 124-27; G. Méautis, *Pindare Le Dorien* (Neuchâtel 1962) 170-84; S. L. Radt, "Pindars Erste *Nemeische* Ode" *Mnem.* 4th s. 19 (1966) 148-74; T. G. Rosenmeyer, "The Rookie: A Reading of Pindar *Nemean* I" *CSCA* 2 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969) 233-46; G. A. Privitera, "Eracle nella prima Nemea" *GIF* n.s., 3 (1972) 28-51; P. W. Rose, "The Myth of Pindar's First *Nemean*: Sportsman, Poetry, and Paideia" *HSCP* 78 (1974) 145-75 and C. Segal, "Time and the Hero: The Myth of *Nemean* I" *RhM* n.f. 117 (1974) 29-39. In the following paper I shall refer to these articles by the author's name and the page number.

[3]Privitera (30) succinctly criticizes and dismisses this sort of criticism. Nevertheless, despite the extravagant fantasies of the scholiasts and succeeding critics, it seems impossible to deny the myths any topical reference. Puech (22) well summarizes the punctual parallels between the lives of Chromios and Heracles:

> l'une et l'autre aboutissent après tant de fatigues à la félicité parfaite; Héraclès goûte cette félicité dans les bras d'Hébé, son épouse divine, à la table de Zeus, son père, comme Chromios jouit de sa gloire auprès de sa femme, soeur de Gélon, auprès de son beau-frère Hiéron, dans son palais d' Ortygie.

*V*. Radt (167-68) for a very similar list. I do not accept Rosenmeyer's (240-41, cf. Segal 39) restatement of Didymus' analogy between the early victory of Heracles leading to a

plishments of both are presented as the manifestation and proof of god-
given virtue.[4] This approach has contributed much to the understand-
ing of the poem, and the understanding gained should forever lay to rest
such doubts as Farnell voiced concerning the unity of *Nemean* I.[5]

But these punctual and thematic correspondences do not fully
explain either the relationship of Chromios to Heracles or of Chromios
and Heracles to Pindar. For there are three heroes in this poem; the
poet takes his place alongside Heracles and Chromios as one who vic-
toriously confronts unjust and destructive forces with god-given
excellence.

If commentators have overlooked this heroic portrayal of the poet,
it is because they have not considered that Chromios' ultimate destiny
diverges from that of Heracles. Both have rest after a life of toil and
hard-fought victories, but the son of Zeus enjoys everlasting repose in

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glorious life and Chromios' victory in an early attempt in the games holding the promise
of future victories. Besides the fact that we do not know how many times Chromios com-
peted before winning a crown, *N.* I looks forward to Chromios' death rather than to his
athletic future. Rose's reworking (165-66) of Fraccaroli's (206) parallel between the suc-
cess of the infant Heracles and that of Hiero's thriving foundation at Aetna presupposes
the founding of Aetna prior to the composition of *N.* I. Even more problematical is
Rose's further suggestion (169) that in 14-17

> the image of Zeus giving over a realm to a lesser goddess, personally guarantee-
> ing its prosperity, and himself supplying the citizenry, might well strike the con-
> temporary audience as parallel to Hieron putting his new city under Chromios'
> command, guaranteeing its survival if not prosperity with his enormous military
> power, and most remarkable of all, supplying the population himself with
> mercenaries.

Although the analogy between Zeus and Hiero works neatly enough, the audience could
not easily equate Persephone and Chromios.

[4]Finley (127), Méautis (181), Radt (167), Privitera (48) and Segal (39) all under-
line Pindar's emphasis on god-given gifts as the source of heroic achievement. The latter
theme, stated in 25-28 and whose development Privitera and Rose trace especially well,
is central to the understanding of *N.* I. Its importance far transcends that of the corre-
spondences of a biographical or circumstantial sort noted above.

[5]Farnell, 159-60:

> In point of fact, the modern commentator is often more concerned about Pindar's
> relevance than Pindar was himself. We are dealing with a poet astonishingly way-
> ward, whom a single phrase is often enough to send off the track, spinning down a
> long by-path of myth.

Rose (156-57) lists critics who have denied or been unable to explain the relevance of the
myth to the rest of the ode.

the arms of eternal Youth (69–72) while Chromios, a mere mortal, can-
not hope that his feasts will last indefinitely.[6] He can hope only for that
immortality which Pindar's song can give.[7] Only the poet's song can
overcome the hostile powers which obscure and efface even the most
excellent reputations. No less than Chromios or his exemplar Heracles,
the poet combats destructive forces to restore and maintain the pre-emi-
nence of the best.

## I. Analysis of 19–33

To apprehend the gap separating the immortal and the mortal
and the role which this leaves for the poet of praise, one must follow
carefully the train of thought in the second triad. In 19–33 Pindar re-
flects upon the fragility of human glory, subject as it is to the attacks of
envy and death, and the role of the epinician poet in ensuring the im-
mortal renown of his patron. At the beginning of the strophe, Pindar
presents himself singing his ode (καλὰ μελπόμενος 20) while standing
at the entrance to a palace (ἔσταν δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐλείαις θύραις 19) where a
feast is in progress (ἔνθα μοι ἁρμόδιον/ δεῖπνον κεκόσμηται 21–22).
Thus he refers to both the victory celebration and to epinician song
(20), an association which appears also at the beginning of N. IX, the
other ode dedicated to Chromios. There, as Bundy pointed out, the in-
vitation to the Muses to join a revel (κωμάσομεν . . . Μοῖσαι, a Doric
subjunctive 1), serves as a foil for the injunction to provide a victory ode

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[6] V. D. C. Young, *Three Odes of Pindar*, Mnem. Supp. 9 (Leiden 1968), esp. 19–
21 for his explanation of the way a myth may serve as a foil, rather than a parallel, to the
career of the *laudandus*. In N. I the Heracles myth both parallels and contrasts with the
life of Chromios. If not a foil in the sense of a less important or less excellent figure,
Heracles serves as antithesis as well as exemplar for Chromios.

[7] Scholars have usually attempted to work out the details of the theme of rest after
hard labor in terms of a mistaken analogy between Chromios and Heracles to the effect
that Chromios, after a life of victorious struggle, can look forward to peaceful happiness
of indefinite length. See e.g. Dissen (358): "post res terra marique iustissime gestas auspi-
cia habes futuri temporis faustissima" and Puech (22): the lives of Chromios and Hera-
cles "aboutissent après tant de fatigues à la félicité *parfaite*" (emphasis added). Boehmer
(91) and Mezger (112) find in the Heracles myth a hint that Chromios will rest eternally
in the Isles of the Blest.

(ἀλλ᾽ ἐπέων γλυκὺν ὕμνον πράσσετε 3). The ἀλλ᾽ dismisses the festivi-
ties, which will soon end, in order to concentrate attention on the more
important song which will permanently record the achievements of the
victor (v. esp. 6-7).[8] The marked similarity of the two passages leads one
to suspect that Pindar is developing this contrast also in the second
strophe of N. I.

    L. 24 provides partial confirmation, for it suggests the transitori-
ness of the good feeling surrounding the victor at the revel. Chromios'
neighbors are divided into friends who speak well of him and the envi-
ous enemies of his newly enhanced fame: λέλογχε δὲ μεμφομένοις ἐσ-
λοὺς ὕδωρ καπνῷ φέρειν/ ἀντίον (24-25). Despite doubts as to the pre-
cise interpretation of the syntax, this verse clearly speaks of carrying
water against smoke as a metaphor for confounding the envious. P.
Waring has recently argued that here and elsewhere in Greek poetry
smoke is viewed as a defilement or blot on a bright object; the water is
the water of cleansing. Envy seeks to tarnish the brilliant renown of the
victor who must have recourse to noble friends who will keep his deeds
in high repute.[9] The intervention of the noble will ensure the perma-
nence of Chromios' glory, whose lustre is in danger of being besmirched
even in the course of the victory revel.

    And how will the noble counteract the devices of envy? Pindar re-
marks that different men will have different skills for effecting this
result (τέχναι δ᾽ἑτέρων ἕτεραι · 25a) but stresses that they must make
just use of whichever skills they have received from the gods (χρὴ δ᾽ ἐν
εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς στείχοντα μάρνασθαι φυᾷ. 25b). The τέχναι, far from
standing in opposition to one's god-given endowment (φυά), constitute

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[8] E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* I, (*Univ. of Calif. Publ. in Class. Phil.* 18, 1962)
22. *V.* also 2 and 11 for further examples.

[9] *V.* P. Waring, "Pindar, *Nemean* I.24 – Smoke Without Fire" *CQ* n.s. 32 no. 2
(1982) 270-77. For the metaphor of the smoke of envy, Waring cites also *N.* VII.61-63
(which, like I.24, contains the metaphor of waters of praise) and Simonides 541 P. He
renders 24: "It is the lot of the noble to bring water against the smoke of the critical."
Whether or not we take ὕδωρ καπνῷ φέρειν ἀντίον as the subject of λέλογχε with ἐσ-
λοὺς as obj. (with Waring) or understand Chromios as subject and ἐσλοὺς + infin. of
purpose as the obj. of the verb, it is important to note that the ἐσλοί are the ones who
carry the water. For the Pindaric concept of envy effacing the glory of the great v.
A. Köhnken's discussion of *N.* VIII.21-23 and 32-34 in *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pin-
dar* (Berlin 1971) 24-34. Hereafter I cite this work by the author's name and the page
number.

the elements of the φυά.[10] As the γάρ indicates, the following verses explicate the compressed gnome of 25b:

πράσσει γὰρ ἔργῳ μὲν σθένος,
βουλαῖσι δὲ φρήν, ἐσσόμενον προϊδεῖν
συγγενὲς οἷς ἔπεται.                                    (26-28)

Here Pindar specifies two τέχναι or means of achieving a goal: strength (σθένος 26) which issues into effective action (ἔργῳ 26) when joined to the prudence (φρήν 27) which permits one to foresee the future (ἐσσό-μενον . . . ἔπεται 27-8). In the following superlative compliment, Pindar praises Chromios as the perfectly gifted man who applies to effect both σθένος and φρήν: Ἀγησιδάμου παῖ, σέο δ᾽ ἀμφὶ τρόπῳ/ τῶν τε καὶ τῶν χρήσιες (29-30).[11] The τῶν τε καὶ τῶν of 30 responds to τέχναι δ᾽ ἑτέρων ἕτεραι of 25. While 25 refers to the variety of skills which Chromios' noble friends would apply to silencing his critics, 30 presents Chromios as himself possessed of these τέχναι. The great man and his defenders share the same god-given gifts.[12]

Although 31-32 (οὐκ ἔραμαι πολὺν ἐν μεγάρῳ πλοῦτον κατα-κρύψαις ἔχειν,/ ἀλλ᾽ ἐόντων εὖ τε παθεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι φίλοις ἐξαρκέων) are couched in the first person, they still concern the efforts of Chromios and his friends to confound his envious detractors. As Dissen remarked, they pick up the theme of generous hospitality in 19-23. When Pindar, the poet of praise (καλὰ μελπόμενος 20), declares, "I do not desire to keep much wealth in my hall, but having lived a life of bounty to gain repute by aiding my friends," he opposes envy by prais-

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[10]In *Das Bild des Weges* (*Hermes Einzelschriften*, Heft 4, Berlin 1937) 62-66, O. Becker argues for the opposition of τέχνη and φυά in 25, a position first enunciated by Bury. Radt (162), Privitera (44-45) and Rose (171) reject this argument and interpret τέχναι as gifts which belong to the good by nature. Privitera cites passages which speak of the τέχναι of the gods or the τέχναι granted by the gods to men, and both Radt and Rose cite *P.* VIII.60 where Pindar speaks of Alcmaeon's inborn skill (συγγόνοισι τέχναις) of prophecy.

[11]Radt (162-63) and Privitera (46) rightly emphasize that the τῶν τε καὶ τῶν in 30 refer to the σθένος and φρήν of 26-27. As their incorrect translations indicate, Bury and Farnell do not perceive this connection.

[12]I agree with Rose (171) who takes the τέχναι of 25 as "the native skills of the poet and the victor" against Radt (162) who interprets this line as referring both to the arts employed by Chromios' friends and to those used by his enemies. Ll. 26-27 explicate the meaning of χρὴ . . . φυᾷ by specifying the τέχναι by which the ἐσλοί will ensure Chromios' continued renown. Cf. *P.* I.41-42 where Pindar clearly implies that wisdom (poetic skill), physical strength, and eloquence are the μαχαναί by which mortals perform great deeds.

ing the sort of generosity for which Chromios is known.[13] Furthermore, with the first person ἔραμαι (31) he draws attention to himself as pre-eminent among the ἐσλοί who keep Chromios' name in high repute. In fact, Pindar is here praising the victor for his wise decision to expend a lordly sum in commissioning an epinician ode. The nexus of ideas is the same as that in *P.* I.90-98 where Pindar assures Hiero of the wisdom of spending lavishly to ensure posthumous renown:

> ὀπιθόμβροτον αὔχημα δόξας
> οἶον ἀποιχομένων ἀνδρῶν δίαιταν μανύει
> καὶ λογίοις καὶ ἀοιδοῖς.                                    (92-94)[14]

The punctual force of the aorist ἀκοῦσαι in *N.* I.32 further supports the idea that here, as in *P.* I, Pindar is referring to the victor's *attainment* — through the poet — of a new and durable glory, rather than to mere *continuance* of the transitory fame he already possesses.

In the following gnome Pindar completes this combination of ideas with a reference to death, the most powerful enemy of Chromios' glory which only the poet's song can defeat. The precise meaning of κοιναὶ γὰρ ἔρχοντ' ἐλπίδες πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν (32-33) has eluded most commentators, but parallel passages from other odes leave its meaning beyond doubt.[15] Of these, the most helpful is *N.* VII.12-20 where Pindar develops the same sequence of thought: 1. the eventual

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[13]Radt (164) remarks "der ganze Abschnitt 22-33 klingt, wenn man nicht genau hinhört, wie *ein* grosses Loblied auf Chromios." I believe that Radt's superficial impression was correct and cannot accept his suggestion that Pindar's words contain an implied exhortation to greater open-handedness with fellow citizens. Cf. Gildersleeve on *P.* I.90.

[14]Privitera (42-43) believes that by πλοῦτον (31) Pindar means the riches of his own poetry. This interpretation presupposes the literal meaning of the first person ἔραμαι. Although I believe that the verb inflection does draw attention to Pindar as the most important of Chromios' noble friends mentioned in 24 and 32, I do not believe that Pindar's primary purpose in 31 is to speak about himself or his poetry. Rather, this is an example of what Young has called "the first person indefinite" — a device of praise by which the poet characterizes the conduct of the *laudandus* as that preferred by all sensible men. For a discussion of this device in the context of *I.* VII and further references to scholarly studies v. D. C. Young, *Pindar Isthmian VII Myth and Exempla, Mnem.* Supp. 15 (Leiden 1971) 10ff.

[15]Méautis (173) alone has perceived the reference to death. Other critics including Mezger, Fennell, Bury, Fraccaroli, Cerrato, Puech, Farnell, Finley (125), Radt (150), and Rose (172) follow the lead of Dissen in interpreting the κοιναὶ ἐλπίδες as every man's awareness of the instability of human happiness and expectation of future trials. Rosenmeyer (241) and Segal (37) take ἐλπίδες as hopes shared by sportsmen for future success in the games, and Privitera (48) as the expectations shared by the valiant setting out to perform a god-given mission.

obscurity of even great achievements unless immortalized in song (ταὶ
μεγάλαι γὰρ ἀλκαί/ σκότον πολὺν ὕμνων ἔχοντι δεόμεναι v. 12-16);
2. the wisdom of victors who, foreseeing the blast that will surely blow
on the third day, i.e. their death (σοφοὶ δὲ μέλλοντα τριταῖον ἄνεμον/
ἔμαθον 17-18), spare no expense to commission an epinician poet (οὐδ᾽
ὑπὸ κέρδει βλάβεν 18); and 3. the inevitability of death which strikes
all alike (cf. the expressions of totality ἀφνεὸς πενιχρός τε in VII.19
with κοιναὶ in I.32). After nine lines dealing with Ajax's slighted honor,
Pindar returns to the theme of the inevitability of death and the need
for song to establish posthumous fame. Because of the notable similarity
of diction, critics have cited VII.30-31 (ἀλλὰ κοινὸν γὰρ ἔρχεται/ κῦμ᾽
Ἀίδα, πέσε δ᾽ ἀδόκητον ἐν καὶ δοκέοντα) in discussions of I.33 with-
out, however, perceiving the identity of the thought.[16] With its double
expression of totality (κοινὸν 30 and ἀδόκητον ἐν καὶ δοκέοντα 31)
and explicit mention of death (κῦμ᾽ Ἀίδα 31), VII.30-31 is really only a
fuller statement of ideas compressed into the gnome of I.32-33. In *O.*
X.91-96, *P.* I.92-94, and fr. 121 Snell, Pindar again contrasts death
and the song of praise but without stressing, as in *N.* I.32-33 and
VII.19-20 and 30-31, that all must die. Once we have apprehended the
meaning of 32, we understand why the poet praises Chromios' foresight.
The ἐσσόμενον of 27 is death. Chromios, who recognizes that he must
share the fate of all mortals (πολυπόνων ἀνδρῶν 33),[17] has prudently
taken thought for future time by engaging Pindar (at a lordly fee) to
celebrate his accomplishments in a victory ode.

With its reference to death, the gnome κοιναὶ ... ἀνδρῶν com-
pletes the ring composition tying together the beginning of the strophe
and the end of the antistrophe. The abundance and generosity which
will be terminated by death recall the merrymaking of the victory revel
interrupted by envy. The development of the thought throughout the
strophe has clarified the role of the poet of praise who stood at the doors
of the court καλὰ μελπόμενος (20). Of all the noble friends upon whom
Chromios can lavish his generosity (φίλοις ἐξαρκέων 32), Pindar is the
one best equipped to guarantee the permanent splendor of his name
against the misrepresentations of envy and even the oblivion of death.

[16]E.g. Mezger, Fennell, Bury and Fraccaroli.

[17]Given the reference to death, the adjective, which appears only here in Pindar,
must mean 'much-suffering' or 'much-enduring' as in Aesch. *Supp.* 382 and Eur. *Or.*
175. Most scholars favor some such rendering, but only Mezger and Méautis (173) com-
prehend that the force of the adj. is to emphasize the mortality of man in contrast to the
eternal happiness of the gods. In this context the adj. does not stress how much man does
or strives to do, but how much he endures.

As Rose (172) has seen, Pindar is speaking of both Chromios and himself in 25 and the following antistrophe. L. 25 begins with a broad statement that there are various methods of preserving the lustre of Chromios' glory. He proceeds to specify the τέχναι necessary for this task which turn out to be the gifts of the perfectly accomplished man. Although he attributes them to the *laudandus*, the subsequent ἔραμαι (31) and the reference to his fee identify Pindar as the ἐσλός who will accomplish the task of bringing water against the smoke of envy (24), a task broadened in 32 to ensuring Chromios an immortal good name. Chromios possesses foresight as well as strength, and Pindar, strength as well as foresight.

M. Lefkowitz has well discussed this sort of "autobiographical fiction" in which Pindar presents his art and his effort to render fitting praise in terms that recall the athlete's skill and his struggle against his opponents. As she points out, in *N*. IV.36-43 Pindar applies to himself combat imagery recalling the wrestling bout of the victor. Feeling almost swamped by the magnitude of his two-fold task of confounding the envious and doing justice to the consummate excellence of the *landandus*, he exclaims, ἀντίτειν᾽ ἐπιβουλίαις᾽ σφόδρα δόξομεν/ δαΐων ὑπέρτεροι ἐν φάει καταβαίνειν (37-38). Let the envious vainly utter their ineffectual cavils,

> ἐμοὶ δ᾽ ὁποίαν ἀρετάν
> ἔδωκε Πότμος ἄναξ,
> εὖ οἶδ᾽ ὅτι χρόνος ἕρπων πεπρωμέναν τελέσει.               (41-43)[18]

Similarly in I.26, the σθένος refers not only to the might which Chromios has displayed in battle or athletics but also to Pindar's artistic capacity to overcome all threats to the permanence of Chromios' glory.


## II. Pindar and Heracles

### A. The Analogy between Pindar in 24-33
### and the Heracliscos in 33-59

This idealized portrait of the poet as the noble comrade of Chromios (ἐσλοὺς 24 and φίλοις 32), who possesses the prudence and might needed to defend his friend, provides the conceptual framework within

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[18]M. Lefkowitz,"Autobiographical Fiction in Pindar," *HSCP* 84 (1980) esp. 36-37.

which one may detect the parallels between Heracles and Pindar sug-
gested by the language and imagery of the myth. One cannot be sur-
prised that the poet's career, like the general's, resembles that of Hera-
cles, for each of the three is ἐσλὸς φυᾷ. In fact, the setting and action of
the third strophe remind one of those of the second. In each a destruc-
tive evil force interrupts joyful repose.[19] In the second strophe envy
threatens, even in the course of the revel, to obliterate Chromios' glory,
i.e. his one hope for immortality, and in the third, the serpents attempt
to kill the slumbering Heracles. We infer from 25 (χρὴ δ' ἐν εὐθείαις
ὁδοῖς στείχοντα μάρνασθαι φυᾷ) that Chromios' detractors adopt
crooked schemes; compare the snakes who try to twist their coils around
the son of Zeus (ἀμφελίξασθαι μεμαῶτες 43). Heracles, gifted with mi-
raculous power, lifts his head up straight (ὀρθὸν 43) and confronts the
serpents, just as Pindar makes upright use (ἐν εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς 25) of his
inborn strength and intelligence (25-28) to confront the enemies of the
man favored of Aetnean Zeus (6), the outstanding example of the war-
like horsemen (16-17) with whom Zeus has peopled Sicily. Relying on
nothing but inborn excellence, Heracles throttles the snakes (ἀπέπνευ-
σεν 47),[20] and Pindar confounds envy and death.

The vain intervention of the alarmed adults serves as foil to the
glorious victories of both the hero and the poet. Indeed, the figure of
Amphitryo standing (ἔστα 55) at the open doors of the bedroom and
observing the scene within bears some similarity to that of Pindar stand-
ing (ἔσταν 19) at the open doors of the court observing the banquet.
Amphitryo has suffered an agony of concern and rushed in to avert a
danger threatening one of his own (53-54); Pindar, who, as a friend
(φίλοις 32), has Chromios' best interests at heart, has come to his aid in
the hour of his greatest success, i.e. when he is most vulnerable to the
attack of envy. But, unlike Amphitryo who uselessly brandishes his
sword, Pindar and Heracles act decisively and effectively though un-

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[19]The passage of the snakes through the opened doors of the bedroom (41) recalls
by antithesis the image of the poet standing at the open doors of the court (19): Pindar
stands prepared to enhance the joyful atmosphere and render immortal the glory of the
*laudandus* while the entering snakes disrupt the peace of the bedroom and attempt to kill
the infant.

[20]ἀπέπνευσεν recalls by antithesis the first word of the ode. In a poem which re-
peatedly speaks of repose or peace as the reward for heroic and victorious effort, the
strange locution ψυχὰς ἀπέπνευσεν becomes an apt way to indicate the defeat of the
snakes.

armed.[21] Thus, Pindar, as well as Chromios, resembles the hero in op-
posing innate gifts against powers which would conceal or destroy Zeus-
given excellence and thereby disrupt the just order in which the best
enjoy permanent pre-eminence.[22]


## B.  Teiresias' prophecy 60-73

The same combination of themes appears in Teiresias' prophecy
which presents the infant's first exploit as the pattern for his future ca-
reer. He prophesies that the child will one day kill wild animals ignorant
of justice and men walking in crooked arrogance,[23] enemies who remind
us of the snakes (cf. θῆρας ἀϊδροδίκας 63 with ὕβριν κνωδάλων 50 and
πλαγίῳ . . . κόρῳ στείχοντα 64-65 with ἀμφελίξασθαι 43). All these
enemies of Heracles remind us of the envious detractors of Chromios
who practice devious devices (cf. 25). The audience will remember by
way of contrast that Chromios, Pindar (ἐν εὐθείαις ὁδοῖς 25), and
Heracles (ὀρθὸν 43) apply their powers in support of the right order
established by Zeus (ὀρθώσειν 15).
      This is not to deny the parallels which critics have drawn between
Pindar and Teiresias. Gifted with powers of prophecy, Teiresias is
ἐσλὸς φυᾷ as are Pindar, Chromios, and Heracles. As he reveals his
power in words rather than in combat, he most clearly resembles Pin-
dar. And as Rose has remarked, both prophet and poet go beyond a
mere public declaration of victories. Teiresias delivers a moral evalua-
tion of Heracles' future career as the application of might in the service
of justice and thereby sets to rest Amphitryo's doubts as to how his son

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[21]Bury (5) noted this responsion of the first line of the fourth strophe with the first
line of the second but missed the contrast between Pindar's effectual song of praise and
Amphitryo's useless sword.

[22]In praising Chromios' military and agonistic accomplishments, Pindar confirms
the continuation even to the present moment of Zeus' gift of war-like horsemen to people
Persephone's island. Pindar's praise of the man thus helps fulfill the will of Zeus to raise
(ὀρθώσειν 15) the island to the highest honor.

[23]Since the Heracles saga does not present the hero slaying any *one* human *arch-
enemy*, I favor (with Bury, Cerrato, Puech, and Radt [151]) translating τινα as 'many a'
instead of 'a certain'. Although Farnell (*Critical Commentary to the Works of Pindar*
[London 1932] 249) denies that this is "in accord with the Greek," Des Places (*Le Pro-
nom chez Pindare* [Paris 1947] 82) cites *N.* VIII.24 and VII.68 as examples of the plural
sense. He hesitates over whether to add to these *N.* I.64.

will use his astonishing strength and daring (ἐκνόμιον/ λῆμά 56–57).[24]
And Pindar sets Chromios' achievements in the framework of perma-
nent values, presenting "the moral excellence of the victor as a conse-
quence of his birth and expanding upon the association of morality and
high birth in the myth."[25]

But Pindar and Teiresias differ in one important respect. The
prophet arrives only after Heracles has saved himself and proceeds to
prophesy victories by which the hero will merit immortal happiness.
Pindar, however, does not merely catalogue and evaluate Chromios'
victories but actually confers immortality upon the *laudandus*. By com-
posing a victory ode, he confronts and defeats the criticisms of the envi-
ous and the obscurity of death which Chromios cannot combat without
his aid. In his active opposition to unjust destructive forces, Pindar re-
sembles the hero rather than the seer.[26]

Like *N*. X, *N*. I contrasts the fate of a mortal with that of a son of a
god, and both poems derive their pathos from the contrast between the
eternal felicity open to the sons of Zeus and the inevitable death await-
ing mere mortals.[27] But if Castor has a brother who can share his im-
mortality with him, Chromios has commissioned an epinician poet to
keep his glory alive. In this he has acted well, for song, far from being
fettered by temporal or spatial limits, resounds even in the timeless
dwellings of the gods (*P*. I.1ff.) and the blessed Hyperboreans (*P*.
X.29ff.).[28] While enjoying song, man partakes of the pleasures of the
immortals.

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[24]Rose (161) argues that λῆμα, 'daring,' is not to be equated with φρήν mentioned
in 27, because the former can have a negative (*P*. III.25) as well as a positive (*N*. III.83)
value in Pindar. After witnessing his son's display of extraordinary daring, "the heroic at
its most impressive and frightening," Amphitryo must learn from Teiresias the implica-
tions of this act for the infant's future conduct.

[25]Rose, 175. *V*. also 173 where Rose points out other convincing correspondences
between Pindar and Teiresias including Teiresias' epithet ὀρθόμαντιν (61) which echoes
Pindar's insistence on his own truthfulness (οὐ ψεύδει βαλών 18).

[26]In his comparison of Teiresias and Pindar, Rose (173) remarks, "In the myth it
certainly is true that the hero is alone with his enemies, and in this sense neither seer nor
poet is presented as directly helping the man of inborn excellence against his enemies."
This statement is true only in so far as it applies to Teiresias.

[27]Finley (129) points to a parallel between the two pairs of brothers (one mortal
and one immortal) in *N*. I and *N*. X. But Iphicles plays no role in *N*. I; the contrast
which Pindar emphasizes is that between Heracles and Chromios.

[28]As A. Loftus has pointed out to me, *P*. X closely resembles *N*. I in the emphasis
on song as the one means of transcending the limitations of mortality. Cf. the develop-

These considerations recommend Bücheler's construction of 69-end:

αὐτὸν μὰν ἐν εἰρήνᾳ τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον ⟨ἐν⟩ σχερῷ

. . . .

. . . . γάμον
δαίσαντα πὰρ Δὶ Κρονίδᾳ, σεμνὸν αἰνήσειν νόμον.                (69–72)

Take νόμον (72) as 'song' and construe as the subj. accus. of αἰνήσειν which governs αὐτὸν in 69.[29] "[Teiresias said] that holy song would praise him forever in peace after he had celebrated his marriage feast in the court of Zeus, son of Chronos."

Pindar's epinicion for Chromios thus blends with the song in heaven celebrating Heracles' triumph over the giants. Both hero and victor have reached the summit (cf. πανδοξίας ἄκρον in 11, referring to Chromios, with ἐν κορυφαῖς ἀρετᾶν μεγάλαις in 34, referring to Heracles), and both are enjoying the victory revel and the victory ode. The song which rushes from Ortygia (4), through the glories of Sicily (18), to Chromios' banquet hall (19) concludes in harmony with Heracles' victory ode in Heaven. With his song, Pindar bridges the chasm dividing Chromios the mortal from Heracles the son of Zeus.

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ment of thought in *N.* I.26–33 and *P.* X.22–29 and v. Köhnken's excellent discussion of the happiness of the Hyperborean realm and the way thither, esp. 175–87.

[29]Boehmer reports and accepts Bücheler's suggestion (accepted also by Radt, 151 and note 3, 167–8). This construction would preclude Segal's interpretation of 69ff. whereby Time (personified) brings about the fulfilment of God's plan adumbrated in the event of 46. I agree with D. E. Gerber ("What Time Can Do [Pindar *Neamean* I.46-7]," *TAPA* 93 [1962] 30–33) and Segal (30) that in 46 Pindar presents Time as an agent and further agree with Segal that the event of 46 foreshadows those of 61–68, but in 69 the phrase τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον is adverbial, meaning no more than 'forever.'

I would like to thank Prof. A. Groton of St. Olaf's College whose criticism has improved virtually every page of this paper.

# THE SILENCING OF PYLADES (*ORESTES* 1591-92)*

"The play belongs among those that are popular on stage, but it is very poor in regard to characters, for apart from Pylades they are all contemptible." So remarked Aristophanes of Byzantium, setting the tone for much future criticism of *Orestes*.[1] While the popularity to which he refers is well documented[2]—the play was a hit, particularly with fourth-century audiences—the condemnation of all the characters except Pylades may not reflect the feelings of the audience that first saw the play in 408. As Walter Burkert observed, it generalizes a complaint that occurs in the *Poetics*, where Aristotle censured Euripides for making Menelaus more depraved than he needed to be.[3] Aristotle's influence may be detected in a second remark, also by Aristophanes, that the ending of *Orestes* is "too comic."[4] Precisely the same fault is alleged in the Hypothesis to the *Alcestis*, and it too may express the opinion of Aristophanes, but it was probably someone else who went on to elaborate, giving the criticism a distinctly Aristotelian formulation: "Both the *Orestes* and the *Alcestis* are rejected as alien to tragedy, for they begin in disaster and end in happiness, which is more appropriate for comedy."[5]

The apparent blend of tragic and comic elements in the play has provoked radically different assessments.[6] Anne Pippin Burnett, for ex-

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[1] *Euripides Orestes*, ed. W. Biehl (Leipzig 1975) 3. On the influence of the statement, and some modern reactions against it, see Anne Pippin Burnett, *Catastrophe Survived* (Oxford 1971) 183 with n. 1.

[2] Fernand Chapouthier, *Euripide Oreste* (Paris 1968) 22-27.

[3] Poetics 1454a 28-29, repeated at 1461b 21. Walter Burkert, "Die Absurdität der Gewalt und das Ende der Tragödie. Euripides' *Orestes*," A&A 20 (1974) 97. See note 22 below.

[4] Note 1 above. τὸ δρᾶμα κωμικωτέραν ἔχει τὴν καταστροφήν.

[5] *Euripides Alcestis*, edited with introduction and commentary by A. M. Dale (Oxford 1954) xliii. Cf. Dale's remarks, xl.

[6] Patricia Neils Boulter, "The Theme of ἀγρία in Euripides' *Orestes*," *Phoenix* 16 (1962) 102. For assessments of the play as a whole, see C. Fuqua, "Studies in the Use of Myth in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the *Orestes* of Euripides," *Traditio* 32 (1976) 63, n. 72. Burkert (note 3 above) 105, n. 34 reviews criticism of the scene between Orestes and the Phrygian (1506-26). Cf. the scholia to 1512 (ἀνάξια καὶ τραγῳδίας καὶ τῆς Ὀρέστου

ample, found the play profoundly influenced by Aeschylus and pro-
foundly meaningful, while R. P. Winnington-Ingram wondered how
anyone could take it seriously.[7] The overall tone and meaning of the
drama are beyond the scope of the present article, which deals only with
a pair of lines in the stichomythia preceding Apollo's appearance *ex ma-
china* at the climax. Winnington-Ingram and others have argued, how-
ever, that the lines in question, 1591-92, hint at the god's arrival.[8] They
may have something to do, then, with the play's extraordinary ending.
About that ending, there seems to be one point of agreement: when
Apollo halts the progress of the action and assigns to each of the charac-
ters his or her traditional destiny, he puts the play back on track, he
brings it into line with expectations for a drama on the theme of the
Pelopidae.[9] Until that final moment, all has been novelty, novelty felt
by the ancient audience too, if we can judge from Aristophanes' remark
in the Hypothesis, that the construction of the plot is unparalleled.[10] A
brief summary will suffice both to bring out its uniqueness and to estab-
lish the context in which to assess the impact of lines of 1591-92.

    The play opens on the sixth day since Orestes killed his mother

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συμφορὰς τὰ λεγόμενα) and 1521 (ταῦτα κωμικώτερά ἐστι καὶ πεζά), which have
thrown unwarranted suspicion on the authenticity of the entire scene: W. Biehl, *Text-
probleme in Euripides Orestes* (Göttingen 1955) 84-85.

    [7]Burnett (note 1 above) 183-222; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "Euripides: Poiêtês
Sophos," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 141, n. 49.

    [8]Winnington-Ingram (note 7 above) 130; Fuqua (note 6 above) 93, n. 136; Henri
Weil, ed. *Euripide Oreste* (Paris 1904) 796-97; A. W. Verrall, *Essays on Four Plays of
Euripides* (Cambridge 1905) 255, n. 2; N. Wecklein, ed. *Orestes* (Leipzig and Berlin
1906) 104; Heinrich Kaffenberger, *Das Dreischauspieler Gesetz in der griechischen
Tragödie* (Diss. Darmstadt 1911) 13-15; Vincenzo DiBenedetto, ed. *Euripides Orestes*
(Florence 1965) 290; W. Biehl, *Euripides Orestes* (Berlin 1965) 173. Lines 1591-92
clearly indicate that *someone* is about to appear; whether they hint at Apollo's arrival in
particular is, perhaps, a different question: see text between notes 29 and 30 below. Most
of those who have dealt with the lines stop short of interpreting them (for three others,
see note 12 below). Of those who go on to an interpretation, I deal with Winnington-
Ingram in the text of this article, with Verrall in note 21 below, with Kaffenberger in
note 17 below, and with DiBenedetto in note 23 below.

    [9]Burnett (note 1 above) 220-1; Chapouthier (note 2 above) 12; Burkert (note 3
above) 100; Winnington-Ingram (note 7 above) 134; H. Strohm. *Euripides: Interpreta-
tionen zur dramatischen Form* (München 1957) 89; D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama*
(Toronto 1967) 213-24; T. B. L. Webster, "Euripides: Traditionalist and Innovator,"
*The Poetic Tradition*, D. C. Allen and H. T. Rowell, eds. (Baltimore 1968) 42, 44; Hugh
Parry, "Euripides' *Orestes*, The Quest for Salvation," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 343-44; C. Fu-
qua, "The World of Myth in Euripides' *Orestes*," *Traditio* 34 (1978) 28.

    [10]Note 1 above, 2: παρ' οὐδενὶ κεῖται ἡ μυθοποιία.

Clytemnestra. Though he had done so under the guidance of Apollo,
nothing seems to be working out for him. Subject to fits of madness, he
also finds himself the target of deadly enmity in Argos. The people, en-
raged at him and Electra for the matricide, are on the point of con-
demning them to death when the arrival of their uncle Menelaus from
Troy gives them reason to hope for salvation. Menelaus, however, an-
swers Orestes' appeal by doing nothing. In retaliation, Orestes and his
friend Pylades try to murder Helen. Word of the attempted killing has
reached Menelaus, who comes rushing onto the stage, believing that
Helen has in fact been slain. He finds Orestes standing on the palace
roof, holding a sword to the throat of his daughter Hermione. Pylades
and Electra are also visible on the roof, brandishing torches. Now under
sentence of death, Orestes hopes this time to extort from Menelaus a
pledge of protection; if refused, he will cut Hermione's throat and give
the order to burn the palace down. He and Menelaus engage in conver-
sation for some thirty lines until, at line 1591, Menelaus suddenly asks

ἢ καὶ σύ, Πυλάδη, τοῦδέ κοινωνεῖς φόνου;

The question seems, as Winnington-Ingram described it, "completely
gratuitous."[11] Pylades cannot answer it, even if he wants to. With Mene-
laus and Orestes already talking and Apollo about to appear and speak
from the machine, all three speaking parts are taken.[12] Orestes must
answer in his friend's behalf:[13]

φησὶν σιωπῶν· ἀρκέσω δ᾽ ἐγὼ λέγων.

What is the point of this exchange? Winnington-Ingram thought
it had no point, or virtually none: it simply expresses Euripides' chagrin

[11]Note 7 above, 130. See text at note 21 below.
[12]The absence of a fourth actor for Pylades has often been noticed. D. P. Stanley-
Porter, "Mute Actors in the Tragedies of Euripides," *BICS* 20 (1973) 83, n. 6 cited only
Kaffenberger (note 8 above) and Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festi-
vals of Athens* (Oxford 1968) 147. See, in addition to the scholars cited in note 8 above,
H. C. Baldry, *The Greek Tragic Theatre* (New York 1971) 55-56.
[13]Orestes also answers for Pylades at *IT* 494, but not because of the three-actor
limit: he and Pylades remain on stage when Iphigeneia leaves at 642 and all three of
them speak together after she returns at 725. This is not a case of a necessarily mute
character being asked a question, but of a character not answering because it is dramati-
cally better for him to be silent: the irony and pathos of the first conversation between the
brother and sister who do not yet recognize each other (472-637) would be dissipated by
the introduction of a third voice. Iphigeneia's question, moreover, is not addressed di-
rectly to Pylades: "Which of the two of you was called Pylades?" This leaves an opening
for Orestes to speak in his friend's behalf. No such opening exists at Orestes 1591-92,
where Menelaus puts his question directly to Pylades.

at having to observe the convention that limited him to employing no more than three speaking actors on stage at any one time. Speaking parts become mute parts in other dramas without attention being drawn to the change,[14] so it does seem possible that Euripides is acting capriciously here. If Winnington-Ingram is right, we would have to wonder about the poet's willingness to sacrifice dramatic momentum for such questionable gain.

And yet his interpretation is not without plausibility. Euripides had not hesitated to retard the action for a much longer spell in the *Electra* in order to evoke a scene from the *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus.[15] Something similar may be happening in the *Orestes*. As T. B. L. Webster and D. L. Stanley-Porter observed, a veritable extravaganza of mute actors throngs the stage at the climax of the play.[16] Menelaus at ground-level has his mute attendants; Electra, Pylades, and Hermione on the roof of the palace are three characters who once spoke and now cannot; the rescued Helen standing by Apollo in the machine a moment later makes a fourth silenced persona. By the end of the play, mutes occupy every possible level of the stage — ground, roof, and sky. With all these characters on board, and with convention preventing Euripides

[14]A clear example is Tecmessa in the *Aias*. Andromache in the play named after her may be another: see P. T. Stevens, ed. *Euripides Andromache* (Oxford 1971) 10-11, 218 19. Orestes and Pylades in *IT* are both played by mute actors after line 1222, but they are at that point veiled prisoners on their way to purification and no one addresses them. Admetus wonders why the resurrected Alcestis, now played by a mute actor, does not speak (*Alcestis* 1143), and Herakles explains that she must first be purified from consecration to the nether-gods (1144-46). Admetus' desire to speak with the wife miraculously returned to him is natural, and the reason given for her silence both proper and convincing (see Dale [note 5 above] 129-30). The silence of the mute actor, in other words, is worth drawing attention to: the dramatic reason for it overshadows the technical one. But unless something previously unnoticed is happening at *Orestes* 1591-92, the opposite situation obtains: there is only a technical reason for Pylades' silence, all the more reason, one would think, for letting it pass unnoticed.

[15]*Electra* 520-84; *Choephoroe* 164-245. See Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "Some Alleged Interpolations in Aeschylus' *Choephori* and Euripides' *Electra*," *CQ* n.s. 11 (1961) 179-80 and G. W. Bond, "Euripides' Parody of Aeschylus," *Hermathena* 118 (1974) 1-14. S. M. Adam, "Two Plays of Euripides," *CR* 49 (1935) 120 offered an interpretation of the parody in the *Electra* based, unusually, on the heroine's character. Chapouthier (note 2 above) 14 felt that a parodic spirit similar to the one evident in *Electra* animates much of *Orestes*. Winnington-Ingram (note 7 above) 129, with notes 18 and 19, cited other examples of Euripides making fun of the archaic technique of Aeschylus. According to James W. Halporn, "The Skeptical Electra," *HSCP* 87 (1983) 101-18, the scene in *Electra* evokes but does not parody or ridicule the scene in *Choephoroe*; rather, it marks the difference between Aeschylus' portrayal of the matricide and Euripides'.

[16]Webster (note 9 above) 29, Stanley-Porter (note 12 above) 81.

from letting any of them speak again, we might indeed imagine that he felt under constraint.[17] But is there any particular reason for singling out Pylades? A glance at Pylades' traditional role in the legend, and at Euripides' treatment of the legend here, helps to answer this question.

Pylades is a mute character in both Sophocles' and Euripides' *Electra*.[18] Though on stage throughout the *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus, he remains silent in that play for 899 lines, speaks but once, briefly and momentously, then speaks no more. His silence is traditional,[19] something to be expected or at least to be set aside only with notable effect, as in the *Choephoroe*. In *Orestes*, however, Pylades is anything but reserved. Arriving on the scene at a run (729), he immediately plunges into a trochaic conversation with Orestes that goes on for forty-five lines (729-74) and then becomes even more animated by breaking into *antilabe* for another twenty-four (774-98). On the return from the Argive assembly, where Orestes' eloquence has secured for him and Electra a change in the sentence, from death by public stoning to death by suicide (946-49), it is Pylades who proposes to wreak vengeance on Menelaus by murdering Helen (1105), or, failing that, by setting fire to the palace of the Atreidae (1150), probably with a view to preventing Menelaus from inheriting it.[20] Menelaus' question, whether Pylades, of all people, is a

[17] According to Kaffenberger (note 8 above) Menelaus' question to Pylades derives from Euripides' discomfort at having seven characters on stage, only three of whom can speak. Euripides puts the question to Pylades through Menelaus in an unsuccessful attempt to create the illusion that Pylades, though silent, is still participating in the drama. But this, apart from imputing clumsiness to Euripides, does not account for his selection of Pylades to serve this purpose.

[18] In both the Sophoclean (16 ff.) and Euripidean (81) plays, he is addressed, but not asked a question he cannot answer, as at *Orestes* 1591. Still, the muteness of Pylades in both plays has struck commentators by its "awkwardness." Cf. Stanley-Porter (note 12 above) 79, 90; J. C. Kamerbeek, ed. *Sophocles' Electra* (Leiden 1974) 22-23, and Kaffenberger (note 19 below).

[19] He is the less important figure in a traditional pair. Cf. Pindar *Pyth.* 11. 15. Stanley-Porter (note 12 above) 69 listed a number of other such pairs. But cf. Kaffenberger (note 8 above) 20: Pylades' silence at the end of *Electra* is less justifiable than that of Polydeukes because the link between the Dioskouroi is closer than that between Orestes and his friend. Kamerbeek (note 18 above) remarked that Pylades' presence, "as Orestes' *alter ego*, was doubtless expected." Pylades' traditional silence is broken in *IT* and *Orestes*, two plays that treat the Atreid legend in tragicomic fashion. His garrulity in *Orestes* is so out of keeping with tradition that his part has been suspected of having been padded by interpolation: Burnett (note 1 above) 214, with n. 9.

[20] Pylades is upset at the thought of Menelaus possessing the palace (1143-46) and Orestes tells Menelaus that he will burn it down to keep him from inheriting it (1596).

willing accomplice, could not be more otiose, at least as far as the audience is concerned.

But what of Menelaus himself? He sees Pylades standing beside Electra, torch in hand (1573-74), waiting on Orestes' command to fire the palace. Can he doubt the meaning of Pylades' presence there, in that attitude?[21] He knows that Pylades had helped Orestes kill Clytemnestra (406). He would have seen Pylades at Orestes' side during the trial (880-83, 949-50). On his return to the stage, he clearly refers to Pylades and Orestes as a pair of lions (1555; cf. 1401) and blames them together for the murder of Helen (1563, 1566). Since his question at line 1591, then, cannot express any real doubt, we are left with two possibilities: Menelaus might, in the agitation of the moment or out of bitterness, be asking Pylades if he's at it again, or the question, with its answer obvious to the audience and to himself, may be meant, like most of what he says and does now, to keep things in abeyance until help arrives.[22] The problem with lines 1591-92 is, why should Euripides have Menelaus vent his frustration or attempt to stall in this particular manner? Why hint at this point that he prefers to let someone other than Pylades take the last available speaking part?

To answer this question, we must consider more closely the meaning of Pylades' silence, imposed on him at line 1592. One thing that

[21]Cf. Verrall (note 8 above): if Pylades is visible on the roof with Orestes, Menelaus must know why he is there, and so his question is "needless." But in order to rescue Euripides from the charge of "inconceivable ineptitude"—having Menelaus ask Pylades a question he cannot answer—Verrall argued that Pylades was not visible on the roof but out of sight within the palace. No one has followed him in this act of critical desperation.

[22]Menelaus is, indeed, very much a champion of "biding one's time." Cf. his final response to Orestes' plea for help at 682-716, particularly 698-701, bitterly echoed by Orestes at 748. Tyndareus' threat to deprive him of his position at Sparta if he helps Orestes (534-37, repeated at 622-25) has had its effect on him. So Orestes charges at 752, echoing Tyndareus' words at 623. Clear proof that the charge is justified comes at 931, where we learn from the messenger that no one else spoke in Orestes' behalf, as Menelaus had promised to do. In addition to the charge that Menelaus values his position at Sparta more than his duty to his nephew, Orestes accuses him of aiming at the throne of Argos (1057); this charge too is confirmed by a reliable second source, Apollo, at 1660. All this is in keeping with the baseness of Menelaus' characterization, first censured by Aristotle (note 3 above). If Menelaus' question at 1591 is meant to gain time, it puts his own daughter's life at risk for the sake of power and wealth, as Burnett argued in regard to the whole scene from 1554 to 1624 (note 1 above) 193-94. The question, then, would suit his character, though this is of secondary importance. The characterization of Menelaus fits in with, but does not motivate, the question at 1591. Compare Lloyd-Jones on *Electra* 520-84 (note 15 above) 179-80. For a defense of Menelaus, see Fuqua (note 6 above) 69, 73-74 and (note 9 above) 15, n. 37.

silence certainly involves is the restoration of a traditional feature to the play. When Pylades falls silent the play begins to take on something of the familiar cast of the legend.[23] Until then, virtually every expectation evoked on the basis of the traditional story has been evoked for the sake of disappointing it.[24] Scholars generally agree about the importance of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* in this constant interplay of reference and subversion of reference.[25] The role of the *Choephoroe* in particular has been noted.[26] Euripides' interest in that play is clear from the detailed allusion to its recognition scene in the *Electra*. The interest seems to be operative again in the *Orestes* where numerous parallels, taken together, suggest that Euripides intended the preparation and botched execution of Helen's murder at the end of the play to be a kind of monstrous mirror-image of the killing of Clytemnestra in the *Choephoroe*.[27] The cru-

[23]DiBenedetto (note 8 above), struck by the contrast between a Pylades who occupied much of the limelight earlier in the play and the Pylades who is now all of a sudden a κωφὸν πρόσωπον, noted the technical necessity for the change and argued that it chimes in well with Euripides' return, at the end, to a more traditional treatment of the legend in which Orestes, and not Pylades, is the center of the action. This is correct, as far as it goes. It is less the legend itself than its treatment on the stage that Euripides has in mind.

[24]See especially Burnett (note 1 above) 195, 199, 203-204, Fuqua (note 6 above) 43, n. 31, and Elizabeth Rawson, "Aspects of Euripides' Orestes," *Arethusa* 5 (1972) 165, n. 2.

[25]Cf. Burnett (note 1 above) 204: " . . . we should read this play always with its Aeschylean predecessors in our minds," a conclusion amply justified by her discussion, 199 ff. Also Chapouthier (note 2 above) 14-15, Burkert (note 3 above) 98-99, Parry (note 9 above) 344; William Arrowsmith, "A Greek Theater of Ideas," *Ideas in the Drama*, ed. John Gassner (New York 1964) 25; Christian Wolff, *"Orestes," Euripides*, ed. Erich Segal (Englewood Cliffs 1968) 146-47. For a different view, see P. Decharme, *Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre* (Paris 1893) 350-53. The many verbal echoes of Aeschylus detected by modern critics were probably not lost on the audience of *Orestes*: several years later, the Athenians could still appreciate verbal hits at Aeschylus in the *Frogs*.

[26]Aristophanes seems to have sensed Euripides' fascination with this play, for he has him criticize its opening at *Frogs* 1119 ff. H.-J. Newiger, "Elektra in Aristophanes' *Wolken*," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 427 suggested that the play may have been reproduced in the late 420's, and so have been fresh in the minds of Athenian theater-goers when Sophocles' and Euripides' Oresteian plays appeared. Cf. T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1971) 34, Fuqua (note 6 above) 65, (note 9 above) 7, Baldry (note 12 above) 109, Bond (note 15 above) 8.

[27]G. Perrotta, "Studi Euripidei, II e III," *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 6 (1928) 102 ff.; N. A. Greenberg, "Euripides' *Orestes*: An Interpretation," *HSCP* 66 (1962) 160-63, 186; followed by W. D. Smith, "Disease in Euripides' *Orestes*," *Hermes* 95 (1967) 307; Burnett (note 1 above) 211; and Fuqua (note 6 above) 65 and (note 9 above) 8, with n. 20. Often emphasized in this reading of the attempt on Helen's life is the lack of Apolline sanction for it. But cf. Strohm (note 9 above) 88.

cial scene in that play occurs when Orestes, on the point of yielding to his mother's appeal not to kill her, turns to his friend Pylades and asks (899):

Πυλάδη, τί δράσω; μητέρ᾽ αἰδεσθῶ κτανεῖν;

In three solemn lines that unmistakably express the will of the god Apollo, Pylades replies (900-2):

ποῦ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν Λοξίου μαντεύματα
τὰ πυθόχρηστα, πιστά τ᾽ εὐορκώματα;
ἅπαντας ἐχθροὺς τῶν θεῶν ἡγοῦ πλέον.

Silent for 899 lines, Pylades in this brief oracular response wields tremendous power, putting Apollo's will at the helm and setting the fearful tragic events in motion again. In our play, on the other hand, Pylades has been a tireless talker up to the moment Euripides openly muffles him. In addition, as Burnett has demonstrated, there is a curious relationship between the garrulity of Pylades and the absence of Apollo's influence on Orestes. The louder and more persistently Pylades asserts himself, the less we hear of Apollo.[28] How appropriate it is, then, that Pylades should fall silent at line 1592, precisely when Euripides hints to his audience that a new speaker is about to appear. This turns out to be Apollo, whose voice, heard at last, restores the chaotic debacle on'stage to something like traditional equilibrium, something like what the audience would remember from Aeschylus. The lines in which Pylades, loquacious since his first appearance but now necessarily mute, is nonetheless asked his opinion but cannot give it because Apollo is about to speak, can only be there because Euripides wanted to evoke the scene from the *Choephoroe* where Pylades, silent till then, is asked his opinion and, in giving it, speaks for Apollo. Apollo, speaking through Pylades in the *Choephoroe*, had called for the shedding of kindred blood; Apollo, speaking instead of Pylades in the *Orestes*, will now put a stop to it.

How much of this the original audience could have appreciated is an intriguing question. The two lines, occurring in the midst of a scene where the drama is building rapidly to a climax, probably took no more than a few seconds of stage time. Still, the counterpoint between the Euripidean and the Aeschylean passages is too precise and too detailed to admit of chance. For whatever reason, Euripides has deliberately brought Aeschylus to mind here. The allusion, not noticed before, thus

provides additional evidence in support of those critics who stress the
importance of *Choephoroe* for our appreciation of *Orestes*.[29] But the
extent to which lines 1591–92 fit into a meaningful pattern of reference
to the matricide in Aeschylus is hard to determine. When Orestes, in
response to Menelaus, answers for Pylades, the audience is alerted to the
change in Pylades' status from speaking character to mute. As the scene
progresses and none of the other characters present on stage speaks
again, it becomes apparent that someone else will soon arrive and take
the speaking part which Pylades has lost and which he could have lost
for no other reason than the newcomer's need of it. Euripides has Mene-
laus address his question to Pylades not because Menelaus is uncertain
about Pylades' complicity—we have seen that he feels differently—but
because Euripides wants the audience to begin to anticipate the arrival
of a new character. The decision to silence Pylades instead of Electra or
Hermione as the means for implanting this anticipation is explained by
Pylades' traditional silence and by his great moment of utterance in the
*Choephoroe*; when he falls mute, the play begins to fulfill, dramatically
and literally, the expectations of its theme. Whether the imposition of
silence on Pylades could also alert the audience that Apollo in particu-
lar would soon appear may seem unlikely in view of the swiftness with
which the audience would have had to react at a moment when so much
else was happening. But before the stichomythia between Orestes and
Menelaus was over they would have sensed that someone was coming,
and all the strands that link the silencing of Pylades in this play with the
breaking of his silence in the *Choephoroe* suggest Apollo as the one who
will arrive and resolve the dilemma. Readers of the play may notice such
niceties; it is to them, if not to the original audience, that Euripides may
seem both tragic and sophisticated at one and the same time.[30]

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[29]Whether Euripides works against the Aeschylean background with the unwaver-
ing seriousness of purpose envisioned by Burnett (note 1 above) 183–222 is doubtful. Cf.,
in regard to v. 1592, Wecklein's comment (note 8 above): "Der Dichter erlaubt sich fast
einen Scherz mit dem Zuschauer, da Pylades κωφὸν πρόσωπον ist" and, in regard to
Apollo's arrangements at the end of the play, Kurt von Fritz, *Antike und Moderne Tra-
gödie* (Berlin 1962) 147.

[30]Cf. Bond (note 15 above) 3–4 and Arrowsmith (note 25 above) 17–18.

# HORACE'S *EPISTLES* I AND PHILOSOPHY

Horace's attitude to the application of philosophy to life always bears investigation. It may be that we can at last bid firm farewell to studies which aim to show that he belongs, however intermittently, to one of the great sects. Nevertheless, the belief is still quite widespread that especially in his *Epistles* Horace is absorbed in philosophy and encourages others to the same pursuit.[1] Most recently C. W. Macleod has focussed upon the role of philosophy in Roman life, with a view to demonstrating Horace's own devotion to it.[2] So common is this view that it must be to some extent correct. At least it is a very old view: at the beginning of his commentary on the *Epistles* Porphyrio interprets the opening of the first letter as a dedication to philosophy ("philosophiae malle inseruire," "transisse ad studium philosophiae"). Such language is however misleadingly vague, and so abstract that the thrust of Horace's exhortations is deflected. A measure of precision is wanted, which this essay aims to supply. Such precision will enhance Horace's originality and that special quality of his *Epistles* which, it will be maintained, has little to do with philosophy.

Philosophy in Horace's lifetime, particularly in the Greek world, was a profession. A man might grow a beard to show his distinctive vocation in life, as Horace says (*sapientem pascere barbam, Serm.* 2.3.35), and there was even a sort of philosopher's uniform in the cloak.[3] Roman devotees of philosophy may not have gone so far, especially if they had public careers, but the philosophical βίος is well-

[1] Here I combine remarks on pages 33 and 38 of M. J. McGann's excellent study of 1969, *Studies in Horace's first book of Epistles.*

[2] C. W. Macleod, "The poetry of ethics: Horace, *Epistles* I" originally in *JRS* 69 (1979) 16-27, and now included with corrections and addenda in his *Collected Essays* (1983), no. 27, pp. 280-91.

[3] For "beard and cloak" see H. Blümer, *Die römischen Privataltertümer* (1911), 270, n. 10, and consult Daremberg-Saglio s.vv. *barbe* (1.669b), *pallium* (4, 1.292), and *tribôn* (5.415a). Since Romans did not much affect walking-sticks, we can add the staff (*fustis*) to the uniform: see Lejay on *Serm.* 1.3. 133f. For the profession see D. Sedley, "The Protagonists" in *Doubt and Dogmatism*, Schofield, Burnyeat, Barnes, eds. (1980), p. 3.

known thanks to the Virgilian *Catalepton* 5 and from Propertius
3.5.23–46 (which is concerned not with ethics but physics). It is plain
that such a profession was far removed from the historically based uni-
versity discipline of our own day. Perhaps the sharpest division between
ancient and modern is this: philosophy then offered a systematic and
comprehensive approach to living. This approach was recognised as
substantially different from that of, say, the rhetorician or the states-
man (Propertius again, 3.21.25–27). The distinction is most easily seen
in works of a protreptic character. Cicero, for instance, tells us that his
lost dialogue, *Hortensius*, was a defence on behalf of *uniuersa philo-
sophia* ("philosophy as a whole") against the claims of other ways of life;
Lucullus there urged the claims of the study of history, and Hortensius
those of eloquence.[4] Protreptic literature aims to interest the reader in
philosophy as such. That achieved, the real work begins.

Another aspect of ancient philosophy, perhaps more important to
the Greek professionals than to their Roman students, is its division into
jealous sects. In Cicero's day these numbered four or five, of which the
Academic and Peripatetic enjoyed only fitful popularity.[5] If you were at
all serious about dedicating yourself to what Porphyrio too loosely called
philosophy, you probably called yourself either a Stoic or an Epicurean:
as Marcus Aurelius put it, "either Providence or Atoms!" (4.3, 2).
Horace's first letter will serve as an example of this sectarianism. He
there has told Maecenas that he is too old to write more poetry and is
now concerned instead with morality. He at once forestalls an obvious
question, and says he is neither a Stoic nor an . . . no, not "Epicurean,"
but "Aristippean," for the followers of Aristippus of Cyrene were also
hedonists (but Horace has a reason for the substitution, to which we
shall return). Two opposed and popular doctrines are at once acknowl-
edged and rejected. To be sure, a controversialist would acquaint him-
self with the teachings of rival schools, with a view largely to refuting
them. We see this in Lucretius's exposition of Epicureanism, and in Plu-
tarch's attacks on Stoics and Epicureans (he favoured the Academy).[6]

Cicero's position deserves a moment's reflection just because he at
times adopts a tone of fairmindedness which is a misleading pre-echo of

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[4]C. F. W. Mueller's edition of Cicero, pt. IV, vol. 3, pp. 312–27 contains frag-
ments of or relating to the *Hortensius*; I have cited *Tusc. Disp.* 2.4 and 3.6.

[5]Cicero draws attention to the jealousy at *Acad.* II. 3, 7: "quod grauius feremus si
quisquam ullam disciplinam philosophiae probaret praeter eam quam ipse sequeretur".

[6]K. Ziegler's article "Plutarchos" of 1951 in *RE* 21.1 is basic.

Horace's claim to independence.[7] Cicero's literary ambitions issued in a desire to create for Roman readers a philosophical literature of their own. In his dialogues he allowed the speakers fair and comprehensive presentation of the doctrines of the schools to which they were deemed to belong. Despite this even-handed approach, Cicero was not himself unattached, but belonged, after earlier adherence to the Epicurean master, Phaedrus, to the New Academy whose scepticism was likely to appeal to a wily pleader; he was also personally devoted to its head, Philo of Larissa.[8] (It is worth noting that M. Junius Brutus and M. Terentius Varro were also Academics at this time; Varro followed Antiochus of Ascalon and Brutus his brother, Aristos.[9]) Thus Cicero gave what may have been an innate scepticism a philosophical foundation. What is more unusual is his readiness to adopt positive moral instruction, chiefly from the Stoics. Philo, a professional Academic philosopher, did not allow himself anything so definite (and that accounts for the practical sterility of the Academy). Cicero did go farther — perhaps following the hesitant lead of Philo — and he adopted certain moral teachings on the grounds that they were probable. He thus incorporated (legitimately, as he felt) his ethics within the Academic sect, which aimed only at probability.[10]

Let me put the question at issue plainly. Do we know of anyone who claimed on the one hand to be keenly studying philosophy and who on the other refused his allegiance to one of the known sects? Scanty evidence enjoins only a tentative answer. Our sources too can be mischievously vague. Nepos is a good example. He himself did not like philosophers, since he thought them hypocrites (fr. 5 in the O.C.T. *Vitae*). In his life of Atticus, therefore, he allows that his hero's good relations

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[7] See J. S. Reid's introduction to the *Academica* (1885) or M. Pohlenz's to the *Tusculans*.

[8] See *RE* 19.2 *s.v.* Philon (40).

[9] For M. Junius Brutus see *RE* 10.1 *s.v.* Iunius (53), p. 974; for Varro, *RE* 6 A.1174 (Dahlmann). J. Glucker's *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (*Hypomnemata*, Heft 56, 1978) is very helpful in sorting out the various Academic schisms at this time; see also Sedley (note 3 above) p. 16.

[10] It is not clear that Philo actually offered ethical instruction; he may simply have allowed that ethics too was dominated by *to pithanon*. This is controversial: see M. Burnyeat, "Can the sceptic live his scepticism?", *op. cit.* in n. 3 above, p. 31 and n. 22; K. von Fritz in *RE* 19.2, *s.v.* Philon (40), colls. 2540.61–2542.6 is more positive about Philo's ethical teaching than J. Glucker in *OCD*, *s.v.* Philon (3).

with his family were in part due to the teachings of the best philosophers
(17.3), but he does not say plainly that Atticus was an Epicurean.[11] (It
may be that he also wanted to protect Atticus from the vulgar prejudice
against the sect.) So if all we know of Atticus were owed to Nepos we
should regard him as an independent or uncommitted student. Com-
mitment was usual. When, for example, C. Cassius Longinus aban-
doned Stoicism, it was not for independence, but for Epicureanism.[12] In
the Greek world we expect to find this, and tomb monuments of philos-
ophers or the philosophically disposed regularly attest the favoured
sect.[13] The only exception to come readily to mind may be Bion the
Borysthenite. His most recent editor, J. F. Kindstrand, reckons that the
evidence supports the belief that Bion was a Cynic.[14] But even in antiq-
uity Bion's status was in dispute — some called him sophist, and we still
cannot be sure that he committed anything to writing. Horace knows of
him (he is named at *Epist.* 2.2.60 as a model for the *Sermones*), and it
may be that in him we might find an independent moralist, if only our
evidence stretched that far. But the larger pattern is clear, and a man
was not so much given to 'philosophy as a whole' as to one of its sects.

   Cicero indeed complains of this premature commitment to a
school. Young men, he says, with little experience of life swear their
allegiance ("ineunte enim adulescentia, cum est maxima imbecillitas
consilii, tum id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit, quod
maxime adamauit; itaque ante implicatur aliquo *certo* genere cursuque
uiuendi quam potuit quod optimum esset iudicare," *De Off.* 1.32.117).
In some cases a friend or a single lecture convinces, and the student
clings to his school like a storm-tossed sailor to a rock ("una alicuius
quem primum audierunt oratione capti de rebus incognitis iudicant, et
ad quamcumque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati ad eam tam-
quam ad saxum adhaerescunt," *Acad.* II [Lucullus] 3, 8 — how like
Horace, *Epist.* 1.1.15 in language, how unlike in context, despite

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[11] *RE* 8 A. 524.

[12] The conversion is the subject of Cic. *Ad Fam.* 15. 16 (45 B.C.).

[13] See M. N. Todd, "Sidelights on Greek Philosophers" in *JHS* 77 (1957) 132-41,
an article to which Mr. E. L. Bowie drew my attention. Todd makes a point that is worth
noting now, namely that few called themselves "Socratic" just because all the schools
acknowledged Socrates' inspiration, and his name signified no group.

[14] J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion the Borysthenite* (1976); a sceptical review by F. H. Sand-
bach, in *CR* 28 (1978) 284f.

Horace's commentators).[15] So belonging to a recognised sect was as-
sumed to be part of the *studium sapientiae*, and true independence was
all but unknown. Eclecticism may seem a middle path, but once again
modern usage of that term is vague and misleading; I shall return to this
notion later.

　　So far the schools have been treated as objects of personal alle-
giance. It is now time to look at them as ways of life, and this entails
some discussion of the nature of philosophical ethics.

　　As a third portion of philosophy, distinct from dialectic and phys-
ics, ethics is bound to be consistent with itself and comprehensive of all
human conduct; in short, it must be founded on reason and elaborated
into a system of conduct. In such rational systems we define ethics as the
consistent pursuit of a single goal, e.g. well-being or pleasure or the
possession of virtue. It is also commonly the case that this goal needs
careful definition. So Aristotle must review popular misunderstandings
of the true nature of εὐδαιμονία, and Epicurus has to expound the
proper sense of ἡδονή. These explanations and definitions tend to link
the ethical part of a philosophical system to its physical part (this is espe-
cially true of Epicureans whose atomic materialism informs their view of
man's place in the universe and his chief aim; but Stoics too see man as
conforming to the laws of nature and these are discovered in the physi-
cal part of their system). So all the parts of a philosophical system were
designed to cohere. Ordinary human conduct had become philosophi-
cal ethics, and ethics was made rational and systematic. There seems
moreover to have been no gap in what the various schools offered, and
every sort of 'life-style' (βίος) could be served. The drop-out could be-
come a Cynic, the retiring an Epicurean; the Stoics instructed the more
public-spirited, and the Academy catered to the sceptical (to put it
crudely). Thus if you wanted to devote yourself to good conduct, ethics,
as the Greek schools had organized it and parcelled it out, ought to serve
any need (as indeed it plainly did except for those who joined the mys-
tery cults, either exclusively or as a spiritual supplement to their chosen
philosophical school).

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[15] As to lectures on philosophy, it should be recalled that the city of Athens pro-
vided a comprehensive course for ephebes lasting a year; see C. Pélékidis, *Histoire de
l'éphébie attique* (1962) 266-67. Perhaps Horace attended such a course when he was in
Athens in 42 B.C. (*Epist.* 2.2.43-45). Horace mocks sudden conversions in the third satire
of the second book, in which the bankrupt Damasippus was won by Stertinius.

This elaboration and refinement of the diverse ethical schools had another effect: the schools absorbed for their own use all the hitherto vague language of moral approval. There was hardly a word left that had not been incorporated into some school or other. This was especially likely to happen in Roman society. The Romans had their own words for moral judgement, e.g. *honestus*, which were used to translate Greek technical terms, e.g. τὸ καλόν. But it would not be correct to make of, say, Lucilius a Stoic, because he uses such technical terms.[16] It is important to remember this when reading Horace. Those who believe he is recommending philosophy seize on a word like *decens* (1.11) and point to Panaetius's doctrine of τὸ πρέπον ("appropriateness"), which Cicero had called *decorum*.[17] But against this view it may be urged first of all that *decet* is one of the commonest words applied to moral judgement in Latin, from Plautus to Horace's own day; and secondly that Horace does not, after all, work this vein assiduously, which might be expected if he were pointing to his own philosophical inclination. *Decens* in the opening lines of the first letter looks to me no more Panaetian than "quid deceat, quid non, obliti" at 6.62. There is a snare in this language, because the sects had appropriated common moral terms to their own use. What terms were left for the uncommitted? It might be argued that Horace said *decens* for the very reason that it was not the by now technical term, *decorum*. Philosophy had turned morals into ethics, and in the process had taken over the basic language of moral discourse. In the main Horace will avoid such catch phrases (18.99, "rerum mediocriter utilium," is exceptional and Stoic); he sticks to vaguer formulae such as *recte uiuere* (2.41, 6.29, and 8.4).

The degree of appropriation is neatly shown in *Serm.* 2.6.72-76. There Horace sketches for us the after-dinner conversation of country people, as it is concerned with morals. There are three issues, happiness, friendship, and the nature of the good. No particular schools are indicated but the formulation of the topics is "philosophical" (especially "natura boni summumque . . . eius"). It is clear however from the context that the approach to the discussion is not professional (a fable illus-

[16] Lucilius should not be seen as the adherent of any sect; see A. S. Gratwick in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature* (1983) 2.167. He may therefore be a model for Horace once again, except that his strategy is the satiric attack rather than the friendly admonition.

[17] So McGann (note 1 above) 10, who leaves the door ajar for those of us who regard *decens* as nothing "more than a general term meaning 'proper', 'right' ". Horace's fondness for *decet*, *decens* and *decorum* in non-philosophical odes is also worth bearing in mind, as the anonymous reader of this essay justly observed.

trates a point). It is remarkable (to me) that in the *Epistles* Horace manages to avoid such baldly technical language in the main, and he never asks what the τέλος of the good is. It took some energy to cut free from both the answers and the questions of the sects.

## II

It is agreed that the first epistle is programmatic, that it introduces the collection by setting out some of the themes that will be developed in the following letters. (It was therefore one of the last to be composed.) The programme is immediately stated as a turning away from writing poetry ("nunc itaque et uersus et cetera ludicra pono," 10) and a turning towards . . . let us not say *philosophy* or even *ethics*, but rather *conduct*: "quid uerum atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum" (11).[18] Conduct, as I maintain, had become the province, some might believe an exclusive one, of ethics and its systematic schools. Horace contrives it that such an assumption is at once taken right out of Maecenas's mouth: "ac ne forte roges quo me duce, quo lare tuter" (13). The answer, in the next two lines, is a disclaimer of allegiance which is then ironically explained over-another four lines as a symptom of indecision and weakness. We must now turn to an analysis of the imagery of this passage.

It is fortunate that both M. J. McGann and D. A. West have written on the images of the opening of the epistle — it shortens what I have to say now.[19] Behind Horace's stated interest in conduct runs the hinted theme of independence. At first this theme appears in the image of the gladiator, honourably retired from combat in the amphitheatre, who refused to be shut up again in the old training ground. That metaphor is pursued in an illustration drawn from the life of a real gladiator, Veianius (4-6). His dedication of the wooden sword suggests complete retirement. It is worth mentioning that a gladiator was often a slave; if free, he bound himself to his *lanista* by a grim oath. A successful gladiator could appeal to the people for conferral of the wooden sword but this did not necessarily entail manumission (or release from the oath).[20] This release from active service might be hard to win just because the people would not let a darling go (that is the point of Cicero's jibe at Antony, "tam bonus gladiator rudem tam cito?," at *Phil.* 2.74). Com-

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[18] *Verum* is "morally right"; so *OLD s.v.* uerus 9.

[19] McGann (note 1 above) 34-36 and D. A. West, *Reading Horace* (1967) 23-28.

[20] Daremberg–Saglio *s.v.* gladiator (2, 2.1575-6).

plete freedom might take even longer, but it ought to follow, as it seems
to have done in the case of Veianius, who has hung up his arms. Horace
has earned his retirement from poetic composition like a successful
gladiator. He is now completely independent, free from external con-
straints. The next picture reinforces this theme. Horace refuses to be
like a racehorse kept too long on the track; the poor creature may over-
extend itself and laughably fail. (Perhaps Horace had in mind the fable
of how the horse lost its freedom, told at 10.34–38.) Both the gladiator
and the horse are successful and do what others constrain them to do.
The gladiator is a slave, or oath-bound, or too popular; the long-suc-
cessful horse is yoked (an image picked up by *subiungere* in 19) and
whipped into action. But once they are free—*armis . . . fixis* and *so-
lue*—they cannot be expected to resume their external constraint. It
may be worth suggesting that Horace has here avoided an obvious im-
age that might have suited his purpose as well, namely the athlete. Since
the athlete is a type of striving, used at *Carm.* 1.1.2–6, and well suited to
moral contexts (we are bound to recall St. Paul, II *Tim.* 4.7, or even M.
Aurelius Antoninus 3.4.3), we might expect to find him here, and we
will find him, in a way, at 49–51. But the athlete will not do as well
because he is free-, even well-born, and so the hint of compulsion
would be absent. I dwell on this so that we *feel* the drift of Horace's
thought. If he has cast off one form of external constraint, is it likely
that he will exchange it for another? (An answer is suggested by 7.35f.,
"nec/otia diuitiis Arabum liberrima muto.")

The composition of poetry, then, is laid aside and the quest for
good conduct is on. An obvious question presents itself to us when we
hear that the new object of pursuit is conduct. At once we assume
Horace means ethics, a systematic branch of philosophy, and so we won-
der to which school Horace gives his allegiance. Horace casts this im-
plied question in language designed to keep alive the imagery of the
opening lines. *Lar* (13) is the god of a family, and *familia* was applied
equally to troupes of gladiators and to philosophical schools. Then
comes the opening phrase of the reply: "nullius addictus iurare in uerba
magistri." As all the commentators observe, this is delightfully applica-
ble to the oath of the gladiators' school and to the orthodoxy of the phil-
osophical sect.[21] Just as Horace declared his new independence from the
lyric Muse in the opening lines, he here strikes out upon a wholly unex-
pected and independent line of moral enquiry. Horace says he is not

[21] Indeed Epicureans did swear a sort of pledge; see N. W. De Witt, *Epicurus and
His Philosophy* (1954) 94, 99. Epicurus was also ἡγεμών, *dux*.

interested in aligning himself with ethics as his contemporaries under-
stood the word. He rejects the schools and their systems; he rejects phi-
losophy. This is bold and original. Horace will be only the *hospes*, the
guest, of ethical schools. His allegiance will never be given.

This independence is expressed in language strikingly like that of
Cicero: "nos institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius disciplinae legibus
adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque
re maxime probabile, semper requiremus," *Tusc. Disp.* 4.4.7. The re-
semblance however is only verbal. *Probabile* points to the criterion of
judgment in the New Academy (τὸ πιθανόν). It has already been said
that Cicero was prepared to employ the probable in ethics and so endow
Academic philosophy with a rule of life. Cicero's independence — "sunt
iudicia libera," he has just said — is therefore generated by the construc-
tion he places upon what is meant by *probabile*. So at *Tusc. Disp.* 2.2.5
he says, "nos . . . sequimur probabilia," and pities those "qui certis
quibusdam destinatisque sententiis quasi addicti et consecrati sunt";
those poor souls even end up maintaining for consistency's sake what
they do not "regard as probable" (*probare*). The Academy offered Ci-
cero a free rein in moral decisions. With this precedent, it is all the more
striking that Horace declines to join a school that offered such freedom
of choice. For Horace, no sect at all has enduring appeal.

Accordingly he dwells in the next four lines (16-19) on the theme
of the *hospes*, the transient. At one moment it is Stoicism that appeals,
at another Horace slips back into his Aristippean rut. Commentators
rightly observe that this distinction is part of the programmatic charac-
ter of the letter.[22] The reference to Stoicism prepares us for the favoura-
ble treatment of some of the sect's tenets in the sixteenth letter, and the
seventeenth contains an anecdote about Aristippus of Cyrene who
trounces the Cynic Diogenes. Furthermore, we see from the anaphora of
*nunc* that Horace points to his inconsistency, a theme of this very letter,
and of the eighth, to Celsus. I would like to add two further points, the
first concerning Aristippus, the second concerning the inconsistency of
attitude.

It was noted earlier that instead of setting the Epicureans in oppo-
sition to the Stoics ("par quod semper habemus"), Horace substitutes
Aristippus. Why? It is clear from the forms of expression (*fio, relabor*)
that Stoicism is somewhat uncongenial, its opposite more attuned to
Horace's nature so that he sinks back into it unwittingly (*furtim*). If

[22] McGann (note 1 above) 36.

Horace had identified himself with the usual Epicureans he would have said in effect that they were his favoured sect (and many modern students of the poet maintain that he was in essence an Epicurean, and point to the last line of the fourth letter, "Epicuri de grege porcum"). I suggest that Horace chose Aristippus because he was a hedonist, and also because the Cyrenaic sect was no longer a force.[23] Horace thus slips out from under the Epicurean yoke and declares for an independent hedonism. (Préaux's comments on this line show the danger of making Horace too philosophical: "c'est avant tout l'affirmation de l'épicurisme d'esprit horatien . . ."; this echoes Porphyrio on 16, "Inter Stoicam et Epicuream iactari se ait" [he goes on to inform us that Aristippus was head of the Epicurean sect!].) In this important initial declaration Horace wisely refuses to attach himself to a living school, and appeals back to a Socratic student (a point to which I shall return).

The anaphora of *nunc* points to inconsistency. Porphyrio however, in the note on 13, says "ex omnibus quidquid optimum sit electurum esse promittit." And since that time Horace is often called an eclectic; the late Professor W. S. Maguinness wrote a humane and sensible article demonstrating the poet's eclecticism.[24] The age in which Horace lived is moreover characterized in handbooks of ancient philosophy (e.g. Zeller's) as eclectic. But once again, modern usage is imprecise. In antiquity the philosophical eclectic felt no less of a duty than his more "original" colleagues to produce a consistent and comprehensive system.[25] As it happens the first named eclectic may have been a contemporary of Horace's. Potamon of Alexandria is accorded a brief mention by Diogenes Laertius in his *Prologue* (1.21), from which it is clear that he had both a criterion of judgement and a goal of life — two things for which we search Horace in vain.[26] By ancient standards, Horace was not even an eclectic because his choice of precepts from various sects does not hang together as a system. A system can be taught; Horace's instruction works only for particular friends in particular situations and for himself (and then not always reliably). The repeated *nunc* tells a

[23] It is hard to know whether any "school" was viable at a particular time. The Cyrenaics seem to have been overtaken by Epicureanism. See G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici* (1958) and Glucker (note 9 above) 179. Aristippus is discussed at greater length in a companion study entitled 'Horace on good manners'; this is to appear in the *ProcCambPhilSoc* 31 (1985).

[24] "Horace the eclectic" in *Hermathena* 52 (1938) 27–46.

[25] Reid, in the introduction to Cicero's *Academica* mentioned in note 7 above, makes this point (p. 14).

[26] Potamon is discussed by Glucker, *op. cit.* in n. 9, p. 94.

sorry tale of indecision, advance followed by relapse. Horace was
charged by Dauus at *Serm.* 2.7.26 with infirmity of purpose and it
dogged him always, as he is prepared to reveal. He is not therefore a
true philosophical eclectic.

Is this inconsistency a liability, as Kiessling-Heinze maintain
("aber freilich hat diese . . . Freiheit auch ihre Kehrseite: ich halte
keinen festen Kurs," on 15)? Horace never suggests that the inability to
fix upon a particular sect bothers him (though he is bothered that he
cannot decide whether to sit still in the country or rush back to Rome,
8.12). All the preceding imagery of gladiator and racehorse should help
us to feel that independence of view is what counts for him. Horace im-
plicitly denied to the sects their claim to be the sole guide to the good
life, and he has emancipated himself from their tyranny. (This is sur-
prising just because there was so much common ground among the sects
where morals were concerned; there were moreover very flexible teach-
ers at this time. Horace's stand has something to do with his character
and something to do with his love of poetry.) Horace calls himself a
*hospes*, one who does not stay long, as Kiessling observed. The image
will reappear at 11.11f.: a traveller avoids a storm in a public house, but
he does not live there. Horace never suggests that his search is for a satis-
factory philosophical *domus*, nor does he encourage his addressees to
give their allegiance to one. Lollius, for example, he encourages to read
and to ask questions of the *docti*; but he does not specify the books or the
teachers (18.96-103), nor does he press for a decision. Independence is
central.

Let me return for a moment to the passage just mentioned in the
second letter to Lollius, 18.96-103:

<div style="margin-left:2em">

inter cuncta leges et percontabere doctos,                          94
qua ratione queas traducere leniter aeuum;
num te semper inops agitet uexetque cupido,
num pauor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes;
uirtutem doctrina paret, naturane donet;                            100
quid minuat curas, quid te tibi reddat amicum;
quid pure tranquillet, honor an dulce lucellum,
an secretum iter et fallentis semita uitae.                         103

</div>

Wickham says that the verbs in 96, *leges* and *percontabere*, refer to the
dead and the living.[27] This is an important point when one is faced with

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[27] Line 94 contains another echo of Cicero, who says at *Acad.* II. 1, 2 that Lucullus
became a general "partim in percontando a peritis, partim in rebus gestis legendis".

a living (and presumably valuable) tradition. Marcus Aurelius for ex-
ample encourages himself to leave reading behind: ἄφες τὰ βιβλία
(2.2), τὴν . . . τῶν βιβλίων δίψαν ῥῖψον (2.3). (That other Stoic, Sen-
eca, echoes the theme at *Epist.* 106.12.) Where you have a living tradi-
tion to inform and encourage you, what need of superfluous study?
Horace on the other hand hints that the contemporary traditions are
not sufficient. They ask the wrong questions, and their schools demand
allegiance. What is remarkable in the passage quoted is the variety of
schools alluded to. The Stoics are suggested in 99 and of course the Epi-
cureans at the close. But what of 100? Commentators all refer to Socra-
tes in the Platonic dialogues, especially the *Meno*. They do not say,
however, what this question has to do with ethics in Horace's own day.
Probably nothing; as Horace formulates it the question was for contem-
porary philosophy not a live issue any longer.[28] But for Horace, the
reader of old books (*Serm.* 2.6.61), who included Plato among his pro-
fessional reading (*Serm.* 2.3.11), who has a Socratic daemon whispering
in his ear (*Epist.* 1.1.7 — how few draw attention to the allusion), who
recommends *Socraticae chartae* as a source of poetic subject matter
(*Ars* 310), for such a man an old philosopher's questions were still as
relevant to shaping his moral life as those of the hour. Thus even where
Horace acknowledges the role ethics has to play in our lives he continues
to encourage independence, a choice among all available alternatives.

### III

The ethical systems, then, are not paramount, and a man can live
well on terms different from theirs. In the first letter Horace adopts the
pose (a bit disingenuously) of the schoolboy, again preserving something
of the imagery of the opening of the poem. He has *elementa* (37) to
guide and soothe him. In the course of listing these basic principles of
the schoolroom he hints at sources: "sunt uerba et uoces . . ." (33); "dis-
cere et audire et meliori credere" (48); "qui . . . praesens hortatur et
aptat" (69). Where do the formulae come from, to whom should we
listen, who stands by us with encouragement? The answer is not to be
found in the first *Epistle*. Perhaps the implication lingers in the mind
that contemporary ethics supplies the wants of the enquirer into con-
duct. I believe, however, that Horace has designed the solution other-

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[28] Stoics were of course prepared with an answer — such as Seneca *Epist.* 120 — to
the question "whence our knowledge of virtue?", but Horace has formulated the question
differently, in the Socratic terms acknowledged by his commentators.

wise. The first letter was written late if not last, and Horace could choose which letter should follow it. The second is so placed to answer the outstanding question, to what do we turn for advice? Wickham and Préaux rightly see that the two poems are linked (though they identify the link somewhat differently). I suggest that Horace has put the poems together so that the second supplements the first. Subsequent letters also give precision to our grasp of the issue.[29]

The opening of the second poem contrasts two forms of education, the new exercise of declamation and the old-fashioned reading of Homer. Horace roundly declares that Homer is a clearer and better moral guide than the Stoic Chrysippus or the Academic Crantor. This stand has not received its proper emphasis in recent discussions (it is hardly mentioned by Macleod when he speaks of Horace's conception of the moral value of poetry[30]). In the first letter Horace denied, at least for himself, the claims of ethics, but supplied no alternative (though he suggested that there is one). The second epistle fills the gap. Loyal to his calling, Horace elects Homer to be his instructor; Homer must once again be allowed the moral function since usurped by philosophy. (Campbell is very good on this point but he strays, I believe, in making of Horace a Stoic, despite his assertion of independence from any school in the first letter.[31]) Homer is to be restored to his position as teacher. No more sectarian squabbles and opaque jargon (*planius*, 4), but instead the vivid moral tales of a writer known to all, the special province of none.[32]

This is not the place to dilate upon Homer as a teacher, since W. J. Verdenius has so comprehensively traced the history of his didactic use. What I want to stress is that philosophy had since Xenophanes (fr. B1.21-3 Diels) faulted epic tales or Homer for being useless, if not positively harmful. When Horace says that the poet tells us what is or is not *utile* (3) he is throwing down a gauntlet. In the letter to Maecenas he will use a passage from the *Odyssey* to guarantee his attitude to gifts

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[29] In the following analysis of the "plot" of the introductory letters I do not assume that Horace composed the letters as a series. They were composed independently (although the first is designed to be introductory, as the twentieth is a conclusion); assembly in a collection allowed juxtaposition for special effect. The so-called cycle of Roman odes which opens the third book of lyrics is analogous.

[30] Macleod (note 2 above) 22 = 286.

[31] A. Y. Campbell, *Horace* (1924) 275.

[32] W. J. Verdenius, "Homer, the educator of the Greeks", in *Meded. Kon. Ned. Akad. v. Weten.*, afd. Lett. Nr. 33.5 (1970). I am amazed that J. Tate in *CQ* 22 (1928) 65-72 finds no deep conviction in Horace's view; why write the letter?

(1.7.40-45). The Stoics did use Homer to bolster their arguments, but Epicureans fled culture (Epic., fr. V.33 Bailey). On no account was older poetry more than tolerated in so far as it agreed with what had been deduced systematically by any one sect. Horace, if my assessment is correct, is now putting ethics into a subsidiary place in his search for good conduct. The study of poetry is to be the preferred guide in moral education; it is no mere propaedeutic. The book one should ask for before daybreak (35) is plainly *not* a philosophical text (can it be Homer, recommended to Lollius earlier in the opening of the epistle?); the end of the letter stresses the need for correct early training (from 64 on). Indeed the language Horace uses suggests a period of life well before the age when a young man might interest himself in formal ethics. But he does not require the man to pass on to philosophy, and his own reading of Homer points to the continued value of the exercise. (It is surprising that Knoche regards this as one of the most philosophical of the letters.[33]) Thus the epistle is a manifesto in favour of poetry as a guide to conduct, a guide clearer and so better than ethics.

The relation between poetry and ethics is pursued otherwise in the third letter, to Julius Florus. He is in literary company, and Horace assumes that he too is composing (20, "ipse quid audes?"). Florus is praised on several counts — oratory, legal knowledge, poetic skill — but Horace concentrates on the poetry, as "hederae . . . praemia" (25) indicates. Then the trouble starts. Like all men, Florus is assumed to be subject to cares, in the broadest sense. This is one of Horace's favourite themes, and he elsewhere depicts care, the result of *uitia*, mounting the rich man's yacht (*Carm.* 2.16.21f.), or sitting behind the *eques* (*Carm.* 3.1.40 — *timor* and *minae* precede at 37). *Cura* is anxiety, and Horace, as the commentators point out, has in mind Lucretius's proem to his second book, where military occupations are said to be no antidote to *curae sequaces* (2.48). All of this lies behind the advice to Florus. Worldly success will be his, but such success, or its pursuit, is after all only a temporary remedy, a cold compress for anxieties. If one could abandon or do without this relief (26), one would make for the goal indicated by *caelestis sapientia* (27). The goal is as much freedom as possible from anxieties, and that is something we should all eagerly pursue (*properemus*, 28) so as to be at peace with ourselves (the connexion is also seen in 18.101, quoted above). After this general appeal, Horace

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[33] U. Knoche, *Die römische Satire*[3] (1971) 56. He classes the second with the sixth and sixteenth. If it is so philosophical, how can Macleod have ignored it (see above)?

·turns to a particular issue, bad blood between Florus and Munatius, which he hopes has been settled.

In the paraphrase offered above *caelestis sapientia* was not translated. I follow neither Professor West in the belief that it refers to poetic activity, nor the common view that it is a vague word for philosophy (in other words, that this letter is a sort of protreptic).[34] *Sapientia* was prominent in the previous letters, and so I suppose that Horace nudges us into a correct sense of the word's meaning here by placing this letter third. The power of *sapientia* is shown by the character of Ulysses (2.17f.). (Wickham, in his opening paraphrase of the second letter, wrongly takes the word to indicate philosophy.) Ulysses gains experience (19-20), and is not *stultus* like his companions (24). This ought to recall the motto from·the first letter: "sapientia prima/stultitia caruisse, sc. est" (41-42). Wisdom comes from experience and the removal of folly. (Both words appear often in the letters.) To draw the third letter into a closer relation to the preceding we should notice, too, the force of Horace's particular appeal to Florus concerning the rift with Munatius. Was it hot blood or *rerum inscitia* (33) that provoked the quarrel? At the end of the second letter Horace dwelt on the dangers of *ira* (59ff.), which·of course chimes with the earlier praise of the moral lessons of the *Iliad* (*ira* appears in 13 and 15). *Calidus sanguis* in the third looks to that.[35] But so also does *rerum inscitia* look to the sort of worldly experience gained by Ulysses (though it is fair to say that Lejay takes the phrase to mean "a misunderstanding"). In the second letter Horace had also in a general way indicated that common objects of desire do not lessen anxieties (47-50, again in a Lucretian vein). He returns to that here in the third letter but again with a direct appeal to Florus to have done with the cold compresses for anxieties (25-7). So the moral thrust of this third letter can be placed against the background of the first and second, and *sapientia* need be no more than practical wisdom, as Lucian Mueller understood it. This practical wisdom is owed to study and experience, not exclusively to "philosophy," as that was understood in Horace's own day.

The special tension in the third letter flows from the advice to put the writing of poetry in the class of "frigida curarum fomenta"; writing

[34] West (note 19 above) 30-39. Since writing this paragraph on *sapientia* I have read the study by M. Massaro entitled "*Sapere* e i suoi derivativi in Orazio" in *SIFC* n.s. 46 (1974) 85-128. We are independently agreed that Horace uses the word unspecifically in the main. Massaro's discussion of passages is exemplary.

[35] So McGann (note 1 above) 41; I build upon his analysis.

too is escapist. This needed to be made plain after Horace's praise of the
moral value of classic literature. Contemporary literature, at least as it
is practised by the younger writers, lacks this dimension. And at this
point it should be stressed that Horace never lets go the fiction that his
letters are *not* poems. This sets the *Epistulae* apart from the earlier *Ser-
mones*. Verse satire was a recognised department of literature thanks to
Lucilius, its *inuentor*; it therefore had a law (*Serm.* 2.1.2). Horace trails
his coat in the fourth satire of the first book when he doubts the poetic
status of verse satire; at the end of that poem he of course reverts to the
universal view that verse satire was a kind of poetry however humble
(*Serm.* 1.4.39-42 is silently answered at 138-43; Lejay's note on
*poetarum* of 141 is worth consulting). In the tenth satire of the first book
Horace lists those contemporaries who have made their mark in genres
of poetry and he naturally includes himself in their number, a tacit
avowal of satire's poetic rank (*Serm.* 1.10.36-49). In the second book
there are casual allusions to the verse form at 1.4, 3.4 'nil dignum ser-
mone *canas*', 6.17 'musa pedestri' (for which Brink's note on *Ars Poetica*
95 may be consulted), and 6.22 *carminis*. But nowhere does Horace hint
that his letters are in verse, a new department of poetry. The eighth is
only an apparent exception. Horace there writes a letter, not to poor
puffed-up Celsus, but to the Muse who inspires him (we know from the
third letter that Celsus is a poet); she is asked to bear the message to her
charge. Of course as a "former" poet Horace has the Muse's ear, but he
is not asking her for inspiration for himself. No, this time she is to "in-
spire" moral advice into Celsus (8.16), and bring him news of Horace.
Thus when Horace claimed to have put verse aside at 1.10, he meant it
after a fashion. (And so the subsequent fourth book of lyric verse opens
with a dismayed question.) Thus the study of poetry as a moral guide is
recommended, but its composition (at least in certain traditional gen-
res) is seen to be an inadequate occupation in the long run. It brings a
victory of sorts (*uictricis*, 25), but not security against the kind of moral
defect which leads a man "fraternum rumpere foedus" (35).

    That brings me at last to *caelestis*. Wickham leads this word out of
the shadows thus: "You might attain to the more celestial heights to
which philosophy conducts . . ." (I should prefer "wisdom" to "philoso-
phy"). And he rightly refers us to the proem of Lucretius's second book:
"edita doctrina sapientum, templa serena." This may be the language
of commonplace, for the poet of the *Ciris* has something similar (14). At
any rate, Horace has this passage, or this complex of notions in his
mind — I have already pointed to the similar attitude to careers as no

more than a sort of aspirin for a headache: symptoms are masked, the sickness remains. The cure for Lucretius is Epicurean philosophy. For Horace it is no sort of philosophy at all, it is wisdom that guides us aloft. Thanks to the context of preceding letters we can judge what wisdom is and where found.

I will turn to the fourth and fifth letters and then conclude. The sects in their ethical systems aimed at consistency with a certain goal, say pleasure or virtue. This single-mindedness was too rigid for Horace because it did not answer the varying needs of individuals and of their place in life. (In practice of course the schools were quite flexible about numerous matters touching daily life, but the chief goals remained as criteria.) He dramatises these shifting needs in the best possible literary form, the letter, which is bound to reflect the character of both correspondents at a particular time. This is well brought out in the fourth letter to Albius.

Albius is a writer, like Florus, but unlike Florus he gives his thoughts to "quidquid dignum sapiente bonoque est" (5). Fraenkel calls this "philosophical meditations"[36]; "good conduct" seems nearer the mark (*sapiens* and *bonus* together are a leitmotiv of the letters, found also at 7.22, 16.20 and 73). The problem with Albius is the opposite of Florus's — he is alone, as *tacitum* (4) indicates, and so not using his conversational skills ("fari possit quae sentiat," 9). Horace wants the dear chap to enjoy his advantages and so invites him to visit (which of course links this letter to the next, an invitation to drinks to Torquatus). Here Horace uses the adaptability of the letter to good purpose. Albius now needs company and amusement. Since the Epicureans set great store by companionship Horace proclaims himself of their "herd" (16). It is his way not of indicating a philosophical allegiance, but of encouraging an approach to the good life. Albius must cease to reflect *alone*, he must take advice from a friend, laugh even at his expense. (Again, conversation will be a theme of the next letter.)

The fifth letter will serve as an example of what I believe is a misplaced zeal for philosophical reflections in modern students of Horace. Macleod sees in it an application of philosophical teaching to daily affairs[37]; and of course philosophers of various sects had dealt with the problem of drunkenness. How could they not have, and yet claimed a

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[36] *Horace* (1957) 324. The reader points out that the suggested alternative is directive, not necessarily descriptive of Albius's present occupation.

[37] Note 2 above, 18 = 282.

comprehensive ethical theory? But drunkenness appears also to have
been a theme for declaimers (Sen. *Epist*. 83.16 — the whole letter is a
Stoic sermon on the subject[38]) and for satirists (Varro's *Est modus matu-
lae*, perhaps). Poets whom Horace here laid under contribution added
their praise of drink. How then is it possible in a poem like this to isolate
a philosophical element? Is it not unnecessary and misleading to direct
us to ethics (systematic, rational, comprehensive) instead of to good
conduct? Horace's father was not interested in the reasons for doing or
avoiding certain actions — they were the philosopher's business. He was
more concerned that his son conform to traditional behaviour (*Serm.*
1.4.115-17). So Horace does not use reason on Torquatus, but urges
him to conform to custom: the emperor's birthday gives us this holiday,
it will be all right (9-10).[39]

    Macleod's reading of the fifth letter is in my view flawed because
he looks for "philosophy" where I would find a concern with "appropri-
ate conduct" (an altogether narrower field than ethics). A related error,
in my submission, is too precise an attribution of Horatian reflections to
one or another school. Let 18.112, "det uitam, det opes: aequum mi
animum ipse parabo," serve as an example. The standard German
commentary of Kiessling-Heinze calls this "epikurische Weisheit", and
since Horace had just spoken of the "fallentis semita uitae" (103, quoted
above) how can we object? Easily: for the wisdom is as Stoic as it is Epi-
curean, or rather, it is common to numerous shades of opinion (e.g.
Cic. *Nat. Deor.* 3.86-88, Sen. *Epist.* 41.1, Juv. 10.363). Horace deals,
as his critics have often complained, in commonplaces. That is impor-
tant, because it releases him from dogmatism or rigour. He can hu-
manely approach matters which concern us all (cf. 1.24-26) in a spirit
of enquiry rather than with an eye to consistency or system (those pre-
requisites of philosophical ethics).

    In a word, Horace is a Socratic. With that Roman sense of the
value of the original he goes back to the source of interest in ethics,
Socrates. He may well borrow from the derived schools, as need
prompts. (So his friend Virgil claims to follow Hesiod in his *Georgics*,
but we trace his debts to Hesiod's "imitators," especially Aratus.) But his
sense of the classic drove him back *ad fontem*. When young Lollius is

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[38] For the passage from Posidonius embedded in Seneca's letter, see now Theiler's
edition, fr. 445, with commentary.

[39] Just so he appeals to the drinking of Cato at *Carm.* 3.21.11f. to justify Corvinus's
call for mellower wine.

urged to "enquire of the learned" (18.86), I have a picture of Socrates buttonholing Protagoras or Gorgias who claimed to have answers. Horace's approach to ethics therefore is a throwback to earlier, untrammeled days of wide enquiry. He puts both philosophy and poetry in their place as guides to the universal quest for the good life (11.29). As Horace presents it, no one has all the answers.

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# THE DATE OF OVID'S *ARS AMATORIA* 3

This paper is meant to be read in conjunction with my preceding paper, "Imitation and Authenticity in Ovid: *Met.* 1.477 and *Her.* 15," AJP 106:4 (1985) pp. 456–74, where the mode of argument is explained.

The dating of Book 3 of Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* is subject to dispute. It is later in composition than the publication of *Ars* 1–2, than the *Medicamina Faciei Femineae* (*Ars* 3.205), than the second edition of the *Amores* (*Ars* 3.343),[1] and than the *Heroides* (*Ars* 3.345). Allusions in *Ars* 1.171 and 179 to events of 2–1 B.C. have generally led scholars to date the publication of *Ars* 1–2 to 1 B.C. (it being unlikely that Ovid would have continued to predict a triumph for Gaius Caesar after his tragic death). If so, *Ars* 3 could easily have been composed after the composition of the early parts of the *Metamorphoses* — a poem essentially complete in 8 A.D. But Sir Ronald Syme, *History in Ovid* (Oxford 1978) 13–15, conjectures a second edition of *Ars* 1–2, for which the reference to the predicted triumph was supposedly added. I am skeptical that this passage entered only in a second edition, but, if Syme were correct, we would expect the second edition of *Ars* 1–2 to correspond with the publication of *Ars* 3, which would make it unlikely for work on *Ars* 3 to predate work on the *Metamorphoses*.

Consideration of imitations similar to what I have discussed in the previous article convinces me that *Ars* 3 was composed later than *Met.* 1:

> *Aen.* 8.326 *deterior donec paulatim ac decolor aetas*
>     et belli rabies et amor successit **habendi**.
> *Met.* 1.130 in quorum subiere locum *fraudesque dolique*
>     insidiae*que* et uis et amor *sceleratus* **habendi**.
> *Ars* 3.539 *adde quod* **insidiae** *sacris a uatibus absunt*
>     *(et facit ad mores ars quoque nostra suos),*
>     nec *nos ambitio* nec **amor** *nos tangit* **habendi**.

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[1] With most scholars, I accept the reading of codex A in 3.343, *deue tribus* (cf. *Trist.* 1.1.115 *deque tribus*). Codices R and Y have separate corruptions which suggest an inherited reading *deue ter*, perhaps with some following minims (*deue ter i* or *deueterii*), which may have resulted from *deue iii*.

*Met.* 1.130f both imitates *Aen.* 8.327 (both on the introduction of the iron age, sharing, besides the generally similar concepts "in quorum subiere locum / successit" and "uis / belli rabies," the sequence of diction "et . . . et . . . amor s . . . habendi"),[2] and, in its imitation, is imitated by *Ars* 3.539-41, with which it shares the sequence of diction "insidiae . . . amor . . . habendi" (and a partial similarity of structure, with *nec . . . nec* corresponding to *et . . . et*);[3] that is, lines 539-41 of

[2] Note that besides the three passages quoted above, there are only three other passages composed down through the time of Ovid in which the locution *amor habendi* occurs. It is significant that the locution does not occur in Lucretius, despite opportunities: the closest that he comes is 5.1432f *quae sit habendi finis*, 4.869 *amorem . . . edendi*. The earliest attestation, and most likely the original coinage of the locution, is Verg. *G.* 4.177 ("Cecropias innatus apes amor urget habendi"): for here the selection of the word of passion *amor* is governed by Vergil's depiction of the bees as not indulging in the normal human kind of *amor* (4.198f "neque concubitu indulgent nec corpora segnes in Venerem soluunt. . . ." 205 "tantus *amor* florum et *generandi* gloria mellis"). *Aen.* 8.327 is linked with *G.* 4.177 by common authorship: that is, once the combination was coined by Vergil, he was free to reuse it in different contexts. The evidence for the relationship of Hor. *Ep.* 1.7.85 "*et amore senescit habendi*" is marginal (see note 4 below), but, such as it is, it suggests indebtedness to *Aen.* 8.327 "*et amor successit habendi*," which Horace may have heard recited (or even may have read for criticism) before Vergil's death; we can say with some assurance that, to judge by the date of publication of *Ep.* 1 (around 20), *Ep.* 1.7.85 could not be the source of *G.* 4.177, and, by its deviation from the nominative case (found in the earliest example, and in all four of the other examples), and lack of any distinctive element shared exclusively with any of the other examples, it cannot be the source of any of the other four. I argue that *Met.* 1.131 imitates *Aen.* 8.327, and *Ars* 3.541 betrays reminiscence of *Met.* 1.131. The remaining early occurrence of *amor habendi, Fasti* 1.195 "tempore creuit amor, qui nunc est summus, habendi," shows itself by 193 *Saturno . . . regnante* to be an independent imitation of *Aen.* 8.328 (cf. *Aen.* 8.319 *Saturnus*, 324 *illo sub rege*, 325 *regebat*): in these two passages alone of the six the reference is to early Latium under the kingship of Saturn. With this similarity, combined with the lack of any element of diction shared solely with any of the other passages, we have the classic evidence of an independent imitation. No conclusion therefore can be drawn from the shared locution *amor habendi* about the chronological relationship of *Fasti* 1.195 to the other two Ovidian occurrences.

[3] The chance that a three-line passage of *Ars* 3 could exist bearing no relation to *Met.* 1.131, yet sharing with it "insidiae . . . nec / et . . . nec / et amor . . . habendi" in that order, are calculable as, at best, the ratio of the number of occurrences of the form *insidiae* in Ovid (only four occurrences, including these two, in the approximate 35,000 lines of the Ovidian corpus) times the ratio of occurrences of either "et . . . et" or "nec . . . nec" (1/66 lines) times the ratio of occurrences of *amor habendi* (3/35000 lines), times 1/12 (twelve being the number of positions relative to each other in which those items of diction could be arranged, even if *amor habendi* is regarded as fixed in that order and inseparable), times three, and times the number of lines in *Ars* 3 (812). By these figures, the odds against chance recurrence of these elements comes out at greater

*Ars* 3 share five elements with *Met.* 1.130f (composition by the same
author, a similarity of structure, and three elements of diction, all in the
same order), three of which are shared with *Aen.* 8.327, and two of
which are not, but lack six elements (context, two concepts, and three
elements of diction) which *Aen.* 8.327 shares with *Met.* 1.130f, while
sharing no distinctive[4] element with *Aen.* 8.326f not shared with *Met.*

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than thirty-three million to one. But the figures are based on concession that the occur-
rences of *insidiae* and *amor habendi* are unrelated. If all occurrences of *amor habendi*
are, as I argue, related in some way to Vergil, the odds against finding an unrelated
occurrence are actually infinite.

⁴The definition of a distinctive element is implied in the claim that three distinc-
tive elements suffice to identify two passages as closely related. If elements, in combina-
tion, suffice to link two passages, and only two passages, of extant literature, and to
render improbable that any earlier example could have shared these elements, or that
the combination could have arisen by chance, the elements taken together are distinc-
tive; usually two shared elements must suffice to show that there is some relationship, not
necessarily close (e.g., all examples of *amor habendi* are in some way related), while the
third element must suffice to distinguish two occurrences of the two elements from all
other occurrences of these two elements. There is one phonematic combination which
*Ars* 3.541 (and not *Met.* 1.131) shares with *Aen.* 8.326, the termination *-it* before *ha-
bendi*. This fails on two grounds to be distinctive: the combination is found also in Hor.
*Ep.* 1.7.85 *senescit habendi*; it is within the realm of chance for such correspondence to
occur. The kind of word which might precede *habendi* is influenced by metrical require-
ments, as well as requirements of syntax and normal poetic habit (a tendency to place the
verb in between a noun and its modifier). As for metrical requirements, in the first 1000
lines of the *Metamorphoses* I find that more than one out of every five words ending in
this metrical position before *h* or a vowel is a verb ending in *-it*, and almost one out of
every two verbs in this position so ends. In general, agreement in termination by itself
does not qualify as a distinctive element: the number of terminations are so limited that
odds probably favor finding some chance agreement within the space of three lines. But
it can be linked with other elements to find a combination which is in total distinctive.
Horace *Ep.* 1.7.85 ends with *senescit* **habendi**, where *senescit* shares with *Aen.* 8.327
*successit* **habendi** the phonemes marked in boldface. The chance that the word before
*habendi* would end in *-it* is perhaps one in three (if we combine the metrical require-
ments with the tendency to place the verb between noun and modifier and in such a
metrical position); the chance that a word beginning with a consonant would begin with
*s* is about one in ten; but words with a medial syllable ending in *es* are uncommon (in the
range of one in 125), and the combination of all these elements is accordingly quite rare:
the chance that a word coming second last in a dactylic line would not only start with *s*
but end in *-it* and have a medial syllable ending in *es* may be estimated by noting that in
the more than twelve thousand lines of Vergil there is only one example, *Aen.* 8.327
*successit habendi*, and in Horace too the occurrence before *habendi* is the sole example.
The odds are not so great when the given elements of metrical position and placement
are factored in, but they are nevertheless great, since words which meet all three require-
ments of initial *s*, medial syllable terminating in *es*, and ending in *-it* are of rare occur-

1.130f (the last proviso is the test against contamination, or descent from a lost intermediary between the *Aeneid* and the *Metamorphoses*).[5] By the principles explained in "Imitation and Authenticity . . ." above, this indicates that, if the *Aeneid* is earlier than the *Metamorphoses*, *Ars* 3.539-41 descends from it through *Met.* 1.130f, and so must be later in composition than *Met.* 1.130f. Similarly, though here the evidence is

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rence in Latin (in Vergil and Horace, besides the two occurrences in question, only *Aen.* 4.10 *successit*, 10.100 *silescit*, and *Ars Poetica* 281 *successit* meet those requirements). The apparent large odds against chance occurrence of these similarities must be mitigated somewhat by the consideration that if one counts resemblances in letters and syllables, rather than whole words, the opportunities for chance resemblance of some sort are much greater. Yet even with such opportunity taken into account, the quantity of phonematic resemblance of the final hemistiches of *Aen.* 8.327 and *Ep.* 1.7.85 seems too great for chance. Why would anyone imitate *successit* with *senescit* (or vice versa)? Probably not deliberately and consciously, but because the ring of a familiar sound in his memory made him feel more comfortable in composing a line ending with a similar ring (the rhythmic difference of *amore senescit* from *amor successit* reflects Horace's relative fondness for homodynes in the fourth foot). What makes the evidence for Horace's relationship to *Aen.* 8.327 less than secure is that when the points of similarity are minimal in quantity and precision, as they are both between *G.* 4.177 and *Aen.* 8.327 and between the latter and Horace, there is minimal protection against conflation or a lost common source as the explanation for the resemblances.

   [5] See "Imitation and Authenticity . . ." *AJP* 106: 4 (1985) including notes 15-19. Besides the kinds of improbabilities there listed which prohibit taking *Met.* 1.130f as arising through conflation of *Aen.* 8.326f with *Ars* 3.539-41 (e. g., the conflation would have to have been made with one of only two other lines in Ovid which possess the locution *amor habendi*: if a conflation had been made with *G.* 4.177 or Hor. *Ep.* 1.7.85 it would have been exposed as a conflation, and if it had been made with any of the other tens of thousands of lines of Ovid, or of the remaining hundreds of thousand extant lines of Latin, it would create no problem), there are improbabilities which prevent taking *Ars* 3.539-41 as either unrelated to *Aen.* 8.326f (which would make it the only occurrence of *amor habendi* in Ovid not so related: see notes 2-3 above), or as descended from *Aen.* 8.326f by any route other than through *Met.* 1.130: for the last to occur we must suppose that, of all the words in *Aen.* 8.326f and the adjacent lines, Ovid chose to imitate in *Ars* 3.539-41 those four words and only those four words which he was in *Met.* 1.130 to take over without change ("et . . . et amor . . . habendi"), did so with less precision ("nec . . . nec amor . . . habendi"), while achieving greater precision in imitating neither words which *Met.* 1.130 imprecisely imitates ("belli rabies, successit"), nor words which *Met.* 1.130 ignores. The improbability of this can be seen in part by observing that these features characterize none of the other occurrences of *amor habendi* (see also the later examples collected by O. Schumann, *Lateinisches Hexameter–Lexikon* I [Munich 1979] 81). This improbability must then be multiplied by the improbability that, though Ovid's experience of the word *insidiae* (the sole word not owed to *Aen.* 8.327 which *Met.* 1.131 and *Ars* 3.359-61 share, and one whose occurrence in both, as pointed out in note 3 above, cannot be by chance) must be inestimably large, he would use *Ars* 3.359 as his

more limited, and so the argument taken singly less secure, we should understand *Ars* 3.133 "non sint *sine lege capilli*" as arising under the influence of *Met.* 1.477 "positos *sine lege capillos.*"[6] When we combine both, in the absence of contradictory internal evidence, the probabilities are very strong that *Ars* 3 was composed later than *Met.* 1.

That is the minimum. There is other evidence, less secure:

> *Met.* 6.227 "*ei mihi,*" conclamat, medioque in pectore fixa
>     tela gerit.
>   7.842 Procris erat, *medioque* tenens *in pectore* uulnus
>       "*ei mihi,*" conclamat.
>   *Ars* 3.737 "*ei mihi,*" conclamat, "fixisti *pectus* amicum."

There may be conflation here, as *Met.* 6.227 may also have influenced *Ars* 3.735 *tela* and 3.736 *fixa*. Although there is not here a clean, simple stemma, nevertheless the latter two passages are linked ɩ.y a shared subject (Procris) and event (Cephalus' accidental slaying of his wife), and the first two, while describing different events (6.227 is the death of Ismenus, a son of Niobe), are linked by a more concentrated and precise resemblance in diction and structure. There is further a greater clarity to the use in *Met.* 7.842. In *Ars* 3.737, because of the third–person narration, it is not immediately clear that Procris is the one shouting (Cephalus could have been exclaiming to himself). In *Met.* 7.842, the story is told by Cephalus, and even without the introducing clause there would be no doubt from the start who shouts. The momentary ambiguity of *Ars* 3.737 is likely to be the product of borrowing without change the "ei mihi conclamat" of *Met.* 7.842. The latter passage had no need to borrow from *Ars* 3, unless one believes that Ovid composed the *Metamorphoses* backwards: the scene and diction were already in his repertoire from 6.227.

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model for the word in *Met.* 1.131: although it is possible for a word or phrase to trigger recollection of another partially similar combination, *insidiae* in *Met.* 1.130 seems to belong to a unit "fraudesque dolique insidiaeque" (that is, the synonyms seem to have triggered recollection of each other), and once *Aen.* 8.327 is recognized as the sufficient cause of the items of diction "et . . . et amor . . . habendi," there is no reason to believe *Ars* 3.539 the source of *insidiae* in *Met.* 1.131; in fact they key word to indicate the iron age is *fraudes* (cf. Verg. *E.* 4.31 *fraudis*), and it is most likely that *dolique insidiaeque* entered mainly as amplification of this inherited word. In short, it is prohibitively improbable to suppose the relation of the three passages anything other than influence of *Aen.* 8.326f on *Met.* 1.130f, followed by influence of *Met.* 1.131 on *Ars* 3.359-61.

   [6] See "Imitation and Authenticity . . ." (note 5 above), including note 5. As I argue in that article, *Met.* 1.477 was composed under the influence of *Her.* 4.77 **positi**que sine *arte* capilli.

Note the genre to which *conclamare* belongs. Before Ovid, the word does not occur in amatory or didactic poetry, other than in Catullus 42.18, where it is humorous, and means "all shout together" (not, as here, "exclaim"). There is no occurrence in Lucretius, Tibullus, Horace, Propertius, or in Ovid's own amatory poetry (if we relegate the *Ars* to didactic). It occurs ten times in the *Aeneid* (seven in the form *conclamat*), but not in the *Eclogues* or *Georgics*. It is not infrequent in history (though most instances indicate a shout by a group). In Ovid, it occurs only in the *Metamorphoses* (4.691, 10.385, 13.73, and the above two passages) and in *Ars* 3.737. It seems to have entered Ovid's poetic diction from epic, and made for Ovid its one foray out of that general genre (if you call the *Metamorphoses* epic) in *Ars* 3's borrowing.

Uncertainty about the relations of the next group of connected passages results from the lack of an external criterion to identify the earliest.

> *Met.* 6.385      *"quid me* mihi *detrahis?" inquit;*
>       *"a!* piget! *a!* non est," clama*bat,* "tibia tanti."
> *Met.* 11.778 exanimem, clamat*que* "piget! *piget esse secutum!*
>       sed non *hoc timui, nec* erat mihi *uincere* tanti."
> *Ars* 3.505 *"i procul hinc,"* dixit, **"non es mihi tibia tanti"**
> *Fasti* 6.701 *"ars* mihi *non tanti est; ualeas mea* tibia" dixi.

I hope that all would agree that *Met.* 11.778 is later, than 6.386, and influenced by it.[7] But our concern is with the relations of the other three. If, as I believe, the earliest version among them is *Met.* 6.385f, then *Ars* 3.505 comes from it, and *Fasti* 6.701 from *Ars* 3.505 (in both of the latter two Minerva is the speaker; in *Met.* 6.385f it is Marsyas as he is being flayed alive). If *Fasti* 6.701 were earliest, *Ars* 3.505 would descend from it, and *Met.* 6.385f from *Ars* 3. If *Ars* 3 is earliest, we can tell nothing about the chronology of the other two relative to each other, since both would descend independently from *Ars* 3.

*Met.* 6.386 seems to me the earliest version of *tibia tanti,* because in that line the *t* sounds, which seem the motivation for coining the collocation, are most developed. Also the wit of the related passage in the *Ars* is enhanced when Minerva's vain remark on seeing her reflection is recognized as a variation on the tragic protest of Marsyas as he is flayed alive; but the pathos of *Met.* 6.386 has little to gain from perception of

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[7] Other passages which appear to be influenced by *Met.* 6.386 are *Met.* 10.613 "non sum me iudice tanti" (this in turn influences *Trist.* 2.209 "nam non sum tanti") and *Her.* 17(16).225 "non sunt tua munera tanti."

an allusion to *Ars* 3.505. If these arguments are accepted, this makes a fourth passage of *Ars* 3 which appears later in composition than a related passage of the *Metamorphoses*. It appears that the composition, or at least completion, of *Ars* 3 postdates the composition of *Metamorphoses* 1–7.

Historians delight in pointing out that, though Augustus claimed the *Ars* as his excuse for banishing Ovid, the work must have been published around 1 B.C., well before the banishment in 8 A.D. Therefore, it is argued, the poem was a mere pretext. Mere pretext it may have been, but even a pretext needs to be credible. Syme (19) points to the concluding couplet of *Ars* 3, "ut quondam iuuenes, ita nunc, mea turba, puellae / inscribant spoliis NASO MAGISTER ERAT": "Mark the word 'quondam'. It is revealing. In the mind of the author *AA* I–II was not a recent work." Indeed it was not. But Syme's solution, to place a "first edition" of the *Ars* around 8 B.C., and a "second edition ' (together with *Ars* 3) around 1 B.C., would make Augustus' excuse all the less credible before the Roman public. There is indeed evidence of a second edition of *Ars* 1–2: just as *Ars* 3 ends with the couplet quoted above, a sphragis marking the completion of the poem, so *Ars* 1–2 must have originally concluded with 2.743f "sed quicumque meo superarit Amazona ferro, / inscribat spoliis NASO MAGISTER ERAT." But this couplet is now followed by 745f "ecce, rogant tenerae, sibi dem praecepta, puellae / uos eritis chartae proxima cura meae." This prediction of the coming *Ars* 3 could not have formed part of the original edition (it destroys the closure achieved by 743f); it therefore must have been added in a second edition to form the bridge to *Ars* 3. But the evidence that Ovid was at work on the *Metamorphoses* before composing *Ars* 3 makes it more likely that the first edition of *Ars* 1–2 was published about 1 B.C., the second edition, together with *Ars* 3, close to 8 A.D.

It would be possible to maintain Syme's date if we were willing to postulate Ovid's work on the *Metamorphoses* more than a decade before his banishment.[8] But I take Ovid, in his references to the poetry of his

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[8] M. Pohlenz, "Die Abfassungszeit von Ovids Metamorphosen," *Hermes* 48 (1913) 1–3, arguing that *Met.* 1.5–77 is earlier than *Ars* 2.467–73, placed the beginning of work on the *Metamorphoses* even before *Ars* 2. His evidence is not conclusive, and even if one can prove that some lines of *Ars* 2 are later than some lines of the *Metamorphoses*, the possibility of a second edition leaves many different conclusions which could be drawn (e.g., that only the second edition of *Ars* 2 postdates the beginning of work on the *Metamorphoses*). It is clear that at least some lines in the episode of Daedalus and Icarus predate the corresponding lines in *Met.* 8 (e.g., *Ars* 2.77f is shown by its closer resem-

"youth,"[9] to mean his original *Amores*. Lewis and Short define a *iuuenis* as anyone between the ages of twenty and forty, while the *OLD* claims "technically any adult male up to the age of forty-five." But in practice it is important to notice who is using the word, and for what purpose. In the mouth of a *senex*, when it suits his purpose, a *iuuenis* may be anyone younger than he. Most properly it is someone of military age, and Ovid gives us a clue to his usage in *Trist.* 2.541f: "carminaque edideram cum te delicta notantem / praeterii totiens inreprehensus eques": Ovid protests that he was often reviewed as a knight by Augustus in the *transuectio*,[10] and was not censured despite having already composed (amatory) poetry. The lines are a defense against a charge of composing amatory verse (see below), not specifically composition of an *Ars*, and so should not be taken as indicating a date for that poem. Service as a knight was traditionally[11] from the age of seventeen to forty-six (that is, through the age of forty-five); the *equites* were even known as *principes iuuentutis*.[12] In the context of *Tristia* 2 then, Ovid

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blance to Apollonius to predate *Met.* 8.217-220), but, although we lack all the elements of a proof, both *Met.* 8.206 and *Ars* 2.63 "inter utrumque uola" seem indebted to *Met.* 2.140 "inter utrumque tene" (spoken by the Sun to his son Phaethon) and *Met.* 8.13 "inter utrumque uolat." A likely inspiration for *Met.* 2.140 is the reading of the codices at *Aen.* 3.685f, "inter utramque . . . ni teneant." Many explanations could be given for such apparently conflicting evidence, including simultaneous composition, or revision of the episode for the second edition of *Ars* 2.

[9] *Trist.* 1.9.61, 2.543, 3.1.7f, 5.1.7f. These passages are the bases for supposing a relatively early date for the composition of the *Ars*. We unfortunately lack a precise and convenient equivalent for the Latin *iuuenis*, on whose meaning here see below.

[10] See Suetonius *Aug.* 38.3 "equitum turmas frequenter recognouit . . . reducto more transuectionis," and 39 "unum quemque equitum rationem uitae reddere coegit atque ex inprobatis alios poena, alios ignominia notauit, plures admonitione, sed uaria." Although Augustus did not hold the office of censor, he seems on these occasions to exercise a censorial power.

[11] That is, under the republic, for which we have evidence: Polybius 6.19.2, Livy 43.14.6, Gell. 10.28.1. Gellius cites Tubero as attributing the prescription to Servius Tullius; he uses the evidence to determine what the ancients meant by the terms *pueritia*, *iuuenta*, and *senectus*, and makes no distinction with the practice of his own day. Although the ages of service had relevance for conscription of an army of citizens, and not necessarily for the army under Augustus, in which troops were sometimes kept in service into old age (Tacitus *Ann.* 1.17.2), Ovid was not a soldier. Since *transuectio* was an early republican institution restored by Augustus, it is reasonable to expect that the duty to ride in the *transuectio* lapsed with attainment of age 46. Augustus eventually exempted, upon request, even those who passed age 35 (Suetonius *Aug.* 38.3).

[12] Liv. 42.61.5, 9.14.16, and elsewhere; also 2.20.11 *iuuentutis proceres*, 10.28.7.

ceased being a *iuuenis* when he reached his forty-sixth birthday, on
March 20, 4 A.D.

Is this then the *terminus ante quem* for *Ars* 3? The evidence of
imitation does not forbid, but *Trist.* 2, in my interpretation, does. Note
the sequence. After defending himself against the charge that his *Ars*
corrupted women (277-312), Ovid answers an imagined complaint that
he wrote such poetry at all rather than celebrating Augustus in epic: his
talent was not rich enough (335f "diuitis ingenii est inmania Caesaris
acta / condere, materia ne superetur opus"). He goes on to claim
(337ff) "et tamen ausus eram. sed detractare uidebar, / quodque ne-
fas, damno uiribus esse tuis. / ad leue rursus opus, iuuenalia carmina,
ueni, / et falso moui pectus amore meum." The poetry of his "youth" to
which he returned after failing in the claimed attempt to celebrate the
great deeds of Caesar seems, from the description ("falso moui pectus
amore meum"), to be the *Amores*, which, as the work's first four lines
inform us, he reissued in a three-book edition (reduced in size from its
original issue in five separate books). Ovid seems slyly to pretend that
*Amores* 1.1 ("Arma graui numero uiolentaque bella parabam . . ."),
which is a variation on a standard *topos* (used also in *Amores* 2.1.11ff),
is autobiographical, and refers to a return to amatory verse after an
attempt at epic.[13] The words, "I returned to light work, the verse of my
youth," seem to imply that he was not any longer a *iuuenis* when he
completed the three-book edition of *Amores*.[14] But, as we learn from

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[13] Note that M. Pohlenz, *De Ovidii Carminibus Amatoriis* (Goettingen 1913) 8f
argues that *Am.* 1.1 was composed for the second edition. For other evidence on the
lateness of *Am.* 1.1, see the Appendix below. But I regard it as inessential to my argu-
ment here whether *Am.* 1.1 is early or late, and whether Ovid alludes in *Trist.* 2.337ff to
a specific poem. If *Am.* 1.1 was composed for the second edition, we would probably
have to place with it 2.1, which seems (in line 3 "hoc quoque iussit Amor") to allude to
1.1. If Ovid in *Trist.* 2.339f does allude to specific poems of the *Amores*, the allusions
perhaps prove too much, since the *Amores* present Ovid's various attempts at epic as
occurring before his attempt at tragedy (see 2.18), and so fairly early in his career. But I
take those attempts to be literary fictions, not to be fit within a real chronology of Ovid's
life. I do not regard a *terminus post quem* of 4 A.D. for the second edition of the *Amores*
as secure, but believe that the case should be presented, if only to permit further test.

[14] I recognize that *iuuenalia carmina* might mean not "verse of my youth," but
"verse suited to youth." But that is not the most natural interpretation after *rursus ueni*,
and it does not agree with the argument: that is, Ovid argues not that *when young* he
could not write serious poetry, but that his *nature* is not suited to serious poetry — the
culprit is not *aetas* or *anni*, but *ingenium* (335), *fata* (341), and *natura* (531). Most
scholars already take the second edition of the *Amores* to postdate *Ars* 1-2 (supposing
*Amores* 2.18.19f to refer to it).

*Ars* 3.343f, the three-book edition of the *Amores* antedates the comple-
tion of *Ars* 3. Therefore, if he was no longer *iuuenis* when his last work
on the *Amores* took place, he was no longer *iuuenis* when he completed
*Ars* 3.

Later in *Trist.* 2, Ovid protests that he alone is punished, though
many have composed amatory verse (361f "denique composui teneros
non solus amores: / composito poenas solus amore dedi"); he goes on to
list his predecessors (363-470): Anacreon, Sappho, Callimachus,
Menander, Homer, Euripides and tragic poetry, Ennius, Lucretius, Ca-
tullus, Calvus, Ticidas, Memmius, Cinna, Anser, Cornificius, Cato,
Varro of Atax, Hortensius, Servius, Sisenna, Gallus, Tibullus, Proper-
tius—a very broad definition of the composition of *amores*, and only in
small part made also a defense of composition of *artes*. He then argues
that others before him have written *artes* on light subjects: dice (471-
84), ball, swimming, hoop, cosmetics, dining, pottery (485-90). Fur-
ther, even mimes go unpunished (497-520), and erotic paintings (521-
28). Through all this (361-528) there have been two main activities
defended: the composition of *amores*,[15] and the composition of an *ars*
on light or amatory topic. He now returns to his claim that his nature is
suited only for light verse (531ff):

> inuida me spatio natura coercuit arto,
>     ingenio uires exiguasque dedit.
> et tamen ille tuae felix Aeneidos auctor
>     contulit in Tyrios arma uirumque toros,
> nec legitur pars ulla magis de corpore toto,
>     quam non legitimo foedere iunctus amor.
> Phyllidis hic idem teneraeque Amaryllidis ignes
>     bucolicis iuuenis luserat ante modis.
> nos quoque iam pridem scripto peccauimus isto:
>     supplicium patitur non noua culpa nouum;
> carminaque edideram cum te delicta notantem
>     praeteriit totiens inreprehensus eques.
> ergo quae iuuenis mihi non nocitura putaui
>     scripta parum prudens, nunc nocuere seni.

I am not suited to epic, he says, but even that great composer of epic,
Vergil, composed *amores* when *iuuenis*. "We too have long ago sinned

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[15] So 367f "nec tibi Battiade nocuit quod saepe legenti / delicias uersu fassus es
ipse tuas." Only in the *Amores* does Ovid pretend to recount his own loves. He had de-
fended himself (349-60) after the manner of Catullus (16.5f): a poet should be chaste, his
verses need not be.

in that genre: an old type of fault suffers a new type of punishment; and I had published verses at the time when, so often, you were noting faults, and I passed you on horseback without being censured. Therefore the types of writing which I, when *iuuenis*, imprudently thought would do me no harm, now have harmed me as a *senex*." There now immediately follow (545f) the lines which more than any other have led scholars to suppose the *Ars* to have been published much earlier than Ovid's banishment:

> sera redundauit ueteris uindicta libelli,
> distat et a meriti tempore poena sui.

What is the *uetus libellus*? The *Ars*? But that is three *libelli* (actually three *libri*, but good rhetoric calls for the diminutive here). *Ars* 3? Strange if after all that build up ("iam pridem, totiens") he would refer to his most recent publication, and call it *uetus*. And even with a date of 1 B.C., the language of the passage could only seem an exaggeration. The words should be understood in sequence, and without prejudice concerning the true cause of Ovid's punishment. Coming where it comes, *uetus libellus* should refer to the *scriptum* of 539: "nos quoque iam pridem scripto peccauimus isto," and that *scriptum* must be something which Ovid shared with Vergil's amatory *Eclogues*. Under no stretch of the imagination do these *Eclogues* qualify as *artes*, and Ovid makes no such claim. They are rather *amores*, the apparently autobiographical[16] treatment of the *persona*'s love of *puer* or *puella*. The *libellus* of 545 should be the first book of *Amores* which Ovid ever published, no doubt in his early youth.[17] The argument which Ovid has been using in effect is, "If composing *amores* is a crime, I am not the first to do it (why then has no one before me been punished for it?), and I did it long ago (why did you not say anything during frequent opportunities?)." Confusion has entered because Ovid also defends himself against the charge of composing *artes* (they do not corrupt; they are only jokes). But though, by my calculation, Ovid composed *Ars* 1-2 while still *iuuenis*, reference to the poetry of his youth is linked with a context referring to the *Amores*.[18] Consider *Tristia* 1.9.59-62:

[16] So the *Eclogues* were interpreted in antiquity.
[17] See *Trist.* 4.10.57-60 "carmina cum primum populo iuuenalia legi, / barba resecta mihi bisue semelue fuit. / mouerat ingenium totam cantata per urbem / nomine non uero dicta Corinna mihi."
[18] Syme (16) claims that Ovid intends us to draw the analogy with the poetic career of Vergil, who composed *Eclogues* as a *iuuenis*, and then moved on to more serious work.

uita tamen tibi nota mea est.   scis artibus illis
  auctoris mores abstinuisse sui:
scis uetus hoc iuueni lusum mihi carmen, et istos,
  ut non laudandos, sic tamen esse iocos.

To what does (61) *hoc* refer? No poem has been mentioned. It is true that the preceding hexameter mentions *artes*, but the closer pentameter is a defense of Ovid's *Amores*: though he pretended to affairs of love in his *Amores*, the poems were fiction, and did not portray his true *mores*. In "uetus hoc carmen" we have an example of postpositive *hoc* for emphasis of the preceding word:[19] its main function is to emphasize *uetus*, and so mark it as contrasting with *istos* (which, by virtue of the contrast, equals *istos recentes*). Understand: "You know that this *old* verse of mine (the *Amores*) was a *lusus* for my youth, and that *those* infamous (more recent verses, the *Ars*), although not praiseworthy, yet nevertheless are jokes."[20]

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But what is significant rather is that here, where the situation is ready made for it, Ovid has presented no such argument: he has not claimed that he composed *Amores* and *Ars* as *iuuenis*, and then moved on to didactic *Fasti* and epic *Metamorphoses*. And if he did not so claim where the situation calls for it, it must be because he could accurately make no such claim: he was still composing an *ars amandi*, and probably *amores*, as a *senex*.

[19] Cf. Leumann-Hoffmann-Szantyr, *Lateinische Grammatik* 2.2 (Munich 1965) 407f: "Ebenso stehen *hic, iste, ille* oft nach, wenn das Subst. im Blickpunkt des Interesses steht und der deiktische Hinweis nur der Ergänzung dient . . .; so besonders im Gegensatz (z. B. Ter. *Ad.* 376f. 'piscis ceteros purga . . .; gongrum istum maximum . . . sinito ludere')." The grammarian speaks only of postposition to the noun (which was his topic), but the principle is the same. The postpositive demonstrative is enclitic, and, by its attachment to the preceding word, it emphasizes that word; emphasis is the main mechanism for warning the reader that a word is meant to contrast with something else (following, preceding, or implied). That *hoc* is here enclitic is detectable from the position in the verse, at the beginning of the second foot, where Ovid overwhelmingly prefers a clash between prose and verse accentuation (heterodyne). The position is less frequently used for emphatic monosyllables, but frequent for monosyllables which are enclitic (e.g., 39 *sunt*) or proclitic (e.g., 31 *ad*, 49 *non*), with the clash of accent thereby preserved. The enclitic could have marked *uetus* as predicate, but that role is performed by *lusum* (so marked by the enclitic *mihi*).

[20] For *iocos* compare *Trist.* 2.238, also of the *Ars*, as 240 makes clear. So in 2.538 *iuuenis luserat* is applied to Vergil's *Eclogues*, and by implication (539) to the *Amores*. The interpretation of *Trist.* 1.9.61 will affect the understanding of 3.1.7f, where *id quoque opus* may now mean "not only jokes (*Ars*), but also my juvenile *lusus* (*Amores*)." *Lusus* is a word of many meanings, among them "amatory sport," and "poetry pretending amatory sport." It would not suit the rhetoric of his argument to point out that the second edition of *Amores* appeared when he was *senex*, and so no inference about that edition's date should be drawn from his insistence that the *Amores* were a juvenile *lusus*.

As *iuuenis* Ovid published (at least) five books of *Amores*, a collection of *Heroides*, his tragedy *Medea*, and *Ars* 1-2.[21] In my understanding of *Trist.* 2.339, he published as a *senex* (probably between 4 and 8 A.D.) the second edition of the *Amores*, followed by a second edition of *Ars* 1-2 together with *Ars* 3. If all Ovid's references to juvenile poems were to the *Amores*, we lack confirmation that his use of *iuuenalia carmina* in *Trist.* 2.339 establishes a *terminus post quem* for the second edition of *Amores* as late as March 20 of 4 A.D., and it is perhaps risky to find such precision in the words of poets. But those who see in *Amores* 2.18.19 a reference to the *Ars* must date that poem, at least, later than *Ars* 1-2; yet this same poem, which lists Ovid's poetic activity as *Amores*, tragedy, *Ars*, and the letters of the *Heroides*, gives no hint of activity on the *Metamorphoses*. When we add the reference to the second edition of *Amores* in *Ars* 3, and the evidence that *Ars* 3 is influenced by *Met.* 1 (if not by *Met.* 1-7), the sequence which emerges is *Ars* 1-2, *Am.* 2.18, *Met.* 1 (probably at least to Book 7), *Ars* 3. *Ars* 3 therefore was probably published not long before Ovid's banishment.

When scholars seek to determine what Ovid's *error*[22] was which led to his banishment, they have a real problem. Ovid seems to have made too many mistakes. Not meeting all the requirements of the *crimen*[23] (since unlikely to have been part of a specific accusation, and not definable as something that he saw) are two mistakes which now seem revealed. The biggest mistake was to have unluckily published *Ars* 3, advising women how to seduce men, shortly before Augustus' discovery of Julia's adultery. This was indeed a mistake which all Romans would know, and which Ovid could not describe (*Trist.* 4.10.99f; *Pont.* 1.6.21f, 2.2.57f). Next in order is the gaucherie of reissuing *Ars* 1, complete with its prediction of Gaius Caesar's triumph, after Gaius' tragic (and presumably triumphless) death. If Augustus was not genuinely angry, he should have been.

## APPENDIX — *REMEDIA AMORIS*

The *Remedia Amoris* I take to be a product of two editions, the first issued shortly after publication of *Ars* 1-2, the second as a companion to the second edition of the *Ars* containing also *Ars* 3. In its basic

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[21] For the *Remedia Amoris*, see the Appendix.
[22] *Trist.* 2.207 "duo crimina, carmen et error."
[23] Admirably summarized by Syme 216-19.

structure *Rem.* addresses only the needs of the man, with nothing meeting the specific needs of *puellae*, and much that is inappropriate for them: e.g., 151–58 ("busy yourself with the forum, the law–courts, or military service"). It therefore was originally composed to follow *Ars* 1–2, whose advice is similarly directed toward the man. Further, within a section of *Rem.* appropriate only for men, we find an apparent reference to the campaign and predicted triumph of Gaius Caesar, which was the basis for dating *Ars* 1 to around 1 B.C. (155f "ecce fugax Parthus, magni noua causa triumphi, / iam uidet in campis Caesaris arma suis"). But some passages seem to have been added later to suit the poem to follow an *Ars* which now contains *Ars* 3, with its advice to *puellae*. The passage 49 to 52 (and probably to 70), which begins "sed quaecumque uiris, uobis quoque dicta puellae / credite," and concedes that the poem is shaped for the needs of men (51f "e quibus ad uestros si quid non pertinet usus, / at tamen exemplo multa docere potest"), seems a minimalist addition to suit the new relationship; the same motive would prompt the addition of the final verse of the poem, and 591–608. The intrusiveness of 361–98, "a diatribe against detractors," has been noted by Syme (14), but he concluded: "No call, however, to postulate a second edition." Yet there are at least two indications of relative lateness in the passage (which really starts with 359). First, the references to *liuor* in 365 and to *Liuor edax* in 389 recall the defense against *Liuor edax* in *Amores* 1.15, a poem whose composition Syme (7 and 20) attributed to the second edition of *Amores*; even if this attribution should be wrong, the poem would be fresh in Ovid's mind (and so more likely to be imitated) close to the time of that second edition. Second, if Pohlenz (note 8 above p. 1) is correct in seeing in 391–94 a reference to the *Metamorphoses* and *Fasti*, there is evidence for composition after the inception of those works; even if he should be wrong, 391 *uiuam modo* is uttered from the perspective of a *senex*.[24] Therefore this pas-

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[24] The authenticity of the couplet 391f has unjustly been questioned by A. A. R. Henderson, "Notes on the text of Ovid's *Remedia Amoris*," *CQ* 30 (1980) 168f. Lines 389–92 ("rumpere, *Liuor edax:* magnum iam nomen habemus; / maius erit, tantum, quo pede coepit, eat. / sed nimium properas: *uiuam* modo, plura dolebis, / et capiunt *anni* carmina *multa mei*") were composed under the influence of the first and last lines of *Am.* 1.15 (1 "Quid mihi, *Liuor edax*, ignauos obicis *annos*," and 42 "*uiuam*, parsque *mei multa* superstes erit"). The imitation of *Liuor edax* is precise in meaning and structure, while the other four shared words reflect more the poet's recollection of the sounds of the lines. The resemblances (which embrace also undisputed lines) support the authenticity both of the couplet, and of 392 *anni* (emended to *animi* by later scribes, bothered by the apparent illogic of "et capiunt anni" following *uiuam modo*). I suspect that

sage too (starting with 359) seems to me likely to have been added in a second edition.

To return to *Am.* 1.15, there are sufficient clues to establish by internal evidence what most scholars who have dealt with the relationship already believe, that this poem is imitated in *Rem.* 359-398.[25] *Am.* 1.15 belongs to a standard type, involving a prediction of the poet's eternal fame. Its closest models among extant poems are Horace *Carm.* 3.30 and Prop. 3.1-2 (which should be joined as a single poem). Also belonging in this tradition is *Met.* 15.871-79, which shares much diction with both *Carm.* 3.30 and *Am.* 1.15. *Am.* 1.15.1 *Liuor edax* owes the diction *edax* and general rhythm to *Carm.* 3.30.3 *imber edax* (less close is *Met.* 15.872 *edax . . . uetustas*), but the thought to Prop. 3.1.21 *inuida turba* (unless there is some lost closer source). Therefore the shared locution, combined with the other close resemblances in diction and thought which *Rem.* 360-98 contains to *Am.* 1.15 (in which the passage departs further from the structures which that poem inherited from Horace), establishes that *Rem.* 359-98 is the later and influenced by *Am.* 1.15. The debt of *Am.* 1.15 to Horace includes (besides *edax*) 7 *perennis* (*Carm.* 3.30.1 *perennius, Met.* 15.875 *perennis*), and 41f "ergo etiam cum me supremus adederit ignis, / *uiuam, parsque mei multa* superstes erit" (*Carm.* 3.30.6f "non omnis moriar, *multaque pars mei* / uitabit Libitinam"). The closeness of the structure of 41f is apparent, with Horace's "non omnis moriar" turned into the oxymoron *uiuam* (in defiance of logic, since "a great part of me will survive" now becomes anticlimactic), and "multaque pars mei" merely rearranged to fit a pentameter. When then *Rem.* 391 adopts *uiuam* for a different purpose, and in a different structure (*uiuam modo*), its debt to *Am.* 1.15 is revealed (that is, indebtedness of one to the other is already es-

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*Rem.* 390 "tantum quo pede coepit eat" contains a pun. The first level of meaning is "provided that it go with the same fortune as it began." But the two preceding uses of *pes* in the same passage have referred to meter (373 *Maeonio . . . pede* of epic, 378 *pedem* of limping iamb): hence it is not too strained to see an implication "if I merely continue to compose elegiac poetry." Following this, *dolebis plura* ("you will have even more cause for grief at my success") and *carmina multa* ("many poems," that is, not merely "many in quantity," but also "many kinds of poems") present a prediction of success even in non-elegiac meter, therefore quite plausibly in epic.

[25] The imitation starts with 360, whose *ingenio uerbis* corresponds with *Am.* 1.15.2 *ingenii* and 5 *uerbosas*. Hence, if the passage is an insertion, the inserted text must include the couplet 359-60. It could also include 399f, which must at the least have been rewritten following the insertion.

tablished by the quantity and closeness of the resemblances; if we elimi-
nate the possibility that *Am.* 1.15 borrowed *uiuam* from *Rem.* 391,
there is left only the conclusion that *Rem.* 391 borrowed it from *Am.*
1.15). Similarly when *Met.* 15 uses the elements of *Am.* 1.15.41f in dif-
ferent groupings, employing *uiuam* in the concluding line (878f) "ore
legar populi, perque omnia saecula fama / (siquid habent ueri uatum
praesagia) *uiuam*," and employing *pars mei* above in 875f "*parte* tamen
meliore *mei* super alta perennis / astra ferar, nomenque erit indelebile
nostrum," it shows its indebtedness to *Am.* 1.15 (that is, the shared dic-
tion, including *uiuam*, which is not in Horace, establishes a relationship
between *Met.* 15 and *Am.* 1.15, while the greater divergence in these
resemblances of *Met.* 15 from Horace excludes the explanation that
*Met.* 15 is the source of the shared diction). The argument for the or-
dering of *Met.* 15 must be subtler, since, unlike *Rem.* 359ff, its lines
871-79 give evidence of independent conflation with Hor. *Carm.* 3.30
(e.g., 871 *exegi*).

Note that here is an instance where Axelson's form of argument
might come up with a different conclusion: for it is surely fitting to end
a poem with the proud boast *uiuam* (*Met.* 15.879), but anticlimactic to
place the word before the more restrained "parsque mei multa superstes
erit" (*Am.* 1.15.42). The anticlimax may work as a clue that *Am.* 1.15 is
later than Hor. *Carm.* 3.30 (in fact the entire couplet 41f follows awk-
wardly after 39f, which is owed to Propertius 3.1.21-24 — the conflation
of Horace and Propertius has produced a roughness missing from either
of the models), but fails as indication of the date relative to *Met.* 15.
One might also argue that *Met.* 15.875 *parte meliore* is a more pleasing
expression than the vaguer *pars multa*. But the better verse is not always
the earlier.

Since the resemblances which *Am.* 1.15 bears to Prop. 3.1-2 are
not as precise in diction as the resemblances of the other passages, it is
possible that if more ancient examples of the *topos* were extant we
would have to modify some conclusions. But *Am* 1.15 shares the follow-
ing with Prop. 3.1-2: 9 *Maeonides* (Prop. 3.1.33 *Homerus*; cf *Rem.* 365
*Homeri*, 373 *Maeonio*, 382 *Homere*); 9 *Ide* (Prop. 3.1.27 *Idaeum*); 10
*Simois* (Prop. 3.1.27 *Simoenta*); 13 *Battiades* (Prop. 3.1.1 *Callimachi*;
cf *Rem.* 381 *Callimachi*); 20 "casurum nullo tempore nomen" (Prop.
3.2.23f "non . . . nomen ab aeuo / excidet"); 23 *sublimis* (Prop. 3.1.9
*sublimis*); 32 "carmina morte carent" (Prop. 3.2.24 "ingenio stat sine
morte decus"); 39f "pascitur in *uiuis* Liuor; *post fata* quiescit, / cum
suus ex merito quemque tuetur *honos* (Prop. 3.1.31-34 at mihi quod

*uiuo* detraxerit *inuida* turba, / *post obitum* duplici faenore reddet
*Honos.* / omnia post obitum fingit majora uetustas: / maius ab exse-
quiis nomen in ora uenit.") My judgment that Prop. 3.1-2 is a single
poem is based more on internal evidence of the poem (and the worth-
lessness of the scribal testimony)[26] than on the possibility that Ovid in-
cluded 3.2 among his models for *Am.* 1.15. For it may be argued that
those models included even the preceding poem, Prop. 2.34, which I
would not join to *Am.* 3.1. So 21 *Varronem*, 25 *Tityrus*, and *Aeneiaque
arma*, 29 *Gallus*, have their precedents in 2.34, lines 85, 72, 63, and 91;
more distinctive than these shared names are 11 *Ascraeus . . . uua*
(Prop. 2.34.77f *Ascraei . . . uua*), 15 *Sophocleo . . . cothurno* (Prop.
2.34.41 *Aeschyleo . . . cothurno*; but cf. Verg. *E.* 8.10 *Sophocleo . . .
cothurno*). Although most of the resemblances to Propertius fail to meet
a standard of three distinctive items shared within a brief space, there
are enough items of resemblance over all, and enough distinctive com-
binations among them, to indicate a genetic relation, and to suggest

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[26] I judge that the divisions of poems found in the MSS of not only Propertius, but
Ovid's *Amores* and Tibullus, reflect medieval editorial decision rather than transmitted
evidence. The earliest MS of the *Amores*, **R** (of the ninth century) lacks all division where
extant, but a codex copied from its missing section (**P**, of later in the ninth century)
usually has divisions, agreeing both in correct divisions and in error with other MSS; if
the medieval editor was usually right (modern editors disagree at 2.9.25 [9b] and 3.11.33
[11b], and divide other poems left undivided in the earliest MSS), it is because Ovid so
constructed his poems that an intelligent reader should detect their beginnings and ends.
We lack early ninth century MSS for Tibullus and Propertius and so cannot observe the
state of their text before they were subjected to medieval editorial activity. But there are
few, if any, places in Tibullus where an editor could go wrong. And Propertius con-
structed most of the poems of Book 1 with clear clues (such as change of addressee or
topic) to the beginnings of poems; yet wherever there was room to go wrong, the medie-
val editor did go wrong, missing the division of 8 (after line 26) and of 12 from 11. In
Books 2-3 Propertius' poems are constructed differently, in part, I would argue, under
the influence of Tibullus, whose poems are not only lengthier than the poems of Prop. 1,
but work many changes before they reach their conclusion. The medieval editor was
thrown into confusion, and few modern editors would accept the divisions of the MSS
throughout. But one principal should be kept in mind: the ancient poet regarded it as
part of his craft to mark the beginnings and ends of poems clearly (without relying on
external punctuation). Therefore we should be slow to mark a division where the poet
has not left clear clues. There is no way in which an ancient poet would have commenced
a poem with *carminis interea* (where the scribes put the beginning of 3.2), and moving
the division down a couplet is an idle stopgap when 3.1-2 is united by pursuit of the same
*topos*. There is indeed development in theme (from the eternal glory which the poet will
win, to the glory which he will confer on the *puella*), but it is a development such as
Propertius (under the influence of Tibullus) uses within the structure of a single poem.

that Ovid knew the poems in juxtaposition to each other (therefore probably not in papyrus rolls, where Books 2 and 3 would be separated, but in a codex). Whether items in which *Rem.* is closer to Propertius than to *Am.* 1.15 reflect conflation with Propertius, or just coincidence, we have insufficient evidence to determine.

Unfortunately a date for *Am.* 1.15 of later than *Carm.* 3.30 and Prop. 3.1–2 and earlier than *Rem.* 359–60 is not very useful for settling controversial questions. Pohlenz[27] argued, from the mention of Tibullus among poets destined for eternal fame and omission of Horace and Propertius, that *Am.* 1.15 was composed later than the death of Tibullus (19 or so) but before the death of Horace (8 B.C.). The *terminus post quem* works, but the *terminus ante quem* does not. If it did, we would be forced to date *Trist.* 2 before 8 B.C.; for its even longer list of poets who composed on amatory themes also omitted Horace, while including poets (e.g., Ennius, Lucretius, Vergil) who had less, or at least no greater, claim for inclusion. Negative evidence has its limits. Many able scholars have argued forcefully that *Am.* 1.15 and other poems (as 2.18) must have been or cannot have been composed for the second edition. The case for the lateness of 2.18 is very strong;[28] and I argue elsewhere

[27] Note 13 above, 7f.

[28] Scholars who see in 2.18.19 "artes teneri profitemur Amoris" a reference to the *Ars* have a stronger argument than those who refer the line to the *Amores*. The reason is not that the line would not aptly describe some *amores*, but that, contrary to Ovid's precision in his other references to his works, it fails as a description of the whole genre, while having key words (*profitemur, artes*) proper to a didactic genre. The pentameter ("ei mihi, praeceptis urgeor ipse meis") does indeed allude to *Am.* 2.19.34 "ei mihi, ne monitis torquear ipse meis," which got its own inspiration from Tib. 1.6.10 "heu, heu, nunc premor arte mea" (see Pohlenz note 13 above, 11). This I take to indicate not that the entire couplet refers to *amores*, but that Ovid included composition of *amores*, as well as *Ars* and *Heroides*, among his activities. The poem is also marked as later than 3.1 and 3.15 in apparent date, because in those poems Ovid's tragedy *Medea* supposedly has not yet been composed, while in 2.18.13f Ovid boasts of success in that genre (so Pohlenz, note 13 above, 6). This does not prove that 3.1 and 3.15 were composed earlier than 2.18, since a poet can pretend a dramatic date earlier than real time (e.g., Prop. 4.8 was composed long after Propertius reported the death of Cynthia, but pretends that Cynthia created a disturbance *hac nocte*), and a prediction of success in tragedy is best uttered *post eventum*. But it does indicate that 2.18 was composed after at least the pretended date of Book 3. As for 3.1 and 3.15, even these poems could have been composed for the second edition, at least if one believes that 1.15 is so late. For 1.15.20 "*post mea* mansuram *fata superstes* opus" recalls 1.15.39 *post fata* (there inspired by Horace's *post obitum*) and 1.15.42 "parsque mei multa superstes erit" (inspired by the same poem of Horace). The pattern that emerges is that there are suspicions of lateness directed against 1.1 and 1.15 (the first and last poems of the book), 2.1 (if 1.1 is late) and 2.18 (the

that at least parts of *Am.* 3.4 were composed after the first versions of
*Ars* 2 and the *Remedia Amoris*.[29] A complicating problem, rarely if
ever addressed, is the possibility that poems could have been composed
for first editions, but revised for the second edition. So, though I believe
more precise evidence is still needed on the vexed question of the dates
of individual *Amores*, I note the consequences which follow in relative
dating for those who do believe that certain poems were composed for
the second edition. The scholar who believes that *Am.* 2.18 refers to the
*Ars* and hence was composed for the second edition, and that *Am.* 1.15
was composed for the second edition but is prior to *Rem.* 359-98, leaves
very little room for composition if *Rem.* 359-98 is not a later insertion,
especially as the *Amores*, including all the poems suspected of late-
ness,[30] give no hint of work on the *Metamorphoses* such as can be found
in *Rem.* 391-94.

 Also affected by the question of the dates of suspected poems of
the *Amores* is the dating of the beginning of the *Remedia*. The *Reme-
dia* has at least two prefaces, 1-40 and 41-78, ending with an invocation
to Phoebus (75ff *te precor* incipiens . . .). That is a long way to go for an
invocation and a claimed beginning (when Cleanthes claimed to start

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second last poem of the book), 3.1 and 3.15 (the first and last poems of the book, linked
by shared theme and diction, and so both late if 1.15 is late). It looks as if Ovid may have
composed (or revised from earlier poems) the first and last poem of each book for the
second edition, with 2.19 later misplaced. Also suspected of belonging to the second edi-
tion is 1.14, whose apparent reference in 46-49 to the triumph over the Sugambri (cele-
brated by Tiberius in 7 B.C.), while not incompatible with publication in the first edition
of one of the later books, is incompatible with publication in Ovid's original Book 1. As
for 2.18, nothing prevents taking lines 1-12 as the remnant of an earlier poem, on the
theme of rejection of epic for *amores* (note 11f, "uincor, et ingenium sumptis reuocatur
ab armis, / resque domi gestas et mea bella cano"), later revised to include in 13-40 his
more recent compositions, *Medea, Ars,* and *Heroides.* As it is now constructed, with its
greatest bulk devoted to describing the *Heroides,* it makes a poor prelude to further
*Amores,* but a good concluding poem, whether for Book 2 of the second edition (which I
think the more likely), or for a book of one of the first editions. Since it is not inconceiv-
able that the first edition of the original Book 5 could have postdated *Ars* 1-2, proof of
lateness does not guarantee composition for the second edition, rather than rearrange-
ment.

 [29]"Influence of Ovid's *Remedia Amoris* on *Ars* 3 and *Amores* 3," *CP* 81 (1986)
forthcoming.

 [30] The greater work to come predicted in 3.15.18 is tragedy, as 3.1 makes clear. It
is not tragedy in *Rem.* 391-94, since the *Medea* antedates *Am.* 2.18, which no one be-
lieves to postdate *Rem.* 391-94.

with Zeus, he really did start with Zeus). Very likely 1–40 were prefixed
for the second edition. The lines are genetically related to *Am.* 1.1,[31] a
poem suspected of dating from the second edition of the *Amores* (see
notes 13 and 28 above). It at any rate is unlikely to have begun Book 1 of
the first edition of *Amores. Am.* 1.1 begins with "Arma graui numero
uiolentaque bella." The beginning with *arma* seems to play with the
readers' expectations, leading the reader to wonder at first whether an
epic is coming. But for the readers' expectations to be so raised, the
reader ideally should know an epic which did indeed begin with *Arma*.
Compare Prop. 3.4, which similarly starts with *Arma*, and later (19f)
has references to Venus and Aeneas (therefore arguably showing knowl-
edge of the *Aeneid*, a knowledge already made amply clear in 2.34.63),
before moving in 3.5 to *Amor* and the *recusatio* proper (Ovid, if I am
right, seems to have read Prop. 3.4–5 as a single poem). Very likely *Am.*
1.1 is influenced by Prop. 3.4–5, but at any rate it postdates publication
of the *Aeneid*. Indeed it probably postdates publication of Prop. 4 (af-
ter 16 B.C.): *Am.* 1.1.7f "Venus . . . uentilet . . . faces" seems indebted
to Prop. 4.3.50 "Venus . . . uentilat . . . facem," whose choice of *uenti-
lat* seems motivated by alliteration (*Venus, ut uiuat, uentilat*) and by
the play on *uen–* (with possible *figura etymologica*, if we suppose an
etymology "Venus dicitur quia uentilat facem amoris"); in Ovid's imita-
tion, where *Venus* is in a separate line and sentence, both alliteration
and word-play are lost, while the contrasting structures ("quid si praeri-
piat flauae Venus arma Mineruae, / uentilet accensas flaua Minerua
faces?") supposes the readers' recognition that *Venus* would be the ex-
pected subject of *uentilet*; therefore, *Am.* 1.1.7f is not the model for
Prop. 4.3.50, but the imitation. The original Book 1 of *Amores* was
probably composed when Ovid was a teenager (*Trist.* 4.10.57–60),
many years before publication of both the *Aeneid* and Prop. 4. *Am.*
1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 work a continuing theme—composition under the
command of *Amor* (1.1 and 2.1) and *Elegeia* (3.1)—and were likely to
have been composed together to preface the three books of the second
edition. *Am.* 1.1 would then have influenced *Rem.* 1–40, which accord-
ingly (in my chronology) would belong to the second edition of *Rem.*

There are therefore good reasons for suspecting many lines of
*Rem.* of composition at a later date than the main fabric of the poem,

[31] See A. A. R. Henderson, *P. Ovidii Nasonis Remedia Amoris* (Edinburgh 1979)
27f.

and later than *Ars* 3 and the second edition of the *Amores*. Elsewhere I present evidence that other lines, belonging to the main fabric of the poem, were composed before *Ars* 3 and the second edition of the *Amores*.[32] The scheme of relative dates which emerges is the following: *Ars* 1-2 (first edition); *Rem.* (first edition); *Am.* (second edition); *Met.* 1-7; *Ars* 3 with the second edition of *Ars* 1-2; *Rem.* (second edition).[33]

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# INTERPRETATIONS

## THE UNSHOD MAIDENS AT *PROMETHEUS* 135[1]

The Oceanids make their initial appearance in the *Prometheus
Bound* at verse 128. With their first words they assure Prometheus of
their sympathetic friendship, and they underscore the sincerity of their
feeling by speaking of the urgency with which they have set out and
made their journey. "We came in swift rivalry of wings," they say, "con-
veyed in winged carts," and, as a final mark of haste, "bare footed,"
ἀπέδιλος (135). They set out, in other words, too hurried to tie on their
sandals.[2] But ἀπέδιλος at *Prometheus* 135 not only conveys an image of
haste. It marks a thematic contrast between the free movement enjoyed
by the Oceanids and the immobility of Prometheus.

The theme of freedom versus constraint is one that lies at the heart
of the *Prometheus Bound*. In the opening scene Prometheus is being
shackled to a rocky crag. In his prophecy of the story's resolution, Pro-
metheus envisions himself free. Yet not only is Prometheus' future free-
dom contrasted with his present bondage; the freedom enjoyed by all
those belonging to Ocean's realm is contrasted with the constraint felt
by all of Zeus' victims. In the *Prometheus Bound* Zeus rules with abso-
lute force while Ocean's realm is an idealized anarchy of absolute *laisser
faire*. The immobility of Prometheus parallels his own stubborn anger
as well as the inflexibility of the tyrant's mind,[3] while the effortless mo-
bility of Ocean's daughters is a symbolic expression of the autonomy and
openness that characterizes the rule of the old sea deity. Ocean's steed,
pulling the god's cart in perfect harmony with Ocean's will (284), re-
quires no bridle or bit (287), while Zeus masters Prometheus in persist-

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[1] This paper was presented in an earlier form at the meetings of the Classical Asso-
ciation of the Middle West and South (1981). It owes much to the subsequent criticism
and kind encouragement of Professor W. B. Stanford. Thanks are also due to the anony-
mous referee whose care saved me several errors.

[2] The scholiast quotes Hesiod, *Op.* 345: Γείτονες ἄζωστοι ἔκιον upon which pas-
sage M. L. West (*Hesiod, Works and Days* [Oxford 1978] 243) adduces parallels to sup-
port the view that "Going ungirt or unshod is a work of urgent haste."

[3] A. J. Podlecki, "Reciprocity in the *Prometheus Bound*," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 287–92,
documents the parallels between Prometheus and his oppressor.

ent images of yoking and harnessing[4] just as he has literally reduced Io
to an animal driven by the gadfly's sting. Ocean's caverns built them-
selves (301),[5] and persuasion (words), not force, prevails in his realm,
πατρῷας/ μόγις παρειποῦσα φρένας (130-31), whereas Zeus' minions
comply only through the exercise or threat of raw force—the tyrant is
οὐ . . . εὐπιθής (333).

In such a cosmos, polarized between the free and the unfree, we
find the Oceanids' freedom cast in the image of feet lightly moving and
apart from trouble. At verses 263-64 Prometheus contrasts his own
sorry state with the freedom of the Oceanids, saying, "to advise and to
chastize someone in trouble is a light matter for a person who has a foot
outside of trouble," ἐλαφρόν, ὅστις πημάτων ἔξω πόδα/ ἔχει. In verses
278-79 the Oceanids tell Prometheus that they descend from their carts
"on a light foot," ἐλαφρῷ/ ποδί. Like verses 263-64, verses 278-79 are
set in a context which contrasts free motion and constraint. The
Oceanids' carts move swiftly in the upper air, the pathway of the birds
(279-80); they descend to the "rugged earth" (281) where Prometheus
stands immobile. These images of the Oceanids' feet lightly moving and
free from troubles suggest the fuller meaning proposed for ἀπέδιλος in
verse 135; the image of a foot without its sandal may convey not only
haste or emotional distraction, but also a sense of freedom, and more
specifically, the freedom which in all three instances is set in contrast to
Prometheus' bondage.

To this small cluster of images—feet, light and freely moving—we
may add another instance from among the terms used of Prometheus'
fetters. In two passages Prometheus' bonds are designated by a more
specific term. At verse 6 Kratos urges Hephaistos to shakle Prometheus
"in unbreakable bracelets of irresistible bonds," ἀδαμαντίνων δεσμῶν
ἐν ἀρρήκτοις πέδαις. In verse 76 Kratos again refers to the shackles
with the term πεδή, calling them διατόρους πέδας, "bracelets that dig
in."[6] With this addition of πεδή designating Prometheus' fetters, the

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[4]For the most recent detailed discussion of the imagery of yoking and harnessing
see B. H. Fowler, "The Imagery of the *Prometheus Bound*," *AJP* 78 (1957) 173-84. See
also H. S. Long's brief remarks in "Notes on Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*," *ProPhilSoc*
102 (1958), the notes on verses 5, 81, and 462.

[5]*Pace* H. Rackham, "Notes on Aeschylus, *Prometheus Vinctus*," *CR* 41 (1927) 9.

[6]The form of Prometheus' punishment may reflect actual fifth century Athenian
practice. In certain categories of capital crimes the condemned was shackled to a wooden
plank and left in the open to perish. The term for this method of execution was ἀποτυμ-
πανισμός. For a convenient discussion of ἀποτυμπανισμός and its application to the *Pro-
metheus Bound*, see Louis Gernet, *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece* (Baltimore and

instances of feet unencumbered are balanced on the verbal as well as on the thematic level by instances of feet encumbered, for all the images under consideration are constructed with terms on the πεδ- (or ποδ-) root. The uncommon word, ἀπέδιλος, at 135 may have had the force to evoke the less rarified words, πέδαις and πέδας from verses 6 and 76, and, this context established, the facility with which the Oceanids may keep their feet free of trouble, ἐλαφρόν, ὅστις πημάτων ἔξω πόδα/ ἔχει (263-64), and the lightness of the feet themselves, ἐλαφρῷ ποδί (278-79), may be felt as part of a system of images reinforcing the thematic contrast between Prometheus' immobility and the free and unrestricted movement of the Oceanids.[7]

In addition to these five images of encumbered and unencumbered feet based on the πεδ- (or ποδ-) root, two further words, also compounds made on the πεδ- (or ποδ-) root, and with them two more dramatic characters, may be felt to belong to the complex. At verses 13-15 Hephaistos contrasts himself with Zeus' unfeeling agents, Kratos and Bia, by his reluctance to bind Prometheus. He expresses the contrast when he says: "You, Kratos and Bia, have done your job, and nothing now stands in the way of your departure, whereas I lack the courage to bind a fellow god with force." Kratos and Bia have escorted the victim to his rock and have no hesitation about impaling him on it, whereas Hephaistos stands facing both the task of securing the fetters and the impediment of his sympathy for Prometheus. Hephaistos' precise words in asserting the freedom of Kratos and Bia are: κοὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν ἔτι. ἐμποδών is literally "on" or "in the way of the feet." Hephaistos, like

London 1981) 252-76 (originally published as "Sur l'execution capital," *REG* 37 [1924] 261-93).

I am indebted to Professor Diskin Clay for calling my attention to the phenomenon of ἀποτυμπανισμός and to the relevant bibliography.

[7] The image of Prometheus "planked" (see note 6 above) shows him bound, as the opening lines of the play specify, not only at the ankles (73-74), but also at the wrists (55, 60), and about the chest (70-71) — indeed, he has been impaled through the chest (64-65)!

Although πεδή is a more specific term than, for example, δεσμός (πεδή occurs only twice in the *Prometheus Bound* while δεσμός is used in 13 instances; at verse 6 πεδή restricts the meaning of δεσμός), the meaning of πεδή is not restricted to foot fetters; it may be used of handcuffs as well, as at *Ch.* 982. Moreover, at *Ch.* 493 πέδαις refers to the net in which Clytemnestra had entangled Agamemnon (cf. the use of πεδάω at *Eu.* 635 where it means "to enmesh") and at *Pe.* 747, the shackles with which Xerxes attempts to bind the Hellespont. Yet the etymological identity of the word πεδή seems sufficient to ally it with πόδα, ποδί and ἀπέδιλος in order to enhance the poetic purpose proposed.

Prometheus, has become a victim of the tyrant's brutality while Kratos and Bia are, ironically, free.[8]

At verse 344 Ocean is urged to stay away — despite his good intentions, Prometheus tells him, his intervention may bring Ocean trouble. "Keep yourself calm," Prometheus says, "and out of trouble," ἀλλ᾽ ἡσύχαζε σαυτὸν ἐκποδὼν ἔχων. ἐκποδών would seem to convey an image analogous to that of πημάτων ἔξω πόδα in verses 263–64. Ocean's daughters are said to "have a foot outside of trouble," Ocean himself is urged to "keep his foot out of the way," or so the image would be if ἐκποδών were felt literally.[9]

Aeschylus' fondness for recurrent imagery has been well attested. In the *Prometheus Bound* the most prominent image has been identified as the yoking and harnessing of animals.[10] Those under yoke, harness or prod stand in thematic contrast to such as Ocean's fairy-tale bird which requires none of the normal constraints. Supporting the same thematic contrast of freedom and restraint are the images of impeded and unimpeded feet, Prometheus' in contrast to the Oceanids' and their father's, Hephaistos' in contrast to Kratos' and Bia's.[11] It has been the intent of this paper to show that these images are reinforced at the poetic level through a common use of words on the πεδ- (or ποδ-) root, and more specifically to cast the unshod maidens at verse 135 in a new light.[12]

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[8]Indeed, if the allusion to the smith-god's lame gait and Zeus' violence at *Iliad* 1.584–96 is felt, the association between Hephaistos and Prometheus becomes more than merely figurative.

[9]The adverbial force of the words under consideration in this and the following paragraph may have been so well established in Aeschylus' time that their original and literal sense was lost in everyday speech. Yet one need hardly say that poetry is not ordinary speech and that it is the work of poets to revitalize the commonplace.

[10]See note 4 above.

[11]Compare verse 550 where Prometheus calls the race of man, another of Zeus' victims (or intended victims), ἐμπεποδισμένον, "shackled."

[12]On the methodological assumptions that underlie the association of words, some of them over three hundred lines apart, see J. Peradotto's review of Lebeck's *The Oresteia* (*CW* 66 [1972] 167–68). Proximity naturally strengthens the case for the association of two words, but separation does not in itself refute it.

## THE NAMES OF AESCHINES' BROTHERS-IN-LAW

In his speech *De Falsa Legatione*, which he delivered against Aeschines in 343, Demosthenes attacked the two brothers-in-law of his opponent, calling one "the disgusting Nicias," who had hired himself out to Chabrias in Egypt, and the other "the accursed Cyrebio," who marched in a festival procession without a mask (19.287). In his reply to these insults, however, Aeschines gives entirely different names for his brothers-in-law. He calls one Philon, whose career as a soldier he praises, and the other Epicrates, whose conduct in the procession at the Dionysia he defends (2.150-52). The scholia on the passage in Demosthenes' speech inform us that Cyrebio was a nickname for Epicrates.[1] This would lead us to expect that "Nicias" was a nickname for Philon, but at first glance this appears unlikely; a name borne by the famous Athenian general of the Peloponnesian War hardly seems appropriate as an insulting nickname.[2]

Assuming that "Nicias" was not a nickname for Philon, Schaefer attempted to explain the apparent discrepancy between the two passages by claiming that Aeschines had three brothers-in-law, Philon, Epicrates, and Nicias.[3] Since Philon's reputation was spotless, Schaefer argued, Demosthenes could not insult him and instead directed his slanders at Nicias. In his reply, Aeschines placed the more valiant Philon in the foreground and passed over Nicias in silence. But Schaefer failed to note that in his speech Aeschines states that Demosthenes had insulted Philon (2.150: λοιδορεῖν Φίλωνα τολμᾷς;). In his Budé edition of the *De Falsa Legatione*, Mathieu tried to circumvent this objection by positing revisions made in the published version of either Aeschines' or Demosthenes' speech.[4] He suggested that in the published versions of the speeches either Aeschines substituted the name of Philon for that of Ni-

[1]For the scholia, see G. Dindorf, *Demosthenes* VIII (Oxford 1851) 442.

[2]R. Shilleto, *Demosthenes: De Falsa Legatione* (Cambridge 1890) 233 denied that "Nicias" could be a nickname.

[3]A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (Leipzig 1858) I, 207; IV, 69. Kirchner appears to have accepted Schaefer's explanation, since he lists this Nicias as #10776 in his *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin 1901).

[4]Mathieu, *Démosthène: Plaidoyers politiques III* (Paris 1946) 134. J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.* (Oxford 1971) 544 also thinks that the problem can be explained by alterations made by Demosthenes in the published version of his speech, but appears to be uncertain about the existence of this Nicias, whom he does not place in his stemma of Aeschines' family.

cias or Demosthenes substituted the name of Nicias, who was *plus com-promis*, for that of Philon.

The problem can better be solved by observation of the general Greek practice regarding the formation of insulting nicknames from the names of well-known persons. These nicknames can be formed in either of two ways.[5] First, a man can be given the name of a disreputable person with or without the addition of an adjective. (The adjective may or may not contain a further insult.) The nickname τοῦ καταράτου κυρηβίωνος given by Demosthenes to Epicrates was formed in this way; we know that Cyrebio was the name of a well-known parasite.[6] There are several other examples of insulting nicknames formed in this way in both Greek and Latin. Demosthenes (18.313) called Aeschines a "τραγι-κὸς Θεοκρίνης," Theocrines being the name of a sycophant who had attained notoriety in Athens at the time.[7] In Menander's *Samia* (336–37) Demeas calls Chrysis τὴν ἐμὴν Ἑλένην on account of her infidelity.[8] The accuser who in a speech of Antiphon (1.17) accused his stepmother of plotting the murder of his father, called her a Clytemnestra. Cicero labelled Clodius a *felix Catilina* (*Dom.* 72) and Clodia a *Palatina Medea* (*Cael.* 18). Caelius called the same woman a *quadrantaria Clytemnestra*.[9] Juvenal (4.38) dubbed Domitian a *calvus Nero*. Velleius (2.33.4) reports that Pompey called Lucullus a *Xerxes togatus* for his extravagant construction of moles to create artificial lakes near his

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[5] The existence of this kind of nickname has been recognized by (i.a.) R. G. M. Nisbet, *Cicero: In Pisonem* (Oxford 1961) 81; R. G. Austin, *Cicero: Pro Caelio*[3] (Oxford 1960) 69; C. Austin, *Menander: Aspis et Samia II* (Berlin 1970) 70; and H. Wankel, *Demosthenes: Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz* (Heidelberg 1976) 1067-68, but none of these scholars distinguish between the two types of this kind of nickname, nor do they analyze how they are formed. No treatment of this kind of nickname can be found in I. Opelte, *Die lateinischen Schimpfwörter und verwandte sprachliche Erscheinungen: Eine Typologie* (Heidelberg 1965) (cf. Nisbet's review in *Gnomon* 39 [1967] 70), nor in E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* (München 1939-53), nor in Hug's article s.v. "Spitznamen" (*RE* 3A[2] [2nd ser., 1929]) 1821-40.

[6] For Cyrebio, see Alexis fr. 168 (Kock). Cf. Callimachus fr. 434 (Pfeiffer).

[7] Cf. Apostolius 17.21 in E. L. Leutsch, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum II* (Göttingen 1851) 690. For Theocrines, see Ps.-Dem. 58.

[8] Eupolis (fr. 249 Kock) appears to have given Aspasia the nickname Helen for her alleged role in starting the war between Samos and Athens. (Cf. Kock I, 87 for a discussion of the textual problem in this fragment.)

[9] Quintilian *Inst.* 8.6.53.

estate. The nickname *Ulixes stolatus* which the emperor Caligula gave
to Livia Augusta also probably falls into this category.[10]

The other method of forming this kind of nickname is to take the
name of an admirable person and to join with it an insulting adjective.
Perhaps the best known example of this in Greek is the sobriquet ὁ
σχινοκέφαλος Ζεύς which Cratinus gave to Pericles in his play *The
Thracian Women*.[11] Another nickname formed with the name of a god
is ἐρεβίνθινος Διόνυσος which was given to people who were consid-
ered worthless.[12] We know that the nicknames ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης[13]
and κρίθινος Δημοσθένης[14] were given to Dinarchus by those who
judged his oratory inferior to that of his more eloquent contemporary.
Juvenal (7.214) recounts how, of all the insults which Rufus had to en-
dure from his studies, none was worse than being taunted with the title
*Cicero Allobrox*.[15] In his *De Corona*, Demosthenes (18.242) called Aes-
chines a "ἀρουραῖος Οἰνόμαος,"[16] presumably alluding to one of the
roles he had played as an actor. Cicero made fun of Piso's philosophical
views by calling him a *barbarus Epicurus* (*Pis.* 20). Caelius was called a
*pulchellus Iason* by Atratinus[17] and called one of his opponents a *Pelia
cincinnatus*.[18] In the Late Republic it was popular to form sobriquets

[10]Suetonius *Cal.* 23.2. Cf. W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme* (Oxford 1954)
265.

[11]Plutarch *Pericles* 13 (= Cratinus fr. 71 Kock).

[12]Zenobius 3.83 in E. L. Leutsch and F. G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemio-
graphorum Graecorum I* (Gottingen 1839) 77.

[13]Dionysius of Halicarnassus *Dinarchus* 7-8.

[14]Hermogenes *Peri Ideon* 2.11 in L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci II* (Leipzig 1854)
413.

[15]J. D. Duff, *D. Iunii Iuvenalis: Saturae XIV* (Cambridge 1898; repr. 1970) ad
loc. fails to see that the nickname is meant as an insult and interprets it as a compliment:
"This Rufus, a rhetor whom his class maltreated, was nevertheless admired by them for
his eloquence, so that they often called him, presumably a Gaul, the Allobrogian Ci-
cero." On this interpretation we must translate the relative clause as concessive, but there
is nothing in the text which would suggest this. E. Courtney, *A Commentary on the
Satires of Juvenal* (London 1980) 238, 377, correctly recognizes that the nickname was
intended as an insult. However, he compares Rufus' title with *Gaetulum Ganymedem* at
Juvenal 5.59. He classifies both as examples of oxymoron and does not compare them
with the nicknames discussed in this article.

[16]Cf. the discussion of this nickname by Hermogenes in his *Peri Methodou Deinou*
34 in Spengel (note 14 above) 453-54.

[17]Quintilian *Inst.* 1.5.61.

[18]Fortunatianus *Artis Rhetoricae* 3.7 in K. F. Halm, *Rhetores Latini Minores*
(Leipzig 1863) 124.

with the name of Romulus. Sulla was called *scaevus iste Romulus.*[19] Ca-
tullus (29.5 and 9) labelled either Caesar or Pompey *cinaede Romule.*[20]
Cicero was insulted with the nickname *Romule Arpinas.*[21]

   We can now see that "Nicias" is only part of the nickname which
Demosthenes created for Philon and that the entire nickname is Νικίου
. . . τοῦ βδελυροῦ. This nickname clearly falls into the second cate-
gory formed from the name of a well-known person. This nickname was
obviously coined by Demosthenes to draw an unfavorable comparison
between the military activities of Philon and those of the famous general
of the Peloponnesian War. Such a solution to this problem makes the
prosopographical and literary speculations of Schaefer and Mathieu un-
necessary.

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# *AENEID* 5.105: THE HORSES OF PHAETHON

   Exspectata dies aderat nonamque serena
   Auroram Phaethontis equi iam luce vehebant . . .

   Editors have insisted, after Servius, that Vergil does not intend for
us here to conjure Phaethon himself; it is *Sol*, before all, whom the poet

metonymically evokes.[1] Other scholars, who have looked carefully into Vergil's art[2] and use of images,[3] the internal rhythms and interconnections of the epic,[4] the way in which the ambient universe frames and reflects the different scenes of the *Aeneid*[5] — whose interest, in sum, it has been to demonstrate that mythological asides in Vergil are not intended only as poetic decoration but more often furnish, learnedly, a significant perspective upon what is to happen — have not paused. The present small addition to our growing list of Vergilian triumphs is offered rather apologetically: the *Aeneid* itself is grander than its separate bright facets. The many volumes which have addressed its larger features have had a broader aim than to attempt elucidation of some single moment like that at hand. Still, the introduction of Phaethon just when the races are about to get underway is too good to let slip. And the fact that this allusion brings out even more perfectly what Michael Putnam documented in such detail in his pioneering study of the themes of the race and Palinurus' death[6] and what Gordon Williams considers as "Thematic Anticipation" in his most recent book[7] will justify, I hope, the following brief notice.

There is no more pivotal book in the story of Aeneas than that in which he stands forth as a father to his people, celebrating their common heritage but ready, now, to guide their future. Book Five honors Anchises, Aeneas' father and patriarch of the exiles, narrates the first

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[1] *Serviani in Aeneidem III–V Commentarii, Editio Harvardiana* ed. A. F. Stocker, A. H. Travis (Oxford 1965) 502:

"Phaethontis = *Solis*, ἀπὸ τοῦ φαίνειν"

Cf. Donatus, *Interpretationes Vergilianae*, ed. Henricus Georgii (Stuttgart 1964), vol. I, 438; J. Henry, *Aeneidea* (Dublin 1889) vol. III, 32; T. E. Page, *The Aeneid of Virgil, Books I–VI* (London 1962[15]) 403; R. D. Williams, *Aeneidos Liber Quintus* (Oxford 1960) 67.

[2] A. Cartault, *L'Art de Virgile dans L'Énéide* (Paris 1926) 368, 407. No mention is made of 5.105.

[3] E.g. B. Otis, *Virgil. A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1964); K. Quinn, *Virgil's Aeneid, A Critical Description* (Ann Arbor 1968); R. A. Hornsby, *Patterns of Action in the Aeneid* (Iowa City 1970).

[4] R. Lesueur, *L'Énéide de Virgile. Étude sur la Composition Rythmique d'une Épopée* (Toulouse 1975).

[5] A. Thorton, "The Living Universe." *Mnemosyne Suppl.* 46 (1976).

[6] M. C. J. Putnam, "Unity and Design in *Aeneid* V" *HSCP* 66 (1962) 203–39. Here, and in his *The Poetry of the Aeneid* (Harvard 1965), Putnam takes no notice of 5.105.

[7] G. Williams, *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid* (New Haven 1983) 67–75. *A.* 5.105 is not listed on p. 294 (index).

settlement of sea-weary Trojans in the western Mediterranean, and asks
Aeneas to overcome two critical losses — of part of his fleet by fire, and of
Palinurus, the helmsman who has set their course thus far. When Vergil
has the horses of Phaethon carry in the long-awaited day of Anchises'
funeral games, he spreads over the world a light intent with danger. In
one name we find concentrated symbolical allusion to the three great
problems of Book Five: the journey by a son to confirm, before his fa-
ther, his right to be his father's successor; the dreadful danger should
firm control be lacking at the helm; the destructive power of fire
brought to earth from heaven.

    We can review the comparisons quickly. Firstly, Phaethon, as-
sured that his father is the Sun, visits the solar palace and wins from its
lord a promise that he will drive the chariot of Day. Unable to control
his father's team, Phaethon allows the horses to career between heaven
and earth, plunging headlong to scorch the planet, until Jupiter blasts
him from the sky with a thunderbolt. In *Aeneid* 5, the maturation of
Aeneas from son into a father in his own right is very much at issue.
Returning to his father's grave, he appoints a celebration in Anchises'
honor; in this action he himself becomes *pater*, "father," for his people
(5.130). Secondly, the risk of losing control at the helm is a recurrent
motif in this book: first among the contests is a boat race, in which one
helmsman is thrown from his ship into the water; this, Putnam has ar-
gued, prepares artfully for the loss of the fleet's navigator, Palinurus,
whom Somnus, god of Sleep, strikes from Aeneas' ship at the end of
Book Five. Palinurus' fall, in turn, brings Aeneas himself to take control
of the rudder at the very conclusion of the book. In this way, we may say
that the point of the foregoing allusion to the helmsman who lost his
course is not so much to adumbrate the death of Palinurus as it is to
heighten our interest when Aeneas assumes this role. Thirdly, fire in the
sky and upon the earth appears importantly in the staging of *Aeneid* 5.
Following an archery contest, Acestes, Aeneas' old friend, releases an
arrow into the open sky, just to try his hand; this missile bursts into
flame and trails a path which Vergil compares expressly with the gliding
course of the meteor which came to earth close to Troy the night she
burned to her foundations.[8] As if to carry out the symbolic suggestion,

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    [8]The phrase *signantemque vias* appears in *A*. 2.697, of the comet at Troy; and in
*A*. 5.526 we find *signavitque viam*. The selective employment of *signare viam(s)* seems to
invite comparison between the celestial phenomena. The words are not applied to the
red meteors in *A*. 10.272 which occur to Vergil as he describes the flash of Aeneas' dread-
ful shield.

Juno sends Iris to the Trojan women, and they hurl fire on the ships they
have grown to hate.

There are important differences between Aeneas and Phaethon.
Aeneas has rejoined his father, while Phaethon approaches his for the
first time. This return of Aeneas to Anchises is significant: Vergil likes
to replay situations he has shown us previously so that we will be able to
measure the distance our story has covered between these two moments.
Selective verbal echoes, mistrusted by some, nevertheless remain a tell-
ing feature of Vergil's strategy.[9] When Aeneas returns to Anchises, we
no longer see him as his father's companion as we did in Book Three:
the fall of Troy has been recast in Dido's death,[10] and the mighty ash
which farmers tore down in the articulating simile for Troy's ruin (*A*.
2.626–31) has been replaced by the great oak assaulted by mountain
winds of *A*. 4.437–49, as Aeneas withstands the tempest of tears with
which Dido and Anna beset him. It is in keeping with such opportuni-
ties to re-experience earlier scenes that Vergil brings Aeneas to An-
chises this second time. We see a man who has chosen; and, by implica-
tion, we sense a survival for Troy. The sheer impetuosity of Phaethon's
green youth offers no parallel.

A second salient divergence distinguishing Aeneas from Phaethon
lies in the fact that Aeneas is not himself responsible for the fire which
ravages the Trojan ships; by contrast, Phaethon unleashes directly the
conflagration his ride brings. Such inconsistencies may encourage us to
drop any attempt to read the reference to Phaethon in the program-
matic manner I have been exploring. On the other hand, it is true that
for both Phaethon and for Aeneas fire creates a crisis of control; and it is
upon control of one's course that Book Five and Phaethon's myth are
centered. Brooks Otis underlined most usefully the full portent of *obli-
tus fatorum* in *A*. 5.703: crushed by the devastation of his fleet (*concus-
sus*), Aeneas loses his grasp upon his own future.[11] This has never been
stated before, nor will it be again. If we do not throw out the baby with
the bath water, discarding altogether the potential force of Phaethon's
history as an *Einleitungssymbol* encoding perfectly the complexities of
the day of Anchises' funeral celebration, we shall perhaps not ask of
Vergil that he write with less resonance than is his custom. Where dis-
crepancies undercut mythological parallels, it is easier to acknowledge

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[9]Cf. Putnam (*Poetry of the Aeneid*, note 6 above, passim).

[10]B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV" *AJP* 80
(1959) 1–24.

[11]B. Otis (note 3 above) 278.

this tension as an important way in which Vergil is defining the present against the past.[12]

Michael Putnam has elicited powerfully the eerie magic which intensifies throughout Book Five.[13] The funeral games offer relaxation; everyone can laugh at the playful dunking of the helmsman Menoetes in *A*. 5.160–80. But these images of race and contest return with the onset of darkness to unsettle us. The very ship seems to strain, as Vergil moves from its "arms" across which the sails are now spread, to Aeneas' rowers departing at the oars into the deepening night.[14] The responsive universe takes up the race, as Night herself reaches the turning mark (*meta, A*. 5.835) of her course. It is here that Sleep glides upon Palinurus, flowing about him with awful gentleness; what was lighter in tone becomes now a struggle against death. Putnam signals the high drama of Aeneas' ascent to the helm at just this point: the Sirens' rocks lie ahead; Aeneas must sail past their ancient dreams and white bones.

The framing of the book makes plain that this elaborate organization is intended to lead us even beyond the fall of Palinurus (itself a mystical sacrifice demanded if one would approach the nether world) to Aeneas, guiding Palinurus' way through darkness toward the future (a most precise anticipation of his journey through the underworld in Book Six). In the opening line of Book Five, Aeneas holds the open sea, along with others in his fleet (*Interea medium Aeneas iam classe tenebat/ . . iter*); in the first verse of Book Six, he directs the course *himself* (*classique immittit habenas*). It is Phaethon, more than Menoetes, of whom mention points ahead to Aeneas at this critical moment. It is Phaethon, and not Menoetes — Phaethon, with his passion to learn about his father and his eagerness to try a father's role — to whom Aeneas answers. For Vergil emphasizes that it is now as *pater* that Aeneas guides the fleet:

> *Pater* amisso fluitantem errare magistro
> sensit, et ipse ratem nocturnis *rexit* in undis
>
>                                                                 (*A*. 5.867–868)

In other words, if — as Putnam shows — Menoetes' fall prepares us for that of Palinurus later in the book, Phaethon's horses form their own

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[12]The comparison of the storms in Books One and Five, and the problem of creating a present out of the past is well handled by P. Holt, "*Aeneid* V: Past and Future," *CJ* 75 (1979–1980) 110–21.

[13]Putnam, "Unity and Design" (note 6 above).

[14]Putnam sees that *intendi bracchia velis* in *A*. 5.829 (the sails spread over the yard-arms as Aeneas' men make ready to leave Sicily) echoes *A*. 5.136 as the boat-race begins: *considunt transtris, intentaque bracchia remis.*

wider frame with the wandering ships which Aeneas comes, as a rescu-
ing father, to steady. The wider frame first sets up a problem, then pro-
vides the solution. This necessitates a reversal, at the end, of the initial
image. One may think in passing of the way in which Turnus' body,
growing slack with icy chill at the penultimate verse of the *Aeneid*,
seems to reverse the direction of *A*. 1.92, where it is Aeneas, who has not
yet emerged from his more labile youth, for whom *solvontur frigore
membra*.[15] Such reversals suit the whole course of the history Vergil re-
counts, a history of triumph grown from the ashes of defeat.

These ruminations on the possible weight of Vergil's mythology
can conclude with the observation that, just as Book Five extends many
lines of connection backward and forward throughout the *Aeneid*,[16] so
Phaethon's horses lift us beyond this book, carrying us to other places in
the epic and beyond the poem itself within a tradition of political imag-
ery which has received very informative consideration from Robert
Wilhelm.[17] We can appreciate how far we have moved from Cicero's
ideal administrator (*rector, astrorum gubernator, moderator rei publi-
cae, De Re Pub.* 5.3.5; 5.6.8) when we find Latinus, amidst a rising tide
of civil war, "giving up the reins" and running from the scene (*rerum-
que reliquit habenas, A*. 7.600), or when Turnus, in *A*. 12.681-683,
jumps out of his *currus* altogether to rush headlong, uncontrollable,
against his enemy. On the other hand, we remember the calm which
accompanies Neptune's chariot after the storm in *A*. 1.155-56 (*curru
volans dat lora secundo*) and after the fire in Book Five (*omnis effundit
habenas, A*. 5.818). What we must also not overlook, however, is that
this same imagery of playing out the reins also appears amid the fury
and flame surrounding the fleet in Book Five (*furit immissis Volcanus
habenis, A*. 5.662), a symbolic reenactment of Troy's burning in Book
Two.

Matters become even more ambiguous when we find Aeneas in *A*.
12.499, "pouring out" the reins of his wrath in a terrible massacre (*A*.
12.494-99):

> Tum vero adsurgunt irae, insidiisque subactus,
> diversos ubi sensit equos *currumque referri*,                    495
> multa Iovem et laesi testatus foederis aras
> iam tandem invadit medios et *Marte secundo*

[15]W. W. De Grummond, "*Saevus Dolor*: The Opening and Closing of the
*Aeneid*," *Vergilius* 27 (1981) 48-52.

[16]G. K. Galinsky, "*Aeneid* V and the *Aeneid*," *AJP* 89 (1968) 157-85.

[17]R. M. Wilhelm, "The Plough-Chariot: Symbol of Order in the *Georgics*," *CJ* 77
(1981-1982) 213-30.

terribilis saevam nullo discrimine caedem
suscitat, irarumque *omnis effundit habenas*.

Each of the italicized phrases in these lines can cause us to remember
other descriptions of storm or of the presence or absence of controlling
order in Vergil. The backward retreat of Turnus' *currus* (*currum re-
ferri*) can serve as a general image for loss of control,[18] *Marte secundo*
stands against *curru secundo* when Neptune calms the storm in *A*.
1.156, and — most to the point — *omnis effundit habenas* is used not only
of Aeneas and his carnage, *but also* of Neptune in *A*. 5.818, who moves
rapidly across an idyllic sea after the fire-storm brought by Iris, the
rainbow goddess.

What emerges from the possible parallel between Aeneas, deter-
mined to destroy, and Neptune who brings *serenity* to the ocean, is that
Aeneas, even in his wildest rage, is pictured as holding the reins of his
wrath. The element of *control* is still present. Vergil does not use the
verb *remittere*; this verb we do find in the *Georgics'* picture of how
things slide backward in the world (*omnia fatis/ . . . referri,/ . . . si
bracchia forte remisit*, *G*. 1.199-200, 202), where it communicates that
giving up of control which, indeed, Phaethon exemplifies (*mentis inops
gelida formidine lora remisit*, Ovid, *Met*. 2.200). As Neptune, or as the
power of fire itself (*furit immissis Volcanus habenis*, *A*. 5.662), Aeneas,
playing out the reins of his anger, appears transformed beyond what is
mortal into a force of nature, which, even in its devastation, remains
ordered. The thesis of Bowra[19] that Roman Stoicism could allow Aeneas
full measure of violence without making him the irrational fiend some
recent interpretations propose, appears confirmed.[20]

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[18] I am thinking, no doubt somewhat arbitrarily, of *G*. 1.199-200 (*sic omnia fatis/
in peius ruere ac retro sublapsa referri*).

[19] C. M. Bowra, "Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal," *G&R* 3 (1933) 8-21.

[20] To say that Aeneas *wields* his anger in a conscious and controlling manner may
not make him less unappealing at the epic's end nor will it do much to dispel our sense
that he has moved away from the person he seemed to be earlier in the story. The ques-
tion to decide is how far Vergil may have gone to imply criticism of the kind we ourselves
might offer.

## A NOTE ON TIBULLUS 1.9.21-22

> Ure meum potius flamma caput et pete ferro
>   corpus et intorto verbere terga seca.

Critics are in trouble when this *locus* is to be explained, and their differ-
ent solutions to the problem can be found elsewhere.[1] Now, I suggest
that we might profitably look back to an old but still not outdated essay
by J. Lipsius on the gladiatorial games.[2] Several of his passages relate to
Tibullus. They are noteworthy enough to be quoted in full:

Hor. *serm.* 2.7.58-59:

> quid refert uri virgis, ferroque necari
> auctoratus eas, . . . ;

Pseudo-Acro added:

> Gladiatores ita se vendunt et cautiones faciunt: uri flammis, virgis secari,
> ferro necari;

Sen. *epist.* 37.1:

> Eadem honestissimi huius et illius turpissimi auctoramenti verba sunt:
> 'uri, vinciri ferroque necari';

Petr. *Sat.* 117.5-6:

> Itaque ut duraret inter omnes tutum mendacium, in verba Eumolpi sa-
> cramentum iuravimus: uri, vinciri, verberari ferroque necari et quicquid
> aliud Eumolpus iussisset. tamquam legitimi gladiatores domino corpora
> animasque religiosissime addicimus. post peractum sacramentum servili-
> ter ficti dominum consalutamus.

[1]See K. F. Smith, *The Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (New York 1913, repr. Darm-
stadt 1964) 291 and 365; J. André, *Albius Tibullus Elegiarum liber primus* (PUF 1965)
100; M. C. J. Putnam, *Tibullus. A Commentary* (Norman 1973) 139; G. Lee, *Tibullus:
Elegies*[2] (Liverpool 1982) 132; F. della Corte, *Tibullo. Le Elegie* (Fondazione Lorenzo
Valla 1980) 219; P. Murgatroyd, *Tibullus I. A Commentary on the first book of the
Elegies of Albius Tibullus* (Pietermaritzburg 1980) 264. See also F. O. Copley, "*Servi-
tium amoris* in Roman Elegists," *TAPA* 78 (1947) 296; W. Wimmel, *Der frühe Tibull*
(München 1968) 95 and 110, and most recently in *Tibull und Delia, II: Tibulls Elegie 1,
2* (Wiesbaden 1983) 54; D. F. Bright, *Haec mihi fingebam. Tibullus in his World*
(Leiden 1978) 252; F. Cairns, *Tibullus. A Hellenistic Poet at Rome* (Cambridge 1979)
173; R. O. A. M. Lyne, "*Servitium amoris*," *CQ* N.S. 29 (1979) 129; P. Murgatroyd,
"*Servitium amoris* and the Roman Elegists," *Latomus* 40 (1981) 599; R. J. Ball, *Tibullus
the Elegist. A Critical Survey* (Göttingen 1983) 136; and M. J. McGann, *The Marathus
Elegies of Tibullus, ANRW* II, 30.3 (1983) 1993.
[2]*Iusti Lipsi Saturnalium Sermonum libri duo, qui de gladiatoribus. Editio ultima,
et castigatissima* (Antverpiae 1617) 71-72.

It seems to me that lines 21–22 represent a metaphorical transposition of a juridical concept into love elegy: that of the *auctoratus'* oath.[3] The meaning is quite clear. Tibullus had advised the *puer delicatus*[4] (unnamed in 1.9 but suposely Marathus) not to be unfaithful for greed (lines 18–19) and had warned him that Venus is *aspera difficilisque* (line 20) with lovers who break their promises. At this very moment the poet reminds Marathus the *auctoratus'* frightful oath (lines 21–22) which conform a *sacramentum amoris* applied metaphorically to his παιδικὸς ἔρως.

If I am right, Tibullus and Marathus had signed a *foedus amoris*[5] with some specific terms[6] to be kept by both the lover and the beloved, and such a relationship was strengthened by this oath in lines 21–22.

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[3]See G. Ville, *La gladiature en Occident des Origines à la mort de Domitien* (École Française de Rome 1981) 246–55. Still useful is L. Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von Augustus bis zum Ausgang der Antonine*[9] (Leipzig 1919) 2, 59–60.

[4]On this *puer*, cf. P. Murgatroyd, "Tibullus and the *puer delicatus*," *A Class* 20 (1977) 105–19.

[5]On the topos, cf. R. Reitzenstein, "Das *foedus* in der römischen Erotik," in *Catull* (Darmstadt 1975) 153–80. See also G. Freyburger, "Le *Foedus* d'amour," in *L'élégie romaine* (Paris 1980) 105–16.

[6]On the imperative need of terms (*leges*), see Propertius, 3.20.15–16:

Foedera sunt ponenda prius signandaque iura
   et scribenda mihi lex in amore novo.

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# BOXING GLOVES AND THE GAMES OF GALLIENUS

carpenta cum mimis et omni genere histrionum, pugiles flacculis, non veritate pugillantes.

(Trebellius Pollio, *H.A.*, *Gall.* 8.3)

flacculis P: flosculis Σ: sacculis *vulgo*: flocculis *Ellis*.

In a passage of the *Historia Augusta* concerning the victory games of Gallienus (A.D. 262) E. K. Borthwick[1] argued for the reading *flocculis*, a diminutive of *floccus*, on the basis of a supposed parallel with the term κῴδια, a diminutive of κῶας, which is mentioned as a part of a boxer's equipment in Philostratus *Her.* 6 (ii.147.4 Kayser). In the latter passage the boxer Plutarch prays for relief after a long contest when νεφέλη ἐς τὸ στάδιον καταρρήγνυται καὶ διψῶν ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔσπασε τοῦ ὕδατος, ὃ ἀνειλήφει τὰ περὶ τοῖς πήχεσι κῴδια. Borthwick thus followed the reading first suggested by Robinson Ellis,[2] who saw wool as the natural material of hand coverings "used to deaden the blows in a sham boxing bout." The implication is that the padding was added to the leather thongs around the fists. A difficulty with this interpretation is that the κῴδια are located "around the forearms" (περὶ τοῖς πήχεσι) and apparently not on the fists. Κῴδια must refer to the strips of fleece on the upper end of the forearm of the so-called "sharp-thong" type of boxing glove (ἱμὰς ὀξύς) seen clearly in sculptural representations of boxers such as the famous bronze "Terme Boxer" or the marble "Sorrento Boxer,"[3] and known from contemporary literary sources (Philos. *Gym.* 10 and Paus. 8.40.3). The fleece strip may have been regularly used as a type of sweatband or as a protection for the forearm, and would have served as a convenient sponge for the boxer Plutarch.[4]

Borthwick's analogy of *flocculi* with κῴδια would require us to believe that the Latin *hapax* was invented as a translation of one part of the Greek "sharp thong" (ἱμὰς ὀξύς), metonymically used for the glove as a whole. The problem is not merely that there is no parallel for this in Greek boxing terminology (κῴδια is never used to name a type of glove), but also that the boxers in Gallienus' games who use this most vicious of Greek gloves are "not really boxing" (*non veritate pugillantes*). *Flocculi* is therefore an unsuitable reading.

There remains the problem of interpreting *flacculis*, P's reading.

[1]E. K. Borthwick, "A Note on Boxing Gloves," *CR* 14.2 (1964) 142.

[2]R. Ellis, *Hermathena* 14 (1907) 3.

[3]"Sorrento Boxer" Naples, Nat. Mus. 119917 (1st c. A.D. by Koblanos of Aphrodisias); "Terme Boxer" Rome, Terme Mus., 1055 (1st c. B.C.). Cf. E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World* (Oxford 1930; repr. Chicago 1980) figs. 72 and 176; idem, *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals* (Oxford 1910) figs. 136 and 137; J. Jüthner and E. Mehl, *s.v.* "Pygmē (pugilatus)," *RE* Suppl. 9, 1306-352, esp. 1319-320 and 124, where the κῴδια of the boxer Plutarch are understood as protective wool on his arms and Statius *Theb.* 6.786 is cited as a parallel: *summo maculas in vellere vidit*.

[4]W. Rudolph, *Olympischer Kampfsport in der Antike* (Berlin 1965) 10 n. 7.

Frère took it as a translation of "soft thongs" (ἱμάντες μαλακώτεροι).[5]
His interpretation is supported by Plato *Laws* 830b, where simulated
boxing is recommended as a form of military training:

> καὶ ὡς ἐγγύτατα τοῦ ὁμοίου ἰόντες, ἀντὶ ἱμάντων σφαίρας ἂν περιεδού-
> μεθα, ὅπως αἱ πληγαί τε καὶ αἱ τῶν πληγῶν εὐλάβειαι διεμελετῶντο εἰς
> τὸ δυνατὸν ἱκανῶς κτλ.

> Approaching as closely as possible to the actual event we should put on
> *sphraiai* instead of *himantes* (simple "thongs" for competition) so that
> both the blows and the avoidance of blows can be executed with the best
> possible competency.

Recently M. Poliakoff has argued that the σφαῖραι mentioned here are
probably padded gloves for practice which are safer than the "sharp
thongs" used in actual competition.[6] The σφαῖραι are probably identi-
cal to the ἐπίσφαιραι gloves, as is suggested by Plutarch *Mor.* 825e
(*Praec.ger.reip.* 32):[7]

> τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διαμαχουμένων ἐπισφαίραις περι-
> δέουσι τὰς χεῖρας, ὅπως εἰς ἀνήκεστον ἡ ἄμιλλα μηδὲν ἐκπίπτῃ μα-
> λακὴν ἔχουσα τὴν πληγὴν καὶ ἄλυπον.

> For they bind with the *episphairai* the hands of those who fight in the
> palaistrai so that the contest might in no way result in irreversible damage
> since its blows are soft and harmless.

That practice gloves in the second century A.D. where also called ἱμάν-
τες μαλακώτεροι is evident from Pausanias 6.23.4:

> καὶ παλαῖστραι τοῖς ἀθλοῦσιν ἐνταῦθα ποιοῦνται, καὶ συμβάλλουσιν
> αὐτόθι τοὺς ἀθλητὰς οὐ παλαίσοντας ἔτι, ἐπὶ δὲ ἱμάντων τῶν μα-
> λακωτέρων ταῖς πληγαῖς.

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[5]H. Frère, "Le témoinage de Stace sur la σφαιρομαχία," in *Mélanges de philolo-
gie, de littérature, et d'histoire anciennes offerts à A. Ernout* (Paris 1940) 155.

[6]O. W. Reinmuth, *s.v.* "Pygmē," *Der Kleine Pauly* (Stuttgart 1964-1975) Bd. 4,
cols. 1246-248, suggests that σφαῖραι are substituted for ἱμάντες in the simulated contest
proposed by Plato *Leg.* 830b. M. Poliakoff, *Studies in the Terminology of Greek Combat
Sports* (Königstein/Ts. 1982) 91-97, upsets the conventional notion that σφαῖραι are
"sharp thongs" by comparing *Leg.* 830b with 830e, where σφαιρομαχεῖν may refer to a
type of fencing or football, and not to boxing as is usually assumed. In any case it is safe
to say that both passages of *Laws* refer to a competition which is less dangerous than
normal contests.

[7]Poliakoff (note 6 above) 96 suggest this identification "although the body of evi-
dence is small."

Here the athletes have their palaistrai and this is where they match ath-
letes who are no longer wrestling for the blows of the soft thongs.

Pausanias' testimonium, read in the light of Plutarch's and Plato's
words above, leads us to a new and significant clarification of boxing
nomenclature.

The ἱμάντες μαλακώτεροι should not be confused with the μειλί-
χαι mentioned in Pausanias 8.40.3, where the "soft thong" is a technical
term used to distinguish the simple thong of Greek boxers in the archaic
and classical periods from the "sharp thong," ἱμὰς ὀξύς, of Hellenistic
times.[8] The diminutive *flacculis* may thus correspond to the compara-
tive μαλακώτεροι, and the contest in which the boxers compete *non
veritate pugillantes* can be compared to the simulated bout proposed by
Plato. Since "sharp thongs" were more damaging, boxing matches in
which they were employed must have been much slower and more de-
fensive than the animated and perhaps more popular activity using
ἱμάντες μαλακώτεροι or σφαῖραι.[9] With *flacculis* we must of course
understand a noun, probably *caestibus* or *loris*, omitted either by a slip
or by analogy with the Greek μειλίχαι, regularly used substantively as a
boxing term (see above). Pollio's choice of *flacculi*, a *hapax*, over a
more literal translation, *molliores* or *molliculi*, or even the attested loan
word *sphaerae* (cf. Cato *R.R.* 82), is curious and can only be explained
as an attempt at a more vivid description of the flaccid devices (cf.
Varro *R.R.* 2.9.4: *auriculae flaccae*).

Another possibility is to regard *flacculis* and *flosculis* as two cor-
ruptions of the well attested diminutive of *follis*: *folliculis* (abl.) which
would represent a new sense of the diminutive, but one well suited to a
translation of σφαῖραι. Or again, if one could determine how early the
root *flasc-* (="flask," Greek ἀσκός) came into Latin, as it did, then one
could posit a diminutive *flasculis*, from which may have derived the cor-
rupted reading *flosculis*, in much the same sense as σφαῖραι.[10]

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[8]J. H. Krause, *Die Gymnastik und Agonistik der Hellenen* Bd. 1 (Halle, 1841) 503
n. 4 first incorrectly associated ἱμάντες μαλακώτεροι with μειλίχαι, and his error has
been followed by scholars for over a century. Cf. A. de Ridder, "Pugilatus," *D–S* 4.1,
755; J. Jüthner, *Philostratus über Gymnastik* (Leipzig and Berlin 1909) 204; E. N. Gar-
diner, *Greek Athletic Sports* (note 3 above) 403; W. Rudolph (note 4 above) 9.

[9]Poliakoff (note 6 above) 99 n. 3 cites σφαιρομαχοῦσ' as a boxing term in Menan-
der *Dysk.* 517 where it creates "an image of a lively style of fighting, apparently an activ-
ity familiar to the common people of [Menander's] day."

[10]*Falsco, –onis*, "bottle," is the earliest attested form of the root in Latin. Cf. En-
nodius (c. 473–521), *carm.* 2.147.1; Gregorius Magnus (c. 540–604), *dial.* 2.18, Migne

Although we can eliminate Ellis' and Borthwick's reading *flocculis* as less probable due to its association with "sharp thongs," we cannot decide with certainty among *flacculis*, *folliculis*, and *flasculis*, the other possibilities corresponding to the padded σφαῖραι. *Flacculis* is to be preferred, however, since it is an actual reading.

In any case we may recognize Gallienus' entertainment as a boxing match with padded gloves, σφαιρομαχία, and note that such *spectacula* were probably also known to Statius (*Silv.* 4 praef. 30–32: *sphaeromachias spectamus*) and to Seneca (*Ep.* 80.1–2: . . . *omnes molestos ad sphaeromachian avocavit* . . . *quantus ad spectaculum non fidele et lusorium fiat concursus*).[11] Indeed Seneca's *spectaculum non fidele* is reminiscent not only of Gallienus' sham bout (*non veritate pugillantes*) but also of Plato's practice sessions "imitating the real thing as nearly as possible" (ὡς ἐγγύτατα τοῦ ὁμοίου ἰόντες, *Leg.* 330b, quoted in full above). Thus *sphaeromachiae* enjoyed a popularity for some six hundred years, at first privately in the Greek *palaistrai* and then later publicly in Roman exhibition matches. The latter contests serve as at least one example of Roman taste for vigorous combat sport without bloodshed.

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75–77; Isidorus (f. 602–36) *Etym.* 20.6.2. *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D.*, A Souter, ed. (Oxford 1949) s.v. *flasco*. Since Trebellius Pollio wrote in the late third to early fourth centuries and *flasco* had entered Latin at least by the late fifth century, it is conceivable that a hypothetical *\*flasculus* or *\*flasculum* entered (vulgar?) Latin in Pollio's day. Commercial and social usage no doubt facilitated adoption of the word.

[11]Although Poliakoff (note 6 above) 90 and 95 lists Seneca *Ep.* 80.1–3 and Statius *Silv.* 4 Praef. 30–32 as uncertain references to the σφαῖραι boxing matches, Frère (note 5 above) 141–58 convincingly argues for that meaning of *sphaeromachia* in view of all the evidence.

# REVIEWS

SIMON GOLDHILL. Language, Sexuality, Narrative: The Oresteia. New York,
    Cambridge University Press, 1984. $59.50.

It is unusual to find a classicist who has read contemporary literary criti-
cal theory and learned from it a way to read classical texts. Simon Goldhill, a
fellow of King's College, Cambridge, is one of the exceptions. *Language, Sexu-
ality, Narrative: the Oresteia* undertakes a reading of the *Oresteia* in the light
(and shadow) of thinking disseminated by Derrida, Barthes, and their fol-
lowers. The book must therefore excite the curiosity of those who are vigilant in
the struggle to maintain a dialogue between antiquity and the twentieth cen-
tury, as well as those who believe in the infinite generosity of the *Oresteia* in
accommodating ways of understanding it. But it takes patience and good will as
well as curiosity to read beyond the polemical and self-serving introduction and
through a text which is impeded by its own critical language, the explication of
its theoretical framework (rather than the mere practice of it) and the repeti-
tiveness of a writer who distrusts language and his readers' understanding of it.
If one persists, however, one is rewarded with the pleasure afforded by a clever
and observant reader's play with the language of Aeschylus' plays; a clearer
understanding of the development in the use of certain words in the trilogy; and
a conviction, at least in my case, that what Aeschylus has composed cannot be
circumscribed within the limits of twentieth-century anxieties about the illusive
and allusive nature of language. And, indeed, cannot be confined to a reading
which takes no account of the dramatic and therefore also oral nature of the
"text".

Dr. Goldhill feels no doubt about the adequacy of his theoretical frame-
work. He believes that "theoretical studies and the concerns of the *Oresteia* are
mutually implicative; . . . A methodology is not a supplement to reading but
constitutive of it" (p. 7). No possibility exists that Aeschylus may be saying more
or other than what his theory allows. Within this belief the well-known and
much-discussed complexity and ambiguity of Aeschylus' poetry can have only
one significance; throughout the *Oresteia* "attention is drawn to the process of
signification based on signifier and signified, or rather, on one sign designating
another, and thus to the possible gaps in the process of communication in lan-
guage in which we have seen the major tensions of this text and our reading of it
constituted" (p. 23). The critic's task of revealing how there can be no stable
meaning to language is identical with the aim of the poet: to create drama
which conveys the constantly shifting ground of communication (verbal, sexual
and social) between human beings.

Goldhill's strategy is to trace various characteristics of Aeschylus' lan-
guage which reveal the self-referentiality of the text and which create a closed
system in which all meaning is denied except the process of the text's "undercut-
ting" itself. So, for example, the multiple occurrences of a word or a phrase

throughout the trilogy in different contexts produce, in Goldhill's understand-
ing, instability in meaning. One use "recalls" other uses, whether they have
already occurred or will occur, regardless of who is speaking, what tone of voice
may be used, and who is addressed. Mere repetition signifies the "polysemy",
and therefore the instability, of all language. The reader, the characters in the
play, and the poet are united in this uncertainty which characterizes the activity
of communication. "The *glissement* of signs involved in the manipulation of
signifiers results in the fearful search for definition in (beyond) the series of
shifting sites of, particularly, the vocabulary of familial and societal relation-
ships — φίλος/ἐχθρός, πατήρ/μήτηρ, τίκτειν, τρέφειν, φρόνημα, τόλμα, νίκη —
a search both constituted by, and, ironically, undercut by the sense of slippage"
(p. 206).

Repetition is not the only source of the pervasive uncertainty, of course.
Goldhill comments on many instances where language calls attention to its own
nature by puns, paragrams, etymologies, irony and metaphor (whose place in
the theoretical framework receives special attention); aspects of the drama's
form — the construction of stichomythia and the "structuration" of opposition,
for example — are also accomplices in the single-minded and all-encompassing
task of producing the "theatre of language".

While acknowledging the visual as an element in the theatre, Goldhill is
interested only in how the language and structure of the plays deny to visual
communication any superiority of unambiguous meaning. Actual visual effects
are rarely a consideration in the discussion. Rather, Goldhill is interested in
how such events as Clytaemnestra's beacon speech, the visual proofs in the re-
cognition scene of the *Choephoroi*, the opposition expressed throughout be-
tween speaking and seeing, the visions of Cassandra and the madness of Orestes
all undercut the integrity of the visual experience and contribute to the only
certainty: the uncertainty of signs.

The third term in the book's title is "narrative" and, predictably, narra-
tive and language display the same characteristics in this reading. All attempts
to utter a coherent system of cause and effect, a narrative, are victims of open-
endedness and doubt. In this case, signs of instability are located in the overde-
termination of causes, in the shifting movement between active and passive
within the same word, in a confusion of subjects and objects, and in the "dou-
bling nature of revenge," to name only a few aspects which coincide with the
uncertainty of language itself. The choruses of the *Agamemnon* contain some
of the most telling attempts at narrative: "The chorus' struggle to link past,
present, and future in a coherent narrative (of cause and effect) constructs,
then, a complex dialectic of control and indeterminacy. The control
. . . slides in tension with the uncertain openness of language . . . " (p. 32).
The tenor of fear and hope in these choruses can be attributed to their wish to
determine a stable link of cause and effect and their somewhat hazy realization
that what they attempt is impossible. Only Cassandra in the trilogy has "lan-
guage to find and express the complexities of events. For it is through her pro-
phetic language that she reaches the clarity in narrative . . . " (p. 85). Proph-
esy and prayer are everywhere manifestations of the constantly frustrated desire
to find coherent meaning in the passage of events.

However, despite the shiftiness of language and narrative, the trilogy does

attempt to redefine in the course of the three plays certain key terms of familial and societal relationship in order to provide a τέλος which is indeed stable. Here lies the relationship between society (and sexuality — like language, another form of exchange), narrative, and language: each contains the desire to establish a firm point of reference, what Goldhill, quoting Lacan, calls the "word-of-the-father," the law. This goal necessarily involves the "hierarchisation" of terms: male to female, father to mother, city to οἶκος, etc. The trilogy attempts to redefine terms in order to allow stabilization. The trial scene in the *Eumenides* is the climax of this movement where "the court case . . . will decide in language between the choices constituted in the terms δίκη, αἰτίας τέλος: it will be a decision in language of definition of language" (p. 235). It would of course be an impossible inconsistency if Goldhill allowed the trial scene and its aftermath to remain a stable τέλος for the drama. Since the dénouement is achieved through πείθω by Athena, a figure who transcends the opposition between male and female but yet is obliged to act in terms of that opposition, "the telos of closure is resisted in the continuing play of difference. The final meaning remains undetermined" (p. 283).

    As one who has always felt that the ending of the *Eumenides* does not represent the triumphant celebration of civic stability for which many critics argue, I have sympathy for Goldhill's analysis of the play's non-ending, though my reasons for seeing uncertainty there have their source in dramatic as well as linguistic considerations. His analysis of the ending is rushed, however, after the exhaustive and repetitious commentary of the rest of the book, perhaps because Goldhill resists building his own book up to a final conclusion or climax. In fact the format of the book is a line-by-line commentary with three chapters, one for each play, and within these chapters, divisions whose titles allude — archly and sometimes obscurely — to scenes within the plays: "the floating text-ile", "suit and pursuit", etc. The reader must gather the strands of the arguments I have tried to present in this review as he or she goes, though there are helpful summaries at the ends of sections and chapters. The illusion of a commentary is, however, misleading as the book by no means comments on every line; rather words and phrases central to the reading are picked out and discussed as they occur. There is, unfortunately, no Greek word index to make it easier for the reader to bring together discussions of key words scattered through the commentary. The book will be of greatest use to those who are thoroughly versed already in the language of Aeschylus' plays.

    One has only to glance at Aeschylus' text while reading Goldhill to remind oneself how much is not discussed, how great the gap is between text and text. The losses are many: we lose "Aeschylus" to "Derrida"; we lose the activity of hearing and seeing to the activity of reading; emotion is lost to the mind (how startling to come across an occasional flash of feeling: "the passion of the recognition . . . "), poetry to language, and action to speech. While there is no doubt that Goldhill's emphasis on the nature of language has support in the text (think, for instance, of the constant references by characters to the act of speaking, not only in the *Oresteia* but generally in Greek tragedy), the assertion that meaning can only be found in the uncertainty of meaning seems the product of late twentieth-century anxieties and does not, in my mind, harmonize with the energy, assurance, and richness of Aeschylean poetry and drama. Goldhill has

much to say about the inadequacies of other forms of criticism: in particular,
those who use psychoanalysis, stagecraft, character, performance or textual
criticism as the basis of their analysis. It is a pity that his own theoretical bias
restricts his perspective so narrowly. With more freedom Goldhill's sensitivity to
the language of the plays might reveal a humanity which shares more than dis-
trust of its own power to communicate.

<div align="right">MARGARET RACHEL KITZINGER</div>

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MABEL L. LANG. Herodotean Narrative and Discourse. Cambridge, Mass. and
    London, Harvard University Press, 1984 (Martin Classical Lectures, 28).
    Pp. xii + 180. $20.00.

New approaches to Herodotus' literary and historical method are both
needed and welcome when they contribute to our understanding and either
suggest or open new areas for exploration. Mabel Lang's Martin Classical Lec-
tures, delivered in 1982 at Oberlin College, fall into this category; and they are
the first in this series to treat Herodotus since 1929 and the inaugural lecture by
Charles Beebe Martin himself (as she notes, p. vii). The author focusses mainly
on those aspects of Herodotus' style which she claims reflect techniques of "oral"
composition, with major attention given to Herodotus' use of discourse (speech
and dialogue). The first (69 pp.) of this volume's two major sections gives the
text of the lectures in four chapters ("Narrative Transitions," "Patterns of Dis-
course," "How could Herodotus Imitate Homer?," and "Look to the End")
capped with a brief epilogue. Lang has supplemented this main text with a
longer section (106 pp.) consisting of four appendices ("On Motivation," "Ana-
lytic List of Herodotean Speeches," "Summary of Speeches' Formal Aspects,"
and "Direct and Indirect Discourse"), themselves further subdivided and in-
cluding further discussion amid numerous lists and tables. Notes to the chap-
ters, selected bibliography, and indices to pertinent Herodotean and Homeric
passages complete the volume.

    Among the aspects of Herodotus' narrative style which Lang isolates and
ascribes to the influence of oral composition (Chap. 1 and App. 1) are his use of
programmatic statements, the positioning and function of digressions, the use
of "hooks" (grammatical repetitions and repetitions of person or place) to con-
nect marginally related passages, and the device of knowledge (expressed prin-
cipally through verbs of learning) used as a primary impetus for action. Chap. 2
and Apps. 2–4 concentrate on patterns of discourse—Herodotus' use of direct
and indirect speeches and dialogue—as a means to advance his narrative by
revealing motivation and explanation. In Chap. 3 she compares Herodotus'
rhetorical use of questions in narrative and speech with Homer's, while Chap. 4
treats such additional rhetorical devices as the presentation of alternatives and
the deployment of maxims, proverbs, and commonplaces.

Lang's own discussion is pleasantly readable and somewhat Herodotean in its own right.[1] The book's structure does present difficulties, however, due in part to her arrangement of material — a result of deciding to retain the lectures in their original form and to append, rather than to integrate, supplementary material. Other problems result from the nature of the appended material. Since the appendices discuss further topics treated in the chapters (though now interspersed with numerous charts and tables), related material is consequently scattered throughout the book. The extra burden of imposing coherence falls to the reader and is further complicated by the comprehensive and detailed tables of statistical analyses, especially those for the speeches. Among other groupings of Herodotean speech (Chap. 2, Apps. 2-4, Index 1), Lang has variously subdivided her author's discourse into individual speech and dialogue, into direct and reported discourse, and further into categories according to the number of utterances (from "singles" to "enneads" with combinations thereof), and according to the nature and purpose of the speech (e.g., question and answer, challenge and response, motivation, explanation, advice). Despite a system of logically devised abbreviations (pp. xii and 167) to represent the various patterns, functions and natures assigned to the speeches, the sheer multiplicity of the classification renders the apparatus cumbersome. Herodotus' narrative of Solon's meeting with Croesus (1.29-33), for example, appears in the index (p. 168) as, "i.30-32 Oct QAQA/qAQA," with discussion scattered variously on pp. 26-27, 34, 37-38, 60, 61, 63, 123, 144n, 161 nn. 11, 12, 14, and 162 n. 23. The related encounter between Croesus and Cyrus (1.86-91) is similarly listed under six separate entries. Although each of these two passages is a carefully wrought whole, Lang's discussion and categorization treats segments of the dialogues in isolation, without reference to their narrative introductions and conclusions or to intervening comments — all as much motivating forces as the speech segments (and as much a part of the folk tradition).[2]

More may be lost than gained by these attempts to subdivide such structured and interrelated passages. While much is to be said for quantification as a means of assessing stylistic tendencies, there remains ever-present the danger of distortion. So, perhaps, in this case. Division and summary impose a measure of control over a text; once divided, interpretation is confined to its parts. The preponderant emphasis on quantification in this work precludes a view of larger thematic patterns which emerge from examining the way Herodotus used speech. It seems more important in understanding Herodotus' methodology, for example, to know that, after his meeting with Solon, Croesus' appearances (1.86-91, 1.155, 1.207-8, 3.14, 3.34, 3.36, 6.37, 6.125) largely involve conversation (direct or reported), than it does to know the number or type of utterances that these passages contain. Similarly, the relationship of these passages to Herodotus' still larger theme of the wise advisor, which includes not only

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[1]Two minor problems encountered in the book are textual rather than stylistic. One can be rectified by substituting "tend" for "then" in the middle of p. 7, and the other by deleting either the first or second sentence on p. 13.

[2]See Axel Olrick, "The Epic Laws of Folk Narrative," (1909) in A. Dundes, ed., *The Study of Folklore* (New York 1965) 129-41.

Croesus' dialogues but others involving figures like Amasis and Polycrates (3.39–43) or Xerxes and Artabanus (7.10, 7.45–51), is lost.[3]

   Lang's major emphasis throughout is the relationship between Herodotean techniques of narrative and discourse and those of oral composition as manifested in Homeric epic and traditional folk literature. Her argument begins and ends with an attempt to demonstrate for Herodotus "composition of an 'oral' type" (p. vii):

   > Recognizing both the largely oral nature of Herodotus' sources and, as a result of his 'lectures,' the likely oral manner of his composition, let us examine ways in which an oral narrative style may have influenced the 'history' (that is, historicity) of Herodotus' work. (p. 5)

   > If, as seems likely from the presence in the *Histories* of such oral features as characterize both the Homeric epic and Herodotus' sources, the historian started reporting the results of his inquiries orally in lectures, there would undoubtedly have been audience reactions in the form of questions and objections. Thereafter, in subsequent re-creations of similar subjects, Herodotus must not only have taken these reactions into account both with fuller explanations (witness the ubiquitous use of *gar*) and with background digressions but also gradually have compacted his wide-ranging and various material into the tightly constructed narrative that he finally wrote down. (p. 69)

While Lang demonstrates similarities which *could* indicate indirect influence from techniques of oral composition, it is a considerable leap from there to positing oral composition for Herodotus himself; and the evidence as presented fails to support her conclusion. Lang's presumed starting point is the tradition about Herodotus' recitations at Athens, transmitted by Syncellus and Diyllus;[4] but recitation need not imply oral composition, and the question of Herodotus' oral and written sources is very much an open one.[5] Lang offers neither the evidence nor the discussion necessary for either assumption.

   Such initial assumptions lead to further suggestions, also presented without firm evidence, that Herodotean notions of causality in general owe more to oral style than to an idea of history or to a logical overall plan (p. 5); and that Herodotus' account of Corinthian motivation and participation in the Lacedaemonian expedition (3.47), for example, stems from "narrative convenience" rather than from "historical fact" (p. 12). To suggest that Herodotean statements about causation result from his need for "easy transitions" (p. 13), rather than from any reasoned assessment, questions not only Herodotus' worth as a historian, but his integrity as well.

   Although the comparison (Chap. 3) of Homer and Herodotus as "presumed oral stylists" (p. 37) contributes to an analysis of Herodotean style, Lang

   [3]See R. Lattimore, "The Wise Advisor in Herodotus," *CP* 34 (1939) 24–35; and H. Bischoff, "Der Warner bei Herodot," in *Herodot: Eine Auswahl aus der neueren Forschung* (Darmstadt 1962) 302–19.
   [4]W. W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1928) I, 6.
   [5]How and Wells (note 4 above) 22–28.

observes more differences than similarities in the ways each uses question and answer in narrative and dialogue (pp. 39, 41, 42, 49); and the results do little to advance the claim for oral composition on Herodotus' part. Also questionable as evidence of Herodotus' oral composition is his use of the "ubiquitous" *gar* (pp. 69, 74, 154 n. 27). For how many Greek prose authors might the same be said? A random scanning of some twenty unconnected pages of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (OCT), for example, produced a percentage similar to Herodotus'.

Perhaps the most important contributions this book makes lie in its calling attention to the utility of stylistic considerations in assessing the historicity of Herodotus' narrative, and in its general analysis of the Herodotean use of speech. This book disappoints, however, where its emphasis falls. For while its author claims to study "the extent to which Herodotus' style makes his history and how it affects his historicity" (p. 17), convincing arguments about specific instances are rare. (One is found in the suggestion of a "stylistic" rather than "historical" reason for the pluperfect tense [7.145] on which Hammond based his date for Herodotus' version of Themistocles' famous decree [p. 152 n. 18]). This work assembles useful information and certainly provokes significant questions. If it inspires others to examine further the relationship between Herodotus' narrative style and the historicity of his account, it will have performed a valuable service.

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RONNA BURGER. The *Phaedo*: A Platonic Labyrinth. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1984. 288pp.

The task Burger has taken upon herself in her reconstruction of the *Phaedo* is revolutionary; she does away with the "twin pillars" of traditional interpretation, the immortality of the soul and the theory of the Forms, and turns Socrates' swan song into a song on the necessity of *mortality* and the *impossibility* of "true philosophy". Her insights are based on treating the dialogue as a unified whole "whose philosophic content cannot be separated from its dramatic form" (p. 218) by paying special attention to the "literary presentation" and to the "deeds" that are neglected all too often by scholars who are unduly preoccupied with the analysis of the arguments.

Burger's intentions are certainly laudable. A closer look at her interpretation shows, however, that she (i) is quite selective in picking out her clues (alternative explanations are never even considered), (ii) simply postulates a "logographic necessity" to push arguments in the desired direction, and (iii) draws conclusions in the judicious way that generally characterizes the "Straussian school" to which she pledges allegiance (on this topic cf. the article by M. Burnyeat, "Sphinx without a Secret," *The New York Review*, May 1985, pp. 30–36). Shortcomings of arguments are seen as a sign that Plato does not want the reader to accept them. Where the straightforward reading of the text does not

suit her purposes Socrates "speaks over the heads of the interlocutors to the reader" (p. 3) or in irony. There seems to be no half-way house between a Straussian and a "straightforward" interpretation of Platonic texts. For in spite of the fact that Burger refers to the relevant literature from Aristotle to Damascius, from Schleiermacher to Vlastos, her interpretation is as idiosyncratic as other commentaries from the same provenance.

Her picture is not without aesthetic charm. The mention of the sacred mission of Theseus' ship that delays Socrates' execution indicates that Socrates is Theseus, the fourteen friends present on his last day are his comrades (I do not know what Burger does with the *alloi tines* in 58b9), and Phaedo is Ariadne (as Socrates' pulling back his long hair indicates) who at the crucial moment hands him the ball of thread that helps Socrates out of the labyrinth in which he had to face the two-headed minotaur of *fear of death* and *fear of misology*.

Within this framework Burger unfolds the scheme of which she wants to convince the reader. Instead of the immortality of the soul Socrates demonstrates the inseparability of soul and body. He renounces the "true philosopher's" attempt to obtain noetic vision of the "things themselves" and argues for a reconciliation between Socratic philosophy ("the greatest music") and demotic music (and at the same time with the Athenian demos). The soul is not a *pragma* possessing life as an essential property but the inherent form of life itself. The final myth is not a vision of the fate of the souls after death but an allegoric description of the relationship between soul and body (earth being a gigantic Corpse). The death of Socrates is to be understood as the end of the person Socrates. What survives is the *logos*—the Platonic Socrates. This is the true meaning for the demand of the sacrifice of a cock to Asclepius: thank God for Plato!

Limitation of space forbids more than a brief indication why these claims are not tenable. Burger overemphasizes the significance of "the ship" and disregards Plato's reasons for giving a historically accurate account of the whole death-scene. There is no indication that Socrates feels any "guilt" that has to be overcome for having neglected "demotic music." There is also no indication that Socrates intends a reconciliation with the demotic virtues; his criticism here is as sharp as it is elsewhere (cf. 68b-69c). The passage on the necessary connection between pleasure and pain (60b-c) does not bear the global significance Burger resorts to again and again.

Burger manages to reconstitute all the arguments for the immortality of the soul into arguments against it by attributing all apparent conclusions to Simmias' and Cebes' incomprehension. But no such deficiency of their capacities can be defended. They are not only capable but willing to revise their basic Pythagorean tenets. (There is no basis in the text for an alleged criticism of teleology in general as claimed by Burger [p. 139]. Nor is there an argument for the alleged undesirability of the *protos plous* [p. 144-45].) The details in the last argument for the immortality of the soul are grossly distorted (p. 161ff). If Socrates had wanted to represent the soul as an immanent form that ceases to exist at the moment of death he could have done so in plain Greek. (The detranscendentalized myth leaves the reader dumbfounded. One cannot see what the infernal geography has to do with the anatomy of our body, nor how the purifications are supposed to be possible in *this* life.) The symptoms (in word

and "deed") that indicate in the death scene that Socrates expects his personal extinction (pained pleasure, anger against gods and Athenians, and—at least momentarily—the fear of death, the minotaur) are forcibly contrived by Burger; they fail to persuade.

Apart from the irritating details of Burger's interpretation the most disturbing feature of the book is the constant wielding of the magic wand that turns all arguments into their opposite on account of the interlocutors' alleged stupidity. Speculation on Plato's intentions "behind the text" *is* necessary, especially where there is obscurity concerning major points. Otherwise we would be confined to dull paraphrases. The *Phaedo*, however, when read in the natural way presents us with certain difficulties but with a clear overall outline; there is nothing obscure or esoteric about its main tenets. Burger turns it into a strange labyrinth, indeed. Her Socrates not only speaks over the head of his audience, he has spoken over the heads of everyone else for 2500 years. There is no indication (not even in the *agrapha dogmata*) that Plato ever breathed a word about the true (Burgerian) meaning of the dialogue or that anyone suspected it. This is most surprising in view of the fact that Plato lets Socrates (the best, most just and *phronimotatos*, 118a) express great concern about not leaving the sting of falsehood in his friends about the immortality of the soul (91c). That he did just that to all of us ever since would be "a wild blast of irony"—Platonic, not Socratic.

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N. G. L. HAMMOND. Three Historians of Alexander the Great. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 205. $39.50 (Cambridge Classical Studies).

"The main problem in any serious interpretation of Alexander is . . . that of the sources." So rightly E. Badian; so also N. G. L. Hammond, who in this book sets out to address this central problem by means of a detailed analysis of the three authors who constitute the so-called "Vulgate Tradition," Diodorus (Book 17), Justin (Books 9–13), and Curtius. Hammond's study is motivated by his rejection (1–4) of the simplistic conception of a "Cleitarchan Vulgate" deriving from a common source—a grouping which has done much damage to the evaluation of the individual works concerned.

Hammond's methodology is of necessity complex. Taking each work in turn, he analyses them from "the general angles of fullness, accuracy, military and political detail and conception of the central theme . . . to find separable groups of narrative" (12). For each group an author of the same general qualities is identified as a hypothetical source, fragments of which author and discrepancies in the work under consideration are then applied to test the identification, with the proviso (13) that we are almost always dealing in probabilities as regards individual cases.

Hammond begins by considering five specimens of military narrative from Diodorus (the sack of Thebes; the battles of the Granicus, Issus, Gauga-mela, and the Hydaspes), which he ascribes to a single source, "Source 1", on the basis of a number of salient characteristics, including a predilection for de-scribing Hellenistic warfare in anachronistic Homeric terms, a baroque sensa-tionalism, an interest in personal prowess in battle, a bias in favour of the Greeks, especially the Thessalians, a sympathy for the Persians, and an anti-pathy towards the Macedonians (13-25, esp. 23-25). Comparison with the ex-tant fragments of Cleitarchus discloses a marked similarity in attitude and ap-proach, which (together with the fact that he was the son of Deinon, who wrote a celebrated work on Persian customs) leads Hammond to identify him as "Source 1" (25-27). This procedure is repeated for a hypothetical "Source 2" (28-32), whom Hammond identifies as Diyllus (32-35). Having thus identified Cleitarchus and Diyllus as the two principal sources underlying Diodorus 17, Hammond proceeds to a full-scale analysis of the book, dividing its provenance fairly evenly between these two writers—attributions which are conveniently summarized, section by section, in tables on pp. 51 and 79.

Such detailed scholarship is of course arduous in the extreme, and Ham-mond does nod once, ascribing Diod. 69.2-9 (the episode of the mutilated Greeks) first to Cleitarchus (56, 79, 101) and then to Diyllus (80-81). This dou-ble attribution throws into high relief one of the great dangers of Hammond's methodology, namely the fact that the detection of any specific characteristic (sensationalism, for instance) is fraught with subjectivity, which can lead the individual reader to veer, as Hammond inadvertently does, between differing assessments of the salient features of a particular passage.

In fact, the reviewer's own appraisal of some of the test narratives initially isolated as "Source 1" and attributed to Cleitarchus leads him to the conclusion that their unitary provenance is far from certain. In particular, those passages relating to the prowess in battle of the Thessalian cavalry and the commander most closely associated with them, Parmenion, cannot be written off as in-stances of Cleitarchus' "ingenuous, almost puerile bias in favour of the Greeks" (23-24). Rather they represent an attempt (possibly encouraged by Antipater or Cassander, who stood to gain most from such a diminution of Alexander's all-pervading glory) to rehabilitate the memory of the conqueror's victim, Par-menion. Nor can these passages simply be dismissed as bad military history cut from the same cloth as the bulk of the battle-narratives in Diodorus, for the tactical transactions attributed to Parmenion and his Thessalians make per-fectly good sense: for detail, see the reviewer's articles on the battles of Gauga-mela (*Phoenix* 29 [1975] 374-85, esp. 381-82 and 385), Issus (*AncW* 12 [1985] 39-52, esp. 50-52), and the Granicus (*Phoenix*, forthcoming). The same criti-cisms are applicable to Hammond's discussion of Curtius' source for Issus (117-18) and Gaugamela (122-23), which is likewise identified as Cleitarchus (128). Surely more detailed source-analysis is called for here.

The better part of Hammond's book (12-85) is devoted to discussion of Diodorus 17, and, extensive though his analyses of Justin (86-115) and Curtius (116-59) are, it is to be regretted that these authors, Curtius especially, are not subjected to even more detailed dissection. Likewise deserving of further discus-sion are two rather old-fashioned views championed by Hammond, namely the

authenticity of the Royal *Ephemerides* (5-11) and a late date (285-83 B.C.) for
the publication of Ptolemy's history of Alexander (37-38).

These shortcomings do not, however, detract from the importance of
Hammond's book, which is a milestone in Alexander-scholarship and a model
for the future analysis of the extant sources. Hammond's source-critical princi-
ples are sound, and their application to Arrian and Plutarch (as promised on p.
169) is eagerly anticipated.

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JUDITH P. HALLETT. Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women and the
     Elite Family. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984. xix + 422 pp.
     $40.00 cloth; $12.50 paper

In many societies, married women have been viewed by men with some
suspicion, not only because of their disturbing biological characteristics but be-
cause they have two possible lines of loyalty: to the family of their birth, and to
that of their marriage.[1] In early Rome, women usually transferred formally to
the husband's family on marriage, relinquishing any claim to inherit from their
biological kin. By the end of the Republic this had ceased to be the predomi-
nant fashion and the Roman matron was usually a *filiafamilias*—literally,
"daughter of the household (or family)"—throughout her father's lifetime. She
had no automatic right of succession to her husband or children if they died
intestate.

In her ambitious new study, Hallett analyses the position of the Roman
woman born into the tight clique of nobles. She notes the paradox of a feminine
ideal of self-effacement and modesty in a society where formidable women were
respected by their male relations and even made their mark on public life. The
key to understanding this, she tells us on pp. 8-9, lay in the élite Roman family.
The Roman girl's special relationship with her father required her to put his
interests before all others—her own or her husband's. In return, she was so val-
ued by her father as to make a lasting impression on her brothers who subse-
quently treated her with respect and her children with favour (pp. 136 ff.). The
daughter, become mother, was then invested with the confidence to assume a
leading role in her own sons' lives.

Hallett coins the term "filiafocal" to describe this phenomenon. She
claims not only that ancient sources endorsed paternal "valuation" of particular
daughters, but that the relationship was "culturally elaborated"—that is, struc-
turally embedded in élite Roman social relations and religion: . . . "this role

[1] J. Poirier, "Le Statut de la Femme dans les Sociétés archaïques," *La Femme*
(Brussels 1959, Receuils de la Société Jean Bodin XI, pp. 11-22) 13-14 sees this "aliena-
tion" as an inevitable result of exogamy.

was affectively as well as culturally central in the Roman kinship system. Such facts further justify labeling the elite Roman cultural emphasis on and valuation of daughters 'filiafocality' " (pp. 65-66). This quotation typifies the reasoning and the prose style of much of the book. Presumably in anticipation of criticisms from her theory-resistant colleagues, Hallett continually advances justifications for using the texts, the terms and the approach she has chosen. It makes for repetitive, dense reading at times. It might have been better to discard methods with which she felt uncomfortable or simply to have thrown them out at the reader, to take or leave. She need not have spent so much of the introductory section apologizing for drawing on anthropology and psychoanalytic reasoning.

In fact the influence of these disciplines is indirect. Hallett's method of sustaining her thesis is to analyse repeatedly a set of six texts (summarized pp. 62-63) from different angles. She explains her concentration on these passages as an attempt to retain the understanding of the general reader. In this she probably succeeds — no mean feat, for outsiders tend quickly to be left behind in the involved world of aristocratic intermarriage. She does introduce other examples incidentally and considers the legal aspect of the Roman woman's status — both her formal affiliation as daughter or wife and her access to property. In essence, though, this is an intensive study of Latin literary examples of father-daughter relationships.

Hallett uses the semi-legendary accounts of Coriolanus, turned aside from his treasonable march on Rome by the pleas of his mother Volumnia (and, though secondarily, of his wife — something the author neglects to mention). She returns again and again to the example of Verginia, the plebeian girl whose father stabbed her to death, a willing victim, to save her from violation by the patrician Appius Claudius. Hallett argues reasonably enough that such accounts, dating from the late Republic and early Empire but describing founding myths of centuries earlier, convey the ideals and assumptions of the later age, with some echoes of the original setting.

Hallett's linguistic argument is more dubious. She reviews the cognates of *mater* in words such as *matrimonium, matrona* (p. 216) and — more questionably — *materia* (p. 212) and compares them with similar forms based on *pater*. This is valuable, but Hallett's conclusions are sometimes eccentric or hark back to an outmoded style of aetiological etymology which does not merit revival. She rightly points out that while *patronus* had a meaning of a parental type in that a *patronus* protected his dependants, *matrona*, formed on the same model, had no such connotation, meaning simply a married woman. This is fine as far as it goes but, as elsewhere, Hallett is selective in supporting her argument. It would have balanced the presentation to have pointed out that *paterfamilias* also denoted a legal relationship to property, as did *materfamilias*, rather than parenthood alone: Gaius at *Dig.* 50.16.195.2 tells us that a Roman boy became a *paterfamilias* on the death of his father, although the orphan himself might be a child or a celibate adult.

The arguments about the history of *avus* as originally meaning mother's father (pp. 127-30) are weak. Similarly the argument from the form of *avunculus* about the early role of such relatives is awkward. Even if true, it would not imply continuity to a later age, but Hallett draws on such material and on ex-

amples from the later period to support her contention that such maternal rela-
tives occupied a special place in the life of a Roman child. Again, the account is
one-sided. Thus it is true, as she says, that the younger Pliny received special
attention from his mother's brother, but there are parallel instances of paternal
uncles like Cicero taking a close personal interest in their fraternal nephews'
affairs.

Perhaps Hallett over-argues her case from the common authorial obses-
sion which leads us all to find what we are looking for, coupled with a desire to
counter earlier tendencies to stress the patrilineal character of Roman kinship
ties. This is understandable, but the balance surely could be restored without
making extravagant claims for kinship on the maternal side. It would have been
sufficient to point out that the line of intestate succession was not the sole deter-
minant of loyalty and that for most purposes Romans observed a system of dual
descent, emphasizing whichever side of the family was more prestigious.

The insistence on the "filiafocal" character of family relations is generally
strained. Hallett dismisses the idea that it was really as mothers that Roman
women made their mark (pp. 66-69), although conceding that the concrete
instances of female forcefulness are overwhelmingly of mothers of adult sons.
She insists that "even after Roman women had come to occupy other, more
'mature' familial roles, they continued to be symbolically and publicly defined
as *daughters*." But the supporting argument — that women progressed from be-
ing daughters to become daughter-like wives under the husband's control or
wards of male relations — overstates the case.

Women *were* defined legally as daughters of the family during their fa-
thers' lifetime, but so were sons defined as *filiifamilias*, sons of the "family" or,
more properly, of the family holdings. A woman who formally entered the fam-
ily of her husband on marriage (by *conventio in manum mariti*) was termed
*materfamilias*. The idea that she was in the position of daughter to her husband
is a later juristic reading (e.g. Gai. 3.3) of her place in the hereditary hierarchy.
As elsewhere in this work, there is a tendency to slide from a discussion of the
underlying structural representation of Roman kinship evidenced by law, phi-
lology and legend to concrete instances without clarifying the parameters of the
discourse, and to skew the evidence by failing to balance the picture of women's
role with that of men.

Given the length of the book and its apparently wide-ranging view of
Roman family relations suggested by chapter headings like "Filiae Familiae,"
"Sorores Familiae," "Matres Familiae" and so on, we might have expected a
more thorough study of the differences between a daughter's relationship to her
mother and her father. In my view this side of the work could have been built
up, with corresponding editing of the extensive and quite inconclusive compar-
ative material on the Etruscans and theories of matriarchy, but this is a matter
of taste. I am bound to admit that many will find that part of the book fascinat-
ing. Perhaps, too, what seems to me undue repetition in the re-working of the
same examples — Brutus' mother Servilia, Cicero's daughter Tullia — would be
welcome to those less familiar with the primary material of the study.

The study of the Roman family is just coming into its own in the 1980s.
The earlier preoccupation with Indo-Germanic forms — which happily died a
natural death in the 1940s — was characterized by voluminous tomes and confi-

dent assertions about the archaic Roman family and primitive marriage.[2] The
new wave of scholarship has been less ambitious. The imaginative generaliza-
tions of the earlier period have been succeeded by detailed examination of in-
scriptions, the law, letters and prosopographical *minutiae* in an attempt to re-
construct patterns of family loyalty, age at first marriage, or aspects of the life
cycle.[3]

    Such studies reflect both the well-known empiricist bent of classical
scholarship and the wider interests of historians of the family in other disci-
plines. The resurgence of interest in families of the past is a product of the
general flowering of social history since the 1960s. It is a demanding trans-
disciplinary field and classical scholars have proved equal to the task of compar-
ative reading and the acquisition of statistical and demographic skills. The pro-
cess is two-way: there is a demand for studies of the Roman family accessible,
for example, to Mediaeval and Early Modern historians. The body of articles
has grown since Rawson's pioneering studies of the lower class family from Ro-
man epitaphs,[4] but most are to be found in classical journals. Veyne and
Hopkins have admittedly addressed a larger scholarly public[5] and Saller and

    [2]Notably C. W. Westrup's 1934-1944 *Introduction to Early Roman Law. Com-
parative Sociological Studies. The Patriarchal Joint Family* (Copenhagen 1934-1944).

    [3]A random sample of such works might include: D. Slusanski, "Le Vocabulaire
Latin des *gradus aetatum*" *Rev. Roumaine de Ling.* 19 (1974) 103-21; 267-96; 345-69;
437-51; 563-78; S. Treggiari, "Family Life among the Staff of the Volusii," *TAPA* 105
(1974) 393-401; M. Manson, "La *Pietas* et le sentiment de l'enfance à Rome d'après les
monnaies," *Rev. Belge de Numism. et de Sigillogr.* 121 (1975) 21-80; K. M. Moir, "Pliny
*HN* 7.57 and the Marriage of Tib. Gracchus," *CQ* 33 (1983) 136-45; R. P. Saller and B.
D. Shaw, "Tombstones and Roman Family Relations in the Principate: Civilians, Sol-
diers and Slaves" *JRS* 74 (1984) 125-26; J. A. Crook, "Women in Roman Succession" in
B. Rawson, ed., *The Family in Ancient Rome: Select Studies* (forthcoming, London/
Ithaca). Family studies are in a healthy state. These authors have all produced other
works in the field and most are still actively engaged in relevant research.

    [4]In labelling Rawson's work "pioneering," I refer to the way her "Family Life
among the Lower Classes at Rome in the First Two Centuries of the Empire," *CP* 61
(1966) 71-83 stood out in 1966 in its clear-sighted attempt to reconstruct aspects of Ro-
man family life and loyalties. This is not to detract from the importance of such earlier
works as S. G. Harrod's 1909 Princeton dissertation, *Latin Terms of Endearment and
Family Relationship* or A. Burn's "*Hic Breve Vivitur*: A Study of the Expectation of Life
in the Roman Empire," *Past and Present* 4 (1953) 1-31 which emerged from time to
time. K. Hopkins' vital population studies began to appear in the 1960s and immediately
became standard works but he had not yet begun to move from statistics to the valuable
generalities about familial and conjugal relations which have since become so closely
associated with his work. The changed state of Roman family studies is shown by the fact
that Rawson's "Roman Concubinage and other *de facto* Marriages," *TAPA* 104 (1974)
279-305 formed part of a trend evident from a perusal of the preceding footnote.

    [5]E.g. P. Veyne, "La Famille et l'amour sous le Haut-empire romain," *Annales
ESC* (1978) 35-63, and K. Hopkins, "Brother-Sister Marriage in Roman Egypt," *Comp.
Stud. in Soc. and Hist.* 22 (1980) 303-54.

Shaw have been moving into other media[6] but there is still no *book* corresponding to W. K. Lacey's *The Family in Classical Greece* (London 1968) to which "outsiders" can refer for a summary view of the Roman family. Rawson's forthcoming volume will be welcomed as a collection of expert studies, representative of the state of the art, in a convenient format, but it does not present a holistic theoretical view.

Perhaps Hallett's book will meet a need. The time has surely come for a synthesizing approach to the carefully assembled *minutiae*. We are all familiar with the entrenched classical resistance to theory and Hallett herself predicts her colleagues' unfavourable reception of terms such as "filiafocal" and "culturally embedded." The reaction to the book will also be affected by her concentration on the upper class and her use of a small selection of literary examples, since this runs counter to current research trends. It would be a pity if this knee-jerk conservatism prevailed, for there is a place for speculation and even — provided the author is honest about her intentions — the use of anecdotal material rather than the so-called hard evidence of inscriptions and statistics. Hallett's expertise is literary and she defines her task as a theoretical study of the principles and presumptions of the élite Roman family. Details are open to criticism but the project as such is legitimate. The fact that it differs from the mainstream should be seen as an advantage. Like the work of Stone[7] and Goody,[8] it contains a number of generalities which will provoke strong reactions — in other words, it will stimulate even where it irritates and perhaps inspire timely consideration of larger views. The Roman family, like any other topic, needs to be researched in detail but reviewed *in toto*.

Nonetheless the unconventional approach, however attractive to non-classicists, raises special problems of assessment. My own rejection of oedipal theories, for example, makes it difficult to accept Hallett's view of mother-son and father-daughter relations. Her stress on the youthful attractiveness of young Roman mothers seems in any case to be misplaced, for if the Oedipus complex is universal it ought not to be unduly influenced by the mother's conformity to adult stereotypes of sex appeal.

I am equally unhappy with Hallett's insistence that conjugal relations in this social group were cold and husbands could not count on the loyalty of their wives. There is ample evidence in Lucretius 3.894-96, in tombstones (notably *CIL* VI, 1527, the famous "*laudatio Turiae*") and in the tales of Appian, Vale-

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[6]E.g. a joint article in 1984, "Close-Kin Marriage in Roman Society?" *Man* n.s. 19, pp. 432-44, and a forthcoming work on the theory and practice of *patria potestas* by Saller to appear in a new Cambridge journal of social history *Society and Change*.

[7]L. Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800* (London 1977), which has been heaped with extravagant praise and blame since its publication, in contrast to the reception of Stone's earlier works, which were in the tradition of sober historical specialization.

[8]J. Goody, *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe* (Cambridge 1983). As an anthropologist daring to cover a wide historical canvas, Goody has incurred special criticism, e.g. by Saller and Shaw in the 1984 work cited in note 6 above.

rius Maximus, Tacitus and Pliny[9] that Roman men of this period *did* hope for
happiness in marriage. Certainly the wife's primary political loyalty was to her
brothers and sons but, again, this point could have been made without harping
one-sidedly on the "low emotional expectations" (e.g. p. 240) upper class Ro-
mans entertained of marriage. It is on such topics that the lack of substantial
background knowledge — especially of the law and the epitaphs — shows
through, but this could be territorial grumbling on my part.

For a number of reasons, then, this book is likely to enjoy greatest popu-
larity with historians of the later European family, feminist historians generally
and social scientists interested in comparative material. They will benefit from
the use of a core of literary samples. The book will also be accessible to under-
graduate students, though the price will ensure that most of them use library
copies. The volume is beautifully presented, though, and Princeton University
Press is to be commended for the style of type and for resisting the temptation to
move the detailed footnotes to the end of the book. The family trees and the
excellent indices will be an aid to all readers.

Above all, outsiders will find it convenient to have to hand a book about
the Roman family and Roman women, albeit those of a restricted social group,
rather than being referred to a series of specialist articles. Hallett has clearly
devoted a great deal of time and industry to this thoughtful study. Her footnot-
ing is admirably meticulous, as is her custom of acknowledging assistance. Ulti-
mately, I find her thesis unconvincing but in presenting it she raises interesting
questions about the position of élite Roman women and the function of mar-
riage which will advance the state of the discipline. That her view is shaped by
literary representations and stereotypes is to be expected and she does not pre-
tend otherwise. The book is rather long and the argument sometimes far-
fetched but many will welcome it as a stimulating and original view of the two-
fold loyalties of the Roman matron.

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[9]E.g. Appian *BC* 14.23; Val. Max. 4.6; Tac. *Ann.* 3.34, 15.62-63; Plin. *Ep.* 3.11,
3.16, 7.19, 9.13.

JEAN-MICHEL RODDAZ. Marcus Agrippa. Paris, Boccard, 1984. Pp. IX + 734;
9 maps and plans; 42 illustrations. (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises
d'Athènes et de Rome, Fasc. 253)

Was there a desideratum for another full-scale biography of Marcus
Agrippa, especially one of such monumental proportions as this book of Rod-
daz? No less than nine substantial works on Agrippa have been written in the
last 150 years, the most important of which are those of Frandsen (1836), Motte
(1872), Daniel (1933), Reinhold (1933), and Hanslik (1961, in *RE*, s.v. "Vipsa-
nius"), not to overlook some popular biographies, such as those of Dahlmann

(1927), Wright (1938), and Signon (1978). True, Agrippa merits pride of place as one of the *grands hommes politiques* of antiquity, co-founder of the Principate, a multi-talented leader who in his short life (he died at age fifty-one) left his mark on Roman and world history as military genius, high administrator, author, and builder, even if Plutarch did not deem him worthy of a place in his gallery of eminent Greeks and Romans. Agrippa, indeed, was not a controversial figure like Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander, Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, Augustus. Moving in the shade of Octavian/Augustus throughout his career, Agrippa remained a relatively neglected figure until the dissertations of Daniel and Reinhold in the 1930s. Since then Agrippa has been accorded a more visible and important role in the history of the end of the Roman Republic and the foundation of the Principate.

So much having been accomplished, a new comprehensive life of Agrippa would be justified if it satisfied four criteria: inclusion of newly discovered primary sources that have come to light since Hanslik's methodical documentation in the *Realencyclopädie*; fundamental critical analysis of the major literary sources for Agrippa's life; study of Agrippa "nella storia del suo tempo," as Momigliano asked for over fifty years ago, in the context of the problems of the Augustan Age.

All this Roddaz, whose biography of Agrippa has been over a decade in the making, set out to achieve—and has accomplished with·exemplary thoroughness, mastery of all the evidence and knowledge of the times. Due justice has been given to all the new materials, epigraphic, papyrological, numismatic, and iconographic. Proper attention has been given to such important discoveries as the fragment on papyrus of a Greek translation of the *laudatio funebris* of Augustus in 12 B.C. for his friend and son-in-law Agrippa, the Greek inscription of 27 B.C. in the Rijksmuseum van Oudheden at Leiden, the inscription of Agrippa of 20-19 B.C. at Glanum in Gallia Narbonensis, the first evidence of a cult of Agrippa in an inscription of 5 B.C. from the Heraeum at Samos.

In preparation for his *Agrippa* Roddaz first made himself master of the relevant literary sources. This he accomplished in his massive third-cycle thesis *Marcus Agrippa, étude des sources littéraires* (Bordeaux 1976, typescript). The results of this study laid the foundation for evaluating the career of Agrippa both as myth and reality. These critical studies enabled Roddaz, in his most important single contribution, to separate from the "real" Agrippa the stereotyped image fashioned in the late Augustan period, popularized by, for example, Velleius Paterculus and Pliny the Elder, until it emerged in its fullest form in the third century in Cassius Dio's *Roman History*, as exemplar of the ideal public servant of the emperor to the military men of Dio's own time. Roddaz cautions that we must read the literary sources for Agrippa as a sort of imperial propaganda portraying Agrippa as the ideal model of *adiutor imperii*, a mythicized paragon of virtues, whose self-effacement, moderation and fidelity to the princeps were held up as a pattern for imitation in the imperial period by those committed to the monarchy.

Roddaz emphasizes that the military talents of Agrippa are usually highlighted; in actuality he was a man of many talents whose gifts as administrator (in Rome, Gaul, and the East) surpassed his achievements as general and admiral. In this connection, Roddaz has tackled anew the much litigated question of

the *imperium* of Agrippa from 23 to 12 B.C. in his unprecedented relationship to Augustus as virtual co-emperor. One must applaud Roddaz's conclusion (pp. 338-57) that the new evidence from the *laudatio funebris* is too fragmentary to enable us to define more closely Agrippa's powers (*pace* Ludwig Koenen and E. W. Gray).[1] More important, Roddaz has proposed as one of the *arcana imperii* that in naming Agrippa *collega imperii* (even if *collega minor*) Augustus sought to demonstrate that in the *respublica restituta* he was committed to the republican institution of collegiality at the very pinnacle of power, his priority as *princeps* being certified only by his *auctoritas*. It was a carefully sought out pragmatic step on Augustus's part to present himself as less than an autocrat. Thus to later generations Agrippa emerged as the ideal servant of the princeps and the people. Seneca the Younger held him up as the only one of those who became famous in the civil wars to be *felix in publicum*, and Cassius Dio called him "the noblest man of his time."

To incorporate Agrippa into the history of his times, Roddaz has devoted much space, with insight and great detail, to the events of the three decades from Agrippa's first appearance in history as friend of Caesar's heir to his untimely death, and beyond. There are splendid treatments of the strategies and movement of troops in the much discussed Perusine War, of Portus Iulius built for the Sicilian War against Sextus Pompey,[2] of the *monumenta Agrippae* in the Campus Martius,[3] of Agrippa as a man of letters and technician, and a sophisticated study of all the portraits of Agrippa, and of the coins concerning Agrippa (including an important contribution to the problem of the *as* of Agrippa issued by Caligula).

The book is equipped with superb illustrations of the coins and portraits of Agrippa, with a summary chronology of his life, an excellent bibliography, containing about 1100 items, and superb indices (of sources, modern authors, persons, divinities, places).

In a work of such magnitude and value it would be trivial to cite minor blemishes, such as typographical slips in Greek and German texts and titles. Considering the readers for whom this learned biography is intended, one may ask whether it was necessary to translate Greek and Latin passages.

Roddaz's new biography of Agrippa is a monumental contribution to the history of the Augustan Age. Barring the discovery of dramatic and substantial new evidence, it will remain the standard authoritative life of Agrippa long into the future.

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[1]See now also R. K. Sherk, "The Last Two Lines of the Laudatio Funebris for Agrippa," *ZPE* 41 (1981) 67-69.

[2]A new study, V. Manfredi, "Il Consulente navale di Vergilio per l'Eneide," *Aevum* 56 (1982) 3-18.

[3]Not noticed by Roddaz: E. Feliciani, "Definitiva sistemazione dei resti dell'acquedotto di Agrippa e dell'arco di Claudio sotto il cortile di Palazzo Sciarra a Roma," *Antiqua* 6, no. 2 (1981) 32-34; H. B. Evans, "Agrippa's Water Plan," *AJA* 86 (1982) 401-16.

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
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## ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS

The manner in which the collection of Aristotelian writings now extant was originally constituted remains very much a mystery. The curious and in many respects implausible story of the disappearance and subsequent recovery of the library of Theophrastus is the best known element in this puzzle. But the most detailed evidence concerning the early condition of the Aristotelian corpus is that provided by three lists of books ascribed to Aristotle which have been preserved in ancient biographies of him. These catalogues are the chief source of external evidence touching on both the condition of Aristotle's writings in the period immediately following his death and the alterations they appear to have undergone in the edition of Aristotelian works prepared by Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century B.C. Because of the many problematic features of the catalogues, their evidence has often been ignored or dismissed, or used only in selective and unsystematic fashion.

The extensive studies devoted to the catalogues in recent years by Paul Moraux and Ingemar Düring have rectified this situation to some degree, and have secured general agreement as to their authority and importance.[1] At the same time, however, the problem of the catalogues, and of the early history of the Aristotelian corpus as a whole, can hardly be said to have been satisfactorily resolved. Disagreements persist over such questions as the identity of the original source of the earliest catalogues and the circumstances and precise nature of Andronicus' editorial activity. Moreover, even when liberal recourse is had to textual emendation, no fully convincing account has yet been given of the exact relationship of the three catalogues to one another, to the edition of

Andronicus, and to the corpus as presently constituted.[2] In the state of
our knowledge, many uncertainties must remain concerning matters
such as the status of book titles and the meaning of the numbering of
books of larger treatises. Still, it has to be acknowledged that much in-
formation in the lists appears to be transmitted with great fidelity, and
under these circumstances it seems legitimate to wonder whether there
are not alternative hypotheses concerning the catalogues which remain
to be explored.

In what follows, an attempt will be made to establish the plausibil-
ity of such a hypothesis and to examine some of its implications with
respect to the composition and early history of Aristotle's writings.


I


Of the extant catalogues of Aristotle's writings, those preserved by
Diogenes Laertius and by the anonymous author of the *Vita Menagiana*
by way of Hesychius are of unknown authorship, while the third, which
survives only in medieval Arabic versions and is attributed to a "Ptolemy
the Unknown," is probably, but not certainly, the work of a Neoplaton-
ist of the fourth century A.D.[3] The catalogue of Ptolemy (P) clearly pre-
supposes the edition of Andronicus, though how exactly it reproduces
Andronicus is a matter of conjecture. The Diogenes catalogue (D) and
the anonymous catalogue (A), which are similar, though far from iden-
tical, are now generally believed to depend on a catalogue originally
compiled in the last quarter of the third century B.C. Moraux has ar-
gued that its author was Ariston, scholarch of the Athenian Peripatos at
this time; but this thesis remains controversial, and some scholars con-
tinue to favor the traditional ascription to the Alexandrian librarian
Hermippus.[4]

[2]Consider the negative judgment on Moraux',undertaking expressed by R. Stark,
*Aristotelesstudien* (Munich 1972) 160-64.

[3]Texts of the catalogues may be found in the collection of Aristotelian fragments
edited by Valentin Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig 1886)
1-22, and in Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 41-50, 83-89, 221-31. On
the identity of this Ptolemy and the text of his biography see Moraux (note 1 above) 289-
94; Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 208-10; "Ptolemy's *Vita Aristotelis*
Rediscovered," in *Philomathes*, ed. R. B. Palmer and R. Hamerton-Kelly (The Hague
1971) 264-69; M. Plezia, "De Ptolemaeo Pinacographo," *Eos* 63 (1975) 37-42.

[4]Moraux (note 1 above) 211-47; but see Düring, "Ariston or Hermippus?" *C&M*
17 (1956) 11-21; Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 67-69, 90-92. Addi-

The anonymous catalogue differs most obviously from the Diogenes catalogue by the fact that it consists of two segments which appear to derive from different sources. The first or main part of the anonymous catalogue ($A_1$) largely reproduces the Diogenes catalogue, although it includes several significant major changes or additions and numerous minor ones. The second part ($A_2$), which appears to be in the nature of an appendix, includes many of the major Aristotelian works which fail to appear in the first part or in D, but it also lists a number of titles otherwise unattested or of very doubtful provenance. This appendix is regarded by Moraux as a much later document consisting of several originally independent parts, and representing an attempt to emend the incomplete first part of the catalogue on the basis of the edition of Andronicus. Moraux is compelled, however, to assume extensive corruption of the crucial section of the appendix containing the major works of the corpus, and his tortuous account of $A_2$ as a whole has been received with scepticism.[5]

The most striking feature of $A_1$ and D is their omission of many of the major works of the corpus as presently constituted—even if one assumes (as is customarily done) that such works might be listed in disassembled form. This is particularly true of D. The biological works (that is, the various zoological treatises as well as the *De anima* and *Parva naturalia*) are grossly underrepresented in both catalogues; there is no *Physics* as such (a few short physical works are listed), and no trace of the other physical treatises; no metaphysical works appear in D, and only a single ethical treatise in five books.

Most explanations for this state of affairs have relied in some degree on the supposed decline of the Peripatetic school at Athens and elsewhere in the years following the death of Theophrastus.[6] That lack of interest in certain subjects on the part of leading Peripatetics could account for the absence in the catalogues of books otherwise available is, however, scarcely credible. Particularly inconvenient for this theory is the fact that Straton of Lampsacus, Theophrastus' immediate successor, appears to have had a considerable interest in physics; and we have

tional contributions to this discussion are inventoried by Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* I (Berlin 1973) 4, n. 2; see especially J. J. Keaney, "Two Notes on the Tradition of Aristotle's Writings," *AJP* 84 (1963) 58-63.

[5]Moraux (note 1 above) 249-88. See, for example, Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 91-92 (where, however, it is also assumed that $A_2$ is post-Andronican).

[6]See, for example, Moraux (note 1 above) 320.

good evidence that Aristotle's *Physics* was available both within and outside the Peripatetic school during the third century B.C. Indeed, it is no longer doubted that at least some of the major treatises of the corpus were available outside the Peripatos at this time—particularly the biological treatises, but also various of the physical and logical writings.[7] How is it, then, that a catalogue or inventory of the works of Aristotle, compiled toward the end of the third century in one of the two main centers of Peripatetic learning, could still exhibit such gross deficiencies?

If one seeks to argue that important Aristotelian works were not available during the third century, one is compelled to revisit the famous tale of the disappearance and subsequent recovery of Aristotle's writings. After Aristotle's death, it appears, the manuscript originals of his works remained in the Lyceum as the property of Theophrastus, his successor as head of the school. Theophrastus' library was then willed to a certain Neleus, who removed it from Athens to the town of Scepsis in the Troad. There it was kept in a cellar by Neleus' heirs. Neglected and virtually forgotten until the beginning of the first century B.C., it was then discovered and purchased by Apellicon, a rich book collector, who returned it to Athens. The collection was subsequently acquired by Sulla on the fall of Athens in 86 B.C. and brought to Rome, where it came to the attention of the grammarian Tyrannion and through him to one Andronicus, who undertook the task of preparing definitive editions of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus based on this material.

While few scholars are now willing to accept uncritically the details of this episode as recounted by Strabo and Plutarch, there appears to be little justification for rejecting it completely.[8] Certainly, the idea

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[7]According to Diogenes Laertius (5.58), Straton was known as "the physicist." Simplicius (*In Phys.* 923,7ff. Diels = Eudemus, fr. 6 Wehrli) relates the story that Eudemus corresponded with Theophrastus concerning the text of passages in Aristotle's *Physics*. That Epicurus had access to the *Physics* and the logical works is attested by Philodemus, *Adv. Soph.* (Pap. Herc. 1005), fr. $1^2$, 7–14 Sbordone = Epicurus, fr. 118 Arrighetti; and a case can be made that he also knew at least *On the Heavens, Movement of Animals* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. See generally G. Arrighetti, *Epicuro Opere* (Turin 1960) 549–56; D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists* (Princeton 1967); Moraux, *Aristotelismus* (note 4 above) 10–12, 16–17; F. Solmsen, "Epicurus on Void, Matter and Genesis," *Phronesis* 22 (1977) 263–81. On Stoic knowledge of Aristotle's physical treatises see L. Tarán in *Gnomon* 53 (1981) 723–25. An overview of the activity of the Peripatos in the period immediately following Theophrastus is provided by F. Wehrli, "Rückblick: Der Peripatos in vorchristlicher Zeit," *Die Schule des Aristoteles* 10 (Basel 1959) 95–128.

[8]Strabo 13.1.54; Plutarch, *Sulla* 26. See particularly the fully documented account of Moraux, *Aristotelismus* (note 4 above) 3–58, with the review of L. Tarán, *Gno-*

that all of Aristotle's school treatises were unknown in the Hellenistic
period can no longer be sustained. Yet it seems quite possible, consider-
ing the surprisingly slight influence exercised by Aristotle in certain of
the major areas of his activity throughout this period, that some of these
writings did indeed remain completely unknown. The *Politics* and the
*Poetics* in particular may be mentioned as candidates for this category.[9]

How to square the Scepsis story with the evidence of the catalogues
is far from clear on any assumption. The undoubted antiquity of D and
$A_1$ tempts one to suppose that they might actually pre-date the removal
of the bulk of the library to Scepsis. On the other hand, their deficien-
cies suggest that a part of the library must already have been separated
from what is represented by these inventories. But it seems unlikely that
the missing part is what went to Scepsis, since these works seem to have
been for the most part better known in the Hellenistic period than the
bulk of those in our lists. Is it possible, then, that D and $A_1$ in fact repre-
sent an inventory of the Aristotelian works sent to Scepsis — an inventory
already reduced by the subtraction of many of the major works of the
corpus?

In attempting to trace the vicissitudes of the Aristotelian corpus in
the period following the death of Theophrastus, it is essential to keep in
mind the turbulent political situation at Athens and throughout the
Greek world at this time.[10] Given the traditional links between the Peri-
patos and the rulers of Macedon, the position of the school at Athens
must have been precarious at best. Memories of the regime of the Peri-

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*mon* 53 (1981) 724-31; also A.-H. Chroust, "The Miraculous Disappearance and Recov-
ery of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*," *C&M* 23 (1962) 51-67; Düring, "Aristoteles" (note 1
above) cols. 190-200; H. B. Gottschalk, "Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scho-
larchs," *Hermes* 100 (1972) 314-42. Gottschalk goes further than most scholars (p. 342)
in doubting that any Aristotelian works were retrieved from Scepsis, though without ad-
ducing additional evidence. Tarán (pp. 727-29) makes the important point that the
anti-Peripatetic animus which has tended to discredit the tale for recent critics is limited
to the version of Strabo, and that Plutarch's source is likely to have been independent of
this.

    [9]There seems to be no compelling reason to assume that the epitome of the argu-
ment of the *Politics* by Areius Didymus is based on a Hellenistic compendium of some
sort rather than that it reflects the text of the *Politics* as it appeared in the edition of
Andronicus; it is surely suggestive that Areius follows Aristotle's text more closely here
than in his epitome of the ethical works (see the account of Moraux, *Aristotelismus* [note
4 above] 259-76, 418-34). On the unavailability of the *Poetics* see G. F. Else, *Aristotle's
Poetics: The Argument* (Cambridge, MA 1963) 337, n. 125.

    [10]The political circumstances affecting the activities of the Lyceum in the third
century are well discussed by J. P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley 1972) 103-05,
152-54.

patetic Demetrius of Phaleron, imposed on Athens by Cassander in 317,
were still fresh. Athens had been captured by Demetrius Poliorcetes in
294 after a lengthy and bitter siege. In 288/7, when Demetrius was hard
pressed at home, the Athenians rose against him. When Theophrastus
set aside money in his will for repairs to the school's library and adjoin-
ing areas, it makes sense to suppose that the damage to which he alludes
was incurred on one of these occasions—possibly at the hands of the
Athenians themselves. That this history was a factor of some impor-
tance in Theophrastus' decision to will his entire library to Neleus—and
in Neleus' decision to remove it from Athens—is surely a plausible
assumption.[11]

     If Athens could no longer reliably serve as the center of Peripatetic
learning, an obvious alternative presented itself. When Demetrius of
Phaleron fell from power in Athens, he took refuge with Ptolemy Soter
and aided him in the establishment of the library at Alexandria.[12]
Theophrastus himself appears to have been invited by Ptolemy to relo-
cate in Alexandria.[13] At the time of Theophrastus' death in 286, Egypt
was probably the most powerful of the Macedonian successor states, and
offered a relatively secure as well as hospitable environment. These facts
lend a certain credence to the report of Athenaeus that Neleus sold the
works of Aristotle and Theophrastus to Ptolemy Philadelphus, son and
successor to Ptolemy Soter.[14] Moreover, if Neleus was indeed motivated
by a concern for the fate of Peripatetic learning, it would have made
better sense to consign his inheritance to Alexandria than to the uncer-
tain fortunes of provincial Scepsis.

     [11]For Theophrastus' will see Diogenes Laertius 5.51-52. Because the Lyceum was
located just outside the walls of Athens, it was vulnerable to a besieging force, and it
appears to have suffered severe damage on two subsequent occasions (see Lynch [note 10
above] 16-31); but action by an Athenian mob would seem at least equally plausible.
Gottschalk's view (note 8 above) 336 that Theophrastus' will betrays an optimistic out-
look regarding the future of the Peripatos at Athens fails to take account of the history of
Athenian hostility toward the school and its founder (cf. Düring, *Biographical Tradition*
[note 1 above] 373-95). This is not to deny that other factors may have been at work in
Theophrastus' decision, such as the need for a "literary executor" to bring order to an
enormous and no doubt imperfectly organized mass of writings (thus Gottschalk [note 8
above] 336-37).
     [12]Diodorus Siculus 20.45.2-5, Diogenes Laertius 5.78-79, Strabo 9.1.20. On the
origins of the library see, for example, R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Ox-
ford 1968) 87-104.
     [13]Diogenes Laertius 5.37; cf. Strabo 13.1.54.
     [14]Athenaeus 1.4 (3a-b). Straton of Lampsacus is said to have tutored the young
Ptolemy (Diogenes Laertius 5.58). See Moraux, *Aristotelismus* (note 4 above) 12-15.

Athenaeus claims that Neleus sold "all the books" of Aristotle and Theophrastus to Ptolemy, and he adds that Ptolemy subsequently acquired other works of these authors at Athens and Rhodes. This claim is an ambiguous one, and to the extent that Athenaeus' story has been credited at all, it has been assumed that what Neleus sold to Ptolemy must have been works by authors other than Aristotle and Theophrastus, or perhaps some of their unpublished manuscripts, or copies of their works. Taken literally, the testimony of Athenaeus directly conflicts with the better known Scepsis story, and there is no obvious way of reconciling them.[15] Nevertheless, it cannot be easily dismissed, and may embody an important element of historical truth.

The biography of Theophrastus in Diogenes Laertius includes a lengthy catalogue of writings ascribed to him. In part because of the alphabetical ordering adopted throughout most of it, this catalogue has been generally considered a product of the Alexandrian library.[16] Although it is virtually certain that the Theophrastus catalogue (T) contains works by Peripatetic authors other than Theophrastus (notably Eudemus of Rhodes), scholars have generally accepted it as what it appears to be, a list of writings regarded by the Alexandrian library as composed by Theophrastus. Yet the inordinate length of the catalogue, its composite nature, the existence of apparent doublets, and the doubtfulness of Theophrastian authorship in some instances suggest that it represents something less than a *catalogue raisonné* of the works of Theophrastus. What it seems to be instead is an inventory of a number of separate collections of Peripatetic writings. Is it possible that the list incorporates an inventory of works of Aristotle and Theophrastus acquired by Ptolemy from Neleus?

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[15]Moraux imagines that what Neleus sold were primarily non-Aristotelian works — books collected by Aristotle and Theophrastus. "Ob Abschriften oder gar Originale der eigenen Werke von Aristoteles und Theophrast auch mit dabei waren, wissen wir nicht. Wir wissen lediglich, dass in dem Teil, den Neleus fur sich behielt, Aristoteleswerke vorhanden waren. Die Vermutung liegt daher nahe, dass Neleus die wertvollen Original-Handschriften der Aristotelesschriften dem Sammeleifer der alexandrinischen Käufer entzog" (Moraux, *Aristotelismus* [note 4 above] 13). Gottschalk (note 8 above) 339–40 doubts that Ptolemy's agents would have been satisfied with less than the entire collection; cf. also Tarán (note 8 above) 727.

[16]The catalogue is discussed at length by H. Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea* (Bonn 1858) 1–24; E. Howald, "Die Schriftenverzeichnisse des Aristoteles und des Theophrast," *Hermes* 55 (1920) 204–21; O. Regenbogen, art. "Theophrastos," *RE* Suppl. VII (1940) cols. 1363–70; cf. Moraux (note 1 above) 246–47. Keaney (note 4 above) 298, n. 4 suggests that the catalogue as a whole antedates Hermippus.

Athenaeus' remark that Ptolemy acquired other Peripatetic man-
uscripts at Athens and Rhodes is suggestive in this context, as it would
help explain both the composite nature of T and the presence in it of
works of Eudemus of Rhodes. In any event, given the fairly extensive
confusion of authorship as between Aristotle and Theophrastus in the
third century and later, it is inherently plausible that works of Aristotle
could have found their way into collections of Theophrastian writings —
just as it is probable that the Aristotelian catalogues include some works
really by Theophrastus.[17]

This line of argument suggests the following hypothesis. Most
of the major treatises of Aristotle, together with many of the works of
Theophrastus, were acquired by Ptolemy Philadelphus from Neleus
and brought to the library of Alexandria, where they formed part of a
larger collection of Peripatetic material catalogued under the name of
Theophrastus. Other works of Aristotle that formed part of Theophras-
tus' library were sent by Neleus to Scepsis.[18] The latter collection was
inventoried (possibly at the request or for the purposes of the school) by
Neleus or an associate, and is reflected in the extant lists D and $A_1$,
while the major treatises, on arriving in Alexandria, were initially
treated as Theophrastian works and catalogued under his name in T.
Subsequently, these were recognized as genuinely Aristotelian works,

[17]On the likely presence of works of Eudemus in the later sections of the list see
Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1365, 1540; F. Wehrli, *Eudemos von Rhodos, Die
Schule des Aristoteles* 8 (Basel 1955) 113-21. The economic treatise extant under Aristo-
tle's name, which appears to be cited in D (23) and A (17) in a single-book version,
is referred to as a work of Theophrastus by Philodemus, possibly correctly (cf. Regen-
bogen, col. 1521); and the extant fragment of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* was probably
transmitted with the works of Aristotle (cf. Regenbogen, cols. 1389-90; W. Burnikel,
*Textgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu neun Opuscula Theophrasts* [Stuttgart 1974]
124-27).

[18]The suggestion that the major Aristotelian treatises did not go to Scepsis might
be thought to require the complete overthrow of the Strabo-Plutarch story, since the
unavailability of these treatises in the later Peripatos is its prime point, at least in the
version of Strabo. It is assumed here, however, that 1) certain of these treatises (for exam-
ple, the *Politics* and *Poetics*) did go to Scepsis; 2) some of the treatises that went to
Alexandria may have been unique exemplars (though copies of some are likely to have
been retained at Athens and elsewhere); and 3) the bulk of the Aristotelian material
did indeed go to Scepsis. The possibility should also be considered that the works of Aris-
totle and those of Theophrastus were treated differently — that is, that the bulk of the
works offered to Ptolemy was by Theophrastus, while the bulk of the Scepsis material was
Aristotelian.

and entered circulation under the name of Aristotle. Some time later, Neleus' inventory was utilized as the basis for a comprehensive catalogue of Aristotelian works that were either known to exist or were currently available.

That A as a whole represents at once a notional $(A_1)$ and an actual $(A_2)$ inventory of Aristotelian works is an assumption that is helpful in explaining some of the curious features of this catalogue, and it may account for the puzzle of its authorship. We have explicit testimony that a catalogue of Aristotelian writings was drawn up toward the end of the third century by Hermippus, chief librarian at Alexandria. The principal difficulty in identifying Hermippus as the author of A is the absence of an alphabetical ordering in that list. Yet if it could be assumed that Hermippus merely combined a preexisting $A_1$ with an inventory of the holdings of Aristotle at Alexandria, it would provide an explanation for the hybrid and duplicatory character of A.[19]

As regards the relation between D and $A_1$, the simplest explanation would seem to be that D represents the original inventory of Neleus' Scepsis collection, while $A_1$ represents a later version that has been altered to take account of the condition of those works on the list that continued to be (or had later become) available.[20] It makes sense to assume that $A_1$ represents a true catalogue rather than an inventory — a catalogue of Aristotelian works known to exist but not available as well as of works actually on hand. And it makes sense to assume that this catalogue was compiled in Athens by the Peripatetic scholarch Ariston sometime during the last quarter of the third century.

Before discussing further the implications of the hypothesis just sketched, it will be best to set forth the evidence from the catalogues themselves and elsewhere that most clearly supports it.

[19]Düring ("Ariston or Hermippus?" [note 4 above] 21) in fact comes close to endorsing such an assumption: "Some kind of inventory must have been made by a member of the library staff, at least as early as in the decade following Theophrastus' death. The simplest solution to the problem before us is to assume that Hermippus hit upon such an old inventory and incorporated it in his biography of Aristotle, without essentially changing its character."

[20]In his lengthy discussion of the relationship of the two lists, Moraux (note 1 above) 195–209 attempts to account for their differences primarily on the basis of accidents in the transmission of the texts. Obviously, the hypothesis suggested here is not intended to exclude the possibility of significant textual errors; the question is rather whether the differences do not form more of a pattern than Moraux is willing to admit.

II

We may begin with what is certainly the most problematic and difficult area of the catalogues and of the early history of the corpus generally, the physical and metaphysical writings. It has long been noticed that the early catalogues are singularly poor in physical and metaphysical works in any form; and such works as are listed do not agree very well with the current articulation of the corpus. In D there is no entry at all for a general work on metaphysics, and no more than a few entries which might conceal individual treatises on that subject. A₂ lists a μεταφυσικά in ten books (154). While certainly in harmony with current notions concerning the composition of the *Metaphysics*, this entry seriously inconveniences the view that A₂ or the relevant section of it is post-Andronican, and Moraux accordingly emends it to produce thirteen books (the current treatise without α).[21] As for A₁, it contains the enigmatic entry μεταφυσικά κ̄ (A 111). This has been generally taken to be a doublet of the ten-book *Metaphysics* listing in A₂, with κ̄ being explained as representing not the numeral twenty, but the designation of the last book of the treatise, or ten. In fact, however, this explanation is wholly arbitrary, and there is no reason on the basis of the catalogues alone for believing that the reference is to anything other than a work in twenty books.[22]

The situation of the physical works is no less puzzling. No general work on physics is to be found in the early lists except for the entry φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις in eighteen books of A₂. A number of short treatises appearing in D and A₁ can be considered as providing some — though not all — of the constituent sections of our current *Physics*. The treatise in one book entitled variously περὶ ἀρχῆς (D 41) and περὶ ἀρχῶν ἢ φύσεως (A 21) is generally considered a likely candidate for *Physics* I, which has the look of an originally independent work; a περὶ φύσεως in three books (D 90; cf. A 81) could represent *Physics* II–IV; and the two entries περὶ κινήσεως in one book (D 45, 115 = A 40, 102) could represent the relatively independent *Physics* VII (which exists in two different versions). However, there is no entry for a work on movement in three books that would account for *Physics* V–VI and VIII.[23] Still less promising is the case of the other major works which stand in close rela-

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[21]Moraux (note 1 above) 278–79.

[22]Moraux (note 1 above) 196–97; cf. Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 90.

[23]See the account of W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford 1936) 1–6.

tion to the *Physics*: *On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption* and the *Meteorology* are entirely absent from D and A₁ in an even remotely recognizable form.[24] The latter two works do appear, however, in A₂, with their proper complement of books.

On turning to the catalogue of Theophrastus, one is struck first by the fact that metaphysical works are as little in evidence here as in the Aristotelian lists, though it is known that Theophrastus wrote on this subject — indeed, a substantial fragment of an introductory lecture by him on metaphysics has been preserved. At the same time, there is a profusion of works apparently devoted to physical subjects. The following titles are the most directly relevant: περὶ φυσικῶν, eighteen books (46); περὶ φυσικῶν ἐπιτομή, two books (46); φυσικαὶ δόξαι, sixteen books (48); φυσικά, eight books (46); περὶ φύσεως, three books (46); περὶ φύσεως, without indication of length (50); περὶ κινήσεως, three books (44); περὶ κινήσεως, two books (49). It is fairly certain that Theophrastus wrote a treatise on physics in five or more books, and it seems reasonable to identify this with the entry for an eight-book *Physics*.[25] Also well attested for Theophrastus is the doxographical treatise in sixteen books. But the remaining entries have not been explained. Of greatest interest is the large physical treatise in eighteen books. Though frequently taken to be a doublet of the doxographical work,[26] there is no evidence for this. Is it merely coincidental that the number of books assigned to this work is the same as the number of books assigned to the "lecture course on physics" listed in A₂?

I would suggest that these two works are in fact one and the same, and that their identity provides a clue of fundamental importance for tracing the history of the whole body of Aristotle's physical writings. What we have in the eighteen-book "physics" of T and A₂, I believe, is a cycle of treatises forming the course on physics in Aristotle's Lyceum — and including all the related Aristotelian treatises not found in the other early catalogues.

It is necessary to emphasize the importance of evidence for the connection and ordering of the extant physical treatises. As is apparent

[24]Cf. Moraux (note 1 above) 104-05.

[25]This treatise appears to have included one book περὶ οὐρανοῦ and at least two books περὶ ψυχῆς (Regenbogen [note 16 above] cols. 1396-97), a fact of some importance that lends support to the analysis of the large physical and metaphysical works offered below.

[26]Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1395-96, 1535-36. The fact that each treatise is immediately followed by an epitome of different length would in fact seem to tell against the identification.

above all from the preface to the *Meteorology*, the *Physics, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption* and *Meteorology* form a broadly continuous treatment of natural phenomena. There is no evidence that anyone other than Aristotle himself was responsible for the internal references linking the physical treatises, and it now seems generally conceded that the preface to the *Meteorology* is authentic.[27] As it happens, these four treatises in their current form have a combined total of eighteen books. This would seem to establish a prima facie case for identifying them with one of the long treatises, and the identification with the entry in $A_2$ has in fact been suggested.[28]

Several other considerations, however, need to be taken into account. First, there are many indications that Book VII of the *Physics* is not an organic part of that work. The fact that the detailed paraphrase of the *Physics* by Eudemus of Rhodes during the early third century omits Book VII argues strongly that it was added at a later date — almost certainly by Andronicus.[29] Second, it is very probable that the *Meteorology* existed at one time in a three-book version. The fourth book of our *Meteorology* is very weakly linked to the rest of the work, and there is some evidence that it may incorporate Theophrastian material, although the book as a whole is well attested as Aristotelian.[30] In addition, Book III ends with what appears to be a transition to a discussion of metals and minerals. Finally, there is the matter of the *Metaphysics*. The very word "metaphysics" is testimony to some sort of external linkage between that discipline and physics in the history of the Peripatos; and it is also clear that "physics" itself was by no means a well-defined field of study at this time.[31]

[27]The fundamental discussion is that of E. Capelle, "Das Proömium der Meteorologie," *Hermes* 47 (1912) 514-35. Cf. I. Düring, *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg 1966) 348-49.

[28]Ross (note 23 above) 6.

[29]Eudemus, frs. 31-123 Wehrli; Ross (note 23 above) 15-18. As will be argued shortly, it is not necessary to assume with Ross (p. 18) that an eight-book *Physics* existed already in the third century.

[30]That this book represents a revision of an Aristotelian treatise by Theophrastus or one of his students has been argued by H. B. Gottschalk, "The Authorship of *Meteorologica*, Book IV," *CQ* N.S. 11 (1961) 67-79; but cf. Düring, *Aristoteles* (note 27 above) 349-50, and D. J. Furley, "The Mechanics of *Meteorologica* IV: A Prolegomenon to Biology," in *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum*, ed. P. Moraux and J. Wiesner, Symposium Aristotelicum IX (Berlin 1983) 73-93.

[31]Ross (note 23 above) 2-3 distinguishes three senses of the term "physics" as employed by Aristotle himself, one a wider sense encompassing *On the Heavens* and proba-

A full discussion of possible solutions would take us very far afield. The most defensible alternative, it seems to me, is a version limited to the physical treatises as such, and encompassing seven books of the *Physics* (I-VI and VIII), the four books of *On the Heavens*, the two books of *On Generation and Corruption*, three books of the *Meteorology* (I-III), and a treatise on metals and minerals in two books.

Regarding the latter, the end of *Meteorology* III seems clearly to announce a detailed discussion of minerals (τὰ ὀρυκτά) and metals (τὰ μεταλλευτά) by Aristotle himself. Comparison of this passage with the beginning of Theophrastus' extant περὶ λίθων suggests that there may have been substantial differences between the approaches of Aristotle and Theophrastus in this area, and that Theophrastus may have composed his own treatise περὶ μετάλλων in response to or by way of revision of such an Aristotelian work. While no work of this description is specifically attested in the catalogues, a περὶ μετάλλων is cited by a number of early authors under the name of Aristotle as well as that of Theophrastus. Persistent confusion with the similar work of Theophrastus and the absence of a separate identity in the catalogues would help to account for the subsequent loss of this treatise.[32]

What, then, of the *Metaphysics*? Let us consider the entries under the term "metaphysics" in A—to begin with, the apparent listing of a *Metaphysics* in twenty books in $A_1$. The temptation to emend or interpret away this odd reference is strong, but it must be resisted. This listing could well represent the earliest occurrence of the word "metaphysics" in the extant literature, and we should not assume that it bears the meaning familiar to us. Moreover, the existence of a twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* may explain the odd form of the corresponding entry in $A_2$, τῆς μεταφυσικά ι. Unless this entry is simply corrupt (as Moraux assumes), it should mean "ten books of the [course or collection on] metaphysics," implying that what is being referred to is only part of a larger whole.[33] If this interpretation is correct, it would appear that a ten-book *Metaphysics* was at some point formed or extracted out of a larger agglomeration of materials.

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bly others of the treatises on nature. The *Metaphysics* refers back to the physical treatises in a number of places. Although it is still frequently assumed that this work derives its name from its position following the physical treatises in the edition of Andronicus, the internal evidence suggests that the linkage is older and more organic. See note 35 below.

[32]See the account of Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1416-18.

[33]Cf. Moraux (note 1 above) 253, 279. I am indebted to Harold Cherniss for this observation.

In what precisely this agglomeration might have consisted is difficult to say with any confidence, although it may be supposed that such a collection would have lacked the internal coherence and logic of the extended physical treatise. While a combination with the *Physics* might seem attractive at first with a view to accounting for the origin of the word "metaphysics," on reflection it would seem to be ruled out by this same factor. It is just possible, on the other hand, that the remaining ten books included portions or versions of the three treatises which came "after physics" in the extended treatise on natural phenomena. At all events, the fact that *On Generation and Corruption* and a *Meteorology* in four books are listed separately in $A_2$ suggests the possibility that what we are dealing with in this part of the list is two distinct editions of the physical and metaphysical writings—the eighteen-book treatise of T and a disassembled version of the twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* of $A_1$. Alternatively, and most plausibly, a twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* may have encompassed the *De anima* and the shorter biological/psychological works, as is suggested above all by the apparent announcement of a transition to the biological works at the end of the fourth book of the *Meteorology*. One should also consider the possibility that it included metaphysical works by Peripatetics other than Aristotle—in particular, the "metaphysical fragment" of Theophrastus, whose early history is otherwise unaccounted for—as well as some or all of the peripheral books that belong to the canonical *Metaphysics*.[34]

Internal evidence, as well as the evidence of $A_2$, suggests that the original core of our *Metaphysics* consisted of the ten books ΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΜΝΙ, in that order. While the individual books or sections of this core are clearly more independent than is the case for most other Aristotelian treatises, it is difficult to exclude the possibility that such unity as they do possess (particularly with respect to cross references) is the work of Aristotle rather than that of a later editor. Still, there is considerable plausibility to the idea that a ten-book *Metaphysics* was

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[34]The entry φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις ιη is emended by Moraux (note 1 above) 252) to ῆ to give our *Physics* in eight books. That the next two entries appear to represent our *On Generation and Corruption* and *Meteorology* would seem to support this view (the absence of *On the Heavens* is explained by Moraux, not implausibly, through the suggestion that this work may be concealed under the immediately following entry περὶ πλού-του ᾱ). Otherwise, however, emendation of the entry for the physical treatise remains wholly arbitrary. Further, as has been indicated, there is good reason for assuming two distinct editions (one with and one without the fourth book) of the *Meteorology*. On the transmission of the metaphysical fragment of Theophrastus, see note 17 above.

constituted out of more or less related Aristotelian materials at some time between the death of Aristotle and the edition of Andronicus. And, in fact, we have explicit testimony that editorial work was done on the text of the *Metaphysics* by Eudemus of Rhodes. Eudemus was the most prominent and favored of Aristotle's students after Theophrastus, and can easily be supposed to have had access to Theophrastus' library after his death. Indeed, according to one story, Aristotle sent Eudemus the manuscript of the *Metaphysics*.[35] If there is any truth to this admittedly questionable information, it could suggest not only that Eudemus put together his own edition of the *Metaphysics*, but also that he was instrumental in the transmission of the *Metaphysics*. Hard as it is to believe that Eudemus would have taken from Athens, or been sent, the only copy of much or all of our *Metaphysics*, the possibility is not one that can be excluded, and it would seem to receive support from the absence in the (arguably) earliest of the catalogues of entries which can be plausibly construed as concealing the core books of the *Metaphysics*.

If Eudemus was indeed the original editor of a core *Metaphysics* of ten books, there is every reason to suppose that the twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* of A₁ represents his work as well, and that the term "metaphysics" was originally applied by him to this larger collection. It seems reasonable to suggest that Eudemus was also responsible for constituting a four-book version of the *Meteorology*.[36]

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[35]According to Pseudo-Alexander (*In Metaph.* 515.9-11 Hayduck = Eudemus, fr. 124 Wehrli), two passages were "placed together by Aristotle but separated by Eudemus." Asclepius (*In Metaph.* 4.9 Hayduck = Eudemus, fr. 3 Wehrli) claims that Aristotle sent the whole work to Eudemus, who thought it unfitting "that so great a work should be published" — an apparent allusion to the idea of an esoteric doctrine. It should also be noted that Book α of our *Metaphysics* is attributed in a scholion to Pasicles of Rhodes, a student of Aristotle and Eudemus' nephew. W. D. Ross (*Aristotle's Metaphysics* I [Oxford 1928] xxxi-ii) is willing to accept the existence of a ten-book edition of the *Metaphysics* in the third century, but does not appear to regard the notices concerning Eudemus as evidence for it. The role of Eudemus is emphasized by H. Reiner, "Die Entstehung und ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Namens Metaphysik," *ZPhF* 8 (1954) 210-37 (cf. Moraux [note 1 above] 315); see also A.-H. Chroust, "The Origin of 'Metaphysics'," *RMeta* 14 (1961) 601-16.

[36]The hypothesis of a twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* of the sort just described is strengthened by an entry in A₁ (39), ἠθικῶν κ̄. Though generally assumed to be a reference to the ten-book *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*), interpreting κ̄ as the numeral twenty can be easily justified as the sum of the books of the three Aristotelian ethical treatises. The parallel entry in D (38) lists an *"Ethics"* in five books; this would appear to represent the *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) without the three books common to it and to the *NE*. The curious entry περὶ ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων in A₂ (174) is explained by Anthony Kenny (*The*

## III

We come finally to the biological writings. The history of this neglected part of the Aristotelian corpus offers many puzzles, not least because the frequent citations of these writings by authors of the Hellenistic period do not always sort well with the catalogues or the extant treatises. Properly understood, however, I believe they provide important confirmation for the hypothesis developed here.

Both D and A₁ list the following biological treatises: περὶ ζῴων, nine books; περὶ ἀνατομῶν, seven books; ἐκλογὴ ἀνατομῶν, one book; ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γεννᾶν, one book; ὑπὲρ τῶν συνθέτων ζῴων, one book; ὑπὲρ τῶν μυθολογουμένων ζῴων, one book (D 102-7 = A 90-95). The first entry has been universally assumed to represent the *History of Animals (HA)* of the corpus, with the treatise on sterility which constitutes its current tenth book usually being identified with the entry ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ γεννᾶν, and regarded as an addition made by Andronicus. The περὶ ἀνατομῶν is generally held to represent a genuine Aristotelian work containing primarily or exclusively anatomical diagrams, which was evidently included in the edition of Andronicus (cf. P 41); of the other two short treatises no trace remains.[37] The other biological works are thus unaccounted for in D and A₁. What, then, of the Theophrastus catalogue? T lists the following biological writings: περὶ ζῴων, seven books (44); ἐπιτομαὶ 'Αριστοτέλους περὶ ζῴων, six books (49); περὶ ζῴων, without indication of length (50); περὶ τῶν αὐτομάτων ζῴων, one book (46); περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἤθους, one book (49); and seven treatises in one book each on various zoological subjects, consecutively listed (43-44). Apart from a few fragments from the short treatises, none of these works survives, at least not under the name of

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*Aristotelian Ethics* [Oxford 1978] 43-46) as a scholarly discussion of the authenticity of the *NE*; but it seems more likely that περί is simply a mistaken correction (as is assumed by Moraux [note 1 above] 258), and that this entry represents the *NE* itself. The evident absence of the ethical treatises of the current corpus from the earliest catalogues (T as well as D) suggests that editorial work on them continued after Aristotle's death. In particular, it makes sense to assume that Eudemus was responsible for reuniting the five-book *"Ethics"* of D with the common books, and for associating the work with his name. The account of R. Bodéüs, "Contribution à l'histoire des oeuvres morales d'Aristote: les Testimonia," *RPhL* 71 (1973) 451-67, seems to give excessive weight to the editorial role of Andronicus in the constitution of the *EE* and the ethical writings in general.

[37]Moraux (note 1 above) 253.

Theophrastus. It seems a strong possibility that the treatise περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἤθους is incorporated in Aristotle's *HA* as currently constituted.[38]

Generally speaking, it is evident from the relatively plentiful references to the biological writings of the Peripatos in antiquity that considerable confusion existed as to the actual authorship of these works. Particularly in the Hellenistic period, it appears that all of the biological writings (by one count amounting to seventy books) were ascribed to Aristotle himself.[39] Taking this into account, as well as the relative absence of other confirmation of Theophrastian authorship, one is entitled to suspect that at least the two long treatises represent Aristotelian works.

Before turning to $A_2$, let us consider briefly the evidence from other sources that bears on the condition of the biological writings in the third century. The paradoxographer Apollonius states that Aristotle "has two treatises on animals, the *On Animals* and the *On Things Pertaining to Animals*" (δύο γὰρ εἰσιν αὐτῷ πραγματεῖαι, ἡ μὲν περὶ ζῴων, ἡ δὲ περὶ τῶν ζῳικῶν).[40] Now the treatise περὶ ζῳικῶν or ζῳικά is frequently cited or referred to by authors of the third century and later (it appears to have been epitomized by Aristophanes of Byzantium around 200 B.C.), and is clearly not identical with any of the extant treatises. As becomes evident from a study of the zoological citations of Aristotle in Athenaeus,[41] there existed prior to Andronicus an edition of the first six books of the *HA* that went under the title περὶ ζῴων μορίων. While the evidence supplied by Athenaeus is complicated by the fact that he or one of his sources also shows awareness of the edition of Andronicus, it generally confirms the testimony of Apollonius concerning the two zoological treatises, and seems to demonstrate that the περὶ

[38]Athenaeus cites a passage in *HA* IX and attributes it to an Aristotelian treatise περὶ ζῴων ἤθων καὶ βίων. περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἤθους is not otherwise attested as Theophrastian; but some features of *HA* IX are suggestive of Theophrastian authorship. See Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1426-27, 1432-34.

[39]Antigonus of Carystus, *Mir.* 60. Pliny (*Hist. nat.* 8.44) mentions fifty books. Of particular interest is the fact that Hermippus and Callimachus treat biological works appearing in the catalogue of Theophrastus as Aristotelian. See generally Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1370-74, 1423-26.

[40]Apollonius, *Mir.* 27. Apollonius' floruit is uncertain, but is probably to be placed around the end of the third century B.C.

[41]I. Düring, "Notes on the History of the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings," *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift* 56 (1950) 37-70; Keaney (note 4 above) 52-58.

ζῳικῶν is a work of zoological description unknown to us, and the περὶ ζῴων is the first six books of our *History of Animals*.[42]

The testimony of A₂, taken by itself (as it generally is), appears relatively unproblematic. A₂ lists a περὶ ζῴων ἱστορίας in ten books, a περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως, a περὶ ζῴων μορίων, and a περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως, each in three books, and (with an easy textual correction) a περὶ ψυχῆς in three books. The first entry is universally identified with our *HA*, and the next three with the extant treatises by those names—the *Movement of Animals (MA), Parts of Animals (PA)* and *Generation of Animals (GA)*—in spite of the fact that the number of books is in every case wrong. But this is not the only difficulty. If the ten-book *"History of Animals"* is post-Andronican, it is difficult to understand how it could appear in close proximity to a pre-Andronican ten-book *"Metaphysics."* If A₂ is early, however, it becomes inconvenient to explain the considerable disparity between the biological works it contains and the works cited under Aristotle's name by contemporary and later authors. In particular, why do contemporary writers refer to a περὶ ζῳικῶν that does not seem to be noticed in any of the catalogues, while they never refer to either of the major treatises—the *GA* and *PA*—currently extant? There is also the difficulty that several smaller biological works (the *Progression of Animals* and the *Parva Naturalia*) do not appear at all.

Is there, then, an alternative explanation? The first step toward a solution lies, it may be suggested, in the identification of the (otherwise unknown) six-book *"Epitome of Aristotle's On Animals"* listed in T with the six-book edition of the *HA* referred to by Athenaeus as περὶ ζῴων μορίων. If is not difficult to see how the first six books of the *HA* (which clearly form a compositional unit) could have been catalogued as an epitome of the *PA* and *GA*, to which they correspond in subject matter. At the same time, such an assumption would seem to offer a better explanation than textual corruption for the two three-book listings for a *"Parts of Animals"* and a *"Generation of Animals"* in A₂ (though it must be admitted that, as the division occurs after what is currently *HA* IV, the number of books poses a difficulty in either case). The second step consists in identifying the ten-book *"History of Animals"* of A₂ with the otherwise unaccounted for περὶ ζῳικῶν, which the testimony of Apollonius shows must have been a major work.

As in the case of the physical and metaphysical writings, it is essen-

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[42]See Düring (note 41 above) 41-48.

tial to consider the order and connection of the extant treatises. Internal references indicate that the biological works at one time formed part of a larger structure, in the following order: *Parts of Animals, Progression of Animals, On the Soul, On Sense, On Memory, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, Movement of Animals,* and *Generation of Animals.*[43] It is tempting to suppose that most or all of the transitions between these treatises were added by Andronicus in an effort to bring more order to the corpus. Yet the fact remains that the connections between the works named are by no means always obvious, particularly as regards the position of the psychological works, and it is difficult to understand why Andronicus should have fabricated these references and no others. Since there is no evidence that Aristotle's immediate successors were responsible for the structure in question, the presumption must be that it goes back to Aristotle himself. At the same time, it is important to note the existence of a single reference which directly contradicts this order: the reference at the end of some manuscripts of the *PA* (697b29–30) indicating that this work was at one time immediately followed by the *GA*.

If one counts the short essays of the *Parva Naturalia* as two books (as they appear in P), the number of books in the extended biological treatise amounts to sixteen. Now nine books of the περὶ ζῴων are listed in D and A₁, and seven books with the same title in T. If one takes account of the peculiar linkage between the *PA* and the *GA*, it makes sense to suggest that the nine-book work listed in D and A₁ represents a combination of our *PA* (four books) and our *GA* (five books), and that the transitional phrase at the end of the *PA* was added at a later point in consequence of this association of the two works. That the *PA* and *GA* were among the works kept by Neleus at Scepsis would explain, too, the complete absence of references to either of these treatises during the Hellenistic period (which Apollonius' testimony indicates is more than fortuitous). It is also understandable that they would have been regarded as inessential given the existence of a core version of the *HA* superficially covering the same ground.

If this identification is correct, it raises the possibility that the seven-book περὶ ζῴων listed in T may represent the remaining treatises of the extended biological cycle—the *Progression of Animals* (one

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[43] *Progression of Animals* 714b20–23; *On Sense* 436a1–8, 449b1–4; *On Sleep* 453b11–24; *Movement of Animals* 704b1–3; and consider *Parts of Animals* 639a1–41b10.

book), *De anima* (three books), *Parva naturalia* (two books), and *Movement of Animals* (one book). However, it must be admitted that the proximity of this entry to the seven one-book zoological works consecutively listed in T (43–44) would appear to rule out this identification.[44] In any event, an excellent case can be made that, like the six-book *"Epitome"* listed in T, this collection appears in disassembled form in A₂. Apart from the entry (assuming an easy textural correction) περὶ ψυχῆς γ̄, A₂ lists a περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως γ̄ (156). The *Progression of Animals* is referred to several times by Aristotle under a similar title, and could have stood at the head of this entire group of treatises. Alternatively, it is tempting to suppose that the incomplete and awkwardly situated entry περὶ ῥητορικῆς (153) conceals an entry for the *Progression of Animals* in one book, while περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως encompasses the *Parva naturalia* as well as the *Movement of Animals*.[45] This would also strengthen the case for associating these biological and psychological works with the *Metaphysics* entry of A₂ and thereby with the twenty-book *"Metaphysics"* of A₁.

Some additional remarks are in order concerning the περὶ ζῳικῶν (the περὶ ζῴων ἱστορίας of A₂, according to my argument) and its place in the early catalogues. While it might be possible to identify this work with treatises appearing separately in T, the fact that extant citations of the περὶ ζῳικῶν point strongly toward non-Aristotelian authorship suggests that another possibility must be considered — namely, that this work is in fact identical with the *Epitome* of Aristophanes of Byzantium. Aristophanes' explanation of the purpose of his work is instructive: "I undertook to do this in order that Aristotle's treatment of animals [τὴν ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ζῴων πραγματείαν] should not be split among a number of works, and that you should have, pulled together in one place, the account of each kind of animal [τὴν ἐφ' ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ ἱστορίαν]." In carrying out his task, Aristophanes seems to have drawn on the biological writings of a number of Peripatetic authors, and it is conceivable that he incorporated much of a single Aristotelian or Theophrastian treatise (which would account for the confused

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[44]On the other hand, this may be the only instance of a doublet of this kind in T. See Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1363–70, and J. J. Keaney, "The Early Tradition of Theophrastus' Historia Plantarum," *Hermes* 96 (1968) 293–98.

[45]Indubitable references to this work appear under the titles περὶ πορείας καὶ κινήσεως τῶν ζῴων (*Parts of Animals* 696a11) and περὶ τὰς τῶν ζῴων κινήσεις (*On the Heavens* 284b13). Particularly as the mss. actually have περὶ ῥιτορικῆς, the corruption would not be palaeographically difficult: ΠΕΡΙΠΟΡΕΙΑΣ→ΠΕΡΙ[ΡΙ]ΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ.

manner in which later authors cite the work).[46] Aristophanes' use of the word ἱστορία at the beginning of his *Epitome* in any event supports its identification with the περὶ ζῴων ἱστορίας of A₂.[47]


## IV

That the Aristotelian corpus as we know it came into being after Aristotle's death through the combination of originally distinct works in larger aggregates, and that the key role in this process was played by Andronicus in connection with the edition of Aristotle's works compiled by him in the first century B.C., has since Jaeger become the orthodox view. The argument sketched here suggests that, while not wholly wrong, this view is at the very least in need of extensive qualification. Above all, it seems necessary to recognize that our evidence points to very substantial differences in the way different parts of the corpus were constituted and transmitted. In the case of the *Metaphysics*, it appears virtually certain that a process of accretion occurred. In the case of the biological writings, precisely the opposite seems to have happened: what was in Aristotle's lifetime a single treatise or cycle of treatises on biological subjects came somehow to be dismembered during the period of Theophrastus' headship of the Lyceum. In the case of the physical writings, both processes appear to have played a role: if my interpretation is correct, individual treatises (the *Physics*, the *Meteorology*) were enlarged, but the single cycle of physical works apparently inherited from Aristotle was broken down. In the case of the ethical and political writings, while a good case can be made that the *Nicomachean Ethics* did not reach its final form until after Aristotle's death, there is little real evidence that the *Politics* represents anything other than a single and unified treatise from the hand of Aristotle himself.[48]

Of the editorial activity of Andronicus, very little is directly

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[46]S. Lambros, *Supplementum Aristotelicum* I (Berlin 1885) B.1.

[47]See the discussion of Regenbogen (note 16 above) cols. 1429-32. It is necessary to emphasize the lack of fixity in book-titles during this period, and the corresponding importance of initial words and phrases in providing convenient indicators of subject matter.

[48]It is striking that, alone among the major works of the corpus, the *Politics* is listed with the correct complement of books in all the ancient catalogues. I have tried to show (*The Politics of Aristotle* [Chicago 1984] 8-17) that Jaeger's attempt to distinguish between early and late strata of this work is misguided.

known. The most important testimony is Porphyry's report that he "divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into 'treatises' [πραγμα-τεῖαι], bringing together related discussions under a single head."[49] While this remark is indeed suggestive of a far-reaching reorganization of the corpus, the extent of Porphyry's familiarity with Andronicus' own account of the condition of the corpus is quite uncertain. It is often assumed that the internal references connecting different treatises or parts of treatises stem largely from Andronicus, but this position involves many difficulties. If one makes Andronicus responsible, for example, for the references constituting the cycle of biological treatises, one has to explain how this same Andronicus could have constructed a *Metaphysics* in which several books are not only obviously out of place but are not even linked with the other books by cross references. That Andronicus—whom we know to have been concerned with questions of authenticity—could have impersonated the language and style of Aristotle in fabricating an elaborate system of cross references is, to say the least, not immediately plausible. If drastic surgery was indeed performed on the corpus or on elements of it, it is much more likely to be the work of Aristotle's immediate successors, who may be supposed to have been less reluctant to treat the writings of the master as part of a common and still living enterprise. Andronicus' role is likely to have been the more limited one of appending isolated short treatises — particularly ones newly unearthed at Scepsis — to existing longer treatises of an already established Aristotelian corpus. As for Porphyry's testimony, it seems possible to take it in a relatively restricted sense. Indeed, it is tempting to think that Porphyry actually uses the term πραγματεία to refer to Andronicus' organization of the corpus into groupings of treatises, and not primarily to any editorial work on the individual treatises themselves.[50]

The implications of all this for the understanding of Aristotle's writings and of the teaching and research activities of the Lyceum are, it need hardly be said, very far-reaching. To mention only one point, if the interpretation I have offered of the original arrangement and connection of the physical and biological writings is correct, it suggests that Aristotle himself was more interested in the systematic organization and presentation of the results of the Lyceum's work than has been generally

    [49]Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 24. See generally Moraux (note 1 above) 58ff.

    [50]This is suggested by Düring, *Biographical Tradition* (note 1 above) 415; see also P. M. Huby, "The Transmission of Aristotle's Writings and the Places Where Copies of his Works Existed," *C&M* 30 (1969) 242.

assumed. The cycles of physical and biological treatises seem clearly to represent the basis for courses offered by Aristotle in these areas. It should be recalled that the title given our *Physics* in the manuscripts — φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις — is the same as the entry for the eighteen-book physical treatise listed in A$_2$, and most probably derives from this description of the character of the larger work. To what extent such cyclical "lecture courses" may be traced in other areas of the corpus is a question very much worth exploring. There are, for example, a number of indications that the ethical and political writings may once have formed a unity; and our *Politics* is the only major work cited in the older lists (D and A$_1$) as an ἀκρόασις.[51]

The distinction between works used for lectures (τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα) and unpublished works (τὰ ἀνέκδοτα) should be mentioned in this context. This distinction is explicitly drawn only in the will of the scholarch Lycon toward the end of the third century, yet it is plausible to suppose that it played a role in the organization and transmission of collections of Peripatetic writings during Aristotle's lifetime and immediately thereafter.[52] In fact, this distinction may help to explain the division of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus effected by Neleus. What found its way to Alexandria, it would appear, were primarily edited or "published" works of Aristotle and Theophrastus — that is, works which had been in active use in the teaching or research program of the Lyceum.[53]

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[51]The end of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1181b12-24) appears to look forward to the *Politics* as the completion of the study of "the philosophy concerning the human things," though the authenticity of this passage is sometimes questioned. That Aristotle regarded ethics as a component of a more comprehensive science of "politics" appears from *NE* 1094a26-b11, *Magna Moralia* 1181a23-b28, *Rhetoric* 1356a25-28; see particularly R. Bodéüs, *Le philosophe et la cité* (Paris 1982). I do not mean to suggest that the term ἀκρόασις necessarily designates an extended cycle of lectures: it may well refer to what can be heard at a single sitting (cf. *Poetics* 1459b21-22).

[52]Diogenes Laertius 5.73. The precise bearing of this distinction is obscure. It has been held that τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα ("works that have been read") were personal, annotated copies of the works of earlier authors, but it seems more likely that they were works prepared and used for lectures and available for reference in the school (though not necessarily otherwise "published"); see Moraux, *Aristotelismus* (note 4 above) 16-17. In a letter cited by Diogenes Laertius (5.37), Theophrastus seems to indicate that these writings were revised from time to time so that lectures would be fresh and responsive to criticism.

[53]Why were the *Politics, Parts of Animals* and *Generation of Animals* not included among the works sold to Ptolemy? The two latter works may have been too long and specialized for regular use, and the *HA* was available as an apparent substitute. In the case of the *Politics*, changing political circumstances could readily account for its

Many unanswered questions remain concerning the use or abuse of Aristotle's writings by colleagues and students following his death. This is particularly true of the metaphysical writings, but many of the treatises betray apparent interpolations and other compositional anomalies that may be traceable to persons active during the early years of the third century. Suffice it to say that it seems necessary to pay more attention to the history of the Peripatos after Aristotle's death than has been customary since Jaeger. This is not to deny the possible importance for interpretation of anomalies resulting from Aristotle's intellectual development. It is rather to suggest that priority ought to be given to questions of authorship and editorial intervention. In particular, an effort should be made to restore the sort of distinction that has tended to be obliterated by Jaeger's approach — the distinction between works which are likely to come directly from the hand of Aristotle and works which are not, or between apparent interpolations which can plausibly be traced to Aristotle and those which cannot. Jaeger's approach has tended to assume that Aristotle's development is the crucial factor, and that the external condition of a text contributes little to tracing that development. In so doing, however, it has generally taken for granted something that is intrinsically implausible — that a text which comes directly from the hand of Aristotle will betray gross substantive inconsistencies deriving from chronological differences between its different parts. It would seem to make better sense to suppose that works regularly used by Aristotle for teaching purposes, even if composed over a period of time, would reveal a broad consistency, and that the existence of manifest inconsistency therefore creates a prima facie case for inauthenticity.

This is by no means to argue that current views concerning the authenticity of the Aristotelian corpus as we have it are in need of sweeping revision. The idea that the bulk of our corpus is really the work of Theophrastus, or that the extant treatises are conflations of the writings of the early Peripatos generally, cannot reasonably be sustained.[54]

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falling into disuse. It is interesting that D cites this work (75) as "Lecture course on politics like that of Theophrastus." This would seem to suggest that the *Politics* was not familiar to the cataloguer, and had been supplanted by the similar treatise of Theophrastus for the purposes of the school.

[54]The first is the thesis of Joseph Zürcher, *Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* (Paderborn 1952); for the latter view see A.-H. Chroust, *Aristotle* I (London 1973) xi–xv, and F. Grayeff, *Aristotle and his School* (New York 1974) 77–85.

While the Peripatos was indeed a common enterprise in some sense, even and precisely the earliest of the catalogues reveal efforts to distinguish individual authorship; and the treatises that have come down to us are in general very much of a piece. Nevertheless, an approach of the sort suggested here, if sensibly pursued, would seem to offer a fruitful and necessary alternative to the approach of Jaeger.

CARNES LORD

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

# PINDAR, *OLYMPIAN* 3.33-34: "THE TWELVE-TURNED *TERMA*" AND THE LENGTH OF THE FOUR-HORSE CHARIOT RACE

Pindar* in his third *Olympian* ode, 33-34, describes the olive trees at the Olympic hippodrome. According to the myth in the poem, Herakles had first seen the olive while on a visit to the land of the Hyperboreans. Now, having just founded the Olympic Games, he recalls those trees as he sees the athletic site exposed to the heat of the sun: τῶν νιν γλυκὺς ἵμερος ἔσχεν δωδεκάγναμπτον περὶ τέρμα δρόμου/ἵππων φυτεῦσαι. ("Sweet desire for them took hold of him to plant them around the twelve-turned *terma* of the race–course for horses.")[1] Where exactly are the olive trees planted? The answer to this question leads me to the three conclusions of this paper. (I) In speaking of the *terma*, Pindar specifically means the west end of the hippodrome.[2] (II) Yet in call-

[1] The word περί must mean "round about, in the vicinity of," rather than literally "around in a circle," for in the latter case the trees would have presented a hazard to the charioteers as they attempted to come as close as possible to the post without colliding with it. Furthermore, Greek chariot races involved large numbers of contestants, perhaps as many as forty-one (*Pyth.* 5.49-50). Such a large number would render the placement of the trees immediately adjacent to the turning post a real danger. The word δρόμος here must mean "race-course" rather than "race."

[2] Neither the scholia nor modern commentators (Boeckh, Farnell, Fennell, Gildersleeve, Donaldson [all cited in note * above]) seem aware that the west *terma* could seriously be meant here. However, one writer on ancient sports, L. Drees, *Olympia* (New York 1968) 96 hits upon the interpretation, although without discussing the complexities involved. He writes, "There is only one thing we know for certain, namely that the finish was surrounded by olive trees which—according to Pindar—had been planted by Theban Hercules." On p. 97 he adds that the finish was located on the west side.

ing the *terma* "twelve-turned," Pindar apparently "nods," for this end of the course was turned only eleven times. (III) The proper understanding of this passage enables us to dispel the idea that the four-horse chariot race, the *tethrippon*, was six circuits of the course and to reaffirm the belief that it was twelve laps.[3]

I

Let us first review the possible meanings of *terma*. The word means (a) any line or limit, (b) the finish-line or goal, and (c) the turning post, also known as the *kamptēr, nyssa*, or in Latin *meta*.[4] The hippodrome does not survive, but with the aid of Pausanias (6.20.10ff.) and the modern excavations, we can reasonably assume that it lay due south of the stadium for track and was aligned like it in an east-west direction. The Altis, with its temples, shrines, and altars, lay immediately to the west of the hippodrome.[5] The turning posts were separated

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[3] I employ the terms "lap" and "circuit" synonymously to signify one complete tour of the course. A "lap" or "circuit" thus equals two "lengths" of the course.

[4] See my article, "The *TERMA* and the Javelin in Pindar, *Nemean* vii 70-3, and Greek Athletics," *JHS* 96 (1976) 73-75. On p. 78 I mistakenly interpreted the twelve turns around the *terma* to refer to the dolichos, the long-distance footrace of seven to twenty-four stades, overlooking the obvious fact that the passage clearly speaks of the hippodrome. Concerning the turning posts and their placement on the stone sills serving as the *termata* of the course, we must now add that at Nemea a stone block to hold a turning post has been found in front of the sill and slightly off-center from the longitudinal axis. Cf. S. G. Miller, "Turns and Lanes in the Ancient Stadium," *AJA* 84 (1980) 159-66; also, Miller, "Excavations at Nemea, 1976," *Hesperia* 46 (1977) 26. In his *AJA* article Miller, p. 160, n. 7, also makes the point that the word *nyssa* is Homeric and "has no bearing on the classical stadium and hippodrome": but cf. Pausanias 6.13.9, which I quote near the end of this article.

[5] The fourth century B.C. stadium for track now visible on the site is aligned, strictly speaking, east-northeast by west-southwest. On the south side of the stadium some 50-60 meters from the west *terma* are stone seats for the officials. Pausanias (6.20.10) says that as one exits the track stadium by the judges' seats, one comes to the starting gate of the hippodrome; the gate was enormous, being a triangle with sides "more than four-hundred feet long" (6.20.11). The gate thus must have been on the west side of the course. The only other possibility, that it was at the north end of a course aligned north-south, is not tenable because the course would run into the Alpheios River. Pausanias also adds that the gate borders on the Stoa of Agnaptos (6.20.13); it is to be hoped that the on-going excavations will turn up the remains of this building and so further clarify our knowledge of the hippodrome. For recent discussion see H.-V. Herrmann, *Olympia, Heiligtum und Wettkampfstätte* (München 1972) 166-68.

by a distance of perhaps two stades, or about 400 meters.[6] Races both
began and ended on the west side, at the sacred place of the god.[7] The
west end thus fits all three meanings of *terma*, the east only the first and
third.

    Now, the west end is preferable to the east as the place where the
trees were placed for the following reasons:

    (i) *Olympian* 3.33–34 is part of a narrative ring-form, and Pindar
has twice earlier referred to the place for which shade is needed. In
these earlier passages he associates the place with Zeus and Pelops. In
lines 17–18, we read Διὸς αἴτει πανδόκῳ/ἄλσει σκιαρόν τε φύτευμα
ξυνὸν ἀνθρώποις στέφανόν τ᾽ ἀρετᾶν ("For the sanctuary of Zeus hos-
pitable to all, he asks for a plant to give shade to men and to be a crown
for deeds of excellence"). Soon afterwards Pindar adds, lines 23–24:
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ καλὰ δένδρ᾽ ἔθαλλεν χῶρος ἐν βάσσαις Κρονίου Πέλοπος./
τούτων ἔδοξεν γυμνὸς αὐτῷ κᾶπος ὀξείαις ὑπακουέμεν αὐγαῖς
ἀελίου ("But with no beautiful trees did the place of Pelops blossom in
the vales of Kronos.[8] But the bare plot of ground seemed to him subject

    [6] The exact dimensions are a matter of controversy. Drees (note 2 above) 97 gives
the figure of two stades between the posts, whereas E. N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic
Sports and Festivals*, henceforth *GASF* (London 1910) 453, and *Athletics of the Ancient
World*, henceforth *AAW* (Oxford 1930; repr. Chicago 1978) 225, puts the figure at
three stades. An 11th century A.D. manuscript from the Seraglio in Constantinople pro-
vides dimensions for the hippodrome, but these have fueled rather than solved the con-
troversy; for the text of this manuscript, see H. Schöne, "Neue Angaben über den Hippo-
drom zu Olympia," *JdI* 12 (1897) 152–53. The manuscript states that the horse-race,
which was two lengths of the track (up and back), was six stades. Gardiner takes this to
mean that the distance between the posts was thus three stades. Drees (note 2 above) 98
suggests that the figure of six stades is an average distance; a horse on the inside would
run four stades, and one on the perimeter of the track, eight. Pausanias 6.16.4 tells us
that a footrace called the *hippios* was four stades long. It seems to have been named after
the horse race and to have borrowed the distance from it. However, Miller (note 4 above)
160 n. 8, suggests that the name may come from the usage of a single turning post at each
end, as is done in the equestrian event, rather than individual posts, as in the *diaulos*.
Herrmann (note 5 above) 168 and n. 656, is dubious about the value of the Seraglio
manuscript. H. A. Harris, *Sport in Greece and Rome* (London 1972) 163, says that the
Olympic hippodrome was three stades in length, but does not make it clear whether this
is the overall length or the distance between the posts.

    [7] As Harris (note 6 above) 163 points out, the hippodrome at Athens (*Etym. Mag.*
s.v. Ἐνεχελιδῷ) and at Delos (*SIG*³ 697, 728) are without turns, the race being a single
length of the track. The races are won ἀκάμπιος.

    [8] Following Aristarchos (Drachmann [note * above] *ad* 43a) and Gildersleeve (note
* above) I take Πέλοπος with χῶρος. Others (the scholia, Boeckh, Donaldson, Fennell,
Farnell [note * above]) take Πέλοπος with βάσσαις, so that the passage reads, "in the
vales of Pelops, descended from Kronos." In either case, my point remains the same, that
the Altis, situated at the foot of the Hill of Kronos, was closely associated with Pelops.

to the harsh rays of the sun"). The Διὸς ἄλσει and the χῶρος Πέλοπος are synonymous. The great altar of Zeus is located in the sanctuary, and near it is the shrine of Pelops, the Pelopeion, where the hero supposedly lay buried.[9] (Figure 1) More so than Herakles, Pelops is the chief hero worshipped at Olympia. As Pausanias (5.13.1) tells us, "Within the Altis there is also a sacred enclosure (the Pelopeion) consecrated to Pelops, whom the Eleans as much prefer in honour above the heroes of Olympia as they prefer Zeus over the other gods."[10] The grove is holy to god and hero, who share the site in common. When Pindar at the close of the narrative returns to the subject of planting the trees (note the verbal parallel of δένδρεα θάμβαινε, line 32, with δένδρ' ἔθαλλεν, line 23) the area must be the same as the sanctuary of Zeus and the place of Pelops.

(ii) In practical terms the planting of shade trees around the west end makes more sense. Because the west end marked both the start and conclusion of the race, and also featured a number of turns, the spectator could enjoy all the excitement of the race, including the climactic finish, to which the possible spills at the distant east end, exciting though they may be, could not compare. We note at *Iliad* 23.448 how the spectators during the chariot contest remain at the place where the race began and ended. Furthermore, the shady trees around the west

[9] Graves have been found at the site of the Pelopeion, none impressive. Pausanias (5.13.4-6) says that a relic, the hero's shoulder blade, had once been in existence but had been lost by his time. The Pelopeion was excavated by W. Dörpfeld, *Alt-Olympia* I-II (Berlin 1935). See also recent discussion in Herrmann (note 5 above) 42, 53ff., and A. Mallwitz, *Olympia und seine Bauten* (München 1972) 80-81, 133-37. Pausanias (5.13.8) informs us that the altar of Zeus was equally distant from the Pelopeion and the temple of Hera, and in front of both. The exact site has not been found; see Herrmann (note 5 above) 69-70. Pindar, *Ol.* 1.90-96, mentions that the burial site of the hero is next to a much-frequented altar, presumably that of Zeus; see the scholia (Drachmann [note * above] *ad* 150b).

[10] Translation by W. H. S. Jones in the *Loeb Classical Library*. There were other monuments associated with Pelops at Olympia; and while some may post-date the third *Olympian* ode, they nonetheless show his importance. Near the site of the temple of Zeus, Pausanias (5.20.6-8; also 5.14.7) saw a so-called pillar of Oinomaos' house, and adds that a Roman senator found fragments of armor, bridles, and bits while digging a foundation for a statue. J. Swaddling, *The Ancient Olympic Games* (London 1980) 68, suggests that the pillar may not have been part of a building but was "a finishing post for races that were originally run towards the heart of the sacred grove." On the other side of the Kladeos was the grave of Oinomaos (Pausanias 6.21.3). On one turning post of the hippodrome there was a statue of Hippodameia about to crown Pelops with a ribbon (Pausanias 6.20.19). The sculpture of the east pediment of the temple of Zeus, the construction of which began (470) not long after the victory celebrated in the ode (476), shows the moment before the chariot race between Pelops and Oinomaos.

*Figure 1.* The Altis and the stadium for track in the sixth and early fifth centuries. The hippodrome would be south of the track stadium. The dotted line indicates the border of the Altis. (*Drawing by Tom Wilkinson.*)

*terma* would provide relief not only for the spectators in the stadiums but also for the throngs who would no doubt flock to the sacred area when the contests were not being held; this consideration of course fits neatly with the identification of the west end with the holy places of Zeus and Pelops in *Olympian* 3. On the other hand, the planting of shade trees at the east end more than six hundred meters from the grove makes little sense.[11] (Figure 2)

(iii) Aesthetically, the west *terma* has much to recommend it. Pindar (*Ol.* 3.17-18) had told us that the olive trees fulfill a dual function: they provide shade for the visitors and participants, and crowns for the victors. By wreathing the *terma* with the olive trees, Herakles has provided to the winner the visible rewards of his efforts. The victor literally approaches the fruits of his toils, both the cool shade after the heat of the contest and the crown woven from the branches of one of the trees. Indeed, Pausanias (5.15.3) informs us that the one special tree from which the wreaths were fashioned was located somewhere near the rear, that is, the west end of the temple of Zeus.[12] Furthermore, the victor approaches the grove of Zeus in whose honor the Games are held, the grove where Pelops lies buried, the grove planted by Herakles when he built the altar for Zeus and founded the Olympic Games. The olive trees planted "around the *terma*" join the victor to the god and the heroes. The symbolism becomes richer when we realize that before the temple of Zeus was built, 470-456 B.C., the race may well have finished inside the Altis, as did the running events.[13] In contrast the east *terma* lacks these symbolic associations.

So far we have been comparing the relative merits of the west and east ends of the hippodrome. Still one other possibility exists, that Pindar is using the singular for the plural, saying τέρμα when he means τέρματα. This alternative, however, requires us to posit a somewhat awkward use of the singular for the plural, and it does not offer any of the advantages supplied by the west *terma*. In brief, to read here the plural for the singular is to favor a more difficult interpretation when a simpler and more elegant one lies readily at hand.

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[11] If we assume (note 6 above) that the distance between the turning posts is 400 meters, we must still add more length for the chariots to turn at each end and also to allow for the enormous starting gate on the west side. If the distance between the posts is 600 meters, as Gardiner believes (note 6 above), then the east end is even further away.

[12] Perhaps before the construction of the Stoa of Agnaptos, the starting gate of Kleoitas, and the temple of Zeus, the contestants could see the olive tree as they approached the finish.

[13] Cf. Drees (note 2 above) 96-97.

*Figure 2.* Olympia in Roman times. The stadium for track in the 5th century (see fig. 1) was located a little further to the west of the fourth century B.C. stadium shown here (A). If the hippodrome was aligned east to west, as it most probably was, and its overall length was at least 600 meters, the area around the east *terma* would be somewhere on the right-hand border of the drawing, a good distance from the grove of Zeus and Pelop's shrine. On the other hand, it is easy to see how trees planted in the Altis could be said to lie around the west *terma*. (*Drawing by Tom Wilkinson*).

## II

The books on Greek athletics state that the chariot race for four horses consisted of twelve circuits of the course.[14] The sources for this information we shall review shortly. For the moment let us assume that the figure is correct.

Now remembering that the race began and finished at the west end, let us count the turns. The chariots start at the west side, head for the opposite end and proceed around the east turning post, head back to the west side, round the west turning post, and commence the second lap. The sequence occurs eleven times. In the twelfth lap, however, the chariots, having made the twelfth turn around the east turning post, cross the finish line at the west end. *There is no twelfth turn around the west side.*[15] The final sums are twelve turns for the east end, but eleven for the west. Upon reflection it becomes clear that the number of turns around the starting end will always be one less than the number of laps. Yet it is easily possible to fall into the mistake that the number of turns equals the number of laps; but this is true only for the end opposite the start. In *Olympian* 3.33, we have seen that Pindar must be speaking of the west *terma*. It therefore seems that Pindar has "nodded," though understandably so.[16] In *Olympian* 6.15, a similar mistake occurs, when

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[14] Gardiner, *GASF* (note 6 above) 457, and *AAW* (note 6 above) 226; Harris, *SGR* (note 6 above) 163, with qualification, to be discussed below in this paper; Swaddling (note 10 above) 68, who says the race is over eight miles (3 stades = 600 meters; 1200 meters = 1 lap; 12 laps = 14,400 meters = more than eight miles); Drees (note 2 above) 97-98.

[15] E. Pollack, *Hippodromica* (Leipzig 1890) 104, is aware that the total number of turns must be an odd number: "Etenim si quis contendat singularis τέρμα hic pro plurali vel duali poetice dictum esse, is calculi errore ducitur, quia ambae metae, si sexies circumcirritur, non duodecies, verum undecies circumflectuntur, exterior sexies, interior quinquies tantum, quia haec in extremo cursu non circumcurritur, sed praetercurritur. Ergo δυωδεκάγναμπτον τέρμα nihil aliud potest esse quam exterior meta duodecies circumflexa." K. Wernicke, "Olympische Beiträge," *JdI* 9 (1894) 200 n. 19, criticizes Pollack; "(er ist) nur scheinbar richtig. Ein zwölfmaliges Durchmessen der Bahn mit den dazu gehörigen Wendungen durfte der Dichter Pindar wohl so bezeichnen." We need not take seriously Wernicke's *argumentum ex silentio*. Pollack, despite his perspicacity in perceiving the odd number of turns, fails to see the problems with making the terma of *Ol.* 3.33 the east end. R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles. The Electra* (Cambridge 1924) 106-07 *ad* 726, also identifies the *terma* as the east one.

[16] Professor M. Poliakoff has cleverly suggested the emendation of δωδεκάγναμπτον to δωδεκάγναμπτου, the latter modifying δρόμου. This would save Pindar from nodding while still making the point that the west *terma* is meant here. The -γναμπτος

Pindar speaks of the seven pyres for the Seven against Thebes. But, as is
noted in the scholia (Drachmann, *ad* 23a), there were only four pyres,
with Adrastos still alive, Amphiaraos swallowed in the ground, and
Polyneices denied burial.

### III

But what *is* the evidence that the *tethrippon* was twelve, not six,
circuits of the hippodrome? Why do scholars, even fairly recently, con-
tinue to allow for the possibility that the race could have been six laps?
For example, H. A. Harris has written, "Pindar reveals that at Olympia
the races for chariots and mule-carts were over twelve 'courses' (δωδε-
κάδρομοι). *It is not certain whether these were lengths or laps*; the lat-
ter is more likely" (my italics).[17]

The evidence comes from Pindar, the Pindaric scholia, and an
eleventh-century manuscript found in the Seraglio in Constantinople
which lists the distances of the equestrian events.[18]

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would now mean "turn" in the sense of "lap" (see note 20 below); otherwise, one would
have a six-lap race *contra* post-Pindaric evidence for twelve laps, and there would still be
the problem of the poet giving an even number for the total of turns. See the discussion in
part III of this paper.

   [17]Harris, *SGR* (note 6 above) 163, written in 1972. A few years before, O. W.
Reinmuth, *Der Kleine Pauly* (Stuttgart 1967), under "Hippodromos," had written,
"Beim Wagenrennen waren nach Pindar die termai (sic!) zwölfmal zu umrunden =
9228.96 m; aber *einige Gelehrte möchten dies auf die Hälfte reduzieren*" (my italics). A.
Martin, *DarSag* (Paris 1926) 196, under "Hippodrome," paraphrases the thoughts of the
eighteenth-century writer La Barre (*MemAcInscr* 9) 607: "Il pense que les chars ne
faisaient en réalité que six tours; ils franchissaient bien douze fois la borne, mais six fois
la borne intérieure et six fois la borne extérieure." "Borne" must be *terma*. I have not
been able to locate this reference, but have seen La Barre, "Dissertation. Sur les Places
destinées aux Jeux Publics dans la Grèce, et sur les Courses qu'on faisoit dans ces Places,"
*MemAcInscr* 9 (1737) 391-93. La Barre insists that *dromos* (δωδεκάγναμπτος = δω-
δεκάδρομος) can only mean "length," never "lap." His best example comes from
Tzetzes, *Chil.* lines 700-06, esp. 704-05. But even if all his examples are as he says, it still
does not follow that *dromos* can never mean "lap." Wernicke (note 15 above) 199 follows
La Barre: "Ich glaube, jeder, der den Ausdruck genau überlegt, wird erkennen, dass bei
zwölfmaligen Umfahren der Bahn von zwölf Wendungen nicht die Rede sein kann, son-
dern die doppelte Zahl herauskommt; das Wort kann demnach in der Tat nur ein sechs-
maliges Umfahren der Bahn andeuten." Wernicke, 199, was also upset by the great
length — over eight miles — of a twelve lap race, since modern races are usually about a
mile to a mile-and-a-half long. Martin, however, loc. cit. 189 and note 12, points out
that at Longchamps there was a race of 6200 meters, another of 7100 at Auteuil.

   [18]For the Seraglio manuscript, see note 6 above.

In addition to *Olympian* 3.33-34, Pindar makes the following references to the four-horse chariot race: *Ol.* 2.50, τεθρίππων δυωδεκαδρόμων; *Ol.* 6.75, περὶ δωδέκατον δρόμον; and *Pyth.* 5.33, δώδεκ᾽ ἂν δρόμων. In all the passages the number "twelve" occurs in conjunction with *dromos.* As Harris has noted, *dromos*, "course," is ambiguous since it can mean either one length of the stadium or one circuit of it.

The scholia to *Ol.* 6.75 (Drachmann *ad* 124 a) provide a clear solution, glossing περὶ δωδεκάτον δρόμον with περὶ τὸν δωδεκάκυκλον δρόμον. The -κυκλον, "circuit," is unambiguous. Confirming this interpretation is the commentary on *Ol.* 2.50 (Drachman *ad* 92a-b): a. δυωδεκαδρόμων: ὅτι δώδεκα δρόμους ἔτρεχον τὰ τέλεια ἅρματα, τουτέστιν ι΄ καὶ β΄ καμπτῆρας. b. τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν οὐκ ἔκαμπτον οἱ ἵπποι ζ΄ καμπτούς, ἀλλὰ δώδεκα ("a. Twelve-coursed: because the chariots for full-grown horses used to run twelve courses, that is twelve turns. b. For in the old days the horses did not turn seven turns, but twelve"). Part (b), with its comparison of Greek and Roman chariot racing, is extremely crucial because we know that the latter consisted of seven circuits of the course.[19] Furthermore, καμπτήρ, or a variant like καμπτός, can mean "lap" as well as "turn," the turn at the outermost point becoming synonymous with the entire out and back distance.[20]

[19] Suetonius (*Domit.* 4.3) says that the emperor reduced the length of the race from seven laps to five in order to fit in more races each day: "in iis (ludis) circensium die, quo facilius centum missus peragerentur, singulos e septenis spatiis ad quina corripuit." For *spatium* = "lap," see the *Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v.,* 1b. However, one could object that *spatium*, like *dromos*, is ambiguous. Dio Cassius (49.43) solves the problem, for he informs us that the seven *ova* (egg-shaped stones) and the seven dolphins in the *spina* of the course indicated the number of *diauloi* (a *diaulos* being a footrace of one lap, namely one length up the track and one length back): Κἂν τῷ ἱπποδρόμῳ σφαλλομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους περὶ τὸν τῶν διαύλων ἀριθμὸν ὁρῶν, τούς τε δελφῖνας καὶ τὰ ὠοειδῆ δημιουργήματα κατεστήσατο, ὅπως δι᾽ αὐτῶν αἱ περίοδοι τῶν περιδρόμων ἀναδεικνύωνται. ("Seeing in the hippodrome men mistaking the number of *diauloi*, he (Agrippa) established the dolphins and egg-shaped artifacts, in order that through them the traversals of the circuits might be indicated.") Sets of dolphins and eggs were set up at each end of the spina. Although only one kind of counter or the other was needed, the Romans kept both. See Harris, *SGR* (note 6 above) 190.

[20] Note the definitions of "turn" in the *OED*: no. 13, "the act of turning so as to face about or go in the opposite direction"; no. 15, "a journey, expedition, tour, course"; no. 16, "an act of walking or pacing around or about a limited area." Thus one can say, "Let's have a turn or two around the track," where a "turn" means a "lap" and where the total number of turns at both ends will be more than the number of circuits.

For καμπτήρ to mean "lap," see Herodas 10.3; the interpretation is supported by *LSJ, s.v.,* II, and I. C. Cunningham, *Herodas. Mimiambi* (Oxford 1971) 205. The -γναμπτ of δωδεκάγναμπτον is a Homeric variant of καμπτ-, according to *LSJ*, under γνάμπτω.

Confirming the scholia is the manuscript from Constantinople: τὰ δὲ τέλεια (ἅρματα τρέχουσι) κύκλους ιβ¹. ("The chariots for full-grown horses run twelve circuits.")[20a]

Since the scholia come after Pindar and the manuscript from Constantinople is much later, one could question their reliability as sources.[21] On the other hand, such sources are not inevitably wrong and can provide valuable information. The comparison of Greek chariot races to the Roman in the scholia to *Ol.* 2.50 is particularly strong evidence. For even when the latter had established its popularity, Greek equestrian events continued. Tiberius (4 B.C.), Germanicus (17 A.D.), and Nero (67 A.D.) all won chariot races at the Olympic Games.

Let us, however, accept the objection and see if we can determine the length of the *tethrippon* solely on the basis of Pindar. At this juncture we reintroduce the matter of the number of turns at the *terma*. For the length of the race the following possibilities exist:

(i) Thirteen circuits, the west end being "twelve-turned" and the east turned thirteen times. No one has raised this possibility, the number thirteen never coming up in Pindar (or the post-Pindaric sources).

(ii) Six circuits, with a grand total of twelve turns, six at each end. This is the position of La Barre in the eighteenth century and Wernicke in the nineteenth.[22] Immediately we must amend the total to eleven turns, five in the west and six in the east. However, we must discard this possibility as well if the arguments presented in part I of this paper are valid. The "twelve-turns" pertain to the west end alone. It is the only end which can be said to be synonymous with the grove of Zeus and the place of Pelops. The Altis does not lie "around" the east *terma* nor can it be said to lie "around" both *termata* so as to in effect embrace the entire hippodrome. The trees are needed primarily for the Altis, not the hippodrome.

(iii) Twelve circuits, eleven turns at the west and twelve at the east. By the process of elimination, this must be the correct number of laps for the *tethrippon*. As for the "twelve-turned *terma*" of *Ol.* 3.33, two interpretations are possible: (a) Pindar intends a reference to the east *terma*.[23] But as we have seen, neither the text nor practical and aes-

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²⁰ᵃ For the reference to the text, see Schöne (note 6 above).

²¹ Wernicke (note 15 above) 200, claims: "Die Scholien schöpfen ihre Weisheit wohl kaum aus ihrer Kenntnis der Spiele oder der Festordnung, sondern lediglich aus dem Text des Pindar, wir sind also an ihre Erklärung nicht gebunden."

²² See notes 15 and 17 above.

²³ This is the position of Pollack and Jebb (note 15 above).

thetic considerations support this. (b) Pindar means the west *terma*, but
has committed an oversight. The latter must be the proper interpreta-
tion.

In summary, therefore, we can determine the length of the four-
horse chariot race from Pindar alone with the aid of a knowledge of
topography and the proper understanding of the nature of the race and
the turns. *Ol.* 3.33-34, with its reference to twelve *turns* rather than
courses, is particularly crucial, even if the number "twelve" is initially
misleading. The race was not six laps. And if we add to Pindar the post-
Pindaric sources, the evidence for the twelve-lap *tethrippon* becomes
overwhelming. The doubt on this matter, traceable to two modern
scholars, La Barre and Wernicke, need no longer trouble us.[24]

IV

Roman chariot racing, unlike the Greek, seems to have had an
equal number of turns at each end. Having completed the final length
of the course, the chariots, instead of stopping, rounded the starting
end and raced to a finish line part of the way up the track. The location
of tribunals or boxes for personages of rank attending the races indi-
cates the area of the finish. The architectural evidence is supported by
mosaics. A white line on the Lyons chariot mosaic appears to be the
finish line. On the Piazza Armerina chariot mosaic, the awards cere-
mony takes place at a point up the track from the start.[25]

How do we know that such a finish line was not used in Greek
equestrian events? An anecdote in Pausanias (6.13.9) tells of the mare
Aura, owned by the Cornithian Pheidolas, who in the Olympic Games
threw her rider at the start of the race. καὶ οὐδέν τι ἧσσον θέουσα ἐν
κόσμῳ περί τε τὴν νύσσαν ἐπέστρεφε, καὶ ἐπεὶ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἤκου-
σεν, ἐπετάχυνεν ἐς πλέον τὸν δρόμον, φθάνει τε δὴ ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἑλ-
λανοδίκας ἀφικομένη καὶ νικῶσα ἔγνω καὶ παύεται τοῦ δρόμου.
("But nevertheless she went on running properly, *turned round the
post*, and, when she heard the trumpet, quickened her pace, reached
the umpires first, realised that she had won and stopped running.")[26]

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[24] The history of the scholarship is summed up in note 17.

[25] For the Roman finish line, see J. H. Humphrey, F. B. Sear, and M. Vickers,
"Aspects of the Circus at Lepcis Magna," *Libya Antiqua* 9-10 (1972-1973) 41-43. See
too J. H. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1986) 85-91.

[26] Translation by W. H. S. Jones, *Loeb Classical Library*.

The most obvious way to interpret the underlined section is to re-
gard ἐπέστρεφε as a progressive use of the imperfect and to see in νύσ-
σαν a reference to a solo turn, at the east end.[27] The sounding of the
trumpet thus announces the final stretch of the race, what we would call
the "homestretch," and it occurs during or perhaps immediately after
the turn. The mare then races for the judges at the finish line.

Is it, however, possible to interpret ἐπέστρεφε as a frequentative
imperfect? If so, the passage would be translated something like, "She
kept making the turn," or, better, "the turns." This interpretation sug-
gests that the mare completed several laps of the course until she heard
the trumpet.[28] But the manuscript from the Seraglio indicates that the
race for single horse was only six stades.[29] A race of several laps seems
therefore unlikely. Furthermore, if only two turns are meant, the fre-
quentative use of the imperfect would hardly then be intended for but
two turns, and it would have been simpler to write νύσσας instead of
νύσσαν.

In summary, then, the first interpretation, which points to a single
turn, is preferable, and there is no archaeological or literary evidence at
present to suggest that the finish line of the Greek hippodrome resem-
bled that of the Roman.[30]

<div align="right">

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[27] This, most recently, is the conclusion of Hans Wiegartz, "Zur Startanlage im
Hippodrom von Olympia," *Boreas. Münstersche Beiträge zur Archäologie*, Band 7
(1984) 77.

[28] Harris, *SGR* (note 6 above) 180 translates thus: "She . . . did the *turns* round
the *posts* . . . " (my italics).

[29] See note 6 above.

[30] Nor, as Diskin Clay has pointed out to me, could such a Roman type of finish
line be called a "twelve-turned terma," for there would be no turns around such a line.

## THE DEATH OF EMPEDOCLES

> To the elements it came from,
> Everything will return —
> Our bodies to earth,
> Our blood to water, Heat to fire,
> Breath to air.
> They were well born, they will be well entomb'd —
> But mind?*

Empedocles' jump into Etna has fascinated both scholars and poets from ancient until modern times.** Diogenes Laertius gave two versions of the jump; Matthew Arnold made it the subject of his long dramatic poem, *Empedocles on Etna*. The more one probes into the story, the more fascinating it is, as it becomes ever more clear that Empedocles was doomed to die in this particular manner. Not that he actually jumped into the volcano; rather, the manner of his death was determined by his biographers, by historians and compilers and, finally, by Empedocles himself. Empedocles' own works provided the ultimate source for those who wrote about him, and the way in which his philosophy was transformed into biography reveals more about ancient biographers, such as Diogenes Laertius, than it does about Empedocles.

There was a tendency in the ancient world to approach any given text as biographical.[1] Homer's life was pieced together from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Aeschylus was presumed to have fought at Salamis because he describes that battle. Nearly all the biographical data that have come down to us from the ancient critics and historians about the lives of the poets were taken from their own poetry. The same case can be made for the lives of the philosophers. The legend of Empedocles neatly demonstrates this ancient tendency towards a biographical reading. A large enough body of Empedocles' own work is still extant, so that many of the legends and events about his life can be traced back to their original source. Since Empedocles was such a popular figure for the bi-

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*Matthew Arnold, "Empedocles on Etna: A Dramatic Poem" in Kenneth Allot, ed., *Poems of Matthew Arnold* (London 1965) ll. 331–38.

**All Empedocles fragments quoted or alluded to are from Diels, H. and Kranz, W., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 10th edition, Vols. 1 and 2 (Berlin 1961). All translations that appear in this paper are my own.

[1] See, e.g., M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (Baltimore 1981); A. S. Riginos, *Platonica* (Leiden 1976); J. A. Fairweather, "Fiction in the Biographies of the Ancient Writers", *AncSoc* 5 (1974–75) 231–75.

ographers, there are also a great many stories to trace, among them the story of his death. However, the jump into Etna must come in its proper sequence (for I intend to discuss Empedocles' life not, as Diogenes Laertius does, anecdote by anedote, but in roughly chronological order)[2] and I will begin with earlier events in Empedocles' life.

## I. *The Careers of Empedocles*

Empedocles' careers as politician, poet, seer, and physician are all the outcome of the tradition which transforms philosophy into biography through a biographical reading of the subject's work. An author derives, from either the *Physics* or the *Purifications*, an act of speech and credits it to Empedocles. It then becomes part of the tradition, is included by other biographers and compilers, and so becomes part of the Empedocles legend. The original impetus for the incident so derived comes from a biographical reading of the philosophy. The story itself, however, is shaped by the biographer's desire to either glorify his subject (Empedocles refuses a kingship) or to parody his subject (Empedocles throws himself into Etna out of hybris or pique.) The desire to parody or even to disparage is perhaps the more common motive, as Diogenes Laertius' epigram on Empedocles reveals:

> And you, Empedocles, did purify your limbs with quick flame,
> and drank fire from immortal bowls.
> I do not say that you willing jumped into Etna's streams,
> but that, not wishing to be found out, you jumped in.
>
> (D.L. 8.75)

Most of the biographical details that have been transmitted to us are made up of similar vituperation, drawn from some part of the philosopher's work and turned against him. Occasionally a 'noble' story does appear, but for the most part, the legends and myths that make up Diogenes Laertius' portrait of Empedocles work on this level.[3] All the careers attributed to Empedocles, however, have as their ultimate source Empedocles' own words, in particular fragment 146 of the *Purifications*:

> Finally, then, prophets and poets and physicians,
> and princes among mortal men are they wont to be,
> blossoming forth from this state to become gods, greatest in honor.

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[2]For Empedocles' family background, see Diogenes Laertius, *Empedocles* 8.51–52. See also M. R. Wright, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments* (New Haven 1968), 3–6.

[3]Lefkowitz (note 1 above) 136–38; Riginos (note 1 above) 160.

All four careers mentioned by Empedocles in this fragment (prophet, poet, physician, and prince/politician) are attributed to him by his biographers, along with suitable anecdotes, none of which are particularly credible. The oddest, however, are those which testify to Empedocles' political career.

Diogenes Laertius presents Empedocles as a champion of the people, a democratic reformer who refuses the kingship because he prefers the 'frugal life' (D.L. 8.63). This is indeed a noble story and one that might be credible, did it not also show up in Diogenes Laertius' life of Heraclitus (D.L. 9.6). There, Heraclitus gives up the kingship in favor of his brother, rather than for some abstract ideal, but both stories function to glorify and to make more democratic their subjects. They are similar to the poems that Aristotle excerpts from Solon's poetry to show Solon as a politician with popular tendencies. However, the poems that Aristotle chooses, read in a more complete and unprejudiced fashion, show Solon not as a democratic reformer, but as a man of moderate, perhaps even slightly conservative beliefs. There is a tendency, among ancient biographers and historians (as among modern ones) to make their philosophers politically aware men with democratic aims, as Aristotle's portrait of Solon in the *Athenian Constitution* makes clear.

This tendency is taken even farther in Empedocles' case. Empedocles must be a politician because he names this as one of the four best careers for men (or one of the four careers for the best type of man), and so suitable anecdotes and proofs of his political career must be found. The absurd lengths to which his biographers would go to find evidence for their reading is best illustrated by a story in Diogenes Laertius taken from Timaeus.[4]

In the story, Empedocles is a guest at a banquet given by one magistrate in honor of another magistrate. When the guest of honor is late, the host refuses to serve the wine, even though Empedocles requests it. The guest magistrate finally arrives, is made master of the feast, and orders the wine served. Empedocles now protests at being made to drink at the magistrate's order. He is told to either drink the wine or to have it poured on his head. Empedocles says nothing for the moment, but later accuses both magistrates of plotting tyranny, takes them to court and has them sentenced to death. This, Diogenes Laertius remarks, was the beginning of Empedocles' political career (D.L. 8.64).

This sort of ridiculous story is the result of trying to force Empedocles' life into the mold created by his biographers. Having decided on

[4]Timaeus: Jacoby, *FrGHist* 134.

the basis of fragment 146 that Empedocles was a politician, Diogenes
Laertius (and his sources) must then find evidence for it. There is no
reason, however, to read Empedocles' work as anything other than phil-
osophical or religious statements. Otherwise one might assume, as
Diogenes Laertius did, that in fragments 118 and 119 of the *Purifica-
tions*, Empedocles is referring to the exile imposed upon him by his po-
litical enemies.

   Such an exile would certainly support Diogenes Laertius' portrait
of Empedocles as a politically active man. Diogenes Laertius' own words
are vague and may serve only to introduce the topic of Empedocles'
death, which immediately follows this section. He concludes his discus-
sion of Empedocles' political career (8.63-66) by remarking (8.67) that
"Later, although the inhabitants of Acragas missed him, the descend-
ents of his enemies opposed his return and because of this, he went off to
the Peloponnesus and died." Forced exile would be appropriate punish-
ment for a political reformer, but there is no evidence for an exile at all.
Rather, the idea seems almost surely to have arisen from a biographical
reading of fragments 118 and 119 of the *Purifications*, in which Empe-
docles speaks metaphorically about the soul's exile from the gods during
the rule of Strife:

   I wept and wailed, looking upon the unfamiliar land . . . (frag. 118)
   From such honor and so great a happiness . . . (frag. 119)

   Political exile, of course, is a standard part of many biographies;
Solon, Aeschylus and Euripides all underwent some form of exile, and
political exile can easily be read into these lines, as Diogenes Laertius
and others seem to have done.[5] A story of exile would support Diogenes
Laertius' portrait of Empedocles as a political reformer and so it was
included, although in a vague and offhand way, which may reflect his
own uneasiness about the story. For Diogenes Laertius does not directly
mention exile itself, but leaves it to be inferred from his words, which
follow his statement about Empedocles' break-up of an oligarchy ("The
Thousand") in Acragas. The story of Empedocles' exile, like the other
political stories that Diogenes Laertius offers the reader, is ultimately
not convincing.

   There are several other stories in Diogenes Laertius that propose
to show Empedocles as a reformer and champion of the people, but I
need mention only these three to demonstrate how such stories enter
into the biographical tradition. First, there was the need to find anec-

   [5]Lefkowitz (note 1 above) 95-96, 43-44.

dotes to support a biographical reading of fragment 146 and to show
Empedocles as an active politician. The first story, the refusal of king-
ship, is a story also told of Heraclitus and can be applied to Solon as
well, indicating that it is a standard motif in the biography of a poet or
philosopher. The story of Empedocles and the wine probably comes
from a parody of Empedocles' character, which originated as a pasquin-
ade, but which Diogenes Laertius (or his source) took as serious evidence
of Empedocles' hatred of tyranny, even in its most subtle form.[6] The
story of exile, as has been shown, is another standard theme in the life of
the poet or philosopher, and, in Empedocles' case, could easily be read
into those fragments which speak metaphorically about exile. The sto-
ries about Empedocles' political career also demonstrate the ancient
fondness for coincidence and the tendency to connect a famous man
with an obscure moment of political history.[7] There undoubtedly was
some sort of political change in Acragas at or around Empedocles' time,
with which he later became associated. The point is that none of the
stories can be substantiated, one of them is ridiculous, and all arise from
the need to prove that Empedocles had an active political career. How-
ever, once these stories become part of the legend, it is hard to escape
their influence, and modern writers as well as ancient ones tend to fall
into the trap.[8]

     Politics, however, is only one of the four professions mentioned by
Empedocles in fragment 146, and the biographers still had to flesh out
the careers of poet, physician, and prophet to make the statement fully
biographical. Fortunately, there was material enough and more in
Empedocles' work to do a thorough job of it. Empedocles' own work
should have been enough to prove him a poet, but the biographers were
not content with this alone. Aristotle calls Empedocles the inventor of
rhetoric and a member of Homer's school, because of his powerful dic-
tion and use of metaphor. He attributes to Empedocles two other poems
besides the *Purifications* and the *Physics* (a poem on the invasion of
Xerxes and a hymn to Apollo), as well as unnamed tragedies and politi-
cal discourses. Heraclides, on the other hand, protests that the tragedies

     [6]T. S. Brown, *Timaeus of Tauromenium* (Berkeley 1958) 52; Wright (note 2
above) 8.
     [7]For the state of affairs in Acragas in and around Empedocles' time, see Wright
(note 2 above) 7-8; E. A. Freeman, *History of Sicily* 2 (Oxford 1891) 345-49.
     [8]Wright (note 2 above) 291 assumes that Empedocles speaks autobiographically in
fragment 146; Freeman (note 7 above) 354 speaks of Empedocles' exile, as does J. Bidez,
*La Biographie d'Empédocle* (Gand 1894) 153-55.

were the work of another author, while Hieronymus asserts that he had
come across some forty-three of the plays (D.L. 8.57–59).[9]

While it is not inconceivable that Empedocles wrote tragedies and
other sorts of poetry and prose besides philosophy, none of this work, if
it ever existed, has come down to us. Here, a case of mistaken identity
seems to have been the cause of the confusion, abetted by the desire to
support a biographical reading of fragment 146. As Wright points out,
according to the *Suda*, Empedocles' grandson and namesake was a tra-
gedian, who wrote roughly twenty-four plays. The political writings as-
signed to Empedocles by Aristotle were doubtless the result of the con-
fused tradition of Empedocles as a politician and of details of his
philosophical writings taken out of context (as Diogenes Laertius either
misread fragments 118 and 119 or read them only with an eye towards
biography). The mention of a destruction of the other two poems makes
their very existence suspect, as though the sources were consciously at-
tempting to account for their disappearance from the corpus. In any
case, the story of their destruction follows a familiar line — the hymn to
Apollo was accidentally burned, but the poem on the invasion of Xerxes
was burned deliberately, because it was unfinished (D.L. 8.57).[10]

The claims made by Diogenes Laertius about Empedocles' medi-
cal writings are equally unfounded, having as their ultimate source
fragment 146. Some fragments of the *Physics* are, of course, concerned
with respiration and embryology. It seems that these fragments were
then elaborated by the biographers into medical theory and backed up
by the strange anecdotes so commonly associated with Empedocles. The
most striking of these is the story that comes to us from Diogenes Laer-
tius, via Hermippus and Heraclides, of the woman in the trance (D.L.
8.61).[11]

In Hermippus' version, the woman is called Pantheia and is healed
by Empedocles after all the other local physicians had given her up.
Heraclides does not give the woman in his story any name but does give
more details of her illness and restoration. He says that she had been in a
death-like trance for thirty days, without pulse or breath, until Empe-
docles brought her back to life.

Several fragments have contributed to the creation of this story.
First is fragment 146, which lays the basis for the biographers' conten-

[9]Aristotle, frag. 65 Rose; Heraclides, frag. 6 Muller; Hieronymous, frag. 30
Wehrli.

[10]For the ancient tendency to equate the perfector of a technique with the creator
of the technique, see Fairweather (note 1 above) 264.

[11]Hermippus, frag. 27 Muller; Heraclides, frag. 83 Wehrli.

tion that Empedocles was a practicing physician. Then there is fragment 112, which Diogenes Laertius quotes (in part) in connection with Heraclides' story of the trance. It was from these lines, he explains, that Heraclides derives his title of "Healer" and "Diviner" for Empedocles:

> Friends, who dwell in the great town above tawny Acragas,
> upon the city's citadel, busy in your good works,
> You who are reverent harbors for strangers and strangers to evil,
> Greeting. I go among you an immortal god, no longer mortal,
> but honored among all men, appropriately,
> wreathed in ribbons and fresh garlands.
> When I come into your flourishing town, then among you,
> I am honored by men and women. They follow me,
> by the thousands, seeking the advantageous way,
> some desiring prophecy, others, against all sorts of diseases,
> ask to learn a well-pointed saying,
> having suffered too long in their painful distress.

Here, for Diogenes Laertius, was proof that Empedocles actually was a physician, for remedies against all sorts of illnesses are implicitly promised in the last several lines, which would support the story of Pantheia's healing as well.

Other fragments contribute to this story also, for respiration is discussed by Empedocles in fragment 100 and a theory of respiration is given in fragment 105.[12] The most influential fragment, however, is 111 from the *Physics*:

> You will learn medicines of all kinds and, against old age, a remedy
>    hear —
> since for you alone will I complete this tale of many charms.
> You will stop the force of the tireless winds, as they sweep across the earth
> shattering crops with their destructive blasts.
> Then, should you wish it, you will bring back these winds requited.
> From murky rain, you will bring a seasonable time
> for men and, from burning drought, make flow the streams
> that nourish trees, streams that dwell in the pure upper air.
> You will bring back from Hades the strength of a man who has perished.

---

[12]Frag. 100:

ὧδε δ' ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ· πᾶσι λίφαιμοι
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα τέτανται,
καί σφιν ἐπὶ στομίοις πυκιναῖς τέτρηνται ἄλοξιν
ῥινῶν ἔσχατα τέρθρα διαμπερές, ὥστε φόνον μέν

This fragment promises, among other things, that Empedocles'
pupil will learn to control the winds, rain and drought, and to bring
back from the underworld the strength (μένος) of someone who has
perished (καταφθιμένου). The same words are used to describe the
strength of the winds and of the dead, and the verb which describes the
destructive tendencies of the wind is also used to describe the man who
has died (μένος καταφθινύθω). The fragment, then, seems to suggest
that both respiration and the winds can be controlled, made to return at
will, and that, if breath is returned to the body, then so is life. This
makes neither life nor death a permanent, fixed state; rather, it suggests
that there are only subtle alterations between two similar states. This is
further suggested by the preceding lines of the fragment, where Empe-
docles reveals the mutability of the elements, the alternation between
the destructive force of the winds and their necessary ('requited') pres-
ence, between wet and dry, and finally between life and death. The
fragment takes on still greater force if read in conjunction with other

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κεύθειν, αἰθέρι δ' εὐπορίην διόδοισι τετμῆσθαι.                          5
ἔνθεν ἔπειθ' ὁπόταν μὲν ἀπαΐξηι τέρεν αἷμα,
αἰθὴρ παφλάζων καταΐσσεται οἴδματι μάργωι,
εὖτε δ' ἀναθρώισκηι, πάλιν ἐκπνέει, ὥσπερ ὅταν παῖς
κλεψύδρηι παίζουσα διειπετέος χαλακοῖο —
εὖτε μὲν αὐλοῦ πορθμὸν ἐπ' εὐειδεῖ χερὶ θεῖσα              10
εἰς ὕδατος βάπτηισι τέρεν δέμας ἀργυφέοιο,
οὐδεὶς ἄγγοσδ' ὄμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλά μιν εἴργει
ἀέρος ὄγκος ἔσωθε πεσὼν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,
εἰσόκ' ἀποστεγάσηι πυκινὸν ῥόον· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
πνεύματος ἐλλείποντος ἐσέρχεται αἴσιμον ὕδωρ.             15
ὣς δ' αὔτως, ὅθ' ὕδωρ μὲν ἔχηι κατὰ βένθεα χαλκοῦ
πορθμοῦ χωσθέντος βροτέωι χροῖ ἠδὲ πόροιο, —
αἰθὴρ δ' ἐκτὸς ἔσω λελιημένος ὄμβρον ἐρύκει,
ἀμφὶ πύλας ἠθμοῖο δυσηχέος ἄκρα κρατύνων,
εἰσόκε χειρὶ μεθῆι, τότε δ' αὖ πάλιν, ἔμπαλιν ἢ πρίν,      20
πνεύματος ἐμπίπτοντος ὑπεκθέει αἴσιμον ὕδωρ.
ὣς δ' αὔτως τέρεν αἷμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ γυίων
ὁππότε μὲν παλίνορσον ἀπαΐξειε μυχόνδε,
αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ῥεῦμα κατέρχεται οἴδματι θῦον,
εὖτε δ' ἀναθρώισκηι, πάλιν ἐκπνέει ἴσον ὀπίσσω.            25

Frag. 105:

αἵματος ἐν πελάγεσσι τεθραμμένη ἀντιθορόντος,
τῆι τε νόημα μάλιστα κικλήσκεται ἀνθρώποισιν·
αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

fragments of the *Physics* (8, 9, 11 and 12) which deny the existence of absolute life and death. Most men are aware only of the outward signs of regeneration and decay, and so speak of life and death as though they were fixed and absolute. Empedocles, however, sees beyond these states and the changing nature of all things. Perhaps this is why, in the anecdote, only Empedocles can bring the woman back to a "living" state. The local physicians, ordinary men who cannot recognize the subtle gradations between life and death but only their absolute states, have given up on the woman. Empedocles, with his greater knowledge, is able not only to see the connection between the two states, but to control them, much as he can control the winds through his knowledge of them. Fragment 111, then, supports the biographers' belief that, as fragment 146 had lead them to believe, Empedocles was himself a physician endowed with almost supernatural powers of healing.

So far, three of the four professions mentioned in fragment 146 have been discussed: poet, politician, and physician. The biographers are oddly silent about the fourth, that of prophet or seer. No famous Empedoclean oracles are quoted and the biographers do not discuss his prophetic powers. They do, however, give several examples of his "wizardry," an attempt to stop the winds and the diverting of a river. The problem lies in the changed meaning of the word Empedocles uses in fragment 146 for prophet, μάντις. Earlier (in Empedocles' time), its meaning was 'diviner', 'prophet' or 'seer'. By Diogenes Laertius' time, however, it had come to mean 'magician' or 'miracle-worker' or 'wizard'. The real clue to Diogenes Laertius' use of the word (and his interpretation of fragment 146) comes in a brief statement from Satyrus. In 8.59, Diogenes Laertius speaks of Empedocles' age and says, "Satyrus says that this man Gorgias claims that he himself was present when Empedocles was performing magical acts," τοῦτόν φησιν . . . τῷ ᾿Εμπεδοκλεῖ γοητεύοντι. The verb γοητεύω can be defined as 'to bewitch', 'to beguile', 'to fascinate' or 'to play the wizard', but it cannot be taken as synonymous with μαντεύομαι, the later μαντεύω, or the noun μάντις.[13] Since Diogenes Laertius has been at such pains throughout to furnish proofs for the other professions mentioned in fragment 146, it is unlikely that he would not also try to prove that Empedocles practiced the fourth profession as well. The most likely explanation is that Diogenes Laertius understood μάντις to mean 'magician' or 'wizard' rather than 'prophet' or 'seer', and supports his biographical reading of

[13] Liddell, Scott, Jones and McKenzie (Oxford 1968) 356, *s.v.* γοητεύω; 1080, *s.v.* μάντις.

146 by giving examples of Empedocles' magical feats. His own words
support my hypothesis, for immediately after the passage in which he
quotes Satyrus on Gorgias, he says that Satyrus believed that Empedo-
cles laid claim to the powers mentioned in fragment 111 of the *Physics*,
after which he introduces the story of Empedocles stopping the winds.
After this comes the story of the woman in the trance and her miracu-
lous restoration by Empedocles. This set of stories, then, is intended to
prove Empedocles' magical powers and so complete the biographical
reading of fragment 146.[14]

## II. *The Deaths of Empedocles*

Now that the various aspects of Empedocles' life have been dis-
cussed, it is time to consider his various deaths. The biographers have
given us a great many to choose from, for the leap into Etna is only one
of the deaths assigned to Empedocles. As it was with his life, so it is with
his death — all the details and stories about his death arise from his own
words. The death stories show more malice, perhaps, than do those
about his life, but their ultimate source is the same. Before discussing
the famous jump into Etna, however, I must mention the other forms of
death that Empedocles was forced by his biographers to undergo.

[11]Scholars have long seen the connection between Empedocles' frag. 128 of the
*Purifications* and the sacrifice that Empedocles, according to Diogenes Laertius (8.53),
made at Olympia. The details of the sacrifice Diogenes Laertius takes from Favorinus'
*Memorabilia* (frag. 48 Barigazzi = 3 Muller): "I found in Favorinus' *Memorabilia* that
Empedocles sacrificed a bull made of honey and barley-meal, for the sacred envoys at
Olympia" (ἐγὼ δ᾿ εὗρον ἐν τοῖς ῾Υπομνήμασι Φαβωρίνου ὅτι καὶ βοῦν ἔθυσε τοῖς
θεωροῖς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐκ μέλιτος καὶ ἀλφίτων). Frag. 128, which speaks quite strongly
against slaughtering a real bull, speaks of the proper sacrifice under the rule of Love:

Then Ares was not god among them, nor yet was Din of Battle,
Zeus was not king nor Chronos, nor yet Poseidon —
but Cypris then was queen.
Her men earnestly appeased with good and pious offerings,
with painted figures and sweet oil, their fragrance cunningly made,
with unmixed myrrh and gifts of sweet-smelling incense,
and libations of honey flowing to the ground.
Nor did the altar flow with the unspeakable slaughter of the bull,
though this defilement still is greatest among men,
to bereave the animal of life to eat his limbs.

Diogenes Laertius gives the reader four different and seemingly unrelated deaths besides the leap into Etna. From Timaeus comes the belief that Empedocles died as an unknown sojourner in some unknown place, perhaps in the Peloponnesus. Favorinus contributes the story that Empedocles died of a broken hip resulting from a carriage fall. A letter from Telauges reveals that Empedocles died from drowning, and Demetrius of Troezen says that Empedocles hanged himself. Diogenes Laertius does not appear to give these stories as much credence as the leap into Etna.[15]

It is not unusual, of course, for a philosopher to have more than one death.[16] One has only to think of Pythagoras and the several deaths that Diogenes Laertius assigns him, or of the several deaths that are attributed to Heraclitus. The point is that the philosopher's death must in some way be appropriate to the philosopher's work. Fraenkel has suggested that the stories that describe Heraclitus' death as due to being buried in excrement or devoured by dogs came directly from the philosopher's own words.[17] Similarly, it is impossible to miss the joke of Pythagoras' death as coming from his refusal to cross a bean field. Empedocles' several deaths are also peculiarly appropriate to him, although somewhat harder to understand. The most obvious link and the most malicious story is Empedocles' suicide. The tradition of his suicide arises quite clearly from fragment 112, in which the narrator states that he now goes among the people as an immortal god, no longer mortal. Timaeus selected this fragment to characterize Empedocles' arrogance, and it seems more than likely that the desire to punish Empedocles for his hybris lies behind the story of his suicide. Then, too, there are fragments 8, 9 and 11 of the *Physics* which deny death in its absolute state:

> And I will tell you something else: Creation exists for no mortal thing whatsoever, nor is there any end in destroying death.
> Rather, there exists only the mingling and the separation of things joined,
> and the name applied to this by man is nature.
>
> (Frag. 8)

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[15] Diogenes Laertius 8.67–72; Timaeus frag. 6 *FrGHist*; Favorinus frag. 48 Barigazzi = 3 Muller; Heraclides *FIG* IV 383 = 1 Diels.

[16] J. A. Fairweather, "The Death of Heraclitus," *GRBS* 14 (1973) 233–37; Riginos (note 1 above) 194–98.

[17] H. Fraenkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *AJP* 59 (1938) 309–37.

But when the parts are mingled together into a man, and come into the
    light,
or into the family of wild animals, or shrubs,
or into birds, this, then, they call creation,
as, when they separate, this they call ill-fated death.
Themis does not call it so, but even I, through convention, apply this
    term.

(Frag. 9)

The fools. For they have no long-reaching thoughts,
but believe something not existing before it comes into being,
or that something dies away and perishes utterly.

(Frag. 11)

There could be no better way to refute the philosopher for his de-
nial of death (and his insult to the average, foolish man) than to have
him commit suicide. All the variants of Empedocles' death function in
this way: words are taken from his philosophy, turned against him and
made to determine the manner of his death. The fall from the carriage
also punishes Empedocles for his claims (via fragment 112) to non-hu-
man, immortal status and refutes his denial of death.

The death by drowning seems particularly odd until one remem-
bers those fragments in which the philosopher lays claim to having been
boy and girl, bird and bush and mute sea-fish:

ἤδη γάρ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ᾽ οἰωνός τε καὶ ἔξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

This particular fragment (117) comes from the *Purifications*, but
its thought, that all living creatures undergo change and transforma-
tion, has its counterpoint in the *Physics*; fragment 21 is especially close
in thought and speaks of the different entities that arise from the basic
elements:

For from these [elements] all things exist, that were and are and will be,
the trees burst forth, and men and women,
beast and birds and mute sea-fish,
and the gods, long-lived and highest in honor.

Like fragment 117, fragment 21 lists opposing groups which in-
clude men and women, trees, birds, beasts and fish. Fragment 21 goes
further, however, in that it mentions the gods as having burst forth from
the common pool of the four elements. The inclusion of the gods in
fragment 21 argues for their inclusion (in thought) in fragment 117 as

well, since the language and meaning of the fragments are so similar. If this is so, it helps explain fragment 112 of the *Purifications* ("Greeting. I go among you an immortal god, no longer mortal"), which so many of the biographers found inexplicable or terribly arrogant. The next logical step in the process of change would be from mortal to immortal, and Empedocles' words in this fragment would be announcing this next step. Death by drowning, in any case, would be an appropriate punishment for a philosopher who claimed to have been a fish at some point of his existence, just as death from a carriage fall is suitable for one who claimed that he has become an immortal god.

These three deaths have in common, then, the desire to punish Empedocles for his claim to godhood or for some part of his philosophy, either his denial of death as an absolute state or for his belief in the mutability of the elements. Empedocles' statements about the four elements and their change under the reigns of Love and Strife are of particular importance to the story of his leap into Etna. Diogenes Laertius gives the reader two versions of the story, taken from Hermippus, Hippobotus, and from Diodorus of Ephesus.[18]

In Hermippus' and Hippobotus' version, Empedocles was offering a sacrifice for a group of about eighty people after having saved Pantheia. Afterwards, Empedocles left the scene of the sacrifice and set out for Etna. Upon reaching it, he plunged into the crater and disappeared, with the intention of confirming that he had indeed become a god (βουλομένου τὴν περὶ αὑτοῦ φήμην βεβαιῶσαι ὅτι γεγόνοι θεός [D.L. 8.69]). Later, one of the bronze sandals that he customarily wore was thrown up from the crater.

Diodorus tells a somewhat different story, although the outcome and the motive attributed to Empedocles are the same. Empedocles has cured Selinus of a plague by diverting one river and mixing it with another. The people of Selinus were celebrating the end of the plague when Empedocles appeared among them. They spontaneously rose up and worshipped him as a god. Empedocles, to confirm their belief, leapt into Etna: ταύτην οὖν θέλοντα βεβαιῶσαι τὴν διάληψιν εἰς τὸ πῦρ ἐναλέσθαι (D.L. 8.70).

Both stories, then, occur after one of Empedocles' magical feats and in both stories the jump is motivated by Empedocles' desire to prove that he had become a god. The first story is concerned with Empedocles' interest in respiration and the curative powers that result from the mas-

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[18]Hermippus frag. 27 Muller; Diodorus of Ephesus frag. 8 Diels.

tering of the elements. His interest in respiration, culled from various fragments, has already been discussed in conjunction with the story of Pantheia. That Empedocles could rescue a woman from a death-like trance also ties in with his refutation of death as an absolute state (fragments 8, 9 and 11), with his career as a physician and prophet or magician (fragment 146), and with his promises to his pupil that he will learn how to control the winds and how to bring back the force (μένος) of someone already dead (fragment 111). Since Empedocles has already fulfilled the four careers mentioned in fragment 146, the only thing left for him to do is to pass on to the last state mentioned in fragment 146, that of an immortal god: ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῆισι φέριστοι. To this end, he throws himself into Etna. The story is not without malice, for it suggests that people did doubt his claim to godhood and, simultaneously, punishes him for his hybris; and yet there is a nobility to the story that suggests admiration behind it as well.

The second story works in similar manner. The leap occurs after a magical feat (the diversion of the plague by the mixing of rivers) and is motivated by Empedocles' desire to confirm the report that he had become a god. Again, we see the interest in controlling the elements to bring health and happiness; for Empedocles, by changing the course of the river, brings health to a large number of people, as he promises to do in fragment 111. Again, there is the belief in the changing nature of the elements, which gives one not only mastery over them, but also disputes their fixed, changeless state. The concerns of fragment 146 and 111 are also in evidence. Empedocles will now pass on to the final state, that of an immortal god, and at the same time be punished for his hybris in proclaiming himself to be immortal, a statement to which so many biographers objected.

There is, moreover, a further element which the stories have in common and again it is taken from Empedocles' own words. In fragment 6, Empedocles lists the four elements in his philosophical system, fire, air, earth and water:

> For hear, first of all, the four roots of all things —
> Zeus and bright-shining Hera and Aidoneus who gives life,
> and Nestis too, who with her tears moistens the mortal stream.

These four elements are acted upon by the opposing forces of Love and Strife and are moved and changed and have their existence according to the force in ascendency. In fragment 115 of the *Purifications*, Empedocles speaks of the changes which occur under the rule of Strife

and (metaphorically) about the changes that it brings for the mortal soul:

> There exists Necessity's decree, an ancient resolution of the gods,
> timeless, immortal, made fast by broad oath,
> that, whenever one in sin defiles his limbs with bloodshed,
> who quarrels and in error, makes falsely sworn his oath,
> then the daimons, who have as their portion long-lasting life,
> make him wander, far from the blessed gods, for thrice a thousand
>     seasons,
> being born in all sorts of mortal shapes throughout this time,
> changing in turn the grievous paths of living.
> For the strength of the air chases him into the ocean,
> and the ocean, in its turn, spews him forth onto dry land; then earth
> into the rays of glowing sun, and aether next, hurl him deep into the
>     vortex.
> One after the other, in succession, they receive him, but all hate him.
> I, now, am one of these, a fugitive from the gods and a wanderer,
> having put my trust in mad Strife.

Having seen how, in all the other stories about Empedocles, his words are twisted to provide a context for his actions, the basis for his jump into Etna is now clear. The heat and fire of Etna combine to hurl Empedocles deep into their vortex and Empedocles is made, once more, to die by his own words. He is punished, first, for having declared himself a god (fragments 111 and 146) in a manner which agrees with and is drawn from his whole philosophical system. It is of note, too, that the various forms of death which Empedocles is made to undergo all embody, to a greater or lesser extent, some one of his four elements: he drowns in water, falls to earth from a carriage and hurls himself into Etna's fires. Nor do we lack a story for air, the fourth element. There is one final way that Empedocles is made to die — apotheosis or vanishing into thin air.

This final story, which Diogenes Laertius takes from Heraclides, is in some ways the most satisfying and the most realistic of the death legends. Heraclides tells us that Empedocles, after curing Pantheia of her death-like trance, was offering sacrifice. After the feast, all the other people retired, but Empedocles remained where he was. At daybreak, he was missing. A servant reported that during the night he had heard a loud voice calling Empedocles and had seen a light in the sky. At first they searched for the missing man, but then Pausanias called the search off, saying that things "beyond expectation" had occurred and that it

was now their duty to worship Empedocles, who had become a god
(D.L. 8.71).[19]

This story, like those that deal with the leap into Etna, occurs after
one of Empedocles' great feats, the curing of Pantheia. However, it
lacks the element of Empedocles' desire to confirm the report that he
had become a god, which leads directly to the jump into Etna, for in this
story he simply disappears. It has all the trappings of an apotheosis — it
occurs at night, there is a loud voice calling from heaven, a light in the
sky, and a disappearance. In some ways, then, it is a typical apotheosis,
but there are elements which make it peculiarly Empedoclean.

First of all, the event is understood only by his friend Pausanias,
whom we must assume to be the pupil addressed by that name in the
*Physics* (fragment 1). In the *Physics* and in the *Purifications*, Empedo-
cles promises his pupil that he alone, by listening to Empedocles, would
have understanding far surpassing that of ordinary men. That Pausa-
nias would assume that Empedocles had now become a god shows that
the pupil had taken his lessons to heart, especially the lesson of fragment
146, which makes the transition from mortal to immortal the final step
of a five-part progression. The underlying meanings of the Pantheia
story (Empedocles' interest in respiration and his claims to restore the
dead) are by this time evident. Empedocles' disappearance into thin air
highlights his refutation of death as an absolute state and gives new
force to those fragments that deal with this and with the mutability of
the elements. Finally, the manner of Empedocles' mysterious disappear-
ance completes his biographers' use of the four elements in the death
legends, for to drowning, falling to earth and into flames is added van-
ishing into thin air.

The story is satisfying partly because it completes Empedocles'
death by means of the four different elements and partly because there
seems to be no trace of parody or malice which attends the other stories.
Empedocles does not die in order to prove himself a god, nor does his
death occur through the trivial or through punitive means (drowning,
falling from a carriage or suicide). This one story seems to have been
created purely from admiration, and perhaps for this reason was attrib-
uted to Pausanias, the addressee and pupil of Empedocles' *Physics*.
However, it is logically satisfying as well, for it fits nicely with Timaeus'
theory about Empedocles' death.

[19]Heraclides frags. 84 and 115 Wehrli.

Diogenes Laertius records Timaeus' distrust of the story of the jump into Etna.[20] Timaeus' criticisms, as far as they go, are good—but they go a bit too far. He raises some good objections (the host of the feast was not a citizen of of Acragas but of Syracuse and so could not have held the feast there), but weakens his argument by commenting that Empedocles never mentioned craters in his work and so would not have leapt into one—a telling comment for the biographers' thinking in itself. Timaeus' own theory is that Empedocles died in some obscure manner in some far away place. The two last stories dovetail neatly in this respect. The apotheosis story has enough truth, dressed up as legend, to be both poetically and logically satisfying.

Empedocles, then, was forced by his biographers both to live and to die by his own words. Almost every aspect of the life attributed to him was drawn from either the *Physics* or the *Purifications*, as was the manner of his death. A biographical reading of his work, then, was the ultimate source from which his biographers invented his life and made him die. The result is a legendary Empedocles who has survived to haunt the imaginations of historians, biographers and philosophers as well as poets, for all have believed in a career for Empedocles that was influenced and shaped by his myth. In the end, we know very little about the historical Empedocles and a great deal about the Empedocles of legend. The historical Empedocles might not, perhaps, have been very interesting, and it is not important that he should have been. Empedocles' importance lies in his philosophy, taken as philosophy and not as biography. On the other hand, the legendary Empedocles is such an appealing figure that we would regret his not having been invented, and can only be grateful to Matthew Arnold for giving us Empedocles' last words, with which this paper began.[21]

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Lines 904–20 of Sophocles' *Antigone* form one of the most vexed and controversial passages in classical literature.[1] Antigone, about to be buried alive as punishment for having defied Creon's official prohibition against burying her brother Polyneices, proclaims that she would not have done for a husband or child what, at the cost of her life, she has done for her brother. Addressing Polyneices, she says:

καίτοι σ' ἐγὼ 'τίμησα τοῖς φρονοῦσιν εὖ.
οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν εἰ τέκνων μήτηρ ἔφυν          905
οὔτ' εἰ πόσις μοι κατθανὼν ἐτήκετο,
βίᾳ πολιτῶν τόνδ' ἂν ἠρόμην πόνον.
τίνος νόμου δὴ ταῦτα πρὸς χάριν λέγω;
πόσις μὲν ἄν μοι κατθανόντος ἄλλος ἦν,
καὶ παῖς ἀπ' ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ' ἤμπλακον,          910
μητρὸς δ' ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ πατρὸς κεκευθότοιν
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅστις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ.
τοιῷδε μέντοι σ' ἐκπροτιμήσασ' ἐγὼ
νόμῳ, Κρέοντι ταῦτ' ἔδοξ' ἁμαρτάνειν
καὶ δεινὰ τολμᾶν, ὦ κασίγνητον κάρα.          915
καὶ νῦν ἄγει με διὰ χερῶν οὕτω λαβὼν
ἄλεκτρον, ἀνυμέναιον, οὔτε του γάμου
μέρος λαχοῦσαν οὔτε παιδείου τροφῆς,
ἀλλ' ὧδ' ἐρῆμος πρὸς φίλων ἡ δύσμορος
ζῶσ' ἐς θανόντων ἔρχομαι κατασκαφάς.          920

The passage is quoted without reservation by the most authoritative ancient critic of tragedy, Aristotle, who refers to it in the *Rhetoric*

[1] For a survey of discussions of this problem with extensive bibliography see D. A. Hester, "Sophocles the Unphilosophical," *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 55–58. Discussions that have appeared since Hester's survey include: H. R. Blumenthal, "Euripides, *Alcestis* 282ff., and the Authenticity of *Antigone* 905ff.," *CR* 24 (1974) 174–75; J. C. Kamerbeek, *The Plays of Sophocles III: The Antigone* (Leiden 1978) 158–60; T. A. Szlezák, "Bemerkungen zur Diskussion um Sophokles, *Antigone* 904–920," *RhM* 109 (1981) 108–142; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation* (Cambridge 1980) 145.

as an illustration of the principle that if a speaker reveals his character through a statement that is incredible (ἄπιστον), he or she should give an explanation for it (*Rhetoric* 1417a). But these lines have rung false to numerous modern readers of the play, most prominently Goethe, whose hope that scholarship would prove the passage to be an interpolation is a famous contribution to the discussion of this problem.[2]

The passage has seemed troubling for two reasons. First, it seems to contradict Antigone's earlier assertion when confronting Creon that her action was in response to unwritten and immutable divine laws, ἄγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν / νόμιμα (454-55) — laws therefore that must apply equally to all and would not permit the kinds of discriminations Antigone now makes. It has, then, seemed to subvert the adherence to principle that gives Antigone's disobedience its noble and affecting significance. As Jebb puts it, "her feet slip from the rock on which they were set; she suddenly gives up that which, throughout the drama, has been the immovable basis of her action, — the universal and unqualified validity of the divine law."[3] Secondly, readers have been repelled by the dispassionate, hyperlogical, calculating character of her argument, a quality that has caused it to be frequently labelled "sophistic." Thus Cedric Whitman, one of the relatively few recent critics to consider the passage spurious, complains that, "Suddenly . . . she begins to reason, in cold-blooded terms, about the relative value and availability of husbands, brothers, and sons," and adds that, "there is nothing in all the rest of Sophocles that is so deadly ψυχρόν."[4]

The question is further complicated by the fact that the argument Antigone advances in these lines is borrowed from a story in Herodotus, the story of the wife of Intaphernes told at *Histories* 3.119. On the one hand, this can be seen as lending support to the authenticity of the passage, because Sophocles was in the habit of borrowing from Herodotus.[5] On the other hand, comparison of this passage with its source makes it possible to see how much better this clever argument fits the circumstances of the wife of Intaphernes than it does those of Antigone. The wife of Intaphernes is faced with the need to choose one of several rela-

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[2]Goethe, *Conversations with Eckermann*, March 28, 1827.

[3]Richard Jebb, *Sophocles: Antigone* (Cambridge 1900) 259.

[4]Cedric Whitman, *Sophocles: A Study of Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, MA 1951) 92, 264.

[5]The most striking example other than this passage in the *Antigone* is Oedipus' reference in the *Oedipus at Colonus* to the topsy-turvy division of activities between men and women in Egypt (*OC* 337-41).

tives to be saved from death, and therefore appeals to a principle ac-
cording to which they can be ranked. Antigone has been faced with a
different choice, the choice of whether or not to bury her one dead un-
buried brother, and so a principle for ranking the competing claims of
various relatives would seem to have no bearing on her situation. Rather
than defending her action by saying that it was preferable to leaving her
brother unburied, she says that it was preferable to other, hypothetical
actions — burying a husband and burying a child — that she has never
had the opportunity to take and that would not have been incompatible
with her burial of Polyneices. Thus the passage seems to be an example
of inept borrowing, of an idea lifted from another source and badly
adapted to its new context, and this contributes to the sense that it is
unsatisfactory and suspect. For example, Jebb asks, "In adapting the
argument used by the wife of Intaphernes, could a great poet have over-
looked the absurdities involved in transferring it from the living to the
dead?"[6]

Nonetheless, in light of the absence of good textual grounds for
rejecting the passage, most recent scholars accept it as authentic. But,
as is frequently pointed out in discussions of this question, no one does
so without some sense of reluctance and misgiving. The problems that
make the passage disturbing have not been explained away. Most of its
defenders stress its positive aspect, the deep attachment to Polyneices to
which it testifies, and deemphasize its negative aspect, the statement
that Antigone would have withheld the same service from a husband or
a child. Her hypothetical claim that she would not have defied Creon
and the citizens of Thebes to bury a husband or child is understood not
as a reliable statement about what she would actually have done, but as
a dramatic means of conveying the depth of feeling behind the action
that she did take in the situation with which she actually was con-
fronted. Thus there is a tendency to defend the passage by claiming that
Antigone doesn't really mean what she says, that what may read as dis-
passionate calculation in fact expresses a passion that is beyond reason
or logic. For example, Bernard Knox has written that this speech is "not
logical" but "an almost hysterically hyperbolic expression of her love for
[her] brother,"[7] and C. M. Bowra, noting that her argument is found in
folklore, comments, "She is moved by an intense love for her brother, a
feeling that her relation to him is unique and demands a special loyalty.

    [6]Jebb (note 3 above) 260.
    [7]Bernard Knox, *Word and Action: Essays on the Ancient Theater* (Baltimore
1979) 180.

So she explains herself in this unsophisticated, even primitive way."[8]
This line of interpretation rightly stresses the depth and personal qual-
ity of Antigone's feeling for her brother, but at the cost of denying the
logic of her argument. But Antigone's argument is logical, both in the
sense that it is rationalistic or sophistic, and in the sense that it makes
sense in light of her situation and the role she plays throughout the play
for her to say what she does.

Antigone's adoption of this argument emerges from her preoccu-
pation at this point with the subject of marriage. This speech marks the
moment when Antigone first confronts the loss of marriage and mother-
hood that her willingness to sacrifice her life for the sake of burying her
brother entails. It is important in interpreting this play to be alert to the
shifting evolution of Antigone's thoughts, which do not remain constant
and monolithic but are formulated differently in response to her situa-
tion as it develops.[9] When we first see her sharing her intention with
Ismene, she does not speak of the immutable unwritten laws of the gods;
she is simply caught up in an instinctive certainty that her brother must
be buried. It is only in her confrontation with Creon that she articulates
the basis for her action in such absolute terms. And only at the point
when she is about to be led off to death does she begin to feel the reality
of her imminent loss of the opportunities for marrying and becoming a
mother. For this reason, the evident inconsistency of this speech with
her earlier pronouncements is not a compelling reason for rejecting it.
Sophocles is often interested in showing the way in which the human
mind arrives at seemingly coherent and conclusive ways of understand-
ing a situation only to have those visions dissolve and reform themselves
under the pressures of changing events. Certainly the evolution of dif-
ferent perspectives on a character's situation is a major element in the
two plays about Oedipus.

In her final speech, Antigone is groping for a way to reconcile her-
self to the renunciation of marriage that she has already made without
at the time really focussing on its consequences. Finding that her deci-
sion to bury her brother rather than to leave him unburied was in effect
a decision to forego marriage for the sake of honoring a tie of kinship,
she gives a rationale (or, as she twice labels it, a *nomos*, 908, 915) for

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[8]C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 94.

[9]This point is well stated by Bernard Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley and
Los Angeles 1964) 103. See also Matthew S. Santirocco, "Justice in Sophocles' *Antigone*,"
*Philosophy and Literature* 4 (1980) 187-90, who stresses the way in which Antigone's love
for Polyneices consistently underlies her varying rationalizations of her actions.

choosing family ties over marriage. In doing so, she uses an argument derived from someone actually faced with that choice, the wife of Intaphernes, whose circumstances it naturally fits more closely. Antigone articulates a principle to which her past action is made retrospectively to conform in an attempt to make the consequences of her action more bearable.

But, while this rationale may be applied retrospectively, that does not mean it is not consistent with the motivations behind her action. A starting point for understanding how this is so can be found in the discussion of this passage in the appendix to Jebb's edition of the play. Jebb, who concluded that the passage was spurious and bracketed it, formulated the problem in the following way: "The question comes to this: — Can the faults of the passage, as they appear to a modern taste, be excused by a peculiarity in ancient modes of thought? Or are they such as to make it inconceivable that any great poet, ancient or modern, should have embodied the passage in a work of art?" In giving consideration to the first possibility—the possibility that this passage reflects some peculiarly ancient mode of thought, he adds:

> Now, the 'primitive sophism' employed by the wife of Intaphernes and the tendency to exalt the fraternal tie, are things which we may certainly recognise as characteristic of that age. And it is true that Aeschylus has some quaint subtleties of a similar kind: as when Apollo defends Orestes on the ground that a man's mother is not, properly speaking, his parent . . . and when Athena votes for Orestes because she herself had no mother at all.

He then goes on to say, "But all that is beside the question here" and to advance the arguments on which his own rejection of the passage is based.[10] But Jebb's suggestive comparison between the strange logic of Antigone's speech and the equally strange logic of the arguments on which the outcome of the trial at the end of the *Oresteia* rests is worth pursuing—not because both passages reveal that "quaint subtleties" are characteristic of classical Greek culture but because in both cases a seemingly unnatural appeal to logical argumentation brings to the surface the kinds of normally unacknowledged, unspoken principles that govern human relations, and in particular the relations between men and women. Sophocles, by having Antigone impose a rationalization on her action retrospectively, and Aeschylus, by having the conflicts of the house of Atreus resolved in the artificial setting of a legal trial with di-

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[10]Jebb (note 3 above) 259-60.

vine antagonists, have created dramatic contexts in which characters articulate the concerns that underlie people's actions without their ordinarily being aware of it. In both cases, this means that human actions are explained in terms that seem remote from perceived human motivations, and this accounts for the strangely rationalistic or scientific tone of both arguments.

In the trial at the end of the *Oresteia*, Apollo argues that Orestes should be pardoned for his murder of his mother because the mother contributes nothing to the development of the unborn child other than a place for the seed provided by the father to grow in, and points to Athena as evidence that the mother is dispensable. He is referring to the story told in Hesiod's *Theogony* of how Zeus, knowing that his wife Metis would produce first a daughter and then a son who would supplant him just as he supplanted Cronos and Cronos supplanted Ouranos, swallowed her while she was pregnant with Athena, who was then born from Zeus' head (*Th.* 886-900, 924-926). When it falls to Athena to make the final decision, she is persuaded by this argument, deciding in Orestes' favor because of this peculiarity of her own birth, which causes her always to side with the male.

As a number of critics have recently pointed out, the use of this argument, quaint and trivial as it may seem, should not be seen as simply the resort to a technicality to get Orestes off the hook. Like the story of Athena's birth which it recalls, it can be understood as part of a phenomenon of classical Greek culture and of patriarchal cultures in general: the attempt by men to confront the deeply disturbing fact of female procreative power by usurping it — as in the case of Zeus' swallowing of Metis to forestall her giving birth to Athena, controlling it — as seen in the culture's high valuation of chastity and marital fidelity in women and the considerable lengths taken to enforce those values, or undervaluing it — as in the argument advanced by Apollo in the *Eumenides* and the contemporary biological theories that it is thought to echo.[11] Denial of the role of the mother in procreation not only resolves the immediate conflict between Orestes and the Eumenides but also justifies the trilogy's wider project of establishing a hierarchy of val-

[11]Cf. Aristotle *De Gen. An.* 763b30-33 where this view is attributed to Anaxagoras, and the discussion of Jean-Pierre Vernant who observes that, "The dream of a purely paternal heredity never ceased to haunt the Greek imagination." "Hestia-Hermes: the Religious Expression of Space and Movement among the Greeks," *Information sur les Sciences Sociales—International Social Science Council* 8 (1969) 138. That dream is expressed by Jason at Euripides, *Medea* 573-75, and by Hippolytus at Euripides, *Hippol.* 616-24.

ues by which female interests and powers are subordinated to male in-
terests and powers.[12]

Antigone's reasoning in her final speech is similarly engaged with
more central and significant issues than its apparent sophistry suggests,
and the issues it engages are similar ones. As she articulates a rationale
for preferring the tie of kinship she has honored over the marriage she
has necessarily renounced, Antigone draws an important distinction be-
tween ties of marriage and ties of blood: ties of marriage are seen as
artificial human constructs that can be made and unmade while ties of
blood are seen as natural, unalterable, and incapable of being manu-
factured through human conventions.[13] In particular, she stresses the
way in which the socially defined role of husband is not restricted to a
single individual but can be taken by any of a number of different men.
The emphasis on this point in her speech can be measured by compar-
ing it to its Herodotean source: while the wife of Intaphernes says, "I
could have another husband (ἀνὴρ ... ἄλλος) and other children
(τέκνα ἄλλα) if I should lose these," Antigone makes the same point by
twice mentioning the possibility of acquiring a new husband, "If my
husband died I could have another husband (πόσις μὲν ἄν μοι κα-
τθανόντος ἄλλος ἦν), or a child from a new husband if I lost the child
of my first husband (καὶ παῖς ἀπ' ἄλλου φωτός, εἰ τοῦδ' ἤμπλα-
κον)."[14] Antigone is defining "husband" not as the unchanging identity
of a specific individual but as an abstract role that could be played by
several different men. In doing so, she is pointing to the way in which
marriage, unlike ties of kinship, is not created irrevocably by nature but
instituted by society.

Furthermore the aspect of marriage that she especially empha-
sizes — the possibility of replacing one participant in it with someone
else — is central to its character as an institution. Social institutions char-
acteristically establish principles of substitution and replacement

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[12]For discussions of the *Oresteia* that stress the sexual politics of the trilogy see
Michael Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1976) 87–105; Brian
Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy* (London 1973) 347–37; Froma Zeitlin, "The Dynamics
of Misogyny: Myth and Mythmaking in the Oresteia," 159–94 in John Peradotto and J. P.
Sullivan, edd., *Women in the Ancient World: The Arethusa Papers* (Albany 1984).

[13]Cf. the Chinese saying quoted by Vickers (note 12 above) in connection with this
passage: "The bond between brothers and sisters comes from heaven, whereas the bond
between husband and wife is created by man" (p. 543).

[14]This departure is particularly striking because in general the phraseology of the
Sophoclean passage follows that of the Herodotean passage very closely. See Denys L.
Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 86–87.

whereby entities that are not identical can be treated as interchange-
able. This quality is well-illustrated by the social institution that forms a
central, if implicit, concern of the *Antigone*, the democratic *polis* of
fifth-century Athens, which was constituted through a series of offices
with stable functions held by a succession of different individuals. Simi-
larly, one of the principal functions of another major institution of
Athenian life, the *oikos*, or household, was to assure its own continuity
through a system of inheritance whereby the father was replaced by the
son. Human institutions counter the precarious, transitory, contingent
nature of all specific people and things by establishing equations that
allow them to be replaced by other people and things that are in actual-
ity different but by convention identical.[15]

The way in which institutions like the the *polis* treat individuals,
who would from another perspective seem unique, as interchangeable
and replaceable can be illustrated from a statement in Pericles' funeral
oration. Towards the end of the speech, Pericles addresses the parents
of the men killed in the war and says, καρτερεῖν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἄλλων
παίδων ἐλπίδι, οἷς ἔτι ἡλικία τέκνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι · ἰδίᾳ τε γὰρ τῶν οὐκ
ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιγιγνόμενοί τισιν ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ πόλει διχόθεν, ἔκ
τε τοῦ μὴ ἐρημοῦσθαι καὶ ἀσφαλείᾳ, ξυνοίσει (Thuc. 2.44.3).
Gomme, in his commentary on Thucydides, notes the strangeness of
this sentiment: "it is extraordinary that this should mean, as it must,
[consolation through] 'hopes of having other sons', not 'from younger
(or, indeed, elder) sons'; for not only would very few parents of sons
killed in war be likely to have more, however philoprogenitive the
Greeks were, but many must actually have had other sons who would
help forgetfulness of the loss, and these are ignored."[16] As Gomme sug-

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[15]This characteristic is most overtly apparent in the institutions that regulate eco-
nomic activity, which depends on the exchange of markedly different commodities. Thus
the institution of currency allows for the exchange of a piece of metal for any of a variety
of goods. But the operation of what might be called an economic principle in all realms
of human life is illustrated by the institution of the blood-price, invoked by Ajax at *Iliad*
9.632-636 in an attempt to reconcile Achilles to Achaean society, according to which
material objects are accepted as compensation for the life of a relative. Levi-Strauss, in
*The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (Boston 1969), argues that marriage is the institu-
tion that makes society possible precisely because of its affinity to an economic system:
prohibitions against incest compel men to exchange women as if they were units of cur-
rency or linguistic signs and so to form the alliances that constitute society. Whitman, in
the complaint against this passage quoted above, criticizes Antigone's formulation by
paraphrasing it in quasi-economic terms: "availability," "relative value."

[16]A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II (Oxford 1956) 142.

gests, this statement makes no sense as an attempt to address the personal feelings of the parents of the slain. It should, rather, be understood as an expression of a statesman's perspective according to which the citizens who have been lost in the war can — and for the benefit of the state should — be replaced with new citizens who will take their place in the service of the city — and, by the same principle, in the hearts of their parents.

By stressing this institutional aspect of marriage, Antigone places it in the category of those things it is characteristic of her to devalue and reject. For throughout the play she consistently undervalues human institutions. Her conflict with Creon is generated by her tendency to ally herself with what lies outside the realm of human culture — the natural (the blood kinship that ties her to her brother) and the supernatural (the gods whose laws she claims to uphold) — in opposition to the human institutions, most notably the *polis*, valued by Creon. Thus, she opposes his κήρυγμα or proclamation, a regulation he had contrived in his role as leader of the *polis* with the interests of the *polis* in mind, by reference to a body of laws that, in contrast to the important political institution of the written law-code, do not depend for their authority or their continuity on the human invention of writing, have no origin or history, can never be changed, and belong not to men but to the gods.[17]

The difference between Creon and Antigone is expressed in a difference of outlook that causes him to stress the political, impersonal dimension of any character or situation while she stresses its personal dimension. Thus they become antagonists because they have different ways of perceiving Polyneices: he chooses to privilege Polyneices' political identity as public enemy of Thebes, while she chooses to privilege his personal identity as her brother. Similarly, Antigone views the family as the locus of intensely-felt personal loyalties while Creon views it in political terms, seeing it, as Knox puts it, as "a sort of training ground for the exercise of political virtue,"[18] an arena in which the civic virtues of discipline, obedience and loyalty are to be developed. He identifies service to

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[17]The vulnerability of lawcodes as human constructs is reflected in the legends of the Greek lawgivers in which the lawgiver is often obliged to include some provision or device to ensure the stability of the code or to defend it by an act of self-sacrifice (e.g., Charondas' suicide on discovering that he had inadvertently violated his own law making it a capital offense to enter the assembly armed), and in which there is in general an emphasis on lawmaking as a human activity. See Andrew Szegedy-Maszak, "Legends of the Greek Lawgivers," *GRBS* 19 (1979) 199–209.

[18]Knox (note 9 above) 89. On Creon's and Antigone's differing conceptions of the family see Christina Elliot Sorum, "The Family in Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Electra*," *CW* 75 (1982) 205.

the family as the exercise of qualities that will allow one to be known as a good citizen: ἐν τοῖς γὰρ οἰκείοισιν ὅστις ἔστ' ἀνὴρ/ χρηστός, φανεῖται κἀν πόλει δίκαιος ὤν. (666–67). In this he is like Pericles in the funeral oration, who imports an impersonal, political perspective into the family, suggesting that just as a new citizen is as good as an old one from the point of view of the state, so should a new son be as good as an old one from the point of view of his parents.

For Antigone to stress the institutional character of marriage and to dissociate herself from it is furthermore consistent with her gender. It reflects the phenomenon, characteristic of patriarchal societies in which the abstract and the conventional are valued over the natural and are associated primarily with men, that women are relatively less identified with cultural institutions than men.[19] It is also consistent with the actual conditions of classical Athenian society, in which a woman's participation in marriage served primarily to assure the continuity of a household with which she was never fully identified and to provide citizens for a city in which she was never a fully participating member, and in which the role of women in maintaining the *oikos* freed men for cultural and political pursuits from which women were largely excluded.[20] This conception of marriage as an institution allied with the interests of the *polis* and of men is reflected in the *Oresteia*, where, as the complex issues of the first two plays are reduced in the *Eumenides* to a series of sharp polarities, a conflict between ties of blood and ties of marriage becomes identified with a conflict between the interests of women and the interests of men, and with a conflict between the primitive conditions antedating the *polis* and the civilization that the *polis* represents.

In this context, it is interesting to consider the legends surrounding the figure of the mythical first king of Athens, Cecrops. Cecrops was a culture-hero like Prometheus or Cadmus who was variously credited with the invention of city-planning and census-taking—two particularly civic institutions—as well as agriculture, the burial of the dead, writing, and monogamous marriage.[21] The legends, then, reflect a conception

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[19]See the now classic statement of this point by Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?" in M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere, edd., *Women, Culture and Society* (Stanford 1974) 67–87.

[20]See Sarah Pomeroy's defense of the sentiments voiced at *Antigone* 905–912 as reasonable in the context of classical Athens on the grounds that the identification of children with their father's household discouraged the formation of close bonds between mothers and children, in *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves* (New York 1975) 101.

[21]For the legends concerning Cecrops see W. H. Röscher, *Ausführliches Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* (Leipzig 1890–1894) II.1 1014–1024.

of marriage that places it in the category of human cultural con-
structs — in the same category, that is, as the human achievements cele-
brated in the first stasimon of the *Antigone*, the ode that is sometimes
called the "ode on man," whose presence in this play reveals its connec-
tion to the fifth-century debate on the relation of *nomos* and *phusis* and
affirms its concern with the value and limitations of such achieve-
ments.[22] The significance of this invention for women is suggested by
another story told about Cecrops.[23] During his reign, a vote was taken to
determine whether the city would be named for Poseidon or Athena.
Since women could vote and there was one more woman than there were
men, Athena won. But Poseidon was angry and flooded the territory of
Athens until women were forced to undergo three penalties; they lost
the vote, they were no longer citizens, and they no longer gave their
names to their children. Thus the exclusion of women from political life
is associated with the loss of matrilineal naming, something that only
becomes possible with Cecrops' other invention, monogamous mar-
riage, in which female fertility is controlled so that it is possible for the
paternity of children to be known and reflected in their names.[24]

A similar conception of how the interests of men and women may
differ in relation to the family underlies the story of the wife of In-
taphernes. There, a woman, who is essentially a private person, makes a
choice indicating a greater allegiance to the family into which she was
born and to which she is tied by blood kinship than to the family into
which she married and which, by marrying into it, she helped to create.
The king, who is very much a public and political figure, is puzzled by
this choice. From his perspective she should be expected to prefer a
member of the family she married into to her brother who, as he puts it,
is less closely related (ἀλλοτριώτερος) than her children and less be-
loved (ἧσσον κεχαρισμένος) than her husband. However, she is able to
express her preference in terms of a logical argument which delights
him, and he decides not only to honor her choice but to reward her for

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[22]For interpretations of the *Antigone* that stress the way in which this ode places
the action of the play in the context of questions about the nature of civilization, see
Charles Segal, "Sophocles' Praise of Man and the Conflicts of the Antigone," *Arion* 3
(1964) 46–66 and *Tragedy and Civilization* (Cambridge, MA 1981) 152–206. On the
play's relationship to fifth-century philosophical speculation see also Robert F. Goheen,
*The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* (Princeton 1951) 86–91.

[23]This story is told by St. Augustine (*Civ. Dei* 18.9), who attributes it to Varro.

[24]On this story see Simon Pembroke, "Women in Charge: the Function of Alter-
natives in Early Greek Tradition and the Ancient Idea of Matriarchy," *Journal of the
Warburg and Courtauld Institute* 30 (1967) 30–31.

her skillful argumentation. And yet his reward is not only a reward but also a correction of her choice, for he grants her the life of her eldest son, the heir produced as a result of her marriage, who should in his view therefore be her most valued relative.[25]

But the abstract cleverness that makes a story like that of the wife of Intaphernes an effective means of articulating such normally unspoken issues also makes it inadequate to the actual complexity of human relations. Marriage is not, after all, simply a conventionalized relationship in which two people come together like interchangeable parts to assure the continuity of society. It also has a personal dimension that plays a more prominent role than its social function in any individual's experience of it and determines the success of any individual marriage. If a marriage is to succeed, it must take on the permanence and particularity of kinship. Its durability depends on the willingness of those who enter into it to consider it inviolable and irreversible, to see it as having the enduring quality that automatically attaches to a tie of blood. This sense of an irrevocable bond cannot be guaranteed by the institution itself but depends on a personal attachment that belongs to the irrational and irregulable realm of love and desire, and this undermines any exclusive association of marriage with culture rather than nature.[26] Thus in the *Oresteia*, when Apollo, the divine champion of marriage, praises it to the Furies, he describes married love as something greater than an oath, "ὅρκου ... μείζων," (*Eum.* 218)—that is, involving an element that transcends the contractual agreements that give it its offi-

[25]See Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, "Exit Atossa: Images of Women in Greek Historiography on Persia," Averil Cameron and Amelie Kuhrt, edd. *Images of Women in Antiquity* (Detroit 1983) 30-31.

[26]Thus Levi-Strauss (note 15 above) characterizes marriage as "a dramatic encounter between nature and culture" (p. 489). For the development of this point in relation to Greek mythology and religion see Marcel Detienne, *Les Jardins d'Adonis* (Paris 1972), and the introduction by Jean-Pierre Vernant. Helene Foley, in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity* (New York 1981) 147, points out that in the fifth-century context of classical tragedy, marriage could seem relatively closer to nature than the *polis*. In the *Antigone*, Haemon's love for the woman he intends to marry is felt by Creon to be subversive to the city, and evokes a choral ode on the disruptive power of Eros. Similar evidence of the instability of the categories of nature and culture is provided by burial of the dead, which in one of the legends about Cecrops (Cicero, *Leg.* 2.25) is represented as a civilized advance, but in the *Antigone* is opposed, at least by Creon, to the interests of the city. Furthermore, it should be noted that kinship cannot be considered a solely natural phenomenon. While it has an undeniable basis in nature, it is also invested with cultural significance and usually plays a large role in determining social status. This was in fact especially true in classical Athens, where kinship served as the basis for citizenship.

cial status.[27] Both the difficulty and the possibility of finding in mar-
riage a bond as compelling as kinship are recurrently expressed in a
range of folktales and legends in which characters are compelled to es-
tablish rankings of their relatives and in some cases, like those of Anti-
gone and the wife of Intaphernes, place a blood relative highest,[28] but
in others a spouse.[29] And yet, while a marriage must be based on a tie
that is felt to be like a blood tie, prohibitions against incest require that
it not be based on an actual blood tie. Once again the creation of an
institutionalized relationship demands that similarity be treated as
identity.

This personal dimension not only limits the extent to which mar-
riage can be identified with the institutional, political sphere associated
with men, but is itself often represented as the particular concern of
women. This association is reflected in a number of stories in which
women come into conflict with men through their allegiance to a con-

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[27]See the discussion of this phrase by J. H. Kells, "Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 312-24
and Athenian Marriage," *CP* 56 (1961) 169-71, where it is interpreted as a specific refer-
ence to the oath between Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, the oath, that is, by which Cly-
temnestra replaces her first husband Agamemnon with someone else.

[28]Parallels to the choice made by the wife of Intaphernes have been found in sto-
ries from India, China, Scotland, and modern Greece. See R. Pischel, "Zu Sophokles
Antigone 909-912," *Hermes* 28 (1893) 465-68; *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und
Paedagogik* (1874) 301; Bowra (note 8 above) 94; Johannes Th. Kakridis, *Homeric Re-
searches* (Lund 1949) 155-57.

[29]For Greek legends in which hierarchies of affection privileging love between a
husband and wife are established, see Kakridis (note 27 above) 11-64, 152-164. The
division of preferences along gender lines outlined in this essay can be observed even in
such stories for, as Kakridis points out (p. 20), the only example of a wife preferring her
husband to her own people is that of Andromache in *Iliad* 6. In Andromache's case the
sentiment is forced on her by circumstances since all of her own relatives have been
killed. Some stories, such as that of Alcestis, do underscore a wife's affection for her
husband, but they do so by contrasting it, not with her feelings for her family, but with
the feelings of other members of his family for him. In Euripides' *Alcestis* this point is
made in a speech that closely resembles and is quite possibly modelled on *Antigone* 904ff.
See Blumenthal (note 1 above). The starting point of Kakridis' investigation is the story
of Meleager told in *Iliad* 9, in which both choices are present: Althaea puts her brother
ahead of her son while Meleager puts his wife ahead of his family. Once again, it is the
woman who places highest value on family ties and the man who places highest value on
the marriage bond. Kakridis himself replicates the assumption, reflected in the various
Greek legends discussed in this essay, that a preference for marriage represents a connec-
tion with civilization and progress, for he argues that Meleager's choice is a later addition
to the story designed to accommodate a more civilized code of ethics, commenting, "It is
no longer blood which blindly governs his perference; it is affection which now binds
human beings together even if they have no common blood" (p. 39).

ception of marriage as a personal and inviolable bond. One obvious ex-
ample of this is Euripides' *Medea* in which Medea responds with a sense
of insupportable betrayal when Jason acts out a purely political concep-
tion of marriage and replaces her with another, more politically advan-
tageous wife.

Another illustration is provided by the role of Penelope in the *Od-
yssey*. Penelope's loyalty to Odysseus as her unique husband, on which
the successfull outcome of his story depends, brings her into conflict
with most of the male figures on Ithaka and with the means of social
continuity that they pursue. Her sharpest opponents are her suitors,
whose attempt to replace Odysseus, while it is discredited in their case
by their insincerity and greed, does represent a procedure for the or-
derly transfer of power on Ithaka. Thus Antinous is able, during the
assembly scene in Book 2 (a scene, that is, set in a public and political
context rather than the more usual domestic setting of the house of
Odysseus), to make a persuasive speech blaming Penelope for the pre-
vailing social disorder (*Od*. 2.85–127). But Penelope's determination to
wait for Odysseus' return also brings her into conflict with Telemachus,
who is reaching the age at which he can play his own destined social role
by replacing Odysseus as head of his household. Telemachus' maturity
and the suitors' presence finally combine to create pressures on her
which she can no longer withstand, and she reluctantly institutes a
mechanism for replacing Odysseus through a contest among her suitors.
As it turns out, this mechanism is miraculously circumvented. Odysseus'
return effectively undoes the passage of time so that the institutionalized
expedients for assuring continuity over time that Penelope has resisted
prove unnecessary. The social order is restored and guaranteed without
any need for substitution or change. Penelope's resistance is rewarded
with personal happiness and her loyalty to Odysseus becomes the central
virtue of the poem.

By contrast, the pathos of Antigone's situation can be felt in the
way in which, as she gropes for a position that will provide justification
and consolation for her own loss of marriage, she finds it necessary to
ignore this personal dimension of marriage. While she addresses Poly-
neices in terms that reveal an intensely-felt bond even after his death,
she dismisses marriage by adopting an argument that depends for its
point on suppressing the idiosyncratic preferences that influence hu-
man relations. For what makes the argument of the wife of Intaphernes
amusing in its Herodotean context and disturbing in its tragic context is
precisely its depersonalizing of a highly personal choice. Antigone not
only emphasizes the idea that the role of husband is not specific to any

one individual, but also speaks of marriage exclusively in abstract and
hypothetical terms. She speaks of herself generally as "*alektros*," "with-
out a marriage bed," and "*anumenaios*," "without a marriage song,"
but makes no reference to Haemon with whom she has already formed a
close personal tie that is painfully sacrificed as a result of her and
Creon's actions.[30] In her effort to justify her sacrifice of marriage by
making it consistent with her willingness to dismiss the political mean-
ing of her action of burying Polyneices, she adopts the same limited per-
spective of which Creon is guilty, seeing marriage only as an impersonal
institution and neglecting its personal dimension.

This impersonal conception of marriage is actually expressed by
Creon earlier in the play and opposed to another, articulated by a
woman, that stresses its personal, specific character. When Ismene asks
him if he really intends to kill his own son's bride, Creon responds, ἀρώ-
σιμοι γὰρ χἀτέρων εἰσὶν γύαι (569), expressing in cruder terms the
same idea later voiced by Antigone, that the partners in a marriage are
replaceable,[31] and Ismene replies, οὐχ ὥς γ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τῇδέ τ᾽ ἦν ἡρ-
μοσμένα (570), pointing to the irreplaceable personal affection that has
bound Antigone and Haemon specifically to each other. Antigone's ex-
pression of a view similar to Creon's can be associated with other depar-
tures from conventionally feminine actions and attitudes, represented
in the play through the figure of Ismene, to which she is led by her de-
termination to bury her brother.

Antigone's formulation in this passage is unquestionably unsatis-
fying — excessively cold and inadequate to the complexities of the situa-
tion to which she responds. But it is not unsatisfying because it is the
work of an incompetent interpolater or even because it is out of keeping
with her character and circumstances for her to say what she does. The
passage is disturbing because of the nature of the situation that gives rise
to it. What makes the argument of the wife of Intaphernes inappro-
priate — the fact that Antigone has never had a husband or a
child for whom she might perform rites of burial and furthermore that
those actions are not incompatible with burying her brother — is also
what makes her situation pathetic. The sterility of her logic expresses

[30]The troubling character of Antigone's silence about Haemon is reflected in the
tradition, going back to the sixteenth-century editions of Aldus and Turnebus, of assign-
ing line 572 to Antigone even though all manuscripts assign it to Ismene.

[31]Creon's words also echo the language of the Athenian marriage ceremony. See
A. W. Gomme and F. H. Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1973) on *Pk.*
1010 and Lowell Edmunds, "The Cults and Legend of Oedipus," HSCP 85 (1981) 235,
n.53. On the association of marriage and plowing see also Vernant (note 11 above) 145.

the sterility of her situation, the way in which her exclusive focus on the family has conspired with Creon's exclusive focus on the city to condemn her to what is repeatedly figured in the play as a marriage to death. As a number of critics have pointed out, Antigone's single-minded determination to honor her family is finally destructive to it.[32] The overvaluation of relationships that cannot be renewed through marriage and procreation that she expresses in her preference for a brother who is dead over a prospective husband or child leads to the termination of her family's line. The family cannot maintain itself without its members engaging in marriage and thus in the kind of wider social interaction it entails, just as — in a view expressed by a number of Greek philosophers[33] — the city cannot maintain itself through laws that do not correspond to the religious customs and traditions that constitute the unwritten laws of the gods.

The *Antigone* dramatizes the consequences of rifts between entities that ought ideally to overlap and support each other: the family and the city, political policies and religious traditions. Such disjunctions both originate and reveal themselves in the kind of exclusivity of vision that characterizes both Creon and Antigone and is expressed in this passage. Antigone's words express this state of disjunction both through their one-sidedness and through their discordant tone — the way in which the calculation with which she considers a hypothetical husband and hypothetical children is out of tune with the warmth of affection she displays towards her actual brother, an incongruity that interpretations like those of Knox and Bowra quoted above have tried to deny by claiming that the calculation somehow expresses that warmth. But we should not search for an interpretation that would eliminate our dissatisfaction with Antigone's words, for it is an appropriate response to them. It can be understood as a measure of what Sophocles has achieved in writing them: it forms part of that recognition to which the whole of the play leads us, that the splitting up of the personal and the political — however congenial to the human mind — is untenable and that there can be no adequate justification for Antigone's loss of a full life containing not only close and properly honored family ties but the experiences of marriage and motherhood as well.

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[32]See Charles Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization*, 189-90; Sorum (note 18 above) 206-207.
    [33]Cf. Heraclitus fr. 114; Plato, *Laws* 793a.

# DIODORUS AND THE DATE OF TRIPARADEISUS

The chronology of the first few years of the Hellenistic period has in the last decade been extensively debated, but no generally accepted chronology has emerged. The principal area of disagreement centers on the dating of the assassination of the regent Perdiccas and the meeting of the army assembly at Triparadeisus. R. M. Errington places both in 320 B.C.; P. Briant and H. Hauben put these events in 321 B.C.[1] The great difficulty in making the proper placement is that the major source for these years is Diodorus Siculus. While recent studies have tended to rehabilitate Diodorus,[2] he still emerges as a none too sophisticated plagiarizer. He almost always used but one source for a given period or topic which he then radically abridged, often inaccurately.[3] Indeed, the evidence suggests that Diodorus lacked the ability to smoothly connect or intermingle material.[4] Not the least of Diodorus' deficiencies as an historian is his treatment of chronology. Diodorus, in his universal history, admirably attempted to organize his work on a chronological framework of archon years, with reference also to consuls and Olympiads. Unfortunately, his sources used different dating systems which Diodorus with only slight success fit into his own system.[5]

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[1] R. M. Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323 B.C.–320 B.C.," *JHS* 80 (1970) 75–77; P. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne. Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne* (Paris 1973) 216–28; H. Hauben, "The First War of the Successors (321 B.C.): Chronological and Historical Problems," *AncSoc* 8 (1977) 85–120.

[2] J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien: Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Lund 1955); cf. R. Drews, *The Historiographical Objectives and Procedures of Diodorus Siculus* (diss. Johns Hopkins 1960) 15–24.

[3] G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 21–22.

[4] N. G. L. Hammond, "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVI," *CQ* 31 (1937) 79–91 and *CQ* 32 (1938) 137–51.

[5] For instance, Diodorus places the attack on Plataea, the event which begins the Peloponnesian War, in 431/0 (12.41.3), while the war actually began in March 431 (A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 2 [Oxford 1956] 2); Sphrodrias' attempt on Peiraeus and Phoebidas' death in 377/6 (15.29.5), while actually both occurred in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20–21, 45); the murder of Darius by Bessus in 329/8 (17.73.2), actually in 330 (A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* 1 [Oxford 1980] 346); Alexander's exile decree in 326/5 (17.109.1), really in 324 (Diod. 18.8.3); and Alexander's arrival in Babylon in 325/4 (17.109.1, 122.4), really in 323 (Arr. *Anab.* 7.15.4).

While part of the problem may lie with Diodorus' sources, much of the difficulty has to be assigned to Diodorus himself. Frequently in his own narrative seasonal references refute his placement of events. As has long been recognized, Diodorus often equated events occurring spring-winter to an archon year.[6] While Diodorus shows a predilection for seasonal errors of this nature, on occasion, he does begin his archon year in the fall or winter. He starts his narration of the events of 479/8 with the Persian fleet still "in winter quarters" at Cyme (11.27.1), and the Greeks awarding prizes after their victory at Salamis (11.27.2). The battle of Salamis was fought in September 479.[7] Diodorus had ended his description of Greek events for the previous year with the victory at Salamis (11.19.6). Indeed, it is clear that Diodorus could sometimes even place events correctly within his chronological scheme, as in 323/2 (18.2.1).[8] Consequently, Diodorus' archon dating can be used with some degree of confidence only when there is collaborative evidence. Given Diodorus' serious limitations in this area, arguments for a systemization of his chronological errors can only be selectively valid.[9]

Diodorus also has difficulty in determining time intervals in his abridgement. Most often he solves this problem by using phrases such as μετὰ ταῦτα, μετά τινα χρόνον, μετὰ ὀλίγον χρόνον, and ἅμα.[10] When he does try to estimate the interval, he usually does so imprecisely

[6]A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1945) 4-5; L. C. Smith, "The Chronology of Books XVIII-XX of Diodorus Siculus," *AJP* 82 (1961) 283. For 405/4 Diodorus begins his narrative of Sicilian events "at the beginning of the summer" of 405 (13.108.2) with Hamilcon's razing of Acragantini. Diodorus has taken up the account at this point, having ended his previous discussion of Sicily with the "winter season" (13.96.5). Similarly, Diodorus has arranged the events of the year 394 in the archon year 394/3 (14.85.1-89.4). After he describes the democratic revolution in Corinth and the two battles at Lechaeum, he then states that the Isthmian Games were at hand (14.86.4). These Games took place in late June or July (A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 5 (Oxford, 1981) 24). The revolution actually occurred in March 392, not in 394 at all (C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* [Ithaca, N.Y. 1979] 266). Diodorus, likewise, places the events of 316 in the archon year 316/5 (R. M. Errington, "Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320-311 B.C.," *Hermes* 105 [1977] 483-86). Diodorus 19.15.6 notes that Antigonus was in winter quarters in Mesopotamia and 19.17.1 has him just leaving Mesopotamia. Moreover, Diodorus begins 316/5 with a winter campaign (19.46.1-48.8).

[7]C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963) 452-53.

[8]L. C. Smith (note 6 above) 285 and n. 8.

[9]As with Smith ibid., 283-90.

[10]Examples from Book XVIII: 18.8.1, 2; 9.1; 13.4; 20.6; 23.3; 32.1; 36.5; 37.1; 38.3; 39.5; 40.5; 41.1; 42.1; 48.5; 49.4; 52.7, 8; 53.6; 55.1; 58.1; 61.5; 64.2; 72.1; 75.1.

and not too successfully. For example, Diodorus 18.9.1 and 18.18.1 state that Alexander's exile decree was issued a "short time" before Alexander's death. However, Diodorus goes on to state that the decree was officially issued at the Olympic Games of 324 (18.8.3). The "short time" was, in consequence, almost one year.

Despite these tendencies, on occasion Diodorus does make reference to specific intervals of time which are accurate. Philip II did rule for twenty-four years (16.1.3, 9.5),[11] and Alexander's siege of Tyre lasted seven months (17.40.5).[12] Diodorus 18.18.9 relates that the Samians were restored forty-three years after their island's capture by the Athenians. Samos was taken by Timotheus in 366/5 and the restoration was in the spring of 322.[13] According to Diodorus (19.54.1) Cassander rebuilt Thebes in the twentieth year after its destruction by Alexander. The rebuilding was in 316;[14] Alexander destroyed Thebes in 335.[15] Finally, Diodorus (20.45.5) states that Demetrius of Phalerum directed Athens for ten years and went into exile fifteen years after the Lamian War (20.46.3), all of which is correct.[16]

With Diodorus' obvious difficulties with chronology, the most likely explanation for the accuracy of these passages is that they come from Diodorus' sources. Diodorus 13.108.1, where the length of Darius II's reign is given, states that this piece of information comes from the chronographer Apollodorus. These attributions are rare, however, because Diodorus and ancient authors in general seldom disclosed the sources of their information. Nor is it possible in but a few instances to check Diodorus' references against his source, since most of Diodorus' sources have not survived except in fragments.[17] However, three parallel passages from Diodorus and his source in this instance, Polybius, bearing on the problem under discussion, do survive. Both Polybius 29.21.9 and Diodorus 31.10.2 in reference to a prophecy voiced by Demetrius of Phalerum state that what was foretold actually occurred one hundred and fifty years later, and both state that Scipio Aemilianus secured his reputation for temperance and strictness in five years (Polybius 31.25.8; Diod. 31.27.1). The third set of parallel passages clearly demonstrates

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[11]This is true if the regency for Amyntas is eliminated (cf. Just. 7.5.6-10).
[12]A. B. Bosworth (note 5 above) 255.
[13]W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens: An Historical Essay* (New York 1969) 20.
[14]E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* (Nancy 1966) 46.
[15]K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 3 (Berlin 1923) 2, 59.
[16]W. S. Ferguson (note 13 above) 39, 45.
[17]V. Schwartz, "Diodoros," *RE* 5 (1905) 663-704.

Diodorus' ability to confuse the information found in his sources. Diodorus (31.26.5) takes a conversation between the "eighteen-year-old" Scipio and Polybius and places it in a much later context than he found it in Polybius (31.24.1).

There is further evidence that Diodorus got his exact dates from his sources. Diodorus 20.29.1 gives the length of the reign of the Spartan king Cleomenes II as sixty years, ten months, while Diodorus 15.60.4 gives it as thirty-four years. The obvious explanation for such an inconsistency is that Diodorus is using different sources. These references to exact periods of time do not derive from Diodorus himself, but rather from his sources. Consequently, their accuracy depends on the reliability of his source in each case.

In Books XVIII through XX, where the narrative follows events in the Hellenistic east, it is clear that Diodorus' source, generally recognized to be Hieronymus of Cardia,[18] paid especial attention to chronology, since suddenly Diodorus' account becomes replete with references to seasons, fixed stars, etc.[19] It is also apparent from these references that Hieronymus dated events by campaigning years and not archon years.[20] Therefore, Diodorus' chronological difficulties, when treating the Hellenistic east, derive both from his inability to place events dated seasonally by his source into archon years, and also from his radical abridgement of what must have been a fairly long and detailed history.[21]

The extensive nature of Hieronymus' history and his seasonal system of time reckoning most likely account for Diodorus' omission of any reference to the archon years 321/0 and 320/9.[22] His placement of 322/1 (18.26.1) after the battle of Crannon, which took placed in September 322, and the subsequent surrender of Athens in October,[23] occurs at least six months too late. Diodorus' archon dating, never too reliable, is useless here. While R. M. Errington has claimed that these difficulties can be remedied through reliance on the Parian Marble,[24] others have counseled against such reliance, for the inscription does

[18]R. H. Simpson, "Abbreviation of Hieronymus in Diodorus," *AJP* 80 (1959) 370; R. Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources," *AJP* 83 (1962) 384.

[19]For example: Diod. 18.25.1; 40.1; 19.12.1; 15.6; 17.3; 18.2.

[20]L. C. Smith (note 6 above) 283.

[21]For instance, battle and siege description must have been very detailed, given the unusual detail found in Diodorus. For example: 18.13.3, 25.6; 29.7; 30–32; 33.3, 6; 34; 35.1; 41.6; 44; 45.2; 70.2.

[22]L. C. Smith (note 6 above) 283–90.

[23]Ibid., 286, n. 9.

[24]R. M. Errington (note 1 above), loc. cit.

contain a number of errors for the Hellenistic period.[25] Ultimately then, in order to arrive at a correct chronology of these early years, Diodorus' narrative must be unraveled.

Fortunately, Diodorus does contain a number of chronological references which supply the key to the placement of events. In the first place he states (18.36.7) that Perdiccas' death occurred after he had ruled for three years. This would place his death in 320, his regency having begun in 323. Since these exact time references do not derive ultimately from Diodorus himself, but from his source Hieronymus of Cardia, who is generally considered to have been a careful and accurate historian, this particular chronological reference should be considered reliable.

Moreover, Diodorus 18.28.2 relates that the building of Alexander's funeral carriage took "almost exactly (σχεδòν) two years" to complete. This would give a date probably in May of 321 for the completion of the hearse. The carriage would then have had to be transported nine-hundred miles to its rendezvous with Ptolemy in southern Syria. This transportation would have taken a considerable amount of time. Alexander's funeral carriage was very elaborate and ceremonial in its nature. It was drawn by sixty-four mules, all outfitted with gilded crowns and jewel-studded yokes (Diod. 18.27.5).[26] In addition, its progress must have been very slow because of the large crowds it drew wherever it went (Diod. 18.28.1), and because of the hearse's size and nature many of the roads had to be widened en route (Diod. 18.28.2).

Now, mule trains in the American West with better harnesses, better wagons, and better mules achieved a usual speed of between fifteen and twenty miles per day, resting completely one day out of seven.[27] Given the complexity of Alexander's funeral carriage, its ceremonial nature, and the inferiority of the equipment, a speed of between ten and fifteen miles per day with a seventh day for rest would be more realistic. If the maximum rate of fifteen miles per day is assumed, it

[25]It places the battle on the Granicus in 334/3, while it actually occurred in the early summer of 334 (J. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* [Oxford 1969] 39), Alexander's entrance into Egypt in 333/2, actually in 332/1 (F. Jacoby, *Das Marmor Parium* [Berlin 1904] 192), the battle of Arbela in 332/1, actually in September 331 (J. Hamilton [op. cit.] 81), the death of Bessus in 330/9, actually in the winter of 329 (Arr. *Anab.* 4.7.1, 3-4), and the eclipse of the sun to 312/1, actually August 15, 310 (Jacoby [op. cit.] 195).

[26]The horse-collar was not invented until the Middle Ages. See L. White, *Medieval Technology and Social Change* (Oxford 1966) 59.

[27]H. P. Walker, *The Wagonmasters* (Norman 1966) 125.

would still take the cortege a minimum of forty-six days to travel the
approximately five hundred and fifty miles from Babylon, the point of
departure, to Thapsacus.[28] It would more likely have taken two months.
From Thapsacus to southern Syria (Diod. 18.28.3), where the sarcopha-
gus was shipped to Egypt, is approximately another three hundred and
fifty miles, or another thirty days.[29] Ptolemy, consequently, could not
have intercepted the body before July at the earliest. Additional time
would have been spent on the sea voyage to Alexandria.[30] Since Perdic-
cas died in Egypt no later than June,[31] it would be impossible for Ptole-
my's receipt of Alexander's corpse and Perdiccas' death both to have
occurred in 321.

    To eliminate this difficulty Hans Hauben has suggested that by
two years Diodorus meant "at least a period of eighteen months."[32]
Given the earlier discussion of Diodorus' methods with regard to time
intervals, it is very likely that here he once again has quoted Hierony-
mus. In light of Hieronymus' generally accepted reliability and of the
reference to Perdiccas' regency lasting three years, it is probable that
the carriage took very close to two years, not eighteen months, to
construct.

    The carriage was, therefore, completed and made ready for move-
ment by June of 321. However, the procession probably did not begin
until late August at the earliest, because of Mesopotamian climatic con-
ditions. The hottest months of the year in Mesopotamia are July and
August with a daylight mean of more than one hundred degrees Fahr-
enheit.[33] A time of departure in late August would place the rendezvous
with Ptolemy in the winter of 321/0.[34]

    The placement of Perdiccas' death in 320 leads to a more sensible
chronological arrangement of the other events taking place in Asia. Al-
exander died in June of 323; subsequently, there followed the disorder

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    [28]This would have been the shortest and easiest land route.
    [29]This estimate is based on Ptolemy meeting the train at Damascus (Arr. *Succ.*
25). Diodorus (18.28.3) only states that Ptolemy came as far as Syria to meet the cortege.
    [30]This assumes the sarcophagus journeyed from Syria to Egypt by ship, the quick-
est means, and not by land across Sinai.
    [31]R. M. Errington (note 1 above) 75; H. Hauben (note 1 above) 87.
    [32]Hauben (note 1 above) 97, n. 62.
    [33]*Encyclopedia Britannica* 12 (1973 ed.) 529.
    [34]This would accord with Arrian's (*Succ.* 24–25) placement of the arrival of Alex-
ander's corpse after the flight of Antigonus to Macedonia, which occurred in the winter
(Diod. 18 25.1–3). On the accuracy of Arrian's sequencing of events, see P. Briant (note
1 above) 158.

in Babylon and the division of the satrapies.[35] Eumenes, after the division, left Babylon to occupy his satrapy of Cappadocia (Diod. 18.3.1; Plut. *Eum.* 3.2). Cappadocia had not yet been conquered, and consequently both Antigonus and Leonnatus were ordered by Perdiccas, the new regent, to aid Eumenes in its conquest (Plut. *Eum.* 3.3). Antigonus did not respond; Leonnatus did appear, but was soon deflected to the aid of Antipater in the Lamian War (Diod. 18.14.4-5; Plut. *Eum.* 3.3-4). These events obviously occupied the rest of the summer and much of the fall of 323. An army's journey from Babylon to Cappadocia would take about seventy days.[36] After Leonnatus' desertion, Eumenes returned to Babylon (Plut. *Eum.* 3.5; cf. Diod. 18.16.1). He probably returned in November. Perdiccas would not have left Babylon before the next spring. He probably would have set out late enough in 322 for his arrival in Cappadocia to correspond with the harvest which occurs there in late July and August.[37] In an important study, D. Engels has shown the severe limitation ancient armies faced with regard to supplies.[38] Since Cappadocia was a land of subsistence agriculture, there would not have been sufficient food to feed the local population let alone two large armies before the harvest. Engels has demonstrated that, where grain and fodder are not readily available, an army can only carry a seven-day supply.[39] In a campaign against a large and previously undefeated force (Diod. 18.16.1-3; Plut. *Eum.* 3.2, 6), operating on its own soil, any supply shortages could be disastrous. Peridiccas was too experienced a commander to run so great a risk. The campaign against Ariarathes in Cappadocia, then, was carried out in late August or September of 322.

After the defeat of Ariarathes and the "arrangement of affairs in Cappadocia," Perdiccas marched to Cilicia and then to Pisidia where he spent the winter of 322/1 (Diod. 18.16.2-3, 22.1; Plut. *Eum.* 3.6-7; Arr. *Succ.* 11). Pisidia, unlike Cappadocia, was productive farm land with ample supplies of food and water.[40]

[35]R. M. Errington (note 1 above) 49-59.

[36]Xenophon's (*Anab.* 1.2.20-7.1) itinerary for Cyrus' army shows that Cyrus took ninety days to cover the same course. The twenty days spent in Tarsus (*Anab.* 1.3.1) were excessive, but the other halts were only for "necessary purposes" (*Anab.* 1.5.9). Fifty-three days were spent in actual travel.

[37]D. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978) 37.

[38]Ibid., 27.

[39]Ibid., 20, 37.

[40]Ibid., 36.

During this winter, or more probably in the following spring,[41] Perdiccas married Nicaea, one of Antipater's daughters (Diod. 18.23.1-3). While Perdiccas remained in Pisidia, he began to intrigue against Antigonus (Diod. 18.23.3-4). Diodorus (18.23.4) suggests that this was an involved business with each party attempting to manipulate the other. Therefore, it is unlikely this was the work of weeks, but rather of months. Perdiccas, who had married Nicaea to keep peace with Antipater, would not have wished to bring on his enmity so soon thereafter by moving too precipitately in Asia. Indeed, Perdiccas' actions against Antigonus probably did not get under way before the summer of 321. Antigonus, therefore, fled to Europe in the winter (Diod. 18.23.4; cf. 18.25.1) of 321/0.

Another argument for this dating comes from an analysis of Antipater's and Craterus' Aetolian campaign. Those who date Perdiccas' death and Triparadeisus in 321 place this campaign in the winter of 322, shortly after the conclusion of the Lamian War and the surrender of Athens.[42] This is unlikely. The battle of Crannon, which virtually ended the Lamian War, took place in September 322 (Plut. *Dem.* 28.1); Athens surrendered thereafter and received a garrison in October (Plut. *Dem.* 28.1; *Phoc.* 28.1). Antipater then proceeded to the Peloponnesus. He was at Cleonae when Hypereides and other Athenians were brought before him and subsequently put to death (Plut. *Dem.* 28.4). This is an incident Plutarch (*Dem.* 29.1) places before Demosthenes' death in October/November. Antipater's presence in the Peloponnesus is perfectly comprehensible since numerous Peloponnesian states had joined the revolt (Diod. 18.11.2), and Antipater chose to deal with the allied cities separately, not *en masse* (Diod. 18.17.6-7). While the negotiations did not require Antipater's presence in every city, the fact that he was not only dictating peace terms, but also demanding constitutional changes similar to those instituted in Athens (Diod. 18.18.8; cf. Diod. 18.18.4-5) made his proximity useful. Following his incursion into the Peloponnesus, Antipater and Craterus returned to Macedonia where Craterus married Antipater's eldest daughter Phila (Diod. 18.18.8).

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[41] R. M. Errington (note 1 above) 77 suggests that the marriage may have occurred as late as the summer of 321. Nothing in Diodorus would preclude this possibility.

[42] P. Briant (note 1 above) 227; H. Hauben (note 1 above) 87. Errington (note 1 above) 76, notes that Diodorus does not state that the Aetolian campaign came immediately after the surrender of Athens.

.This leaves too little time for the organization and undertaking of a full-scale invasion of Aetolia, since Antigonus arrived from Asia with the news of Perdiccas' ambitions in the same winter (Diod. 18.25.1–3). First of all, the Macedonian army had already been engaged in a long and exhausting campaign year, which began with Antipater still under siege in Lamia. It is unlikely Antipater would have attempted to finish the year already punctuated with two major battles (Diod. 18.15.1–4, 17.3–5) and a number of sieges (Diod. 18.17.7) with a winter campaign in Aetolia. Secondly, campaigning in Aetolia was not something to be taken lightly. Aetolia often destroyed her invaders, as she had done to the Athenians in 426 (Thuc. 3.94–96), and would do to the Gauls in 279 (Paus. 10.22.3). Also, when defeated in battle or faced with preponderant opponents, the Aetolians simply retreated into their inaccessible mountains (Diod. 19.74.6; Polyb. 5.13.3).

Aetolia had no real centers of power; no cities whose fall would destroy her confederacy.[43] A campaign in Aetolia, especially one designed to reduce the Aetolians to submission, therefore, would take time to plan and carry out.[44]

Besides, Diodorus' account of this campaign implies much more time than can be managed if the invasion is placed in the winter of 322/1. Diodorus (18.25.1) states that at first the Macedonians tried to overrun various fortified positions, but failing in this settled into a series of sieges. This policy drove the Aetolians to desperation due to the cold and the lack of food (Diod. 18.25.2). Since the Aetolians after Crannon had prepared for a Macedonian advance and had already planned their retreat into these mountain fortresses (Diod. 18.24.1–2; cf. Diod. 18.25.1), it is unlikely that their resources would have been so quickly expended. However, if the invasion took place in the spring or summer of 321, the sieges would have been longer, and the Aetolians would have been unable to harvest their grain, making the dearth of provisions mentioned by Diodorus more plausible.

.The evidence in Diodorus, consequently, supports the assigning of Perdiccas' death and Triparadeisus to 320 B.C. Diodorus' usually confused archon dating is in these early years of the Hellenistic period unreliable. Fortunately, the references to the length of Perdiccas' regency

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[43] W. J. Woodhouse, *Aetolia, its Geography, Topography and Antiquities* (Oxford 1897) 49.

[44] Both Philip V's winter campaign into Aetolia of 218 B.C. (Polyb. 5.7) and Perseus' of 170 B.C. (Livy 43.21) were little more than raids.

and the time required to construct Alexander's funeral carriage, taken
from Hieronymus, provide the keys to the unraveling of this confused
chronology. Also, as shown, the placement of Perdiccas' death and Tri-
paradeisus in 320 permit a more reasonable reconstruction of events in
these years.

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# *AUORUM SPES ET PURPUREI FLORES*:
# THE EULOGY FOR MARCELLUS IN *AENEID* VI

Toward the end of the Sixth Book of the *Aeneid*, there is a procession of Roman heroes, symbols of the glories and struggles of the Republic. Then, through the figure of the aged Anchises, Vergil introduces Marcellus, the nephew of the emperor, who had died at nineteen, frustrating the emperor's hopes for imperial succession.[1] Buried in funereal splendor in the emperor's mausoleum, he remained a symbol of Augustus' personal trials. According to legend, when Vergil read this passage to the Emperor and his sister Octavia, the mother of Marcellus, their tears almost forced him to close the book.[2]

There are no close literary precedents within the epic tradition for this scene.[3] It does have many of the hallmarks of sepulchral epigram. Norden felt that any parallels between the words of Augustus himself, spoken on the actual occasion of Marcellus' burial, and those of Vergil's eulogy would only be due to *topoi*.[4] But we cannot rule out the possibil-

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[1] Born in 42 B.C. the son of Gaius Claudius Marcellus and Octavia, Augustus' sister, he died in 23 B.C. In 1927 in the Mausoleum of Augustus an inscription was found for him, together with one for Octavia, on the same block of marble. The use of Roman antecedents for the Marcellus eulogy might correspond to the propagandistic aim of Augustus in the Mausoleum, as developed by K. Kraft, "Der Sinn des Mausoleums des Augustus," *Historia* 16 (1967) 189–206. He holds that the Mausoleum was intended to be ultra-Roman in opposition to the Hellenistic-Egyptian monument to Antony and Cleopatra at Alexandria.

[2] Servius, *Ad Aeneidem* 6.861.

[3] The passage has received surprisingly little attention, especially on the literary background. Among individual treatments the following can be mentioned here: L. Hermann, "Pro M. Claudio Marcello," *RA* 33 (1931) 47–68; J. De Keyser, "Marcellus' lof. Vergilius *Aen.* VI 854–886," *N&V* 14 (1932) 18–28; F. De Ruyt, "L'élégie de Marcellus dans l'*Énéide*: rhétorique ou lyrisme," *LEC* 2 (1933) 138–44; F. Dupont-J. P. Neraudau, "Marcellus dans le chant VI de l'*Énéide*," *REL* 48 (1970) 259–76; S. V. Tracy, "The Marcellus Passage (*Aeneid* 6.860–886) and *Aeneid* 9–12," *CJ* 70 (1975) 37–42. The inspiration for this article came from a talk by Prof. J. Van Sickle at Brown University, which was originally given as "Stile Ellenistico-Romano e Nascita dell' Epigramma a Roma," for the Società Italiana per lo Studio dell'Antichità Classica, Naples, 1981; now printed in E. Flores, ed., *Dall' Epigramma Ellenistico all' Elegia Romana* (Naples 1984) 9–26.

[4] E. Norden, *P. Vergilius Maro. Aeneis Buch VI* (2nd ed., Leipzig 1916) 345. Later (346) for the flower strewing he cites *AP* 7.485 = G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex Lapidibus Conlecta* (Berlin 1878) 547a 1; F. Bücheler, *Carmina Latina Epigraphica* (Leipzig 1895–1897) 467, 578.

ity that Vergil incorporated some actual phrases from the funeral ora-
tion or even had helped in its composition. At the same time Norden
pointed to the Hellenistic flavor of the passage with its reference to the
lilies and *purpureos flores* which Anchises was to strew.

First Anchises asks Aeneas not to inquire into "the great sorrow of
thy people" ("ingentem luctum ne quaere tuorum," 6.868). He then dis-
courses on the invincibility of the young man in war, the greatest of the
Trojan-Roman stock, if only he could "burst the harsh fates" ("si qua
fata aspera rumpas," 6.882). Although one might expect the theme of
greatness denied to be natural to the sepulchral tradition of the Greek
Anthology, it is noticeable by its absence. The thought in fact is surpris-
ingly absent from Greek literature in general. In an embryonic way the
sentiment appears in Pindar's Eleventh Nemean Ode, where its appear-
ance is striking.[5] Here a young man would have won victories at Pytho
and Olympia, if only "his parents' too hesitant expectations had not
held him back":

ἐλπίδες δ᾽ ὀκνηρότεραι γονέων παιδὸς βίαν
ἔσχον ἐν Πυθῶνι πειρᾶσθαι καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ ἀέθλων.
ναὶ μὰ γὰρ ὅρκον, ἐμὰν δόξαν παρὰ Κασταλίᾳ
καὶ παρ᾽ εὐδένδρῳ μολὼν ὄχθῳ Κρόνου
κάλλιον ἂν δηριώντων ἐνόστησ᾽ ἀντιπάλων,

πενταετηρίδ᾽ ἑορτὰν Ἡρακλέος τέθμιον
κωμάσαις ἀνδησάμενός τε κόμαν ἐν πορφυρέοις
ἔρνεσιν. ἀλλὰ βροτῶν τὸν μὲν κενεόφρονες αὖχαι
ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἔβαλον· τὸν δ᾽ αὖ καταμεμφθέντ᾽ ἄγαν
ἰσχὺν οἰκείων παρέσφαλεν καλῶν
χειρὸς ἕλκων ὀπίσσω θυμὸς ἄτολμος ἐών.

(22-32)

Though the reason for the absence of the hopes-disappointed
theme in Greek literature is undoubtedly complex, literary precedent
and genres may have contributed. An obvious place for its appearance
would be passages involving the future of Astyanax, Hektor's son, in the
*Iliad*. Hektor himself, in his speech with Andromache (6.476-81), al-
ludes to Astyanax' future as a valiant ruler who would bring home the

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[5]On the poem see M. R. Lefkowitz, "Pindar's *Nemean* XI," *JHS* 99 (1979) 49-56,
esp. 52-53: "This apology for non-accomplishment of deeds never attempted is unique"
(53). The section contains a rather normal contrary-to-fact condition, κάλλιον ἂν
δηριώντων ἐνόστησ᾽ ἀντιπάλων (25). Vergil's future perspective forces him into a less
natural construction: "non illi . . . tulisset . . . si qua . . . rumpas."

foeman's armor. However, the context is totally ironic, pervaded as it is
with fatalism and the control of events by the gods and by Andro-
mache's dread of Hektor's vainglory. In any case the wish is rather
muted. In the laments of Books 22 and 24 the theme is totally ignored.
Greek archaic poetry was composed during the decline of the nobility
and something of a retreat inward. Pindar's *Odes* were directed at suc-
cess stories. Greek tragedy generally takes a dim view of *kudos* won at
the expense of humanitarian values. Finally, in the Greek anthology the
epitaphs reflect a genre primarily describing the anonymous lower
classes. Such a background contrasts strongly with the historical situa-
tion and ideology of the Roman *nobilitas* in the middle and late Repub-
lic where extraordinary opportunities existed for competent and aggres-
sive members of the upper class; they showered glory and riches on their
families while extending the *imperium*, thus becoming benefactors of a
city they filled with monuments lest it forget.

Missing from the eulogy for Marcellus as well are most of the pop-
ular themes of the Greek grave inscriptions: regret that the youth was
born or complaint over the labor of birth and the raising of children,
the inversion of the natural order by death before that of the parents,
the *palaistra* and athletic accomplishments, the first growth of beard,
the victim as only son (μουνογενής) as well as the botanical vocabulary
(σπορά, ῥίζη, καρπός, θάλος, βλαστόν, ἔρνος, ἄνθος).[6] Also absent
are the consolation motifs: dying in the fullness of life, accomplishments
attained, death as a flight from evil, "whom the gods love die young."
Missing too are the popular "in place of" expressions, such as "in place
of the bridal chamber, the tomb" (ἀντὶ μὲν θαλάμοιο τάφος). Even the
popular symbolism of light and darkness is only obliquely evoked by the
cloud around Marcellus' head ("sed nox atra caput tristi circumuolat
umbra," 866).

Though for the Greeks the importance of the family (γένος,
οἶκος, δῶμα) was as great as the *gens* was to the Romans, it does not
appear as frequently in the Greek inscriptions. Moreover, it is expressed
in a slightly different way than we find in Vergil and in the Scipionic
epigrams. Excellence (ἀρετή) is inherited, revealed in youthful ath-
letic prowess, and hinted at by the botanical language; the absence of
marriage (γάμος, ὑμέναιος), which would continue the line, is a great
tragedy.

Since lamentation of the unfulfilled aspirations of a noble young
man does not seem to have formed part of the sepulchral epigram tradi-

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[6]On this see E. Griessmair, *Das Motiv der Mors Immatura in den Griechischen
Metrischen Grabinschriften* (Innsbruck 1966), esp. 42, 44, and 71-82.

tion, perhaps we should continue our search further. The thought and phrasing is distinctive enough for it to suggest something particularly Roman:

> o gnate, ingentem luctum ne quaere tuorum;
> ostendent terris hunc tantum fata nec ultra
> esse sinent. nimium uobis Romana propago
> uisa potens, superi, propria haec si dona fuissent.
> quantos ille uirum magnam Mauortis ad urbem
> campus aget gemitus! uel quae, Tiberine, uidebis
> funera, cum tumulum praeterlabere recentem!
> nec puer Iliaca quisquam de gente Latinos
> in tantum spe tollet auos, nec Romula quondam
> ullo se tantum tellus iactabit alumno.
> heu pietas, heu prisca fides inuictaque bello
> dextera! non illi se quisquam impune tulisset
> obuius armato, seu cum pedes iret in hostem
> seu spumantis equi foderet calcaribus armos.
> heu, miserande puer, si qua fata aspera rumpas,
> tu Marcellus eris. manibus date lilia plenis
> purpureos spargam flores animamque nepotis
> his saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
> munere.

(6.868-86)[7]

Something similar does exist in the famous Roman epigrams for the Scipio family which were found in their tomb outside the Porta Capena on the Appian Way. The most important of these for the Marcellus eulogy is that for a Publius Scipio whose youthful death disappointed great expectations:

> Quei apice insigne Dial[is fl]aminis gesistei |
> mors perfec[it] tua ut essent omnia | brevia,
> honos, fama, virtusque | gloria atque ingenium.
> Quibus sei | in longa licuiset tibe utier vita, |
> facile facteis superases gloriam | maiorum.
> Qua re lubens te in gremiu, | Scipio, recipit
> terra, Publi, | prognatum Publio, Corneli.

(*ILLRP* 311)[8]

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[7]The text is that of R. A. B. Mynors, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* (Oxford 1969/ 1972).

[8]The texts given here are from A. Degrassi, *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae* (Florence 1957) 178-86. Commentary on them can be found in A. Ernout, *Recueil de Textes Latins Archaïques* (Paris 1916/1957) 12-21 and in F. Coarelli, "Il sepolcro degli Scipioni," *Dialoghi di Archaeologia* 6 (1972) 36-106.

Among the epigrams is another youthful death, that of a Cornelius:

> L.Cornelius Cn.f. Cn.n. Scipio.
> Magna sapientia | multasque virtutes
> aetate quom parva | posidet hoc saxsum.
> Quoiei vita defecit, non | honos honore,
> is hic situs, quei nunquam | victus est virtutei.
> Annos gnatus (viginti) is | l[oc]eis mandatus.
> Ne quairatis honore | quei·minus sit mandatus.
>
> (*ILLRP* 312)

To these two, can be added some others for the purpose of understanding Vergil's vocabulary:

> [L.Corneli]o(s) Cn. f. Scipio
> Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus - Gnaivod patre
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> Cornelius Lucius Scipio Barbatus - Gnaivod patre
> | prognatus, fortis vir sapiensque - quoius forma
> virtutei parisuma | fuit, - consol, censor, aidilis
> quei fuit apud vos. - Taurasia. Cisauna | Sam-
> nio cepit, - subigit omne Loucanam opsidesque
> abdoucit.
>
> (*ILLRP* 309)

and that for another Cornelius:

> L.Cornelio(s) L.f. Scipio | aidiles, cosol, cesor.
> Honc oino ploirume cosentiont R[omane]
> duonoro optumo fuise viro
> Luciom Scipione. Filios Barbati
> consol, censor, aidilis hic fuet a[pud vos].
> Hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe,
> dedet Tempestatebus aide mereto[d].
>
> (*ILLRP* 310)

Though the basic sentiment of Vergil's eulogy is similar to that of the epigram for the youthful Publius Scipio (*ILLRP* 311), he has consciously or unconsciously avoided exact linguistic parallels — if in fact he was inspired by this epigram or similar ones known to him. Vergil seems to avoid much of the popular epitaph vocabulary: *merito, optimus uir, fortis, sapiens, uirtus* or *uirtutes, honor, fama, gloria, mores, laus, facta, caelestes, maiores*. Instead he uses *pietas, prisca fides, inuicta dextera, fata*. By his positioning of *quantos* and *magnam* in the phrase "quantos ille uirum magnam . . . campus aget gemitus" (6.872-73), he suggests something like *magnum uirum* or *optimum uirum* rather than

stating it directly. But there are some parallels with the Scipionic epigrams. Anchises' "gnate, ingentem luctum ne quaere tuorum . . ." (6.868) corresponds somewhat to "ne quaeratis honorem quo minus sit mandatus" in *ILLRP* 312. In the same epitaph we find "is hic situs est qui numquam uictus est uirtuti . . ." corresponding somewhat to "inuictaque bello/dextera!" (6.878-79). Perhaps significant are the contrary-to-fact conditions: "propria haec si dona fuissent" (6.871), "non illi se quisquam impune tulisset" (6.879), suggesting "quibus si in longa licuisset tibi utier uita/facile factis superasses gloriam maiorum" of the Publius Scipio epitaph. Though using different words, Vergil—like the Scipionic epigrams—puts heavy stress on family and *gens*: *filius, patre, prognatus, maiorum, progeniem, generis, meis, stirpem* of the Scipionic epitaphs correspond to *gnate, pater, propago, puer, auos, alumno, tuorum* in the immediate context of the eulogy. As with the Scipionic epigrams (*Romani, Corsicam, Aleriamque, Samnio, Lucaniam* [*ILLRP* 309-310]), Vergil incorporates Roman topography (*Romana, Mauortis urbem, Tiberine, Latinos, Romula*). In the light of the Hellenistic tradition, one is struck at first by the surprising belligerence, but it becomes more understandable when one reflects on the Scipionic parallels.[9] In these, *uirtus, honos, fama, gloria, factis* must certainly suggest military efficiency.[10] Particularly close is the thought of how the young man's deeds will glorify his ancestors. Vergil's sentiment, "in tantum spe tollet auos, nec Romula quondam/ullo se tantum tellus iactabit alumno" (6.876-77) suggests the "facile factis superasses gloriam maiorum, uirtutes generis meis moribus accumulaui . . . facta patris petii./maiorum optinui laudem ut sibi me esse creatum/laetentur. stirpem nobilitauit honor" of the Publius Scipio epigram (*ILLRP* 311). The juxtaposition between "nec puer . . . in tantum spe tollet auos" and "sei in longa licuisset tibi utier uita . . ." was made by Norden, but he does not seem to have realized the difference between Greek and Roman attitudes, and thus missed the significance of the Scipionic epi-

[9]See W. V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford 1979) 10-41; he cites *ILLRP* 311 and 316 as illustrations (50).

[10]Ennius' epigram for Scipio Africanus Maior (E. H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* I, *Ennius and Caecilius* [London 1935] 398-401: Epigrammata 1-6 [= Vahlen, 19-20, 23-24]), actually seems to downplay the military aspect of Scipio's career, only referring to *facta* which cannot be equaled in Rome. The sentiment of the Marcellus eulogy is the same but the wording is different. The Scipio epigram was very well-known (Cicero, *De leg.* 2.22.57, 21-22; *Tusc.* 5.17.49; Seneca, *Epist.* 108.32.19-20). The tomb of the Scipios probably had military exploits painted on the walls; see. F. Coarelli, *Guida Archeologica di Roma* (Roma 1974/1980) 326.

grams.[11] Finally, though the first phrase of the introduction of Aeneas and the reader to Marcellus seems very Greek (*egregium forma iuuenem*), it is followed by *et fulgentibus armis*—a sentiment more Roman in tone (6.861). If we take *uirtuti* in the first Scipionic epigram (*ILLRP* 309) to include military excellence, then the sentiment of the description of Marcellus is very close to that of "cuius forma uirtuti parissima fuit" of that epigram.

Anchises' perspective forces Vergil to use the future in place of the past tense of the Scipionic epigrams, a perspective which leads to *tu Marcellus eris*, where in the epigrams the subject would have finished his life. In the Scipionic group the name is positioned at the beginning, middle, and end in the various epitaphs. However, in the one which is closest to the Marcellus eulogy, that for Publius Scipio, the name closes the sentiment which we find in Vergil's eulogy. This suggests a rather clear break between the more Roman and Hellenistic parts of the eulogy, the latter being more romantic with poetic detail massed in flower imagery:

> . . . manibus date lilia plenis
> purpureos spargam flores animamque nepotis
> his saltem accumulem donis et fungar inani
> munere.
>
> (6.883-86)

Norden's parallels are the most significant, but unfortunately he offered them only as proof that "lilies were grave offerings," not alluding to their poetic significance. The first, from Dioskorides (*AP* 7.485), is the imaginative call for a lament along the Strymon for a Dionysiac priest.[12] The fact that it begins with Βάλλεθ' ὑπὲρ τύμβου πολιὰ κρίνα corresponding to Anchises' "manibus date lilia plenis" is a clearer indication that Vergil was consciously separating Roman and Hellenistic parts in his eulogy.[13] It continues with καὶ τὰ συνήθη/ τύμπαν' ἐπὶ

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[11] Norden (note 4 above) 345.

[12] P. Waltz, *Anthologie Grecque* V (Paris 1960) 63.

[13] R. G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Sextus* (Oxford 1977) 272-73, has some good observations on this passage. He adds Nicander *Fr.* 74.70 for purple (*leiria*) flowers being put on a tomb, and Val. Flacc. 6.492-93 for *lilia* indicating a short life in funereal imagery. *Purpurea lilia* are the *narkissos* in Pliny *NH* 21.25, but in *AP* 7.485 the *krina* (also used at times for the *narkissos*) are white, and other flowers appear. Thus the *AP* passage suggests that Vergil may have been thinking of different kinds of

στήλη ῥήσσετ᾽ ᾽Αλεξιμένευς. The first phrase is traditional; the second is an individuating touch for the Bacchic priest. The mourning Bacchantes, being women, naturally cast flowers. In contrast, the role of an isolated man laying the flowers on the tomb appears to be a break with Hellenistic tradition.

Some other haunting similarities to the anthology deserve comment. Frequently another than the deceased addresses the passerby:[14] in most cases the father or mother speaks, but a mother only of a son prematurely dead.[15] When the father appears, the son has always died in battle. In one case, eight sons have been killed by the Spartans. Anchises' appearance as substitute father of Marcellus, lamenting his early death, suggests the role of the father in Greek sepulchral epigrams where the context is death in war. His eulogy, then, is a unifying element, relating the death of Marcellus closely to the immediate background — the sufferings of Romans in their wars and particularly the death of their young men. Indirectly, Marcellus becomes a symbol of all the Roman youth cut off in the flower of life.

Vergil frequently likes to "sign" his work, and this aspect of his artistic technique may appear in the Marcellus eulogy, which bears some resemblance to the lament for Daphnis in the *Fifth Eclogue*. The Daphnis lament in turn is inspired by the *First Idyll* of Theokritos. The lines in question, 132 and 133, contain the *adynaton*:

νῦν ἴα μὲν φορέοιτε βάτοι, φορέοιτε δ᾽ ἄκανθαι,
ἁ δὲ καλὰ νάρκισσος ἐπ᾽ ἀρκεύθοισι κομάσαι,

---

flowers, not just the narcissus, in the Marcellus passage. The meaning of "manibus date lilia plenis" is controverted, but "date lilia ut spargam flores" is the interpretation of Donatus, Conington-Nettleship, Norden, and Austin. The commentators identify the *lilia* with the *purpurea flores* explaining them as "bright lilies," narcissus, or purple lilies. See Austin (273), who prefers purple or bright red. Some of these points are covered by R. J. Edgeworth, "The Purple Flower Image in the *Aeneid*," *ZKP* 127 (1983) 143–47, who perhaps takes too literal an approach to lines 883–84. He is right, though, in underscoring the importance of "purple flowers" in Roman ritual and in demonstrating a relationship between the Marcellus passage and other flower passages in the *Aeneid*.

[14]P. Waltz, *Anthologie Grecque* IV (Paris 1938) 29–31; see *AP* 7.229, 434, 467, 526, 542. In 229 and 526 the father speaks directly.

[15]Some of these instances appear in P. A. Hansen, *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca Saeculorum VII–V A. Chr. N.* (Berlin 1983) 1–98, *tituli sepulcrales*; see esp. nn. 14, 25, 32, 41, 46, 50, 51, 71 for the father playing a principal role. In 51 the father addresses the onlooker directly.

Now violets bear, ye brambles, bear them, akanthos,
and may the beautiful narkissos on the junipers grow locks.[16]

These were followed by Vergil 38 and 40:

pro molli uiola, *pro purpureo narcisso*

. . . .

*spargite* humum *foliis*, inducite fontibus umbras

Then, the Marcellus eulogy:

*purpureos spargam flores* animamque nepotis.[17]

The comparison is more striking than it seems since the *folia* of line 40 are flower petals, imitating the φύλλα of *Idyll* 11.26 where the expression refers to *hyakinthos* petals.[18]

Other suggestions of the Daphnis lament are the haunting parallels: "postquam te *fata tulerunt*" (34), corresponding to "si qua *fata aspera* rumpas" (882) and "*ostendent* terris hunc tantum *fata* nec ultra esse sinunt . . ." (869-70); "et *tumulum facite* et *tumulo* superaddite carmen" (42), corresponding to "*funera, cum tumulum* praeterlabere recentem" (874); "*fortunate puer*, tu nunc eris . . ." (49) corresponding to "heu *miserande puer* . . ." (882-83). The future perspective of the Daphnis lament shows how natural the future perspective of Anchises toward Aeneas is in the light of the Hellenistic tradition, even if it is foreign to the Scipionic epigrams. The *Eclogue*, with extravagance and mock epic tone, borders on parody, something foreign to the solemnity and gravity of Vergil's Roman epic, and to be avoided at all cost. The similarities to the Daphnis' lament may have been unconscious, but in any case the parallel passages reveal Vergil's genius in moving from one genre to another.

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[16]Text and commentary on this in A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus* (Cambridge 1950) I, 14; II, 28-29. Theocritos' line is an elaborate conceit. The word κομάω in Homer refers to the long hair of warriors, who cut it in grief (not let it grow); e.g., *Il.* 3.43. In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 454, it refers to the bursting forth of grain in a time of happiness. Perhaps ταναοῖσι κομήσειν ἀσταχύεσσιν there suggested ἀρκεύθοισι κομάσαι. In Aristophanes it has the connotation of "plume oneself," "put on airs"; e.g., *Clouds* 545, *Ploutos* 170.

[17]R. Coleman, *Vergil. Eclogues* (Cambridge 1977) on line 40 (164) notes this point, drawing attention to 9.19, *florentibus herbis*. He mentions *Aeneid* 6.883-85, but only with reference to the flower-strewing motif. The reference seems to go unnoticed by *Aeneid* commentators.

[18]ἤνθες ἐμᾷ σὺν ματρὶ θέλοισ' ὑακίνθινα φύλλα.

With his superb artistry in mixing Greek and Roman forms, Vergil's eulogy also recalls the magnificent grave steles of the Attic cemeteries. In one of the most famous, that from Ilissos, an old man leans on a staff, his eyes seeming to penetrate the body of a handsome young man whose own gaze goes out dreamily past the viewer; beside him at his feet a young boy weeps.[19] The artist seems to suggest the reversal of the natural order, deliberately overstating the age and debility of the older man, who should be the father, while at the same time intimating the physical closeness but spiritual separation which death brings.[20] Judging by the sepulchral tradition, one might expect that this youth died in battle. As in the Ilissos relief, Vergil's young man is extraordinarily handsome ("egregium forma iuuenis et fulgentibus armis" — the latter phrase suggesting the typology of the hero killed in battle [6.861]). Like the relief, Vergil's description of the youth, both in his own statement and in the impression Aeneas communicates, suggests sadness and contemplation rather than grief:

> sed frons laeta parum et deiecto lumina uoltu . . .
> 'sed nox atra caput tristi circumuolat umbra.'
>
> (6.862-66)

Moreover, the presence of Anchises and Aeneas suggests another characteristic of the Greek sepulchral epigrams, the allusion not only to immediate parents and grandparents but to mythical ancestors and divine birth — something absent in the Roman epitaphs. The epic setting of the encounter, too, evokes the Homeric vocabulary of the Greek inscrip-

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[19]National Museum Athens, n. 869; K. F. Johansen, *The Attic Grave Reliefs of the Classical Period* (Copenhagen 1951) Fig. 9, p. 23.

[20]A beautiful but extremely pessimistic interpretation of the Ilissos relief can be found in F. Wassermann, "Serenity and Repose: Life and Death on Attic Tombstones," *CJ* 64 (1969) 193-202. It is discussed in D. C. Kurtz, J. Boardman, *Greek Burial Customs* (London 1971) 140-41 where they point to the difficulty of interpreting these reliefs. The appearance of the boy seems to be an optimistic note: the ugly gap in the cycle of generations caused by youthful death can be restored when the boy becomes a youth. The continuation of generations is an epic motif (Glaukos' speech, *Iliad* 6.144-49) — running through the *Aeneid* and the Scipionic epigrams.

The statue by Kleomenes in the Louvre, #1207, now identified as Marcellus, suggests the idealized youths of the Attic gravestones, but even more striking is the sad idealization of the figure taken to be Marcellus in a bas relief from Algiers (Musée d'Alger), which closely repeats the pose of the funerary youths. See L. Fabbrini, "Su una recente proposta per la identificazione di M. Claudio Marcello," *ArchClass* 13 (1961) 152-58.

tions, which, like the allusion to divine parentage, was obviously meant to idealize the dead.[21]

In this scene, then, as throughout the *Aeneid*, the depth of Vergil's grasp of the literary and artistic complexity of the Roman and Hellenistic background is profound. Merging universal themes and expressions, he subtly plays with the distinctions of human generations, with the transmission of values and traditions, with human suffering and loss — particularly the premature and unnatural death of the young, as well as with the characteristically Vergilian sentiment of the cost of *imperium*.[22]

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[21] See Griessmair (note 6 above) 78 and 80-82.

[22] Professors Roger Hornsby and Alexander McKay kindly read through the manuscript of this article. The latter believes the rites for Misenus at the beginning of the Sixth Book were meant to evoke the actual rites for Marcellus, and thus make his presence very pervasive in this book; see "Vergilian Heroes and Toponomy," H. D. Evjen, ed., *MNEMAI* (Chico, Calif. 1984) 121-37. The author is most indebted to Professor Ernst Badian for many helpful suggestions and corrections in improving the text as well as for his encouragement toward its publication. The anonymous referee made several excellent suggestions, particularly drawing attention to Norden's notice of the Scipio epigrams and to flower practice in Roman funerals.

# THE SURVIVAL OF PAGANISM IN CHRISTIAN GREECE:
## A CRITICAL ESSAY

The survival of paganism is one of the most widely discussed and commonly accepted aspects of Byzantine and modern Greek culture. In the popular imagination, and in many scholarly works, ancient and modern Greece are bound tightly together by religious continuity: the Byzantine saints are viewed as the pagan gods transformed, while modern rural festivals are thought to replicate the worship carried out in the pagan sanctuaries centuries before.[1] In most cases, however, conclusions concerning the survival of pagan ideas are drawn using the simplest of methods: a medieval or modern practice is compared with its supposed counterpart in antiquity; if there appears to be a similarity it is assumed that this represents a pagan survival.

Investigations such as these pay little attention to the intervening years or to the process of survival.[2] This paper, by contrast, will focus on just that issue: it will seek to isolate examples of pagan survival into Greek Christian society and it will investigate the means by which these survivals may have been possible. This will naturally also open the question of why some aspects of paganism were assimilated and others rejected and what role such survivals may have played in the thoroughly Christian world of Byzantine and modern Greece. The paper is primarily historical in orientation and it will focus largely on the period of late antiquity which represented the crucial point of contact between the two religious traditions. Obviously, this is an enormous problem and this paper cannot hope to deal with all aspects of it; rather, it will be

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[1] J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion* (Cambridge 1910; repr. Hyde Park, N.Y. 1964); Martin P. Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion* (New York 1940), repr. as *Greek Folk Religion* (New York 1961); Katerina Kakouri, *Dionysiaka: Aspects of the Popular Thracian Religion of Today* (Athens 1965).

[2] Note the comments of Cyril Mango ("Discontinuity with the Classical Past in Byzantium," in Margaret Mullet and Roger Scott, eds., *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition* [Birmingham 1981] 55): "The field has been pre-empted by folklorists whose methods are a puzzle to the historian. It is not, of course, inconceivable that certain remnants of pagan beliefs and practices should have survived the conversion of the common people to Christianity and lived on for centuries, transformed and misunderstood, but to be convinced of the existence of such continuity, we need a chain of evidence that is simply not there."

selective and deal with issues that are crucial for a proper understanding
of the process.

Before beginning the investigation a few definitions are in order.
In the first place, by "paganism" I mean to define a religious tradition,
centered primarily around cult, and those manifestations that are
closely linked to cult. Thus, I wish to exclude from consideration a gen-
eral treatment of the survival of the classical tradition or those manifes-
tations of paganism that are not closely connected to it as a religious
phenomenon, what might be called "romantic Hellenism" or "romantic
paganism."[3] This, of course, involves a subtle distinction between what
is religious and what is not, but in most cases the difference should be
clear.[4]

Secondly, most of my discussion will focus on the geographical
area within the boundaries of the modern Greek state. This is not be-
cause I believe that pagan survivals were any greater or lesser in this area
than elsewhere in the eastern Mediterranean. Rather, this simply repre-
sents the area of my experience and the limit of whatever knowledge I
may possess.

Perhaps surprisingly, the easiest area in which one may identify
possible pagan survivals is in the elite culture of Byzantium and modern
Greece. Thus, the classical inspiration of much of Byzantine literature
and art is readily acknowledged.[5] Within Byzantine literature the most
admired literary forms were classical in origin and the models that were

[3]Cyril Mango, "Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism," *Journal of the Warburg
and Courtauld Institutes* 28 (1965) 29-43.

[4]In examining our own culture we face similar but less extreme dilemmas: for
example, the debate about the "religiousness" of prayer in public schools and civic
Christmas displays. The apparent pagan "survivals" in New Year's and other mid-winter
celebrations seem to provide an interesting parallel with the present study, but few other
than antiquarians bother about such questions. Within the study of Greece, however, the
question of pagan survivals is historically of the utmost concern, in large part because the
issue of continuity between antiquity and the present has been used as a means of estab-
lishing and maintaining (or, conversely, denying) Greek national identity. See Apostolos
Vacalopoulos, "Byzantinism and Hellenism: Remarks on the Racial Origin and the In-
tellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation," *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968) 101-26; Stephen
Xydis, "Mediaeval Origins of Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968)
1-20; and Speros Vryonis, "Recent Scholarship on Continuity of Culture: Classical
Greeks, Byzantines, Modern Greeks," in *The Past in Medieval and Modern Greek Cul-
ture* (Malibu, CA 1978) 237-56.

[5]Literature: Herbert Hunger, "On the Imitation (μίμεσις) of Antiquity in Byzan-
tine Literature," *DOP* 23-24 (1969-70) 17-38, and *Die hochsprachliche profane Litera-
tur der Byzantiner* 2 vols. (Munich 1978); art: Kurt Weitzmann, *Greek Mythology in
Byzantine Art* (Princeton 1951); and Ernst Kitzinger, *Byzantine Art in the Making*
(Cambridge, MA 1977).

followed among elite authors were consistently pagan.[6] This naturally had an impact not only on form but also on content, to the degree that one can even speak of the "tyranny" which classical thought exercised on the culture of Byzantium. Among Byzantine historians, for example, it was generally fashionable to imitate not only the concerns but also the vocabulary of their classical predecessors—this to the point that a Christian author such as Procopius might appear to some readers as a representative of a pagan tradition.[7] The same is certainly true in art, where the basis of much of the artistic tradition was classical and where one can speak of classical revivals in many periods.[8]

Yet, none of this seems to have involved paganism in the sense discussed above.[9] The religious content of most of these phenomena was minimal and this was one of the reasons the church Fathers could be so positive in their acceptance of the classical tradition. It is, of course, true that in some cases this process may also have involved a transmission of the mentality of paganism in the religious sense. Thus, it has been argued that the representation of Christ which became popular in the reign of Justinian II and which dominated representational art in the period after Iconoclasm was based on Phidias' statue of Zeus from Olympia.[10] If one accepts this hypothesis, either in its original form or

[6]Charles N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (Oxford 1940, repr. New York 1957), 213-60; C. Fabricius, "Der sprachliche Klassizismus der griechischen Kirchenväter: ein philologisches und geistesgeschichtliches Problem," *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 10 (1967) 187-99.

[7]Averil and Alan Cameron, "Christianity and Tradition in the Historiography of the Later Empire," *CQ* N.S. 14 (1964) 316-28; R. J. H. Jenkins, "The Classical Background of the Scriptores post Theophanem," *DOP* 8 (1954) 13-30, and "The Hellenistic Origins of Byzantine Literature," *DOP* 17 (1963) 37-52; and J. Irmscher, "Christliches und Heidnisches in der Literatur der justinianischen Zeit," *Rev. ét. sud-est europ.* 18 (1980) 85-94.

[8]Kitzinger, "The Survival of Mythological Representations in Early Christian and Byzantine Art and their Impact on Christian Iconography," *DOP* 14 (1960) 45-68, repr. in *Classical Heritage in Byzantine and Near Eastern Art* (London 1981), and Kitzinger (note 5 above). See also George M. A. Hanfmann, "The Continuity of Classical Art," in Kurt Weitzmann, ed., *Age of Spirituality* (New York 1980) 75-99.

[9]Kitzinger, "Representations of Hellenic Oracles in Byzantine Manuscripts," in *Mansel'e Armagan, I. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi* (Ankara 1974) 397-410, repr. in *Classical Heritage in Byzantine and Near Eastern Art* (London 1981) presents an interesting discussion of the distinction between survival and new creation and the difference between the classical and the Byzantine view of certain art forms.

[10]James Breckenridge, *The Numismatic Iconography of Justinian II* (New York 1959) 58-59. It may be significant that the original ikon of Christ "in the form of Zeus" was supposedly painted during the reign of the patriarch Gennadios, 458-71, when there was obviously much turmoil in Greece over religious issues.

in that suggested by Kitzinger,[11] then some pagan religious sensibilities
may have been involved in the success of this particular representation
and the syncretism of the pagan and the Christian god. On the whole,
however, the "survival" of pagan forms in elite art affected only a lim-
ited number of people within a small circle and it had nothing to do
with paganism *per se*.[12]

Many scholars working on the struggle between paganism and
Christianity in Greece have during the past few years quite reasonably
reacted against the facile conclusions of earlier studies. This is true both
among anthropologists and Byzantinists. Many anthropologists now ar-
gue that modern Greece must be seen in is own terms, and not merely as
a curious and rather quaint survival of classical Greece.[13] Byzantinists,
for their part, have come more and more to recognize a break in conti-
nuity between antiquity and the Byzantine age and to define the latter
as fundamentally and thoroughly Christian in sentiment with little in
the way of religious continuity.[14]

More specifically in Greece, the current consensus of scholarly
opinion suggests that the conflict between paganism and Christianity
took a rather peculiar course and that, in Athens and many other
places, pagan and Christian communities simply had little to do with
each other, making true pagan "survivals" most unlikely.

Much of the recent discussion on the situation in Greece has fo-
cused on the conversion of pagan temples into churches. At one time it
was thought that such conversions were very common and that newly
converted Christians simply continued to worship in their accustomed
places.[15] Today such a reconstruction is very much out of favor. The

[11]Kitzinger (note 5 above) 121-22.

[12]Mosaics may represent a medium in which some of the essence of paganism was
transmitted. See Gunilla Akerström-Hougen, "Hellenism in Late Roman Mosaics,"
*Proc. of the 10th Intern. Congr. of Class. Arch., Ankara–Izmir, 23–30 Sept. 1973*, vol. 2
(Ankara 1978) 651-52; and *The Calendar and Hunting Mosaics of the Villa of the Fal-
coner in Argos* (Stockholm 1974) 11; 107. See also Cyril Mango, "Antique Statuary and
the Byzantine Beholder," *DOP* 17 (1963) 55-75, for an interesting view of how elite art
might be viewed by the Byzantine "man on the street."

[13]The best example of this new trend is probably Michael Herzfeld, *Ours Once
More* (Austin 1983); see also Loring M. Danforth, "The Ideological Context of the
Search for Continuities in Greek Culture," *JMGS* 2 (1984) 53-85.

[14]C. Mango (note 2 above) 48-57 is probably the foremost advocate of this ap-
proach, but it is supported in one way or another by scholars as diverse as Clive Foss and
Peter Charanis.

[15]Lawson (note 1 above) 42-46 and *passim*; F. W. Deichmann, "Frühchristliche
Kirchen in antiken Heiligtümern," *Jahrbuch d. deutschen archaeol. Inst.* 54 (1939)
103-36.

seminal work in this regard was an article published by Alison Frantz in 1965.[16] In this article Frantz argued that pagans and Christians in Athens maintained essentially separate spheres of activity throughout late antiquity: the pagans retained the old civic center with its temples and public buildings, while the Christians restricted themselves to the suburban areas. Thus, there was little direct contact between the two religions and no mass conversion of the temples resulted from some "edict of Theodosius." It is true, of course, that the Parthenon, the Erechtheion, and the Theseion were all turned into churches, but Frantz argues that this took place only at a later date, especially in the seventh century, after the displacements caused by the Slavic invasions and at a time when paganism was only a distant memory.

This argument has won nearly general acceptance[17] and some scholars have pushed it far beyond the conclusions suggested by Frantz. The best example of this is J.-M. Speiser's interesting article published in the Olympia *Festschrift* in 1976.[18] For Athens, Speiser simply accepted Frantz's conclusions, but elsewhere he argued that the situation was the same throughout the country and that rarely was there any significant contact, hostile or otherwise, between the two competing religions. In most cases paganism simply died a quiet death long before the triumph of Christianity.

Conclusions such as Speiser's are strengthened by studies which have shown that hasty earlier conclusions about pagan–Christian syncretism are not borne out by detailed examination. Thus, for example, it was once thought that some lamps found in an important cult place in Corinth showed evidence of syncretism among Judaism, Christianity, and perhaps paganism, and this was taken as evidence that the same places of worship were used by individual devotees of various religious persuasions.[19] It now seems clear, however, that this interpretation was based on a hasty reading of the graffiti scratched on the lamps and that no conclusions about religious syncretism can be drawn from this evidence.[20]

[16]"From Paganism to Christianity in the Temples of Athens," *DOP* 19 (1965) 187-205.

[17]See, for example, Garth Fowden, "Bishops and Temples in the Eastern Roman Empire," *Journal of Theological Studies* N.S. 29 (1978) 43.

[18]"La christianisation des sanctuaires paiens en Grèce," in Ulf Jantzen, ed., *Neue Forschungen in griechischen Heiligtümern* (Tübingen 1976) 309-20.

[19]James Wiseman, "The Gymnasium Area at Corinth, 1969-1970," *Hesperia* 41 (1972) 28-33.

[20]D. R. Jordan, "Angels in the 'Fountain of the Lamps' at Corinth," *Actes du XVe Congrès Intern. d'Ét. byz.* I (Athens 1975) 69.

Thus, scholarly caution is certainly justified, especially in light of the simplistic approach of earlier generations and the uncritical tendency to see pagan "survivals" behind most of the practices of orthodox Greek Christians. On the other hand, it is admirably clear that organized paganism survived well into the sixth century throughout the empire[21] and in parts of Greece (at least in the Mani) until the ninth century or later.[22] In such a situation is it reasonable to suppose that there was no survival of pagan forms? Further, one may legitimately invoke comparative material from other cultures in this connection. This is suggested by the obvious parallels between the situation in Greece at the end of antiquity and that in other areas where Christian missionary activities are better documented. Thus, in the New World and in Africa many aspects of traditional, pre-Christian religion survived to find a place in the new religious system.[23] In some cases these survivals were actively encouraged by Christian missionaries who were willing to explain some of the complexities of Christianity by reference to more familiar traditional practices and beliefs. Other aspects of traditional religion survived in a Christian setting despite the opposition of the missionaries. Modern anthropological and sociological studies of the

[21]J. Irmscher, "Paganismus im justinianischen Reich." *Klio* 63 (1981) 683-88.

[22]See Const. Porph., *De admin. imp.*, G. Moravcsik, ed. (Budapest 1949) chapt. 50, p. 236.

[23]On the African experience see B. A. Pauw, *Christianity and Xhosa Tradition* (Cape Town/London 1975), while for Mexico and Central America see William Madsen, "Christo-Paganism. A Study of Mexican Religious Syncretism," *Middle American Research Institute, Tulane U., Publ.* No. 19 (1957) 105-80; *The Virgin's Children. Life in an Aztec Village Today* (Austin 1960, repr. New York 1969); and "Religious Syncretism," in Robert Wauchope and Manning Nash, eds., *Handbook of Middle American Indians* Vol. 6 (Austin 1967) 369-91. The literature on conversion to Christianity in Latin American and Africa simply assumes the reasonableness of continuities between traditional religion and Christianity. The questions which are discussed are naturally different for each area, but among them a functional concern seems now generally to predominate. From an historical point of view, the comments of Charles Gibson ( *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule* [Stanford 1964] 134-35) are most instructive: "What, finally, did the church accomplish? On the surface it achieved a radical transition from pagan to Christian life. Beneath the surface, in the private lives and covert attitudes and inner convictions of Indians, it touched but did not remold native habits. Our fullest evidence for preconquest survivals derives from modern Indian practices rather than from colonial records, for the latter, however informative in individual incidents, are unsystematic for the whole. Modern Indian society, on the other hand, abundantly demonstrates a pervasive supernaturalism of pagan origin, often in syncretic compromise with Christian doctrine. Although it cannot be really demonstrated, it may be assumed that the pagan components of modern Indian religions have survived in an unbroken tradition to the present day."

process of conversion have emphasized the structural importance of these survivals and the significance of the "level of complexity" of the societies involved[24] — and we shall return to these concepts later and see how they might be applied to the situation in Greece at the end of antiquity. It is true that the Christian missionaries in more modern periods represented supposedly "superior" European civilization as much as they did a new religious tradition, and no such relationship applied in Greece at the end of antiquity. Nevertheless, on the basis of comparable situations elsewhere, it seems rash to dismiss the likelihood that some aspects of paganism would survive into Greek Christianity. Indeed, we should be very surprised if such were not the case in any situation where one religion replaced another. Rather than pursuing extreme conclusions, either positive or negative, we should, I think, follow the lead admirably set by Margaret Alexiou and investigate the possibility of survival for specific phenomena and in specific historical settings.[25]

In Greece, as opposed to the other areas of the empire, the spread of Christianity is often thought to have been slower because of the strength of paganism in the Schools, especially in Athens.[26] This may have had some effect among a small group of people, but if we remember our definition of paganism as essentially a cultic phenomenon, then the survival of the Schools to 529 and probably beyond can have had only a limited effect. Probably more important was the relatively isolated character of Greece in late antiquity. With the exception of the far north, especially in Thessaloniki and along the Via Egnatia, Greece was apparently something of a cultural and economic backwater in which we might well expect to see the survival of old fashioned ideas and ideologies. One other factor is the apparent absence of monasticism in Greece

[24]Pauw (note 23 above).

[25] *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974). This approach may be less spectacular and more time-consuming, but it will ultimately lead to conclusions that are more likely to be correct. Further, we should carefully examine the means available for the survival of elements of paganism. On the one hand, this will involve the survival of paganism as an intact, organized cult phenomenon, while on the other hand it will involve the incorporation of pagan elements within the fabric of medieval and modern Christian society. The former investigation is probably simpler since it "merely" involves an understanding of why Christianity was not successful in eliminating paganism in a short period. From a comparison with other similar historical situations we should not expect Christianity to supplant paganism entirely within a short period, especially given the inefficient means at the disposal of the Christian church and state. Cf. Garth Fowden (note 17 above) 53–78.

[26]On this question see recently Garth Fowden, "The Pagan Holy Man in Late Antique Society," *JHS* 102 (1982) 33–35.

outside such centers as Thessaloniki. In other areas of the empire the monks were the "shock troops" in the spread of Christianity, and their virtual absence in Greece must certainly have had an effect. It is, of course, difficult to say why monasticism did not flourish in late antique Greece. Perhaps this is merely a circular argument and the absence of monks may simply have been related to the slow spread of Christianity rather than the other way around. Concerning the elimination of paganism, however, the absence of monastic "shock troops" must have been a significant causative factor.

There are, then, many reasons to expect the survival of paganism well into the Byzantine period. What is more difficult to understand is the means by which elements of paganism made their way into Christian practice and belief, given the naturally antagonistic relationship between the two religions. Again, we can hypothesize many means of transmission — for example that the Christian missionaries found it convenient to allow new converts to think of Christian truths in ways that were already familiar to them. Although these hypotheses may well be true in certain circumstances, we cannot normally know about them and they lie outside the realm of historical proof. What we need to do is to establish specific instances of, first, contact between the two religious traditions and, second, evidence of borrowing on the part of the Christian community — or at least an indication that the Christians reacted to pagan belief or practice.[27]

As we have seen, much has been written on the conversion of the pagan temples, and current scholarly opinion suggests little in the way even of contact between the two religious traditions. One of the phenomena which has not been fully explored, however, is the close proximity of many early Christian basilicas to important pagan sanctuaries. These can be identified, for example, at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, Eleusis, Dodonna, Delos, Lykosoura, and many other places. Scholars have, of course, noted the phenomenon and observed that in practically none of these instances was the church actually built on the site of the temple itself, or even within the sacred temenos. This is normally explained by suggesting that the church was erected to serve a nearby urban center or that it was constructed on this spot simply to take advantage of the building materials from the remains of the sanctuary.[28]

[27]This is, of course, exactly the kind of evidence sought by Mango (note 14 above) 55.

[28]Cf. Speiser (note 18 above).

What is not fully appreciated is that, in example after example, the churches were built just outside the sacred boundaries, as though the Christians were still avoiding the pagan sacred ground but wishing to locate their churches in such a way as to offer a challenge to the pagan sanctuary or a choice to those who came there to worship. If this were the case and especially if it were a policy consciously adopted by the church, the physical proximity of the two cult centers would certainly have encouraged a blending of pagan and Christian elements.

Potentially more important, of course, were the occasions where Christians actually took over the pagan temples. As we have seen, few examples of this phenomenon can actually be documented in Greece before the seventh century, but those which can are extremely important. One such case has been found in the recent excavations at Philippi.[29] There, beside the remains of a lavishly decorated, octagonally shaped church, a burial of Macedonian date was discovered. Sometime after the original interrment the tomb was used as a place of worship, an interesting example of the well-documented phenomenon of the hero cult. Finally, sometime before the middle of the fourth century after Christ this was taken over by Christianity and a church built on the spot.[30] In this case there is good, solid evidence that a Christian holy place succeeded a pagan holy place. Significantly, this church was dedicated to Saint Paul, the founder of the Christian community of Philippi, and it seems all but certain that the pagan hero cult was replaced by the cult of Saint Paul.

A case about which we know even more is that of the Asklepieion on the south slope of the Akropolis in Athens. It has long been known that a Christian basilica, or rather a succession of at least three basilicas, was built on the ruins of the pagan sanctuary.[31] Studies earlier in the century suggested that the conversion of the Asklepieion represented a case of pagan continuity into the Christian period, and authorities such as Travlos and Delehaye have argued that sanctuaries of Asklepios were often singled out for conversion to places of Christian healing. Re-

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[29]S. Pelekanides, "Ἀνασκαφὴ Φιλίππων," Πρακτικά 1976, 115-29; 1978, 64-72; and 1979, 90-91.

[30]S. Pelekanides, "Kultprobleme im Apostel-Paulus-Oktagon von Philippi in Zusammenhang mit einem älteren Heroenkult," Atti 9th Cong. Int. Arch. Christ. 2 (Vatican 1978) 393-97.

[31]Andreas Xyngopoulos, Χριστιανικὸν Ἀσκληπιεῖον, AE, 1915, 52-71; and I. N. Travlos, Ἡ παλαῖο Χριστιανικὴ Βασιλικὴ τοῦ Ἀσκληπιείου τῶν Ἀθηνῶν, AE, 1939-41, 34-68.

cent works have naturally been more skeptical in this regard and have denied any significant continuity in the Asklepieia.[32]

The question of the Asklepieion in Athens is important from a methodological point of view. Clearly, the case can be argued from either side, but a positive case for continuity demands more than an assertion of the mere possibility of similar cult practices. In the first instance, the issue requires a rather detailed chronological argument, of which only the barest details can be sketched here. The primary consideration is that if there is to have been any survival of elements of paganism, the old religion must still have been alive at the time when Christianity came into contact with it. The situation at the Asklepieion provides particularly good evidence in this regard since the site was clearly being used for pagan worship at least as late as 450 A.D., and possibly as late as 485, while the earliest church on the site appears to have been constructed before the end of the fifth century.[33] Furthermore, there is ample evidence for the destruction of the pagan sanctuary, both in the levelling of the walls before construction of the church and in the defacing of the votive *stelai* which had adorned the temple. This was almost certainly carried out by a Christian mob, and it is one of the very few instances in Greece where violent contact between pagans and Christians can be confidently documented.

What is most significant, however, is the form that the earliest church took, and some of the movable finds that can be associated with it. Thus, as Travlos has noted, the church included not only the site of the temple of Asklepios itself, but also the earlier stoa of incubation, the sacred spring, and what was probably the *katagogeion* of the sanctuary.[34] This, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of the continuity of cult, but from the *miracula* of SS. Cosmas and Damian we know that their church in Constantinople had a special aisle where incubation was practiced and a series of cells where some of the faithful slept while waiting for the saints to appear to them in a dream.[35] This physical arrange-

[32]Travlos (note 31 above) 63-64; Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les légendes hagiographiques. Subsidia Hagiographica* 18⁴ (Brussels 1955) 143-44; cf., however, Frantz (note 16 above) 194-95 and Speiser (note 18 above) 310, 312.

[33]The main piece of evidence is Marinos, *Vita Procli* 29 (ed. Boissonade); cf. the illuminating discussion of Frantz (note 16 above) 194-95.

[34]Note 31 above, 51-57.

[35]Ludwig Deubner, *Kosmas und Damian. Texte und Einleitung* (Leipzig 1907) miracle 30 (p. 174) and 34 (p. 184). In both of these cases some of those awaiting a miracle slept in the right aisle (στοᾷ), i.e. presumably the south aisle to be close to the

ment is clearly paralleled in the church erected within the former sanctuary of Asklepios at Athens, where one finds a fourth assymetrical aisle to the north of the nave of the church and where the former *katagogeion* was incorporated to the north of the atrium. Further, an inscription suggests that the church in the Asklepieion was dedicated to St. Andrew, who is otherwise known as a patron of healing in early Christian Greece.[36] In other words, the Asklepieion provides us with evidence of transition from a place of pagan to one of Christian healing. Chronological considerations allow us to be certain that the pagan associations of the place were still alive when the church was built and the architectural and epigraphic evidence suggests that healing was still carried out in the same place.

Evidence of the Christian tombstones likewise provides direct evidence of contact between Christianity and paganism in Greece. Thus, it is obvious that the adults who became Christians must previously have been pagans, but it is interesting to see that some of them retained their pagan names, even those which evinced a close connection with pagan cult. Many Christian names were of the predictable sort: Agape, Eirene, Eutychios, and Theodoulos (Bayet, *De Titulis* Nos. 18, 26, 109, 72, 104, 26, 44, 86.), while others were bland and "non-sectarian": Alexandros, Attike, Valerios, Mavra (Nos. 85, 41, 91, 10). More significant are the following: Asklepiarion (No. 1), Asklepia (No. 72), Asklepiodote (No. 118), and even Oinofilos (No. 19)! Particularly interesting are the first three of these, which suggest that converts to Christianity, who certainly must have known about Asklepios, apparently had no hesitation in maintaining their pagan names, evocative as they were of the pagan *soter*.[37]

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reliquary where the remains of the saints were kept. It is clear from these texts, however, that some of the ill stayed somewhere else, presumably in a *katagogeion* or *xenon*. Cf. also the *miracula* of St. Artemios (ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Varia Graeca Sacra* [St. Petersburg 1909, repr. Leipzig 1975], where the cure is not consistently localized, and Alice-Mary Talbot, ed. and trans., *Faith Healing in Late Byzantium. The Posthumous Miracles of the Patriarch Athanasios I of Constantinople by Theoktistos the Stoudite* (Brookline, MA 1983), esp. pp. 115-19.

[36]The inscription was published by C. Bayet, *De Titulis Atticae Christianis Antiquissimis* (Paris 1878) 71, No. 13, and discussed by John S. Creaghan, S. J., and A. E. Raubitschek, "Early Christian Epitaphs from Athens," *Hesperia* 16 (1947) 29, No. XI. Further archaeological evidence for the conversion of the Akslepieion is complex and I will discuss it fully elsewhere.

[37]M. A. Walbank, "The Family of Philagros Erchieus and the Cult of Asklepios at Athens," *AJAH* 4 (1979) 186-91, discusses the use of names derived from the god in

Especially illustrative is the tombstone of Asklepiarion (No. 1),
which was found near the Theatre of Dionysos, not far from the Askle-
pieion itself. The tomb was apparently a family one, since four individ-
uals were commemorated on the tombstone: Asklepiarion and his wife
Isychia, and Mysterios and his wife Theodoule. The wives in these two
instances were apparently Christians, probably born into Christian fam-
ilies, while the husbands apparently were originally pagans. A simple
cross at the beginning of the inscription suggests that both of the men
had adopted Christianity prior to their demise, but neither Asklepiarion
nor Mysterios thought it necessary to adopt a more appropriate Chris-
tian name. Likewise, the tomb of Asklepia was shared with her husband
Eutychios (No. 72), although here it was the woman who maintained
the pagan nomenclature. As a footnote to this analysis we can observe
the typically laconic tombstone of a certain Andreas (No. 74), which
after an initial cross reads simply Τύνβ[ος | 'Ανδ[ρέου, utilizing the pa-
gan τύμβος instead of the Christian κοιμητήριον.[38] This may seem like
a simple difference, but it is not insignificant since it shows that An-
dreas, and those like him[39] could continue to use the traditional term
while avoiding or perhaps simply identifying the theologically-charged
Christian word for a final resting place.

Even in these few examples, we can catch fleeting glimpses of a
process of transmission which must have accounted for the survival of
pagan elements in Byzantine and modern Greek Christianity. But how
are we to explain this process of transmission? On the one hand the pro-
cess was probably extremely simple: as conversion to Christianity pro-
ceeded through the Greek cities and countryside, the depth of under-
standing of Christian truths must have varied considerably. As A. D.
Nock has pointed out, the concept of conversion and the exclusivity of
Judaism and Christianity were essentially foreign to the mindset of
much of the ancient world, and the identification of old ideas in the

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Athens, but he implies that this practice died out in Roman times. It was, however,
common among the late antique philosophers, including Asclepiodotus, uncle of the em-
press Eudocia, and Asclepigenia, who was healed through the prayer of Proclus at the
Asklepieion in Athens. Practically all of the several individuals with such names cited in
*PLRE* 2 had strong pagan associations; only one (Asclepius, bishop of Edessa [p. 163])
was clearly a Christian.

[38]Creaghan and Raubitschek (note 36 above) 5-6. The term *koimeterion* was
nearly standard in Attica, the Korinthia, and Thessaly, but it was uncommon elsewhere.

[39]Cf. ibid., 27-28, No. VII.

context of Christianity must have been a totally natural mode of think-
ing for many people.[40]

But such a simple analysis is perhaps not enough to allow us to
understand the phenomenon of pagan survivals, since this will not tell
us why some aspects of paganism were accepted while others were re-
jected. Leaving aside questions relevant to the incorporation of pagan
forms in elite culture, we can see that pagan ideas and forms persisted in
those areas which provided the best structure for them: traditional
practices related to healing, death, and the family. These are areas
which Eric Wolf would call "first-order" concerns — those which are in-
timately connected with the bases of life and which would be relatively
unaffected by the objections of theologians and bishops.[41]

From this, however, one should not assume that documentable pa-
gan survivals are unimportant because they did not always affect the
higher reaches of intellectual and theological development. Indeed, as
Peter Brown has shown, in late antiquity religious forms within pagan-
ism and Christianity were remarkably parallel.[42] More and more, indi-
viduals were concerned with the quest for contact with "the holy," and,
historically speaking, Gregory of Nazianzus should not have been sur-
prised that openly pagan ceremonies continued to be practiced at the
tombs of Christian dead.[43] As an intellectual, he felt he could accept the
cultural trappings of paganism while condemning the cultic or religious
expressions of that tradition. Logically he was correct, but practically
he was expecting the faithful to make a distinction that was difficult and
unlikely in many cases.

The "religious expression" of late antique paganism had little in
common with the stories of the Olympian gods or even with the cultural
paganism of the pagan aristocracy. Instead, it was much more con-
cerned with the wonders of the magicians and the supernatural feats of

[40] *Conversion* (Oxford 1933) 14: "There was therefore in the rivals of Judaism and
Christianity no possibility of anything which can be called conversion. In fact, the only
context in which we find it in ancient paganism is that of philosophy." Cf. also Miracle 9
of Cosmas and Damian (ed. Deubner 113–17) where pagans insisted on identifying the
Christian saints with Castor and Polydeuces!

[41] *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1966).

[42] *The World of Late Antiquity* (London 1965) 49–57; "The Rise and Function of
the Holy Man in Late Antiquity," *JRS* 61 (1971) 80–101; cf. Garth Fowden (note 26
above) 187–205.

[43] *Palatine Anthology* 8.166–70, 174–75, 269.

the "sophists" such as Maximus and Iamblichos. Their activities and those of their rivals, the Christian holy men, touched people directly and spoke to their common and individual fears. It was at this level that syncretism took place and it here that we should seek pagan survivals. Indeed, what this brief survey suggests is that "survival" may be the wrong concept to apply in the present investigation. By the fourth century or shortly thereafter many of the fundamental aspects of the two traditions were the same. This is not to say that there was no difference between paganism and Christianity: certainly there was, and the church Fathers did their best to articulate that difference in terms that would be understandable to the faithful. But a degree of accommodation had already been made, in the streets of the great cities and in the vast spaces of the mountains and remote villages, and Christianity came to accommodate points of view that were fully acceptable to the sentiments of those who had previously been pagans.[44]

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# INTERPRETATIONS

## SEEING SLEEP: HERACLITUS FR. 49 MARCOVICH
## (DK 22 B 21)

θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὁρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὔδοντες ὕπνος.

In this form Clement (*Strom*. 3.21.1) quotes this enigmatic fragment of Heraclitus. Marcovich, however, objects to the final word: "ὕπνος is semantically unsatisfactory; ὁκόσα εὔδοντες ὁρέομεν is not a ὕπνος ('sleep'), but an ἐνύπνιον."[1] He argues that the common association of ὕπνος and θάνατος has caused Clement to alter the text.[2] Accordingly, he prints his conjecture ὕπαρ, an alteration which he has retained in the slightly up-dated Italian version of his edition (Florence 1978) and reiterated recently in *Gnomon* 54 (1982) 428. Although subsequent scholarship has not taken up Marcovich's emendation,[3] no one has answered his objections to Clement's text.

The force to Marcovich's objection lies in his doubts concerning ὕπνος. The transmitted text implies ὕπνον ὁρέομεν: is such an expression meaningful in Greek? There are two passages, neither of which has been discussed in this connection, that show that ὕπνον ὁρᾶν is semantically possible: Sappho fr. 30.8-9 Voigt, ἦπερ ὄσσον ἀ λιγύφω[νος . . ./ὕπνον [ἴ]δωμεν;[4] Ar. *Vesp.* 91, ὕπνου δ' ὁρᾷ τῆς νυκτὸς οὐδὲ πασπάλην.[5] ὕπνον ὁρᾶν is a metaphoric expression which means "to sleep." This idiom may be thought to imply personificaton or reifica-

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[1]M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (Merida 1967) 248; cf. *RE* Suppl. 10 (1965) 261. The only other attempt to emend the fragment is the absurd rewriting of the passage offered by D. Holwerda, *Sprünge in die Tiefen Heraklits* (Groningen 1978) 42.

[2]On this basis Marcovich calls ὕπνος the *lectio facilior*, implying that ὕπαρ should be accepted as the *lectio difficilior*; but it is only legitimate to speak in these terms when the paradosis transmits *both* readings.

[3]Cf. M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford 1971) 147; C. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1978) 68; C. Diano and G. Serra, *Eraclito: i frammenti e le testimonianze* (Vicenza 1980) 16, 133; K. Held, *Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft* (Berlin-New York 1980) 250.

[4]". . . (dass wir grad soviel) wie die schmelzend schlagenden (Nachtigallen) sehen den Schlummer," M. Treu, *Sappho*[6] (Munich 1979) 47.

[5]He "doesn't see a grain of sleep all night," MacDowell ad loc.

tion,[6] but it seems more probable that this locution is similar to a number of expressions which consist of a verb of seeing followed by a noun in the accusative:[7] ὄσσοντο δ' ὄλεθρον (of eagles), Hom. *Od.* 2.152; ὁρῶντ' ἀλκάν, Pind. *Ol.* 9.111;[8] Ἄρη δεδορκότων (of lions), Aesch. *ScT* 53; Ἄρη βλέπων, Timocles fr. 12 Kock; φόβον βλέπων, Aesch. *ScT* 498 (cf. Gorg. *Hel.* 17 [DK II 293]); ἔβλεψε νᾶπυ, Ar. *Eq.* 631; βλεπόντων κάρδαμα, Ar. *Vesp.* 455; σκύπη βλέπειν, Ar. *Vesp.* 643 (cf. Eup. fr. 282 Kock); αἴκειαν βλέπων, Ar. *Au.* 1671; βλέπων ἀπιστίαν, Eup. fr. 309 Kock. Perhaps the boldest example is Theocritus' description of the Nymph Nycheia as ἔαρ ὁρόωσα (*Id.* 3.45: Gow translates, "Nycheia with her eyes of May"). In each of these instances a verb of seeing/looking governs a noun which reflects the internal condition of the subject of the verb. These verbs are semantically ambivalent in a fundamental way, signifying both how one perceives and how one is perceived. In this light, ὕπνον ὁρᾶν would basically mean to manifest the condition of sleep; Aristophanes' ὕπνου . . . ὁρᾷ . . . πασπάλην would be an extended use.

Fr. 49 has often been seen in relation to passages like fr. 41 (B 88): ταὐτό τ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα· and fr. 48 (B 26): ἄνθρωπος ἐν εὐφρόνῃ φάος ἅπτεται ἑαυτῷ {ἀποθανὼν} ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις, ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὕδων {ἀποσβεσθεὶς ὄψεις}, ἐγρηγορὼς ἅπτεται εὕδοντος.[9] In Heraclitus' thought life and death and consciousness and un-

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[6]In addition to the common full personification of sleep (see West on Hes. *Th.* 212), it is often conceived in concrete terms: (e.g.) Alcm. fr. 26.7 Calame (3.7 *PMG*); Pind. *Pyth.* 1.8 and 9.23–25; Bacch. fr. 4.77 Snell-Maehler; Soph. *Tr.* 989–91. Cf. R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*[2] (Cambridge 1954) 31–32, 422, 428. On personification in early Greek thought, see W. Burkert, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart 1977) 286–88, and Fraenkel on Aesch. *Ag.* 14. For examples of personification in Heraclitus, see Marcovich, *Heraclitus* (note 1 above) 18 (cf. also fr. 52 [B94]).

[7]On this sort of expression in general see Kühner-Gerth I 309; W. Headlam and A. D. Knox, *Herodas: the Mimes and Fragments* (Cambridge 1922) 129, 204; Gow on Theoc. 13.45 and 25.137; on the comic passages, J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane*[2] (Paris 1965) 216–18. Related to this are a number of expressions involving πνέω: see M. van der Valk in *ΚΩΜΩΙΔΟΤΡΑΓΗΜΑΤΑ. Studia Aristophanea uiri Aristophanei W. J. W. Koster in honorem* (Amsterdam 1967) 131–42; D. E. Gerber, *GRBS* 24 (1983) 23.

[8]"With courage in his gaze," W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) 387. B. L. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1890; repr. Amsterdam 1965) 210, compares the English expression "look daggers."

[9]With most editors I print the text as established by Wilamowitz. For a defense of the full text, see J. Mansfeld, *Mnemosyne* 20 (1967) 1–7.

consciousness are regular antitheses and are linked by some analogy.[10] Marcovich's ὕπαρ is an attempt to find this sort of antithesis in fr. 49; so too is Nestle's ζωή.[11] If we follow this approach, we gain a neat and unexceptional antithesis, one which parallels those in fr. 41. But as argued above, there is no linguistic reason to impugn the reading of the paradosis, and, consequently, another approach is preferable.

In antiquity sleep was often regarded as an intermediate state between life and death.[12] This sort of view seems present in fr. 48 (ζῶν δὲ ἅπτεται τεθνεῶτος εὕδων). In this light Diels thought fr. 49 to be incomplete and suggested ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή as a completion. While unnecessary from a strictly textual point of view, this understanding of the passage is attractive. As in fr. 48, ὕπνος would stand between death and life. The fragment would then imply continuity between the opposites life and death, which, in turn, may parallel that which exists for the phases of transformation on the elemental level.[13] In addition, we can recognize in fr. 49 a characteristic Heraclitean form of argument, viz. $x:y = y:z$.[14] In this case what is suggested is *death:sleep = sleep:life*. It is, however, unnecessary to suppose that Clement's text is defective. Diels' supplement may simply make explicit what is already implicit in Heraclitus' pregnant sentence, or, as Kahn (note 3 above) 213f. suggests, fr. 49 may have served teasingly to introduce a full presentation of the argument, such as we find in fr. 48.[15]

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## ELECTRA'S HAIR

This is the hair that R. D. Dawe despaired of, in his Teubner text (Leipzig 1975) of Soph. *El.* 451:

σὺ δὲ
τεμοῦσα κρατὸς βοστρύχων ἄκρας φόβας
κἀμοῦ ταλαίνης, σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως                    450
ἄχω, δὸς αὐτῶι † τήνδ᾽ ἀλιπαρῆ τρίχα †
καὶ ζῶμα τοὐμὸν οὐ χλιδαῖς ἠσκημένον.

His critical note on the line reads: "τήνδ᾽ ἀλιπαρῆ codd., Hesychius, Suda, Eustathius τήνδε λιπαρῇ ex commentario novit Σ τήνδε τ᾽ Bergk ἀλίπαρον Hartung: sed post φόβας (449) et ante ζῶμα (452) exspectares non τρίχα sed μίτραν vel sim." I wish to suggest that Dawe may have expected too much—or, rather, too little: Sophocles did write τρίχα, and he qualified it with λιπαρῇ, the Scholiast's ancient variant.

At face value, the manuscripts' ἀλιπαρῆ would appear to be a coinage from λιπαρής, meaning 'not persistent,' 'not persevering,' 'not earnest.'[1] As such, however, it could be read only as a transferred epithet, transferred to τρίχα from ἐμοῦ in the preceding line, and that would be most awkard, for Electra is nothing if not persistent, persevering, earnest. The Scholiast recognized a very different coinage, from λιπαρός, apparently, since he offers αὐχμηράν as a synonym: τὸ δὲ ἀλιπαρῆ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐχμηράν. And Hesychius (s.v. ἀλιπαρῆ), the Suda (s.v. ἀλιπαρῆ), and Eustathius (787, 50) all agree: ἀλιπαρῆ stands for αὐχμηράν.[2] But a genuine, Sophoclean coinage of ἀλιπαρής from λιπαρός, to describe hair which is 'not oily,' 'not sleek,' 'neglected,' is out of the question since ἀλῑπ- is not consonant with the root λῑπ- in λιπαρός.[3]

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[1]Cf. Jebb's discussion in his large edition of the play (Cambridge 1894).

[2]Hesychius has ἀλιπαρῆ · αὐχμηρά, but αὐχμηράν "seems an obvious correction" (F. A. Paley, *JP* [1874] 90).

[3]Cf. G. Kaibel, *Sophokles Elektra* (Leipzig 1896) 143; H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1970) s.v. λίπτω. One may note here T. C. W. Stinton's recent attempt (*JHS* 97 [1977] 31) to defend the reading τήνδε ⟨τ᾽⟩ ἀλίπαρον (on whose authorship, see Dawe's critical note, quoted above). While ἀλίπαρον has the requisite root λῑπ-, Kaibel (loc. cit.) had objected to its conjectural coinage ,on the ground that adjectives in -αρος (-ερος) are not found with alpha privative. Stinton appealed to Eupolis fr. 69 Kock (I p. 274), ὅτι οὐκ ἀτρύφερος οὐδ᾽ ἄωρός ἐστ᾽ ἀνήρ. Even if ἀλίπαρος is a legitimate coinage, however, it is hard to see why ἀλίπαρον should have become MSS ἀλιπαρῆ.

The Scholiast's explanation of the variant λιπαρῇ, which was preserved in an ancient commentary (ἐν . . . τῶι ὑπομνήματι), is as follows: ὅ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς αὐτὸν λιπαρήσομεν, ὡς εἰ ἔλεγεν ἱκέτιν τρίχα.[4] It is true that λιπαρής may be used of a suppliant's insistence; thus, in 1377-78, Electra asks Apollo to hear her prayer, ἐμοῦ . . . ἥ σε πολλὰ δὴ/ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἔχοιμι λιπαρεῖ προὔστην χερί. But the adjective on its own is not synonymous with ἱκέτηριος, just as λιπαρεῖν is not really synonymous with ἱκετεύειν.[5] I would suggest that τήνδε λιπαρῆ τρίχα means simply 'this persistent hair.' Electra applies to her hair the epithet which properly, justifiably, belongs to her whole being. Unlike Chrysothemis, she has refused to accept an easy, leisured life by complying with the rules and demands laid down by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Compare 359-61:

> ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄν ποτ', οὐδ' εἴ μοι τὰ σὰ
> μέλλοι τις οἴσειν δῶρ', ἐφ' οἷσι νῦν χλιδαῖς
> τούτοις ὑπεικάθοιμι.

She is λιπαρής, 'persevering,' 'persistent,' 'earnest,' in adhering to the standards of τὸ δίκαιον,[6] and in resisting the claims of expediency, τὸ συμφέρον, which Chrysothemis champions: εἰ δ᾽ ἐλευθέραν με δεῖ/ ζῆν, τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ᾽ ἀκουστέα (339-40).[7]

Electra's application of λιπαρής to her hair, in a dedicatory context, will have sounded not at all startling to the audience since "the hair was felt as a detachable, and therefore conveniently dedicable, extension of its owner's personality."[8] But τήνδε λιπαρῆ τρίχα may con-

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[4] The Suda also records the variant, with the same explanation: ἥ λιπαρῇ, ἐξ ἧς αὐτὸν λιπαρήσομεν.

[5] "It is surely manifest . . . that λιπαρὴς θρίξ could not mean, 'a lock of hair offered by a suppliant' . . ." (Jebb).

[6] Thus she may be described as λιπαρὴς περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. Cf. Plato, *Crat.* 413a, ἐγὼ δέ . . . ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὢν περὶ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ δικαίου).

[7] Cf. 395-96:

> ΗΛ. μή μ᾽ ἐκδίδασκε τοῖς φίλοις εἶναι κακήν.
> ΧΡ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διδάσκω · τοῖς κρατοῦσι δ᾽ εἰκαθεῖν.

And on this conflict of values in the play, see J. H. Kells, *Sophocles, Electra* (Cambridge 1973) 240-42. Kells' own text of 451, incidentally, jettisons both ἀλιπαρῆ and λιπαρῆ, for he emends to τήνδε, λιπαρῶ, τρίχα ("Give him this hair, I beseech you"); as Stinton (note 3 above) observed, the verb is too strong for the context.

[8] So E. R. Dodds, *Euripides, Bacchae* (Oxford 1944) 139, with reference to W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings* (Cambridge 1902) 240ff. See also L. Woodbury, *TAPA* 109 (1979) 285, n. 39.

tain more than a transferred epithet (as in λιπαρεῖ . . . χερί, cited above). There would appear to be room for a pun, a play upon the phonetic similarity of λῑπαρής and λῑπαρός.[9] Electra has asked Chrysothemis to clip off κρατὸς βοστρύχων ἄκρας φόβας (449), which L. Campbell rendered freely as "a little from thy luxuriant locks," noting that the words "call attention to the abundance of Chrysothemis' hair in comparison with Electra's" (*Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments II* [Oxford 1881] ad loc.). Chrysothemis' hair, then, might well be described as λιπαρά, 'sleek' or 'glossy,' and Electra will mock it, and the easy, compliant way of life which it represents, when she describes her own presumably dry and unkempt hair as λιπαρής.[10]

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[9]On this similarity, cf. H. Frisk's question about λῑπαρέω: "Hat es einst ein *λῑπαρός gegeben (zu λίψ, λίπτομαι; vgl. καρτερός:καρτερέω), dass wegen des Gleichklangs mit λῑπαρός 'fett' vermieden wurde?" (*Eranos* 40 [1942] 86 = *Kleine Schriften* [Göteburg 1966] 340).

[10]I must thank an *AJP* referee for helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.

☙

# TWO REMARKS ON THE TEXT OF EURIPIDES' *BACCHAE*

I

μόλε, χρυσῶπα τινάσσων,
ἄνα, θύρσον κατ' Ὄλυμπον

(553-54)

So Murray's Oxford text, adopting Hermann's emended accentuation of L's ἀνά, taking the word as a vocative of ἄναξ and punctuating accordingly. It is perfectly reasonable for the chorus to address their god as ἄναξ (they thus refer to him at 1192), and certainly after the rather blunt μόλε a vocative of some sort seems called for, not so much to specify the addressee, for he has just been named at 551, but simply to render these lines a prayer and not a command.

An important but all too often forgotten desideratum of any emended reading in tragedy, however, is that it be not merely something the poet could conceivably have written, but a written transcription of something he might reasonably have intended actors or chorus to sing or say. Under conditions of oral performance, and so without the benefit of punctuation marks or the leisure which we enjoy to peruse the lines as something static on a printed page, would the audience really have been likely to hear the metrically uttered clause,

$$\text{μόλε χρυσῶπα τινάσσων ἄνα θύρσον κατ' Ὄλυμπον,}$$

as containing in its midst and in short syllables a rare and moribund vocative — especially in the absence of the aural cue ὦ?[1] And if this question be answered even tentatively in the negative, where, if anywhere, is the vocative?

These questions have already been pondered by Usener, in conjunction with the widespread scholarly reservations about the appropriateness of χρυσῶπα as an epithet for θύρσον;[2] Usener deals with both difficulties by proposing χρυσωπέ. The epithet is thus transferred from the thyrsus, where it seems abrupt and confusing, to Dionysus, where it seems poetically natural and beautiful; and the vocative is now located in its most natural position. (Dodds' objection, that Dionysus is not "golden" but οἰνωπός, is ill-founded; the two are not mutually exclusive, and besides, οἰνωπός at 236 and 438 are descriptions by Theban men of someone they think is merely the chorus' mortal leader, whereas we have here to do with the chorus themselves invoking the immortal object of their worship.[3]) The audience would then hear ἄνα as in "tme-

[1] Indeed, LSJ specifically assert that the vocative ἄνα *never* appears except after ὦ or Ζεῦ. As for the form itself, Euripides uses as vocative the form ἄναξ, with or without ὦ, about seventy times, including *Bacchae* 666, 670, 760, and 1031, but ἄνα (with ὦ) only at *Rhesus* 828 — which, being a play of doubtful authenticity, may not be evidence for Euripidean practice at all.

[2] Dodds (= Euripides, *Bacchae*, ed. with intro. and comm. by E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed. [Oxford 1960]) rightly dismisses as "weak" the usual explanation, that so striking a term alludes to the yellowness of the leaves or berries of the ivy with which the thyrsus is bound; but he substitutes the equally obscure and allusive view of Sandys, that the thyrsus is golden because accessories of gods are naturally made of gold.

[3] If Dodds (note 2 above) is right, in his notes on 115, 135, 136, and 141, that the male celebrant in the Dionysiac rites is called "Bromius" and "The Bacchus" in a ritual sense, then not even the chorus know that their θιασώτης *is* in fact the god to whom at 553 they pray. I presume the Lydian Stranger revealed his true identity in the great lacuna before 1330. Ironically, here Dodds himself confuses the Lydian Stranger with

sis" with τινάσσων — compare for such "tmesis" the strikingly similar 80, ἀνὰ θύρσον τε τινάσσων, which our lines intentionally echo, and, for the preposition following the verb, *Hecuba* 504, ἥκω . . . Ἀγαμέμνονος πέμψαντος, ὦ γύναι, μέτα.[4]

So far this note has only urged the revival of Usener's reading; at this point, however, it is suggested that the same arguments can be applied *without altering the text* — namely, by taking χρυσῶπα as *itself a vocative*. It may be that Euripides, dipping into Homer (as so often) for a grandiose and archaic-sounding epithet, has created a vocative χρυσῶπα on the analogy of κυνῶπα, εὐρύοπα, and so forth.[5] This word, while by no means an Attic prose form, is nevertheless far more likely to have been recognised as vocative by virtue of its position than

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Dionysus, despite his own notes, and although the Stranger has explicitly informed the audience (4, and again at 53f. if genuine) that his mortal shape is different from his godly one, in which the chorus presumably expect him to come.

[4]*LSJ* implicitly admit *Hec.* 504 as an example of "tmesis" by citing it under μεταπέμπω. The parallel is thus a good one for countering the objections of Professor Diskin Clay and of *AJP*'s anonymous reader, who ask whether the preposition can follow its verb in "tmesis" and, if not, whether ἄνα can here be adverbial when the only meaning given by *LSJ* for adverbial ἄνα is "all over," which clearly won't fit this context. I may just add that I think such objections indicate a source of semantic confusion, which is why I have put the word "tmesis" in quotation marks. In my opinion, "tmesis" is a false grammatical category; the only ground on which it can be distinguished from the adverbial use of the preposition is whether the corresponding compounded verb ever appears in a parallel sense or not, which is a circular differentia. Thus, for example, when D. B. Munro (*A Grammar of Homeric Dialect* [Oxford 1891] 163f.) says that περὶ φρένας ἵμερος αἱρεῖ is an example of a "simply adverbial" preposition as opposed to "tmesis," because the Greek word περιαιρέω means only "remove" and never, as here, "seize round," he begs the question; for it would have been equivalent either to say that περιαιρέω means only "remove" except in "tmesis" where it can also mean "seize round," or alternatively to dispense altogether with the term "tmesis" and grant that an adverbial preposition sometimes modifies the sense of the verb as it would if it were compounded, and sometimes has yet another meaning. See further the discussion in Schwyzer.

[5]Euripides is, as Dodds points out, extremely fond of coining -ωπ-derivatives; much of the time the morpheme seems virtually void of meaning (as *IT* 263 κοιλωπός), and Euripides apparently feels free to assign to it either -o-stem or consonantal declension — thus even in the same play we find *HF* 131 γοργῶπες but 1266 γοργωπούς. Homer's κυνῶπα, yet again, is the vocative of a masculine -ā-stem, while εὐρύοπα (whose -οπ-morpheme was no more certainly understood in antiquity than today) is usually explained as a heteroclite, a consonant-stem with vocative-nominative formed analogically to the -ā-stems with nominative in -ă. No wonder that Euripides, no Indo-Europeanist, was confused; later generations, indeed, so despaired of the Homeric -ă-type -ā-stem masculine nominative that they treated it as indeclinable (so Aratus 664, ἱππότα used as a genitive).

the unemphatic and ambiguous ἄνα. Simply replace the difficult, inau-
dible commas after ἄνα, τινάσσων and μόλε by a single and more likely
one after χρυσῶπα.

## II

κοῦφα γὰρ δαπάνα νομί-
ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ᾽ ἔχειν,
ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,
τό τ᾽ ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ νόμιμον
ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός.

(892-96)

Heath's τόδ᾽ for the manuscript's τ᾽ being universally accepted,
debate continues over how to construe the lines. Dodds cites the view of
Sandys, that the last three lines form a single noun-complex united by
the two τε's and appositive to τόδε: "It costs but little to hold that *that*
has (sovereign) power, whate'er it be that is more than mortal, and in
the long ages is upheld by law and grounded in nature." This he rejects
(rightly) as too blithely making a single concept of very different sorts of
things, that is, as too easily assuming the existence of a category "things
that are (i) divine, (ii) upheld by law, and (iii) grounded in nature."
Dodds' own view is that the last two lines form a second clause depend-
ing on νομίζειν, with εἶναι to be supplied with πεφυκός; for the last
half of Sandys' translation, after "more than mortal," he substitutes,
"and to consider what has been accepted through long ages (to be) an
eternal truth and grounded in nature." But this in turn has recently
been rejected by Dawe (again rightly) on primarily grammatical
grounds—it is too much to suppose the last two lines a clause rather
than a single noun-complex introduced by τό.[6] Dawe then finds himself
unable to translate the lines as they stand, and emends the last line,
condemning this single noun-complex as "pedestrian."[7]

[6]R. D. Dawe, "A note on Euripides, *Bacchae* 896," *RhM* 123:3 (1980) 223-24.
[7]How "pedestrian" a line is, however, is a poor criterion for judging its genuine-
ness. Certainly Roux's translation, quoted by Dawe, trivialises the verse ("la tradition
consacrée par les siècles, qui, toujours, est issue de la nature même"); but Roux's prose is
not Euripides' poetry, nor is her relative clause his parataxis. How little "pedestrian" is
the concept is well indicated by Heinimann, who, as cited by Dodds, "rightly speaks of
'the consciously paradoxical union of two predicates which are elsewhere sharply op-
posed' "—and they are two opposed, not to say polar, notions: "What has been instituted
over long time, and what has always existed by nature."

But gentler medicines are ready to hand. All of the views thus far cited make τόδ' the subject of ἔχειν, and so are forced to grapple, one way or another, with the text's apparently making the third line *and* the fourth and fifth lines appositive to it. But Dawe's strong insistence should be taken seriously, that the anticipatory τόδ' loses its punch if it is made to introduce several notions connected by "and." The difficulty vanishes if the third line itself be taken as the subject of ἔχειν; τόδ' can now be taken as appositive to ἰσχύν, introducing the fourth and fifth lines only. Translate: "It costs but little to hold that whatever the divine may be has this as its strength: that which has been instituted by much time, and that which has always existed by nature." It might help to remove the comma after ἔχειν and to replace the comma after δαιμό-νιον by an anticipatory dash.

The correctness of these grammatical suggestions is confirmed by the power and cogency of the resulting sense. On Sandys' reading, we are being told that the divine is powerful, which is obvious; on Dodds' that *nomos* is *physis*, which is false — indeed, it negates the dynamic opposition of the two on which the play rests. Dionysus' manifestation seems to imply a paradox: on the one hand his rituals are obviously a threat to the societal stability that Pentheus, in the name of justice, makes it his business to defend, and to this extent "the advent of Dionysus will appear as a movement back to nature, as a return from *nomos* to *physis*"; yet at the same time, as Conacher has pointed out, Teiresias can justify worshipping Dionysus by an appeal to tradition (210ff.), and the chorus can call Pentheus, the self-appointed vindicator of *nomos*, ἄνομον (995).[8] Here in the third stasimon this paradox is addressed directly: impiety and disobedience to law are one and the same, for (γάρ, 892) one may as well realise that, whatever the divine may be, its power lies in *a combination of* nomos *and* physis.

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[8]"The advent," etc.: Charles Segal, *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides' Bacchae* (Princeton 1982) 344. Conacher = D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme, and Structure* (Toronto 1967). Compare also Cadmus' exhortation that Pentheus join him and Teiresias (in their back-to-nature activities) rather than live θύραζε τῶν νόμων (331). The line is echoed by the chorus here at 890ff.

## THE PLANT DECORATION ON THEOCRITUS' IVY-CUP

The κισσύβιον which the goatherd offers to Thyrsis in *Idyll* 1 has among its decorations this vegetable motif:

τῷ ποτὶ μὲν χείλη μαρύεται ὑψόθι κισσός,
κισσὸς ἑλιχρύσῳ κεκονισμένος· ἁ δὲ κατ' αὐτόν
καρπῷ ἕλιξ εἱλεῖται ἀγαλλομένα κροκόεντι.

(29-31)

A. S. F. Gow prints the variant κεκονιμένος "dusted," which I find much harder to defend than κεκονισμένος "intertwined," derived from κονίζω.[1] C. Gallavotti has pointed out Gow's further error in taking ἑλιχρύσῳ as the flower of the ivy instead of helichryse, a flower with a straight, rigid stem around which the ivy might twist.[2] Yet Gallavotti himself is surely wrong to think that καρπῷ κροκόεντι refers to blossoms of helichryse rather than ivy berries,[3] as *Homeric Hymn* 7.40-41 suggests:

ἀμφ' ἱστὸν δὲ μέλας εἱλίσσετο κισσός
ἄνθεσι τηλεθάων, χαρίεις δ' ἐπὶ καρπὸς ὀρώρει·

Although Theocritus' dependence on early Greek epic is well documented, no scholar, to my knowledge, has noticed that these lines must surely be the model for his description. They contain the only occurrence of κισσός in Homer, Hesiod, and the *Hymns*. The first line of Theocritus' passage is structured after line 40 of the *Hymn*, ἑλιχρύσῳ κεκονισμένος in the second line recalls ἄνθεσι τηλεθάων, and the last line and a half with its καρπῷ harks back to χαρίεις δ' ἐπὶ καρπὸς ὀρώρει. Theocritus' εἱλεῖται is probably also a reminiscence, of εἱλίσ-

[1] All three families of manuscripts (K, Va, and Q) transmit κεκονισμένος, while κεκονιμένος is found only in P and W, both of the Laurentian family. K. Latte, "Neues zur klassischen Literatur aus Hesych," *Mnemosyne* 3rd. ser. 10 (1941) 82-83, has argued persuasively for the derivation from κονίζω and shows that this verb refers to interweaving in an irregular pattern. Gow, ed., *Theocritus* II, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1952) *ad* 30f., rejects Latte's interpretation in favor of Wilamowitz's supposition (*Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Bukoliker* [Berlin 1906] 223) that κεκονισμένος is merely an inferior form of κεκονιμένος.

[2] Gallavotti, "Le coppe istoriate di Teocrito e di Virgilio," *PP* 21 (1966) 423-25. Gow's interpretation is supported only by a gloss in the Suda (repeated by Zonaras), ἑλίχρυσος· τὸ τοῦ κισσοῦ ἄνθος, which may well have originated in an attempt to explicate the confusing language in *Id.* 1.29-31. On the flower helichryse, see K. Lembach, *Die Pflanzen bei Theokrit* (Heidelberg 1970) 171-72.

[3] Gallavotti (note 2 above) 428.

σετο. Based on this comparison with the model, I translate: "High toward the lip of the cup curls ivy, ivy intertwined with helichryse; along the flower winds the ivy tendril, rejoicing in its golden fruit."[4]

In the *Homeric Hymn*, that to Dionysus, the ivy is growing with supernatural speed; its twining about the mast and the blossoming of its fruit and flowers are a Dionysiac miracle. In *Idyll* 1 the ivy likewise seems alive and even has animate feeling, although it is carved ivy, chiselled in wood. The verb μαρύεται is a middle, indicating that the ivy "twines itself," and εἰλεῖται also connotes self-propelled motion. ἀγαλλομένα is generally used of persons or animals and suggests that the ivy feels joy in its saffron-colored fruit. What Theocritus has done here is to recast a miracle, which was acceptable under the terms of archaic religious thought, into a description of an object of art, marvelous in that its motion suggests either supreme artistic workmanship or the naive imagination of the goatherd.

Theocritus' lines have proved difficult to interpret not only because of uncertainty about the text and about the meanings of certain terms but also because Theocritus has fostered ambiguity by using for ivy terminology that recalls the helichryse. The stem ἑλι- repeats in ἕλιξ "vine tendril" and in εἰλεῖται, which describes the tendril's motion, while -χρύσῳ echoes in καρπῷ κροκόεντι where the adjective suggests both goldenness and the crocus, a flower like the helichryse. The intertwining of the ivy and helichryse, conveyed even by the word order of κισσὸς ἑλιχρύσῳ κεκονισμένος, is further described in 31 in such a way that the actual twining and goldenness of the ivy duplicates the etymological twining and goldenness of the flower it surrounds. While the intricacy of the description suggests the high sophistication of a Hellenistic poet like Theocritus, the slightly illogical nature of the associations calls to mind the simplicity of the naive goatherd. The lines thus replicate something of the magic of their model, but in terms acceptable to a more modern and somewhat jaded age.

[4] A correct understanding of Theocritus' passage clarifies the syntax of Vergil's imitation in *Ecl.* 3.38-39:

> lenta quibus torno facili superaddita vitis
> diffusos hedera vestit pallente corymbos.

As Vergil's golden line (39) clearly mimics Theocritus' golden line (31), so the *corymbos* must be *bacas hederarum* (Serv. *ad* 3.39; Jun. Philarg. *ad* 3.39) just as the καρπῷ κροκόεντι are ivy-berries. Robert Coleman, ed., *Vergil: Eclogues* (Cambridge 1977) *ad* 3.39 is thus wrong to insist that *hedera . . . pallente* is to be taken with *vestit* rather than *diffusos*.

This example, though a small one, is illustrative of Theocritus' pastoral technique. It suggests that William Empson speaks not quite accurately of "the pastoral process of putting the complex into the simple,"[5] that the pastoral process is rather an intertwining of the complex and the simple with the result that our sophistication and the characters' naivité meet, indistinguishably, like helichryse and ivy, in a form of aesthetic pleasure.

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[5]William Empson, *Some Versions of Pastoral* (London 1935) 23.

# NOBILES AND NOVI RECONSIDERED[1]

Gelzer's revelation in *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (1912) that the term *nobilis* applied to Roman citizens denotes direct descent from a consul in the male line[2] soon became *communis opinio*. Recently Brunt[3] has revived Mommsen's proposition that all persons possessing the *ius imaginum*, i.e. descended from curule magistrates, were so designated.

Gelzer's theory is based on the fact that persons or families called *nobilis* in the sources either demonstrably conform to his definition or at least do not refute it. Afzelius[4] counted 294 references, 156 applying to nobility definitely proven in Gelzer's sense, while in 126 it is "jedenfalls wahrscheinlich." Had descendants of other curule magistrates qualified, we should expect plenty of contrary examples, not only among known praetorian and aedilician families but among others not otherwise so known. In view of the paucity of information after Livy's lists fail

[1]This paper owes much to Professor Badian's comments and criticisms. He is, of course, not responsible for the views put forward.
[2]Or certain comparable magistrates — dictator, perhaps Master of Horse or military tribune with consular power.
[3]*JRS* 72 (1982) 1-17.
[4]*C&M* 1 (1938) 90.

us, the latter must be numerous. But such examples are not forthcoming. The twelve apparent exceptions to Gelzer's rule nearly all turn out on brief inspection to be illusory, and none of them convinces. Brunt adduces only two:

1) In *De orat.* 3.74 Cicero alludes to C. Papirius Carbo, consul in 120, as "nobilissimus homo atque eloquentissimus." Brunt rightly rejects an explanation offered by Gelzer but himself allows that just conceivably Cicero did not recall when he wrote the passage that Carbo was not descended from the patrician Papirii, "as he later did": the last words refer to Cicero's letter to Papirius Paetus (*Fam.* 9.21), in which he says that the Carbones and Turdi were plebeians. That however does not prove that the family was not originally patrician, as were the Papirii Mas(s)ones, later almost certainly plebeian (cf. Münzer, *RE* XVIII [3].1064.32), and the house of the Servilii Gemini, recently the subject of an illuminating study by Badian.[5] There is no proof that, as Gelzer asserted, "the Carbones maintained that their *stirps* had originally been patrician"; none the less it may be so. The ignorance of Papirius Paetus (cf. Brunt, p. 6) is no real evidence to the contrary. He was clearly uninformed on these matters. On the other hand, even supposing that Cicero could have knowingly described a man of praetorian family as *nobilis*, it would be strange indeed to call him *nobilissimus*.[6]

2) In *Rab. perd.* 21 Cicero speaks of the rallying of Rome's élite against Saturninus. After mention of the consuls and eight consulars (not all of them *nobiles*), he continues: "cum omnes praetores, cuncta nobilitas ac iuventus accurreret, Cn. et L. Domitii, L. Crassus, Q. Mucius, C. Claudius, M. Drusus, cum omnes Octavii, Metelli, Iulii, Cassii, Catones, Pompeii, cum L. Philippus, L. Scipio, cum M. Lepidus, cum D. Brutus, cum hic ipse P. Servilius quo tu imperatore, Labiene, meruisti, cum hic Q. Catulus admodum adulescens, cum hic C. Curio, cum denique omnes clarissimi viri cum consulibus essent," sqq. Catulus and Curio were both very young men in 100. Both were distinguished consulars in 63 and both were present in the audience. *iuventus* does not literally exclude non-nobles. Obviously Cicero was thinking of socially distinguished young men, and such Curio was. His family was praetorian, his father had been a celebrated orator; it surprised Cicero that he did not become consul (*Brut.* 124). To name Catulus and leave

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[5] *PBSR* 52 (1984) 49–71.

[6] I do not exclude the possibility that Carbo's eminence as orator and politician may have been in Cicero's mind, but from all analogy the primary reference has to be to birth.

Curio out would have been offensive, as Gelzer saw. The doctrine is not shaken.

Brunt's further argument that *omnes Pompeii* should include Pompey's father as well as the descendants of Q. Pompeius, consul in 141, can hardly be taken seriously. Cicero did not guard his tongue as closely as all that. In this same passage *omnes praetores* ignores Glaucia, who had been excepted in 20. We could not expect him to be at pains to point out that Pompey the Great's father did not quite qualify. A. Pompeius and Q. Pompeius Rufus carry their *gentilis* Strabo.[7]

Gelzer urged that in his defences of Fonteius and Murena, both of well-established praetorian stock, Cicero makes no mention of their nobility. Brunt counters with the warning that "it is very rash to draw inferences from Cicero's non-use of terms." That depends. Brunt himself notes that Cicero refers to the nobility of P. Sulla, L. Flaccus, and M. Marcellus in the speeches that go by their names. If the references are "incidental and unemphatic," it is none the less remarkable that none at all occur in the other two speeches.

Antony's imputation of *ignobilitas* to Octavian (*Phil.* 3.15), the son of a praetor who would probably have been consul had he lived, is plain positive evidence for Gelzer. Brunt was evidently not very happy with his counter-plea, that Antony was thinking rather of Octavian's Arician mother. Doubtless he was, but C. Octavius was not to be ignored if his praetorship conferred nobility. And this very mother was the daughter of a *praetorius*!

Brunt gives prominence (p. 9) to a passage in Sallust's sketch of Marius (*Iug.* 63.6f.): "etiam tum alios magistratus plebs, consulatum nobilitas inter se per manus tradebat. novus nemo tam clarus neque tam egregiis factis erat quin is indignus illo honore et quasi pollutus haberetur." He claims that it makes much better sense if we follow Mommsen. On the contrary, the contrast between the sacred consulship and the inferior offices which the nobles were willing to leave open to the "plebs" is all in favor of Gelzer — though this is obscured in Brunt's citation (in English), which starts at *consulatum*. True, Sallust takes no account of the scions of non-consular families whose ancestors had held curule office and who did reach the top. He is generally allowed to have been a better rhetorician than historian, and it is the stark opposition between the nobility and the upstart from Arpinum that matters to him here.

[7]On the Pompeii see G. V. Sumner, *AJAH* 2 (1977) 8-25.

I think I have answered as much of Brunt's case as bears closely on the point at issue. The challenge to Gelzer comes from a highly respected quarter, but it fails on all counts.

*Novus homo* is defined by Badian in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* as follows: "A term used in the late Republic (and probably earlier) for the first man of a family to reach the Senate . . . and in a special sense for the first to obtain the consulate and hence *nobilitas*."

This may be regarded as the orthodox view, adopted by Wiseman in his *New Men in the Roman Senate* (1971), p. 1. He refers to Strasburger's entry in *RE* and to Helleguarc'h's *Vocabulaire latine*, pp. 472ff. The treatment in the latter is unhelpful,[8] but Strasburger puts the evidence clearly, whatever may be thought of his conclusion.

The first sense emerges most clearly from the well-known passage in Cicero's second speech, *De lege agraria* (3), made during his consulship, in which he tells the people that he was the first *novus homo* to have been elected consul for a very long time (*perlongo intervallo*), almost the first in living memory ("prope memoriae temporumque nostrorum primum"). From the lists of notable *novi homines* in *Verr.* 2.5.81 and *Mur.* 17 it is clear that he was here looking back to the consulship of C. Coelius Caldus in 92.[9] Since a number of the intervening consuls, including L. Volcacius Tullus only three years previously, were not of consular descent, it is safely inferred that descendants of praetors and probably of senators generally did not come within Cicero's use of the term in these passages.

But what of Badian's "special sense," coexisting and to some extent conflicting with the first (a *novus* in the second sense might not be *novus* in the first)? Strasburger adduces four items of evidence. I take them in reverse order of weight:

1) *Cons. petit.* 13 speaks of *invidia* directed against Cicero's candidature from men of consular families who had not attained the office themselves and even from *homines praetorii*, i.e., New Men (like Cicero

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[8]The same, I am afraid, must be said of M. Dandin-Payre's article in *Historia* 30 (1981) 22–53, except for the valuable appendix with its full collection of examples.

[9]"In these texts 'homo novus' is an outright *parvenu*," Brunt (note 3 above) 12. As for C. Norbanus, consul in 83, the absence of filiation in the *Fasti* (not mentioned by E. S. Gruen, *Historia* 15 [1966] 46 n. 65) has reasonably been taken to indicate that his father was not a Roman citizen. Wiseman (*New Men*, p. 245) observes that "Cicero's failure to mention him as one of his predecessors is explicable on political grounds." Brunt, while doubtfully granting him senatorial family, suggests that "Cicero may not have wished to find a precedent for his own rise in that of a man prominent in the discredited régime of Cinna and Carbo." Was it not that in a context like this, *Cinnanum tempus* simply did not count?

himself), who had held the praetorship and so were legally entitled to
stand for the consulship. The writer clearly means that New Men who
were *not* so entitled would not have the same reason for being jealous.
But Strasburger seems to have understood *praetorios* as "descendants of
praetors," which is unexampled Latin and ruinous to the point. This
argument can therefore be dismissed.

2) L. Mummius, the destroyer of Corinth, is twice called *novus
homo* by Velleius (1.13.2, 2.128.2).[10] Mummius was the son of a prae-
tor, but Velleius may well have been ignorant of the fact. His authority
in such a matter does not count for much anyway.

3) In *Mur.* 17 Cicero says that after his own attainment of the con-
sulship he had not expected the prosecution to talk about *generis novi-
tas* in the case of a consul-designate of old and distinguished family[11]
(Murena) defended by a Roman Knight (himself, by origin). This cer-
tainly fits in with Strasburger's theory, but the wording seems to me too
indirect to sustain a conclusion.

4) In *Off.* 1.138[12] Cicero refers to Cn. Octavius, consul in 165,
who was the son of a praetor and grandson of a quaestor, as *novus
homo*. And in *Phil.* 9.4 he implies as much. The passages had better be
quoted:

> Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex illa familia consul factus est, honori fuisse
> accepimus quod praeclaram aedificasset in Palatio et plenam dignitatis
> domum: quae cum vulgo viseretur, suffragata domino, novo homini, ad
> consulatum putabatur.

> Cn. Octavi, clari viri et magni, qui primus in eam familiam quae postea
> viris fortissimis floruit attulit consulatum, statuam videmus in rostris.
> nemo tum novitati invidebat; nemo virtutem non honorabat.[13]

Octavius is Strasburger's trump card. Brunt doubts whether Cicero
knew that his father was a praetor, but it would be surprising if he did
not, for Octavius senior was quite a distinguished figure in the Second
Punic War and after, whom Cicero must have encountered in his histor-
ical reading. In both passages, moreover, Cicero refers to the fact that

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[10]He is called *nobilis* in the editions of Valerius Maximus (6.4.2), where the
plainly defective text calls for an easy remedy: see *HSCP* 85 (1981) 164f.

[11]"Vetere atque illustri familia." On the significance of these epithets see my note
on Vell. 2. 117.2 in *CQ* 34 (1984) 451.

[12]Correct Strasburger's slip ("De Orat.").

[13]Brunt translates: "No one begrudged the novelty (of the memorial); none with-
held honour from virtue." That does not suit the tense of *invidebat*. Furthermore, the
memorial (a statue) to Octavius is mentioned as the *second* of two precedents for the
proposed monument to Sulpicius Rufus.

the consul of 165 was the first of his family to attain the office. Does that not rather look as though he knew that there had been lesser offices in the family?

But at most this one example can be taken as showing that *novus homo* may be used of a newcomer to the consulship in a context relating to that office, provided the speaker make it plain, as Cicero does, that this is what he means. We must not forget that these terms are governed by usage, not by legal definition.

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## THE FINAL SIMILE IN THE *AENEID*:
## ROMAN AND RUTULIAN RAMPARTS

The initial simile in the *Aeneid* (1.148-53) has been the subject of repeated and deserved attention by scholars.[1] The emphatic position and scope of that comparison are reinforced by programmatic elements which mark it as emblematic of the specifically Vergilian and Roman innovations in epic poetry. The *Aeneid's* final "simile-cluster" (12.921-24), in contrast, has been virtually ignored by commentators and critics. In this article I shall examine certain peculiarities of the passage itself, relate the three comparisons in it to other Vergilian contexts, and discuss their significance to the theme of the poem.

> Cunctanti telum Aeneas fatale coruscat,
> sortitus fortunam oculis, et corpore toto                          920
> eminus intorquet. murali concita numquam
> tormento sic saxa fremunt nec fulmine tanti
> dissultant crepitus. uolat atri turbinis instar
> exitium dirum hasta ferens orasque recludit
> loricae et clipei extremos septemplicis orbis;                     925
> per medium stridens transit femur.

[1]See V. Pöschl, *The Art of Vergil*, trans. G. Seligson (Ann Arbor 1970) 20-24; G. Williams, *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid* (New Haven 1983) 70-72; R. Hornsby, *Patterns of Action in the Aeneid* (Iowa City 1970) 20-22; R. Brower's chapter, "Verbal and Visual Translations of Myth: Neptune in Virgil, Rubens, Dryden," in *Mirror on Mirror* (Cambridge 1974) 17-45.

Before concentrating on the last simile itself, it is necessary to ex-
amine the relatively rare mode of comparison which it shares with sev-
eral other passages. Of the 104 developed similes[2] in the *Aeneid* only
four are expressed in genuinely negative terms:[3]

    2.496-99 — river breaking the levees ≠ (*non sic*) Greeks pouring
                into Priam's chamber.

    5.144-47 — chariots breaking from starting line or charioteers
                urging their teams ≠ (*non tam, nec sic*) rousing
                start of boat-race.

    6.801-5 — distance of Hercules' travels or Bacchus' processions
                ≠ (*nec tantum, nec*) scope of Augustus' empire.

    12.921-23 — sound of stones launched from catapult or of a light-
                ning bolt ≠ (*numquam . . . sic, nec . . . tanti*)
                roar of Aeneas' spear-throw.

No poet, of course, is so frivolous as to frame a comparison, then imme-
diately to deny its propriety. Rather, his audience is implicitly expected
to understand that the primary action or dimension eclipses even that of
the simile. In rhetorical terms, the four passages cited contain tacit ex-
amples of a *comparatio a minore ad maiorem*. In them, however, there
is a hyperbolic reversal of the expected order of magnitude, *non pro-
bandi, sed ornandi causa*.[4]

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[2]By "developed" similes I mean those which contain a finite verb; "brief" similes
have no verb. This distinction is the basis for the useful Vergilian and Homeric tables
(confirmed by my own count) in the six appendices to G. Carlson's *Die Verwandlung der
homerischen Gleichnisse in Vergils Äneis* (Heidelberg: Inaug.-Diss., Ruprecht-Karl-
Univ. 1972). Neither R. B. Steele, "The Similes in Latin Epic Poetry," *TAPA* 49 (1918)
83-100 nor J. Perkins, "An Aspect of Latin Comparison Constructions," *TAPA* 104
(1974) 261-77 addresses the specific issue which I shall discuss in this study. (Their "sta-
tistics" are also vague or incorrect.)

[3]Though it contains one explicit comparative ("non densior . . . nec . . . tan-
tum"), the simile at *Georgics* 4.80-81 is genuinely negative. It is also grammatically in-
dependent (see my comments below), but perhaps its brevity dictated an editorial semi-
colon rather than a full-stop to separate it from the preceding section of the text. In
another small group (six) of similes in the *Aeneid*, the comparison is introduced by litotes
and there is an ellipsis of the *res comparanda*: "non aliter quam si" (4.669); "nec magis
. . . quam si" (6.470-1); "non secus ac si" (8.243); "non secus atque olim" (8.391); "non
secus ac . . . sive" (12.856-8); "haud secus atque" (11.456). In *Georgics* 3.470-71 both
terms are expressed: "non tam creber . . . turbo/quam multae . . . pestes." These
examples are to be carefully distinguished from the many instances (nineteen) in which
the resumptive link *between* the simile and the plot-action is expressed by litotes, e.g.,
2.382, 4.149, 4.256, 4.669, 5.592, 9.342, etc.

[4]See M. H. McCall, Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison*
(Cambridge 1969) 191-210; and note Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.14 for a Vergilian *contrarii ex-
emplum* (*Aeneid* 2.540-41), which is a forcefully negative comparison, but *not* a simile.

There seems to be no common contextual or formal reason for Vergil to have cast these four similes in a negative mold. One highlights a Trojan defeat, another a Trojan victory; there is no conceivable narrative connection between — or psychological grounds for the negative presentation of — similes that emphasize the start of an athletic contest and the extent of Roman rule under Augustus. There are, however, in these similes some interesting structural anomalies. The first three negative comparisons are of average length for a Vergilian simile. The *hasta*-simile at 12.921–23 is relatively short, but there are a number of others in the *Aeneid* that are no longer, and some even briefer. Unlike the vast majority of developed comparisons in the epic, this final simile both begins and ends in the middle of a verse: in each case at the strong caesura.[5] The very short simile at 5.458–59 and the more expansive one at 2.355–58, however, display this same irregularity of linear placement; the former also at the strong caesura, the latter with an unparalleled introduction in the last three syllables of the line, *lupi ceu*. But these two passages have no other peculiarities of context, theme, or form which would cause them to be classified with the epic's last simile.

Each of these four negative similes is a self-contained unit, a complete sentence, figuratively, but not grammatically, linked to the preceding narrative. This independence of construction is shared by only one other developed simile in the *Aeneid*. (By definition, "brief" similes are always dependent.) Though conventions of punctuation may vary, the Oxford edition of Mynors marks the elaborate Bitias-simile at 9.710–16 as a complete sentence. Its introductory word *talis* is also unique, but necessary as the comparative link to preceding action.[6] (The internal *sic* [712] reinforces the comparison.) The passage is long,[7] complex, and "contemporary"; moreover, it *terminates* the scene in which Bitias is slain, a rare and emphatic placement for a Vergilian simile. In the Bitias-simile and in the preceding action there are also some lexical parallels to which I shall refer later in this study when I discuss the cumulative thematic elements present in the final *hasta*-simile. Thus far, then, in a search for some common structural element in

[5] The terminal position of the adverb *numquam* at 12.921 is also emphatic, but hardly unparalled, cf. 2.438, 5.633, 8.470; a final *umquam (usquam)* preceded by a negative appears in 4.338, 4.529, 8.569, 9.256, 9.420.

[6] The reading *qualis* (Pω) is a standard introduction to a simile; its adoption would presumably deprive the passage of its grammatical independence.

[7] Its 7 lines are matched by similes at 1.430 and 5.273; there is one eight-line simile (12.715) and two of nine lines (10.707, as expanded by Scaliger's placement of 717–18, and 12.749).

the four negative similes, the evidence has yielded only one significant
result: their grammatical independence. Indeed, Vergil's poetic logic
seems to demand that his negative similes stand by themselves: a direct
grammatical link with the context would destroy the impact of the para-
doxical exaggeration which is the basis of the comparison, and thereby
reduce the figure to an absurdity. But, apart from the eccentric linear
placement of the simile at 12.921-23, there is nothing else in the shape
of the passages or in their immediate contexts which would, by itself,
mark them as startlingly different.

What about the isolated referential content of these similes? The
negative comparison at 2.496-99 is quite closely modelled on a simile in
the *Iliad* 5.87-92; but the Homeric analogue is expressed in a conven-
tional positive form: ἐοικὼς . . . ὥς.[8] Three of the negatively-cast
Vergilian similes contain *two* parallels to the plot-action (chariots and
charioteers, Hercules and Bacchus, stones and lightning bolt); but a
number of other similes in the *Aeneid* also include double referents.[9] In
these four negative similes there are two analogues from the natural
world (river and lightning bolt) and two from mythology (Hercules and
Bacchus); both sources are common in Vergilian comparisons. In the
entire epic, *tormentum*[10] is otherwise found only in a brief comparison
at 11.616. (I shall discuss this verse in greater detail later in this study.)
The paired analogy to an athletic contest (chariots and charioteers) is
unique in the *Aeneid*.[11] Both of the latter references, however, would

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[8]The question of genuinely negative similes in Homer is too complex to be treated
in any detail here. Undoubted examples, however, are very rare indeed: *Il.* 14.394-99,
17.20-22; *Od.* 13.86-87; none of these is grammatically independent. Other passages in
which negative comparisons appear are not necessarily similes, or present other problems
which urge caution.

[9]4.469-71, 6.309-12, 6.470-71, 7.718-21, 8.691-92, 9.435-37, 9.563-66, 9.668-
71, 11.456-58, 12.67-69, 12.521-25, 12.921-23. (The three referents at 12.701-03
[*Athos, Eryx, pater Appenninus*] share the same verbs and the same conspicuous height,
the real basis of the comparison.) Those similes with multiple referents are to be distin-
guished from those in which the narrative agent and action are both reflected in some
detail in the simile, e.g., 1.148-53; Neptune calms the storms just as a citizen of author-
ity calms an incipient riot; or 12.749-57: Aeneas pursues Turnus just as a hunting dog
tracks a stag.

[10]There are two references to battering rams in the *Aeneid*. An *aries* is used
against the walls of Latinus's city (12.706) and against the gate of the *penetralia* of
Priam's palace (2.492).

[11]In *Georgics* 1.512-14 an emphatic race-simile concludes the book. The ekphra-
sis in *Georgics* 3.103-12 is literally the call, from starting-gate to mid-course, of a chariot
race.

be familiar to a Roman audience, and by themselves can hardly be
considered so exotic as to prompt or demand a special mode of
introduction.

The preceding examination of the four similes designated as a spe-
cial group by their rhetorically negative and independent status was a
necessary excursus into a minor aspect of Vergilian poetics and struc-
ture. In the data examined, however, one can find almost nothing—
apart from their rare introduction—in the context, shape, or isolated
content that would mark any or all of these similes as *per se* extraordi-
nary. My primary purpose in this article, then, is to demonstrate that in
the final simile in the *Aeneid* there are other considerations which en-
dow it with a symbolic significance as important, but scarcely as evi-
dent, as that of the epic's initial simile. That demonstration will require
close attention to a cumulative pattern of literal and symbolic poetic
detail from the entire epic, with special emphasis on the closing
episodes.

Vergil signals the special force of the *hasta*-simile by modifying its
first referent, *tormento*, by *murali*, the only appearance of this adjec-
tive in his works.[12] The target of Aeneas' spear is thus figuratively con-
nected with and opposed to a city's defenses. Throughout the *Aeneid*,
ramparts (*moenia*) and walls (*muri*) play extremely significant narra-
tive and symbolic roles. The paramount theme of the poem is an-
nounced in the final words of its opening sentence: *altae* moenia *Ro-*
*mae* (1.7). Propertius summarized Vergil's epic project in this couplet:

> qui nunc Aeneae Troiani suscitat arma
>     iactaque Lauinis *moenia* litoribus.                    (2.34.62–63)

The reasons for this are obvious. Fortified walls not only define
and protect a city, they are also a concrete reminder to its citizens of the
city's stability and vulnerability. While the ramparts stand, the city
stands; when the ramparts are breached, by force or by treachery, the
city falls. Moreover, to the Romans these walls were literally sacred.[13]

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[12]The force of this adjective here is, of course, "causing the devastation of walls,"
not "characteristic of a wall" (see *TLL* s.v.); but cf. Milton's *Paradise Lost* 6.879: "mu-
ral breach" in a section bristling with lightning bolts (see R. J. Schork, "Hordes, Hounds,
and a Comma: Negative Similes in Milton," forthcoming in *Milton Quarterly*).

[13]See W. F. J. Knight, "The Holy City of the East in Vergil," *Vergilius* 2 (1939) 6–
16 (reprinted in *Vergil: Epic and Anthropology*, ed. J. D. Christie, [London 1967] 291–
303); Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (Garden City 1955) 134-42; and "Ritual
and Space," in F. E. Brown, *Roman Architecture* (New York 1967) 9-11.

Thus, Vergil specifically seals the fate of each of the major cities in the epic by direct reference to their walls:

a) Troy's collapse is the work of a god: "Neptunus *muros* magnoque emota tridenti/fundamenta quatit totamque a sedibus urbem/eruit" (2.610-12; cf. 9.144-45).

b) Carthage survives the departure of the Trojans; but its ultimate destruction is foreshadowed in Aeneas' last sight of the city: "*moenia* respiciens, quae iam infelicis Elissae/conlucent flammis" (5.3-4).[14]

c) Castra Troiana on the banks of the Tiber serves the refugee band as *sedes exigua*, but it too is protected by modest ramparts (7.157), which are the focus of Mnestheus' desperate cry to rally the Trojans against Turnus' assault: "quos alios *muros*, quaeue ultra *moenia* habetis?" (9.782).

d) A new city is offered to the Trojans by King Latinus, who thereby hopes to stop the bloodshed and to protect his own citadel: "considant, si tantus amor, et *moenia* condant" (11.323)[15] and "mihi *moenia* Teucri/constituent urbique dabit Lauinia nomen" (12.193-94).

It is clear, then, that throughout the *Aeneid* the fate of a city's walls is emphasized in a pattern that necessarily anticipates the rise of the epic's ultimate ramparts, those of Rome. This permanent foundation and its intermediate stages are guaranteed by Jupiter's solemn promise to Venus:

> cernes urbem et promissa Lauini/*moenia* (1.258-59); et *moenia* ponet
> (1.264); et Longam multa vi *muniet* Albam (1.271); et Mauortia condet/
> *moenia* (1.276-77); imperium sine fine dedi (1.279).

In an impressive article on Book Seven, Reckford identified other dimensions of this "contramural" pattern in the *Aeneid*, and concluded that "according to the isonomic law of history, only one set of walls may prevail."[16]

The frequent importance attached to *moenia* and *muri* in the *Aeneid*, then, underscores the significance of the first referent in the

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[14]Cf. Juno's earlier accusation of Venus: "nec me adeo fallit ueritam te *moenia* nostra/suspectas habuisse domos Karthaginis altae" (4.96-97).

[15]Cf. Turnus' taunt: "haec praemia, qui me/ferro ausi temptare, ferunt, sic *moenia* condunt" (12.360-61).

[16]K. J. Reckford, "Latent Tragedy in *Aeneid* VII. 1-285," *AJP* 82 (1961) 262; for extensive comments on "antithetical pairs" in the epic, see E. Vance, "Warfare and the Structure of Thought in Virgil's *Aeneid*," *Quaderni Urbinati* 15 (1973) 116-25.

epic's final simile: the terrifying concussive roar (*fremunt*) of missiles launched from a catapult at a fortified wall. Not all ramparts are built of stone; some are made of flesh and blood. Thus, in this aspect of the simile, Turnus becomes, like a city wall, the exposed target of Aeneas' "siege" weapon. Ramparts in "isonomic opposition" to those of Rome must fall—as have fallen the *moenia* of Priam's Troy and as will fall those of Dido's Carthage.[17]

The second term (the crack of a lightning bolt) in the simile is just as significant to the primary theme of the poem. In the comparison, the accuracy and the finality of Aeneas' spear-cast are certified by their association with Jupiter's natural and regal weapon.[13] Earlier in the epic, when the Trojans have arrived at the mouth of the Tiber, both the site and the occasion, "quo debita *moenia* condant," are confirmed by a triple thunder-clap, as Jupiter's hand propels a shuddering cloud of fire-gold light through the sky (7.141-45). Now, in the final dark moments of the *Aeneid*, Vergil includes another symbolic *omen magnum* to announce Turnus' devastation.

The primary basis of comparison in this second, as in the first, element of Vergil's final simile is the terrible sound[19] (*tanti . . . crepitus*) of the flung spear. By metonymic extension, however—especially in the light of Turnus' prior recognition of the ultimate cause of his doom ("di me terrent et Iuppiter hostis" [12.895])—one can also detect the fatal twist of the Olympian hand.

Two other similes—both are of the "brief" (= no-verb) type—perhaps foreshadow the actual terms of the final expanded comparison. In one, the Latin warrior Aconteus is hurled from his horse and falls "fulminis in morem aut tormento ponderis acti" (11.616).[20] Here the analogy is based on the sudden and definitive force by which the rider is hit and struck to the ground: *excussus . . . praecipitat* (11.615, 617). Though the charge of the two horses is appropriately onomatopoetic, the fatal blow itself makes no direct appeal to the auditory senses. The collocation of lightning and a catapult at the death of Aconteus, how-

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[17]See M. Mack, "To See It Feelingly," *PMLA* 86 (1971) 366: "The *Aeneid*, as everybody knows, is Vergil's tale of three cities: Troy, Carthage, and Rome. The price of the founding of Rome is that Troy and Carthage must be left behind: Troy in flames, Carthage unfinished with the body of Dido its queen on her funeral pyre also in flames."

[18]See Hornsby (note 1 above) 138.

[19]For a comprehensive review of the sonic dimension in the *Aeneid*, see F. X. M. J. Roiron, *Étude sur l'imagination auditive de Virgile* (Paris 1908).

[20]Cf. Lucretius 6.329, a simile in which the speed of a *fulmen* is presented "ut ualidis quae de *tormentis* missa feruntur."

ever, marks a climax in the battle before the city of Latinus. The Latin
battle lines break and the troops turn *ad moenia* (11.619). They will be
temporarily rallied by Camilla; but when she too is slain, there is a pan-
icked flight into the defensive walls, and then Trojan encirclement.
Turnus and Aeneas lift this siege by agreeing to the decisive single-
combat.

The second "prophetic" brief simile appears immediately prior to
the much more vividly acoustic description of the death of Bitias:

> tum Bitian ardentem oculis animisque *frementem*,
> non iaculo (neque enim iaculo uitam ille dedisset),
> sed magnum *stridens* contorta phalarica uenit
> *fulminis acta modo* . . . ;
> dat tellus *gemitum* et clipeum super *intonat* ingens.     (9.703-6, 709)

In neither of the two passages just quoted is there an ominous suggestion
that Jupiter has participated in the warrior's death. That special con-
junction of divine decision and human execution is limited to the *hasta*-
simile, primarily on the basis of its connection with the *moenia*-motif
and the symbolic bolt of lightning. Nevertheless, the description of the
blow which dispatches Bitias reverberates with elements that call for
comment.

In the passage just quoted there are important formal and lexical
links with the Aeneid's final simile-cluster. This is the context: the giant
brothers, Pandarus and Bitias, have rashly challenged the Rutulians to
enter the ramparts (*moenibus* [9.676]) of Castra Troiana. In the fierce
combat inside the fortifications, Bitias is fatally struck down—but no
ordinary hand-weapon could pierce his shield and breastplate: "non
iaculo . . . /sed . . . contorta phalarica uenit" (9.704-05).[21] In addi-
tion to the narrative presence of a siege-missile here, the emphatic nega-
tives (*non, neque, nec, nec*), the obtrusive ablative, and the negative
past-contrary-to-fact apodosis (704) all underscore the extraordinary
force of the blow. The structure and syntax, then, are analogous to the
peculiarly negative introductions to the final simile in which a spear is
launched with greater concussive energy than that of a catapult projec-
tile or lightning bolt. Here, just *before* the extended simile, one finds

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[21]Cf. Lucan 6.198-99: "hunc aut tortibus uibrata falarica neruis/obruat aut uasti
muralia pondera saxi." Some commentators have suggested that the clause "ipsi [P. and
B.] intus dextra ac laeua *pro turribus* astant" (9.677) contains a crypto-simile. This pos-
sibility is thoroughly discussed but rejected by J. Henry, *Aeneidea* (Dublin 1881) 934:
". . . *vice turrium; performing the office of*, without resemblance being at all implied"
(his italics).

the second brief comparison (*fulminis . . . modo* [9.706]) mentioned
above. It features the same comparative element as that in 12.922-23,
thus reinforcing the relevance of its context to that of the final simile.
Moreover, both in the narration of missile-strike and in the elaborate
independent simile amplifying Bitias' collapse (9.710-16), Vergil's pri-
mary purpose is to orchestrate the sounds of the seismic shock (*sonitu*
[9.715]). Several of these acoustical flourishes are also found in the
spear-passage (*frementem/fremunt, fulminis/fulmine*); the *gemitum*
(9.709) of the earth is echoed by *gemitu* of Turnus' comrades at his fall
(12.928);[22] the sharp ring of Bitias' huge shield (*intonat* [9.709]) re-
dounds in the dull bellow of the mountain (*remugit* [12.928]).

A final, and most vivid, sonic element is shared by the two pas-
sages. The missile which strikes Bitias is modified by the phrase *mag-
num stridens* (9.705). Immediately after the bipartite negative simile
describing the sound of Aeneas' spear as it is flung at Turnus, Vergil
follows its flight with yet another, this time "brief," simile:[23] "uolat atri
turbinis instar" (12.923). In its downward path the weapon pierces
Turnus' shield and breastplate; then, "per medium *stridens* transit fe-
mur" (12.926). The verb *strido* and its cognates appear six times in
Book Twelve of the *Aeneid*.[24] The most significant passage is one that
occurs almost immediately before Aeneas casts his spear. Jupiter dis-
patches one of the Dirae to warn Juturna that her continued protection
of Turnus is futile. The messenger's descent is described in terms which
are reflected in 12.923-26: "illa *uolat* celerique ad terram *turbine*
fertur" (12.855); "*stridens . . .* transilit umbras" (12.859): "*stridorem
. . .* agnouit [Iuturna]" (12.869). In the epic's final episode, Aeneas'
spear flies like a "dark whirlwind;" it bears dire death (*exitium dirum*
[12.924]); and "screeches" through Turnus' thigh. In the previous pas-
sage, the ominous Dira is carried to earth in a "whirlwind of speed"—
then, in a four-line simile (12.856-59), her flight is compared to a poi-

[22]Cf. the description of the grief at Dido's death, just before the simile in which her
fall is equated with that of Carthage itself: *gemituque . . . tecta fremunt* (4.667-68).

[23]This is the only instance in the entire *Aeneid* of immediately juxtaposed similes;
hence, my term "simile-cluster." In fact, in Book Twelve, the epic's longest, there are
more similes (sixteen developed and four brief) than in any other book, including the
combat-packed Book Ten (fourteen and two).

[24]12.267, 319, 590, 691, 859, 869. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find com-
pletely satisfactory English equivalents for the Latin verbs and nouns which punctuate
these two combat-passages. An era just preceeding that of contemporary supersonic
ICBM's, however, may supply an appropriate analogue: the *screech* of Stuka dive-
bombers.

soned Parthian arrow "screeching" through the clouds. In the two pas-
sages, the narrative and figurative elements are reversed, but their col-
location and the repetition of parallel terms[25] leave no doubt that Vergil
intended the one to echo the other.

Though it is not strictly speaking a simile, one should also note yet
another passage near the end of Book Twelve. In it, Turnus tries to
anticipate Aeneas' cast by hurling an immense stone at him. The at-
tempt is introduced by a Homeric convention:

> vix illud lecti bis sex cervice subirent,
> qualia nunc hominum producit corpora tellus.                    (12.899-900)

Unlike his Homeric analogues (one of whom smashes Aineias' hip),[26]
however, Turnus, dazed by the descent of the Dira, misses his target.
This unsuccessful cast of a massive stone stands in ironic contrast to the
stone missile figuratively, but so accurately, launched by the spear-cata-
pult in the epic's next scene. Thus, although Jupiter's hand is only figu-
ratively present in the *fulmen* of the final spear-cast, neither the two
combatants nor an alert reader could fail to recognize that the "iussa
superba/magnanimi Iovis" (12.877-78) have determined the outcome
of the action.

The cumulatively significant content of the final developed simile
in the *Aeneid* is rhetorically underscored by its rare negative form. In
this figure Turnus is momentarily transformed into a city's walls. The
sound of the weapon which lays him open is even more terrifying than
that of the whirl of a catapult or the crash of a lightning-bolt. Themati-
cally and acoustically, this comparison and its brief but independent
continuation pick up and magnify reverberations from other sections of
the epic. At the end of a dense flurry of comparisons that are Homeric
in both origin and scope, the stark brevity—every word is necessary,
none merely ornamental—of the *hasta*-simile is another mark of the
poet's firm control of his craft. The graphic descriptions of the climactic
action which surrounds this simile-cluster have perhaps deflected schol-

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[25]The Dira is not specifically described as *atra*, but she is *sata Nocte* (12.860) and
her terrestial metamorphosis is that of a night-singing owl (12.862-64). Exactly what
natural phenomenon is to be seen in a *turbo* is difficult to specify. It can occur over land
or sea; and by extension is the Latin word for a toy top (7.378). For other instances of a
"dark whirlwind," see 1.511 and 10.603-04 (also in a brief simile), and *Georgics* 1.320;
*turbine nigro*. It is worth noting that the narrative context enclosing the *Aeneid's* first
"brief" simile includes the word *turbine* (1.83).

[26]See G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen 1964) ( = *Hypomnemeta*
7) 317-18.

arly attention from it. But, far from being a randomly selected and fee-
bly executed series of conventional tropes, Vergil's last comparisons det-
onate with compressed martial energy and conclusive Olympian
authority.

I am not unaware that the conclusions I draw from the evidence
presented both reflect and project a critical point of view about Vergil's
poetic purpose and Aeneas' heroic stature. In analyzing a work of litera-
ture, attention to the author's choice and placement of subtle details is
important. Failing to recognize the precise concatenation of these ele-
ments, one might argue that Vergil intended the two terms of his final
simile to reduce Aeneas to a machine for destruction and a blind mete-
orological force. Such an inference, in my judgment, is not only far too
literal, it also betrays a reading of the end of the poem which is more
consonant with modern anti-war sensibilities than with Roman realities.
To be sure, the central point of the simile-cluster cannot be limited
merely to the *sound* of the spear-cast; rather, through a series of com-
parisons which are sensually effective and cross-referentially definitive,
Vergil emphasizes the tragic but necessary roles of the epic's victorious
hero and his vanquished opponent. The ramparts of Rome stand on a
Rutulian bulwark shattered by the will of Jupiter.

<div align="right">R. J. SCHORK</div>

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## SENECA, *TROADES* 197, 578, 584

haec fatus alta nocte divisit diem,                                    197
repetensque Ditem mersus ingentem specum
coeunte terra iunxit.

Critics take 197 to mean that Achilles' ghost "divided the daylight
with deep night," and since this makes little sense they are forced to give
weak explanations, to obelize or to conjecture.[1] But what the transmit-

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[1]Details in Fantham (see note 2 below) ad loc.; for the history of the problem, see
Richard L. Wertis ed., *L. Annaei Senecae Troades* (diss. Columbia 1973) 88–90.

ted text means is that Achilles "separated the daylight (of the upper world) from the deep darkness (of the nether world)." He did so, as lines 198-99 explain, by re-entering the earth, thus allowing it to close over him and so re-establishing the barrier between the two worlds. Seneca has already noted at 179 that the usual barrier was disrupted by Achilles' emergence; the unnatural contact between light and the world of darkness is a commonplace of such contexts, e.g., V. *Aen.* 8.243-46; Ov. *Met.* 5.356-58 (n.b. *immissus dies*); Sen. *HF* 50-61 (n.b. *nocte discussa* and *labentem diem*). Further examples of *nox* of the underworld in Sen. include *HF* 282, *Pha.* 221, *Oed.* 585; *alta* will refer not only to colour but also to location, as at *HF* 92 *alta caligine* and *Pha.* 93f. *altas tenebras* (both describing the underworld). For the poetic use of *dividere* with an ablative of separation cf. V. *Ecl.* 1.66, Prop. 1.12.3, Stat. *Silv.* 3.2.54; to write *alta a nocte* would clarify the sense, but seems unnecessary in view of these parallels.

> verberibus igni † morte cruciatu eloqui 578
> quodcumque celas adiget invitam dolor.

I am among those who decline to believe that Seneca wrote, in effect, "death will compel you to reveal your secrets." "*Morte* is almost certainly to be understood in the sense of *morte proposita*," writes Elaine Fantham in her fine recent edition of this play;[2] but it is clearly the *infliction* of *verbera*, etc., which will, according to Ulysses, make Andromache talk. Furthermore the repetition of *mors* from 575 is feeble, particularly when Andromache has just responded that she *wants* to die. Leo's conjecture, "verberibus igni omnique cruciatu," e.q.s. is popular, but style and content clearly require what Fantham calls an "asyndetic enumeration of horrors," for which she cites parallels such as Lucr. 3.1017, "verbera carnifices robor pix lamina taedae."[3] I would

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[2] *Seneca's Troades: a Literary Introduction with Text, Translation and Commentary* (Princeton 1982).

[3] In Sen. Trag. cf. e.g., *Phoen.* 296, "avidis cruoris imperi armorum doli"; *Tro.* 862, "lamenta caedes sanguinem gemitus habet." Otto Zwierlein's study of Seneca's elision technique would rule out Leo's *igni omnique*, since he finds no parallel at this place in the line for a final long vowel elided with a following long syllable, except where the latter is a monosyllable (*Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Ausgabe der Tragödien Senecas* [Wiesbaden 1984] 214-16). But this difficulty could be evaded by changing the transmitted *igni* to *igne*, on the grounds that the MSS almost always have *igne* elsewhere, even where *igni* would be metrically possible (*Phoen.* 563; *Ag.* 556; *Thy.* 748; the exception is *Thy.* 675, *igne* E *igni* PCS). If one accepts my conjecture, it is conceivable that Seneca wrote *igni* to avoid a sequence of two disyllabic words ending in -*e*.

suggest that the original word was *cruce*. For the cross in lists of tortures, cf. e.g., Plaut. *As.* 548f. "stimulos lamminas crucesque compedesque/nervos;" Sen. *de Ira* 3.3.6, "eculei et fidiculae et ergastula et cruces." For the collocation of *crux* and *cruciatus*, cf. Plaut. *Amph.* fr. 1, *cruce et cruciatu;* Cic. *Verr.* 1.9, 5.14, 5.170. The assonance of the two words will have a slightly archaic quality in Seneca, for which cf. e.g., *Phoen.* 159f., "effringe corpus corque . . . evelle"; *HF* 572 *saxaque traxerat;* 581 *Eurydicen iuridici;* and more generally his use of archaic-sounding alliteration at, e.g., *HF* 752f., "faucibus siccis senex/sectatur undas;" *Tro.* 694f., "preces placidus pias/patiensque recipe." The error probably arose through haplography, followed by interpolation of *morte* from 575 or 577 *mori.*

> Propone flammas, vulnera et diras mali
> doloris artes et famem et saevam sitim
> variasque pestes undique, et ferrum inditum                          584
> visceribus istis, carceris caeci luem,
> et quidquid audet victor iratus timens
>
>         585 istis E ustis A

Fantham translates *ferrum inditum visceribus* as "shackles fixed upon this flesh," but this will not do: "flesh" can be used emotively in such a context for the skin covering the flesh, but not so *viscera*. Given *ferrum* and *visceribus*, the phrase ought to mean "the sword driven into my innards," and so many translators render it. However, Fantham is right to balk at attributing such a meaning to *inditum*. Seneca uses it of a mirror "set in" gold (*NQ* 1.17.8; cf. 7.1.7), but one doubts whether it could have had a violent meaning in his day: for such a meaning *TLL* 7.1213.73 cites only the undated but late poem *Anth. Lat.* 941.64f., "nec semel Arcitenens tentarat spicula castis/indere pectoribus," and even here the verb could be rendered "implant," and has less violent connotations than the present passage requires.[4] Suspicion is increased by the fact that *indere* is generally avoided in classical poetry: *TLL* cites only two other uses of it in verse between the second century B.C. and the fourth A.D. (Lucr. 2.1124; Phaed. 1.16.2). I suggest that *inditum* is a

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[4] *Inditum* could be saved only by accepting A's *ustis* in 584 and understanding "ferrum inditum visceribus ustis" as "[hot] irons inserted in my scorched entrails." However, while *ferrum* can refer to such instruments, as at Juv. 14.21f., "aliquis tortore vocato/uritur ardenti . . . ferro," an epithet like Juvenal's *ardenti* would be needed to distinguish this from the usual poetic sense of *ferrum*, viz. "sword"; *ustis* seems too little and too late to make the sense clear.

simplification of an original *abditum*. Vergil had experimented with
*abdere* + Dat. in such a context at *Aen*. 2.553, "lateri . . . abdidit
ensem," and Seneca has already echoed that phrase once in *Tro*., at 48,
"alto nefandum vulneri ferrum abdidit." For stabbing as an extreme
form of torture compare the similar passage 558ff., "non hostilibus/
confossa telis pectus . . . maternam fidem/umquam exuissem."

As to the word after *visceribus*, the right reading is *istis* in the
sense "these of mine," for which see *TLL* 7.509.49ff. This is the clearest
example of the usage in Sen. Trag., but cf. *Ag*. 526 where *ista classis* is
the Greeks' fleet; also *Phoen*. 81 where *ista virgo* is Oedipus' own
daughter, and *Med*. 970f. where *victima ista* refers to Medea's own son.
A's *ustis* would refer to the effects of the torture, but it seems too mild a
word, "galled" rather than "tortured."[5]

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[5] I am grateful to Professor Clay, and to the Journal's anonymous referee, for their
helpful comments on these notes.

REVIEW ARTICLE

## SEXUAL ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF
## IN CLASSICAL GREECE

Review of Michel Foucault, *L'usage des plaisirs* = *Histoire de la sexualité* 2. Paris, Gallimard, 1984.

> The study of history makes one "happy, unlike the metaphysicians,
> to possess in oneself not an immortal soul but many mortal ones."
> —Foucault, quoting Nietzsche[1]

The second volume of Foucault's unfinished *History of Sexuality*, which is not so much about the history of sexual theories and practices as it is about the shifting conditions that determine the nature of one's relation to oneself as a sexual being, is the first installment of what may turn out to be the most important contribution to the history of Western morality since the publication, a hundred years ago, of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Foucault himself invites the comparison to Nietzsche when he describes, in the preface to the present volume, the motive for his unforeseen and, as it happened, costly decision to interrupt work on the project announced in Volume One and to extend its scope backwards in time to include classical antiquity: in order to analyze the formation and development of the modern experience called "sexuality," he explains, it was necessary first of all to discover the provenance of the one theme common to the otherwise discontinuous experiences of "sexuality" and "carnality" (its Christian predecessor)—it was necessary, that is, to trace the "'genealogy'" of desire and of man as a desiring subject (p. 11). Desire, as it figures in contemporary experience, is not a natural given, Foucault realized, but a prominent element—though featured in different ways—of both traditional Christian and modern "scientific" discourse; research into the origins of "sexuality" therefore requires the historian to do for desire what Nietzsche had

done for "good" and "evil." If Nietzsche's genealogical inquiry often comes to mind in the course of reading *L'usage des plaisirs*, it does so not because Foucault is directly indebted to it for individual interpretations (unlike Arthur W. H. Adkins, for example, whose discussion of Homeric values in *Merit and Responsibility* [1960] draws heavily, if silently, on Nietzsche's distinction between the kinds of valuation implicit in the vocabularies of good/bad and good/evil), but because Foucault is consciously and deliberately elaborating the "critical" tradition in modern philosophy that Nietzsche helped to found.[2] Distinctive to that tradition, among other things, is the practice of treating morality as an object of hermeneutic "suspicion" (to borrow Paul Ricoeur's term): both Nietzsche and Foucault, in other words, conceive morality not as a set of formal and explicit prescriptions whose content can be more or less accurately summarized but as a cultural discourse whose modes of signification reveal the conditions under which values are constituted as such.

Foucault's analysis, like Nietzsche's, is historical rather than functional, intuitive rather than systematic, selective rather than exhaustive. It is not designed to displace conventional scholarship. Despite the impression that one might receive from the show of territorial hostility with which his work has been greeted by members of the interested professions,[3] Foucault is not trying to beat classical philologists or ancient philosophers at their own games, nor does he propose to make historical exegesis irrelevant; rather, he is trying to do something that traditional scholars do not do—something that helps to arrange and place the insights culled from philology in a new and different light. His success, like Nietzsche's, reminds us that an interpreter's scholarship need not be above reproach in order to be adequate to the brilliant portrayal of a

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[2]See Foucault's discussion of the differences between conventional history and "genealogy" in "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 139-64, and "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. (Chicago 1983) 229-52, esp. 237-43. For a commentary, see the lucid and masterly account by Thomas R. Flynn, "Truth and Subjectivation in the Later Foucault," *JPhilos* 82 (1985) 531-40, esp. 531-32: "Foucault's point, however, is not to uncover something more fundamental than truth as its precondition, such as Heidegger's *aletheia*, for example, but to reveal the sheer multiplicity of truths that 'truth' was intended to contain. The project is Nietzschean." See, generally, Dreyfus and Rabinow, 104-17.

[3]See the reviews by Martha C. Nussbaum, *New York Times Book Review* (10 November 1985) 13-14; Mary Lefkowitz, *Partisan Review* 52.4 (1985) 460-66.

historical phenomenon. Dante, after all, managed to seize upon the essence of the *Odyssey* without ever having read it. And *The Birth of Tragedy* continues, deservedly, to reach a wide and varied audience, most of whose members have never heard of Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff—or, if they have, know him not as Europe's supreme authority in the field of classical philology but only as that curious fellow who hounded Nietzsche out of the academic profession for having published his famous book.[4]

Foucault's classical scholarship, to be sure, is not nearly as good as Nietzsche's, but his portrait of the sexual morality of fifth- and fourth-century Greece (the subject of Volume Two) turns out to be in substantial accord with the results of the best recent work on the topic. Specialists will cavil, no doubt, at his slapdash use of ancient sources and at his seemingly uncritical willingness to assemble his portrait of Greek morals from the scattered testimony of highly unrepresentative authors. Foucault's reliance on philosophical and medical texts, in preference to those rich materials so successfully quarried for information by K. J. Dover in *Greek Popular Morality* (which, however, Foucault does not omit to cite), his relative neglect of his authors' social context or purpose in writing, and his greater attentiveness to what people say than to what they do are all causes for justifiable alarm; Foucault himself seems unsure at times *whose* morality, precisely, he is describing. (This focusing of attention on "scientific" texts can be explained in part by Foucault's interest in "the history of truth" [p. 12] and by his corresponding concern to show how sexual experience is constituted as a morally problematic domain by the ethical discourse of the various relevant "experts"; all the same, such a neglect of *praxis* is a strange failing, especially in Foucault, and it leads one to suspect him of reverting from Nietzschean genealogy to mere Hegelian phenomenology.)[5] The genius of his unprofessional approach, however, lies in its receptiveness to the general features of moral discourse in classical Greece; it enables Foucault to articulate a sort of moral grammar common to popular sentiment and élitist prescription alike and thereby to attack familiar problems from a genuinely fresh perspective. To his credit, Foucault is alive to the dangers of

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[4]*Pace* William M. Calder, III, ed., *Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Selected Correspondence, 1869–1931* = *Antiqua* 23 (Naples 1983) 13: "Today *Die Geburt der Tragödie* is read only by those interested in the intellectual biography of Nietzsche or the relation of Wagnerian opera to Greek tragedy. Wilamowitz' *Einleitung in die griechische Tragödie* remains the fundamental book in the field."

[5]Flynn (note 2 above) 532.

homogenizing the irreducible particularities of his various sources into a deceptively coherent system: he freely concedes that his portrait is "cavalier and very schematic," a mere "sketch" of "certain general traits" (pp. 105, 277).

But despite all these weaknesses, it is a most impressive achievement, and one that professional classicists might well envy (or begrudge, as the case may be). The eight years which elapsed between the publication of Volumes One and Two were evidently put to good use. Handicapped from the outset by what he acknowledges to be an irremediable lack of requisite familiarity with classical Greek texts—though not, apparently, by an insufficient (for his purposes, at least) grasp of the classical languages[6]—Foucault submitted himself to the rigors of basic research in the field of ancient social relations, under the tutelage of Paul Veyne, and he seems to have emerged from this scholarly apprenticeship chastened by the experience. Even his respect for historical and philological method appears to have grown over the interval. The difference in the intellectual climate of Volumes One and Two is correspondingly palpable. Volume One, for all its admittedly bright ideas, is dogmatic, tediously repetitious, full of hollow assertions, disdainful of historical documentation, and careless in its generalizations: it distributes over a period spanning from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries a gradual process of change well known to Foucault only in its later, mid-nineteenth-century manifestations. Volume Two, by contrast, is becomingly modest in its tone, cautious in its interpretations, conservative in its adherence to ancient literary sources, and tentative in its conclusions. Foucault hews closely to the lines of interpretation laid down by some of the soundest and most traditional British and American classicists, such as K. J. Dover and Helen North, and something of their scrupulousness appears to have rubbed off on him. Most touchingly of all, perhaps, he seems to have learned a good deal, in his turn, from those scholars on this side of the Atlantic (chiefly in California, where Foucault spent considerable time between Volumes One and Two) who had once learned so much from him, and who went on to contaminate his distinctive blend of phenomenology and structuralism[7]

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[6]Nussbaum (note 3 above) 14, plainly implies—without, however, stating outright—that Foucault "lacks . . . knowledge of Greek and Latin"; she apparently bases that insinuation on Foucault's use of Budé texts: see her reply to David Konstan, *New York Times Book Review* (22 December 1985) 4, 29.

[7]Foucault, however, has repeatedly claimed that his thought owes less to phenomenology, structuralism, and Marxism than it does to Nietzsche: see the original version of

with their native brand of cultural anthropology. Still, it would be a
mistake to suppose that Foucault simply abandoned his now-familiar
"archaeological" method in favor of "thick description" (which is not,
after all, a historical procedure). In Volume One he wrote, "Sexuality
must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to
hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually
to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not
a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in
which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the in-
citement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in
accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power."[8] Vol-
ume Two still finds him unrepentantly concerned with the history of
discursive formations, though no longer with "sexuality," which he has
persuasively shown to be a modern "production"; his purpose remains
that of investigating the constitution of sexual experience—or, as he
puts it, "the correlation, in a culture, between domains of knowledge,
types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity" (p. 10). What Foucault
calls "experience" is circumscribed by these three "axes";[9] it is the last of
them that pertains most particularly to sex, in his opinion.

     Why is it, Foucault asks, that sexual behavior and the various ac-
tivities and pleasures associated with it comprise an object of moral pre-
occupation in our culture? How and in what terms did sex come to be
constituted as a specifically *moral* domain? The stance of radical inno-
cence implied by those questions—a stance far removed from the
merely naïve (by comparison) "objectivity" of the traditional historian
with his studious avoidance of "preconceptions" and "prejudices" (cf.
Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 3.12)[10]—enables Foucault to reconceptualize
morality in such a way as to bring it within the purview of an *histoire de
la pensée*, a history of thought *as thought inhabits experiences and sys-*

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his preface to *L'usage des plaisirs*, transl. William Smock and published in Paul Ra-
binow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York 1984) 333–39, esp. 336; also, Michel
Foucault and Richard Sennett, "Sexuality and Solitude," *London Review of Books* 3:9
(21 May–3 June 1981) 3, 5–7, esp. 3–5.

     [8]Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*, trans.
Robert Hurley (New York 1978) 105–06.

     [9]See Flynn (note 2 above) 532–33.

     [10]Cf. also Foucault's remarks on historical objectivity in "Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History" (note 2 above) esp. 146–47, 152–53, 158–59, 162–63.

*tems of action*[11] (not to be confused with the history of cultural representations, or "ideas"),[12] a project whose proper task is to describe "the conditions under which human beings problematize what they are, what they do, and the world they live in" (p. 16).[13] The conventional approach, which Foucault considers valid enough but uninformative for his purposes, treats morality as a set of values and rules of conduct that are prescribed for individuals and groups by various agencies of authority in the society, such as the Church or the family, and are either articulated explicitly in formal doctrines and codes of behavior or are handed down and enforced by a variety of informal strategies; it also takes into account the actual behavior of individuals, their relation to the dominant values, and the degree to which they resist or obey a moral code of whose content they are more or less aware (pp. 32–33). Virtually all students of ancient morality, I think it is fair to say, have been guided hitherto by a conception of morality that approximates to the one Foucault outlines. What is wrong with it is that it places too much interpretative weight on the *content* of a moral system and ignores the discursive structures that determine that system's characteristic orientation. Foucault illustrates the defect of studying morality solely in terms of its content by identifying four themes attested in both pagan and Christian sources that would seem, in and of themselves, to argue for a continuing ethic of sexual austerity in Western culture: fear of sex; praise of monogamy; condemnation of effeminate men; and glorification of resistance to appetite. These four themes, when examined as to their content, may well reveal striking differences in emphasis or tonality in their pagan and Christian manifestations, and there remain a number of valid historical criteria for distinguishing the unique flavor of otherwise identical pagan and Christian interdictions, but traditional methods do not provide a clear and simple means of describing the conceptual or discursive gap separating, say, Greek from Victorian prohibi-

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[11]Original preface to *The History of Sexuality*, Volume II, in Rabinow (note 7 above) 334–35.

[12]See Reiner Schürmann, " 'What Can I Do?' in an Archaeological-Genealogical History," *JPhilos* 82 (1985) 540–47, esp. 542.

[13]Foucault defines "problematization" as "the ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis or the like)" (interview with François Ewald, "Le souci de la verité," *Magazine littéraire*, 207 [May 1984] 18, quoted by Flynn [note 2 above] 533).

tions against masturbation.[14] Even worse, such thematic continuities
might seem to suggest that sexuality is a cultural invariant and that his-
torical variations in its expression merely reflect the differential impact
on sexuality of the various mechanisms employed in different societies
to repress it; but that, as Foucault remarks, would be in effect to place
desire and the desiring subject outside the field of human history (p.
10) — as John Boswell, for example, has tried to do in *Christianity, So-
cial Tolerance, and Homosexuality* (1980).

      Foucault will later devote a separate chapter of Volume Two to
the classical Greek expression of each of these four themes: "diaetetics,"
or the regimen by which one controls the economy of one's own body
and physical style of life; "economics," or the husband's relation to his
wife and household; "erotics," or a man's relation to boys and other ob-
jects of longing; and the will to truth, or the philosophical renunciation
of sexual pleasure. He readily admits that the persistence of these
themes raises complex questions about continuity and discontinuity in
the evolution of Western morality, but he aspires to penetrate beyond
such thematic correspondences by means of an emphasis on "ethics"
rather than "morals." Following, apparently, Hegel's distinction be-
tween *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, Foucault regards "ethics," in pointed
contrast to "morals," *not* as a system of prescriptive codes and a pattern
of behavioral response but as a relation that one establishes with oneself
in the act of constituting oneself as a moral subject (this relation, of
course, is not necessarily a self-conscious one, nor does it imply the
moral independence of an individual from his society). In order to re-
fute the currently fashionable "repressive hypothesis" and to uncover
the discontinuities between different historical forms of sexual experi-
ence, Foucault sets out to construct a genealogy of "ethics": this com-
prises, as it pertains to sex, the genealogy of the subject as a subject of
ethical actions and the genealogy of desire as an ethical problem.[15]
Foucault acknowledges that morality includes both systems of rules, on
the one hand, and forms of subjectification and self-fashioning (*prati-
ques de soi*), on the other, but he finds that the morality of classical
Greece features the latter more than the former; his history of ancient
sexual morality (to be continued in Volume Three), then, will concen-

      [14]See Foucault and Sennett (note 7 above) 6, on the shifting significance of mas-
turbation in moral discourse about sex.
      [15]See Foucault and Sennett (note 7 above) 3–5; "On the Genealogy of Ethics" (note
2 above) esp. 240.

trate neither on moral codes and systems of rules nor on human behavior that violates or conforms to them but will analyze the prevalent mode or modes in which human beings constitute themselves as moral subjects, as the subjects of their own actions, and it will catalogue the techniques by means of which they do so. What Foucault has tried to write, in short, is a history of "technologies of the self."[16]

Such a genealogy of man as a moral subject must comprehend, according to Foucault, at least four aspects of moral self-constitution: (1) "ontology," or determination of the ethical substance, the material that is going to be worked over by ethics—i.e., what part or aspect of myself is concerned with moral conduct, is taken as an object of moral observation and control? (2) "deontology," or mode of subjection—how do I establish my relation to moral imperatives, in what terms do I recognize my moral obligations or define my adherence to moral values? (3) "ascetics," or ethical work—what do I have to do to become moral, what are the means by which I change myself in order to become an ethical subject? (4) "teleology," or ethical goal—how do I conceive the end to which being moral will contribute, what is the kind of being to which I aspire when I behave in a moral way? (pp. 33–35).[17] This way of setting the question allows Foucault to address the problem of understanding the transition from pagan to Christian varieties of sexual experience not by asking how Christians took over, assimilated, or modified classical codes of ethics (as historians of ideas have done) but by asking how one's relation to oneself as a moral subject changed with the coming of Christianity (pp. 38–39).[18]

Because Foucault's exposition is deliberately schematic, his thesis is easy to summarize. The ethical material on which the sexual morality of the classical Greeks was supposed to operate is what they called *aphrodisia*; their mode of submission is *chrêsis* (whence the title of Volume Two: *L'usage des plaisirs* translates *chrêsis aphrodisiôn*, an Aristotelian tag); the ethical work to be performed is *enkrateia*; and the

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[16]Foucault and Sennett (note 7 above) 3–5; "On the Genealogy of Ethics" (note 2 above) 230.

[17]See also Foucault's explanation of his analytical method in "On the Genealogy of Ethics" (note 2 above) 237–43.

[18]See also Foucault and Sennett (note 7 above) 5. To say, as Lefkowitz (note 3 above) 465, does, that "Foucault seems to have been interested in what Greek and Roman writers said about sex because of their influence on our ways of thinking" is therefore to get his whole enterprise exactly backwards.

goal is *sophrosyné*.[19] The first two of these elements require some amplification.

*Aphrodisia* refers to those actions, contacts, and forms of self-expression that procure the individual a certain type of pleasure. The word implies something very different from the modern understanding of "sexuality," according to Foucault, in that it does not refer to some mute force within us that makes itself felt in all sorts of indirect and devious ways other than the performance of sexual acts; rather, it designates the more concrete processes of sexual enjoyment: *aphrodisia* includes within its sphere three aspects of sexuality that we tend to distinguish — sexual acts, sexual pleasure, and sexual desire — and thereby reflects the continuous circuit of responsiveness connecting the desire that leads to the act, the act that produces pleasure, and the pleasure that evokes (anticipatory) desire. Secondly, *aphrodisia*, literally "the things of Aphrodite," are measured by their intensity and frequency (whence the corresponding and typical Greek concern about an agent's moderation or incontinence) as well as by the direction of their current, so to speak, which defines in every instance a subject and object, an active and a passive participant. Finally, *aphrodisia* are never bad in themselves but are morally problematic for two reasons: first, they represent a lower pleasure, common to both men and beasts; second, the impulse associated with them is by nature "hyperbolic" — it tends greedily, if indulged, to seek more intense and frequent satisfaction, refusing to limit its demands to the bare requirements of need (pp. 49-61). These observations contribute to Foucault's first major conceptual breakthrough, as I see it: namely, his ability to specify so clearly the

[19]Foucault's choice of terms is careful and deliberate. Nussbaum (note 3 above) 14, has accused Foucault of employing, unwittingly, a nineteenth-century "empiricist-utilitarian" notion of pleasure and of neglecting Greek controversies about its nature — i.e., whether pleasure is a sensation, an activity, or "something that supervenes on activity" — but that (peculiarly Aristotelian) problematic, evident even to a Greekless reader of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, bears entirely on the definition of *hédoné*, not *aphrodisia*; far from being blinded to the subtleties of ancient philosophical discourse by philological incompetence ("Foucault is not enough of a classical scholar even to perceive the issues," Nussbaum claims), Foucault reads his texts with rather more precision than Nussbaum who, in her haste to play Wilamowitz to Foucault's Nietzsche, has apparently confused *aphrodisia* with *hédoné*. The term *plaisir*, in Foucault's title and vocabulary, does not signify "pleasure," after all, but is simply a vernacular equivalent (though an obviously inadequate one) of *aphrodision*: *l'usage des plaisirs* literally means, then — translating from the French via the Greek — "the management of venereal acts, pleasures, and desires," as Flynn (note 2 above) 535, and David Konstan, "Letter to the Editor," *New York Times Book Review* (22 December 1985) 4, properly observe.

ground of the Greeks' consistent assimilation of sexual desire to the
other human appetites — these being, canonically, desires for food,
drink, and sleep — and their tendency to view them all as qualitatively
interchangeable "necessities," or compulsions, of human nature[20]
(Plato, of course, is the bizarre exception to this tendency, though
Foucault apparently has failed to notice this). Foucault recaptures
something of the Greeks' original outlook when he places the Greek de-
bate about how much sex it is good to have into the larger context of
"diaetetics," the technique for achieving a properly balanced physical
regimen. It would be interesting to determine, Foucault remarks, ex-
actly when in the development of Western culture sex became more
morally problematic than eating (pp. 61-62); he seems to think that sex
won out only at the turn of the eighteenth century, after a long period of
relative equilibrium during the Middle Ages.[21] (The evidence newly as-
sembled by Caroline Walker Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast* [forth-
coming], suggests that moral evolution may not have been such a con-
tinuously linear affair as Foucault imagines.)

It is a feature of moral life in classical Greece, Foucault observes,
that universal interdictions are few and far between. They tend also to
be rather unspecific. The Greeks had no Decalogue, just some basic
rules of thumb, of which the most prominent were: respect the laws and
customs of the country; try not to offend the gods; and don't violate the
dictates of your own nature (pp. 63-64). Foucault draws from these ob-
servations another startling and acute conclusion. The general require-
ments of Greek morality radically underdetermine the definition of
proper conduct for an individual in any particular situation; they leave
room for a self-imposed (though no doubt communally enforced) ethic
of sexual restraint within the larger field of a Greek male's moral free-
dom. Greek morality, in other words, doesn't concern itself so much
with the forbidden as with the voluntary (in principle, at least): morality
is therefore not a matter of obedience to specific prescriptions but a reg-
ulated usage, or *chrêsis*, of morally unrestricted pleasures. No moral
value, either positive or negative, attaches to certain kinds of caresses,
sexual postures, or modes of copulation. Instead, the ethic governing
the usage of pleasures takes the form of a kind of calculated economy of

[20]Heinz Schreckenberg, *Ananke. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortge-
brauchs* = *Zetemata* 36 (Munich 1964), esp. 50-61.
    [21]"On the Genealogy of Ethics" (note 2 above) 229; also, Foucault and Sennett
(note 7 above) 5-6; Michel Foucault, *Le souci de soi* = *Histoire de la sexualité* 3 (Paris
1984) 166.

sexual spending: limit yourself to what you really need; wait until the
most opportune moment to consume; and take into account your own
social, political, and economic status. Sexual morality is thus subsumed
by the more general practice of self-regulation with regard to enjoyment
that constituted for the Greeks an art of living, a technique for main-
taining personal equilibrium, "an aesthetics of being." Sexual morality
is not part of an attempt to normalize populations but an element in a
procedure adopted by a few people with the aim of living a beautiful
and praiseworthy life — not a pattern of behavior for everybody but a
personal choice for a small élite. Greek morality, Foucault concludes,
does not justify and internalize interdictions: it stylizes freedom (pp.
103–111).

Here is the point at which Nietzsche naturally comes to mind. In
the Third Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche sought to
distinguish the origins and significance of what he called the ascetic
ideal from its multitude of subsequent adaptive uses, its later incorpora-
tion into a system of purposes. Nietzsche ultimately saw in asceticism
not a symptom of weakness, not an example of the typically Christian
tendency to make a moral virtue out of material necessity, but the ex-
pression of a powerful will. Currently manifested in the secular priest-
hood of philological scholarship as a will to truth (what Foucault, in the
title of Volume One, calls a *volonté de savoir*), the will expressed by
asceticism was, according to Nietzsche, originally an instrument of the
power-hungry; it derived not from moral scruple or hatred of pleasure
but from an instinct of mastery over self and others. Foucault similarly
sees the Greek moralists in terms of a will to power, a strategy for achiev-
ing domination of self and others; that is the key, in his view, to an ethic
that paradoxically combines categorical permission and voluntary sup-
pression. Like Nietzsche, Foucault measures the change in outlook that
accompanied the triumph of Christianity by gauging the extent of a
shift in the valuation of activity and passivity: the paradigm of moral
virtue is no longer represented by a man in a position of power who
nonetheless takes no advantage of it but by a woman (usually) who is
outwardly helpless but able to defend her moral integrity (specifically
her chastity) against the onslaught of the wicked and powerful; the clas-
sical ideal of self-restraint has yielded to an ideal of purity, based on a
model of physical integrity rather than on one of self-regulation.[22] Fi-

[22]In Foucault and Sennett (note 7 above) 5–6, Foucault illustrates this shift by
attempting to document a change in the emphasis of sexual ethics from a concern with

nally, one may even see in Foucault's own analysis an instance of a discursive tendency whose beginnings Nietzsche first glimpsed and heralded: the tendency of the will to truth to take *itself* as an object of genealogical scrutiny and, by means of a consequent heightening of self-consciousness, to put ethics — or moral science (as it used to be called) — out of existence. As Foucault has written elsewhere, with reference to Nietzsche, truth is an error with a history from which we are barely emerging.[23]

There is a good deal more to Foucault's portrait of Greek moral discourse than I can indicate here. His account affords a great many local insights into individual authors and texts; the most persuasive vindication of his discursive archaeology consists, perhaps, in his ability to distinguish clearly and precisely between the ways moral discourse is typically structured in classical Greece (Volume Two), Imperial Rome (Volume Three), and early Christianity (Volume Four). But my forbearing reader may still be wondering whether anything Foucault has to say is really new and what, if anything, he may have to contribute to the interpretation of classical Greek culture. I should like to offer two illustrations pertaining to Greek philosophy from which so many of Foucault's examples are derived.

Foucault's analysis of Greek moral discourse bears on two prominent and competing modes of defining virtue in Greek ethics: Socrates' craft-analogy and Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Both have to do with the problem of specifying the relation between moral virtue as the attribute or possession of individual agents and moral virtue as realized in concrete action. It would be inappropriate to expect Foucault's work to answer the difficult philosophical questions engendered by Socrates' habit of conceptualizing moral virtue according to the model of various crafts, from medicine to carpentry — to determine, for example, whether or not Socrates regards moral knowledge as reducible to propositional knowledge — but Foucault's interpretation of Greek sexual morality in terms of the usage of pleasures does make it seem more natural, at any rate, for a classical Greek to think of moral virtue as a *pratique de soi*, an art of self-fashioning, a technology of the self. Similarly: Aris-

penetration to a concern with erection. Cf. also Foucault's published excerpt from Volume Four, "Le combat de la chasteté," in Philippe Ariès and André Béjin, eds., *Sexualité occidentale = Communications* 35 (1982) 15-25.

[23]"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (note 2 above) 144. See Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2* (Cambridge 1985) 152-84.

totle's definition of moral virtue as a mean implies the specification of proper conduct in terms relative to the individual moral agent and his immediate circumstances. "How much practical guidance does Aristotle really offer?" asks Terence Irwin in the introduction to his new translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1985): "Despite his emphasis on the practical function of ethics, he does not offer many specific moral rules. . . . Aristotle is more concerned with identifying the right states of character than with specifying the range of actions associated with them [and] he thinks detailed ethical instructions require reference to social and political conditions." Aristotle's doctrine makes perfect sense in the larger context of a culture in which ethical prescriptions radically underdetermine proper conduct. Foucault's account suggests that Socrates' craft-analogy and Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, despite their lack of immediately discernible relevance to one another, are each of them consequences, in different ways, of the essentially improvisatory character of virtuous action in Greek morality.

The reason for reading Foucault, then, is much the same as the reason for reading Nietzsche: he may not tell us anything new, but he will enable us to understand considerably better what we already know, and he will help us to figure out how to go about the bewildering process of discovering who we are.

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# REVIEWS

VICTOR BERS. Greek Poetic Syntax in the Classical Age. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xix + 218.

Although poetic diction tends to be thought of as differing from the diction of daily life or of formal prose chiefly in vocabulary, there is a respectable number of syntactic features admitted in poetry but avoided to a greater or lesser degree in non-poetic forms of expression. Considerable information on such matters may be found scattered about in the grammars, but Victor Bers recognized the need for a systematic treatment, and has provided such a treatment for Greek of the classical age in a thoroughly competent fashion.

If the features of syntax peculiar to poetry are to be properly identified, we must have a clear starting point from which to make our comparisons. The familiar linguistic form, from which the poetic form strikes the hearer as a deviation, is the "pedestrian gloss," a term used with some frequency throughout the work. It is not merely a matter of *oratio vincta* versus *oratio soluta*, for it is necessary on the one hand to take account of the well-known idiosyncrasies of Xenophon, sometimes reminiscent of dialectal usage or poetic usage or both, and on the other hand of the iambic trimeters of Aristophanes composed in the Attic of daily life. Bers, following Denniston's *Greek Prose Style*, distinguishes a "semi-Ionic" group of writers (the tragedians, Thucydides, Xenophon and Plato) and a "pure Attic" group (Aristophanes and the orators), and yet even so some reservations are necessary. P. 10 deals with the marks of Ionic influence in Antiphon, more pronounced in his tetralogies than in his actual court speeches, and pp. 163–64 touch upon traces of Ionic coloring in Andocides. Throughout the work due account is taken of differences in speech-levels, with recognition both of the fact that poetic and colloquial language sometimes possess common features which contrast with the usage of formal literary prose (50, 74, 135, 187), and also of certain differences within tragedy, between the diction of the spoken parts and of the lyric parts. In this connection pp. 99–100 call attention to the scarcity of genitive of the starting point of motion with an uncompounded verb in lyric poetry. This may be partly explained by the fact that lyric, being less Attic than dialogue, is less likely to show Attic archaisms of the type described by Schwyzer, *Syntaktische Archaismen des Attischen (Abh. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss., Phil.-hist. Kl.,* 1940) 7, but due allowance must be made for the smaller quantity of lyric text in the total corpus of Attic tragedy, lyric to trimeter being in the ratio of roughly 1:4 according to p. 97. At the same time p. 188 contains a warning against overestimating the differences between tragic dialogue and lyric, once allowance is made for differences of other kinds; metrical schemes, music, ā for η, vocabulary, more frequent omission of the article in lyric.

The forty-page section on number, setting apart the ordinary usage whereby x and x with plural marker mean respectively "one x" and "more than one x," distinguishes (23–24) twelve categories of stylistically motivated use of

plural where singular might be expected, or vice versa: the "elliptical" plural (τόξα = "bows and arrows"), x-plural of a proper name = anyone or anything like x in some important aspect, as when *Cassandras* stands for "unerring prophets believed by none;" x of a concrete noun = x plural, as when ὁ Μῆδος stands for οἱ Μῆδοι; etc. The discussion which follows is devoted in large part to ascertaining the reason for the plural use of several specific nouns: γάμοι, μα-νίαι, θάνατοι, and more briefly ἅλες, δόλοι, νόσοι, δώματα, δόμοι and οἶκοι. No account is taken of "mass-words" and "count-words" as used by Gleason, *Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics*[2] (New York 1966) 224, where the two categories are illustrated by *rice* and *beans* respectively, and in fact the distinc-tion is not relevant to most of the Greek words listed above, but it is conceivable that from a Greek point of view ἅλες may have been thought of as *grains of salt*. Admittedly the singular ἅλς does occur, placing salt in a category partly simlar to that of *iron, glass, wood*, etc. For metrical convenience as a means of ex-plaining poetic plurals Bers has in general little use, and it has no doubt been overused as an easy way out of difficulties, but it is hard to escape the suspicion that νόσοις in Soph., *O. T.* 962 νόσοις ὁ τλήμων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔφθιτο was cho-sen as a means of avoiding hiatus (νόσου ξυναλλαγῇ had been used two lines above; the page in Bers is 35). On metrical convenience see also p. 29, n. 18, p. 44, n. 47, pp. 52-53, in each case partly in opposition to Witte, *Singular und Plural*. At p. 112, n. 33, however, Bers does support Schwyzer's view (2.232) that in certain verbs which show both active and deponent inflection metrical convenience is a factor. Touching upon the Latin side of the question at p. 38, n. 40, he appears not to favor the metrical explanation for the frequency of neuter plurals, but Latin, with a higher natural ratio of long to short syllables than Greek, found in neuter plurals a good source of dactyls, as J. F. Gummere showed in *The Neuter Plural in Vergil* (Philadelphia 1934).

       One of the most familiar features of poetic style in both Greek and Latin is the omission of prepositions in certain local expressions. The discussion of the terminal accusative forces Bers to ascertain the criteria for distinguishing it from the accusative of direct object, and in Pind., *Nem.* 3.3 ἵκεο Δωρίδα νᾶ-σον Αἴγιναν he sees, rightly I believe, a terminal accusative, in opposition to Gildersleeve, who was apparently misled by his translation of ἵκεο "reach" into regarding the accusative as a direct object. Bers sees that the distinction de-pends rather on whether the verb of motion affects its accusative object or not. In the lyrical passage Soph., *El.* 1391 92 παράγεται γὰρ ἐνέρων/δολιόπους ἀρωγὸς εἴσω στέγας, cited p. 70, I favor taking στέγας as gen. sg. rather than as acc. pl., despite Homer's preference for εἴσω with acc. Soph., *O. T.* 533-34 has τὰς ἐμὰς στέγας/ἵκου, while *Trach.* 202 has an unambiguous genitive in a αἵ τ᾽ εἴσω στέγης/αἵ τ᾽ ἐκτὸς αὐλῆς, unless one argues that the decisive factor is the lack of any verb of motion in the last of these three passages. When we come to the dative without a preposition the problem is of a different nature: the Greek dative is a syncretic case, and it is sometimes difficult to know whether we have in a given passage a "true" dative or a local dative, a local dative or an instrumental dative. On p. 87, where the choice between "true" and local dative in Ar., *Clouds* 305 is under discussion, I suspect that we were intended to read "no one would doubt" for "no one would suppose"; in other

words we are supposed to recognize a "true" dative, in contrast to Pind., I. 6.41 ἀνατείνας οὐρανῷ χεῖρας, where we have a local dative, not an indirect object. The section on the dative ends with a brief discussion of the temporal dative, the nature of the problem being brilliantly introduced by the sentence "Boundaries of gauze, not adamant, separate the temporal dative from the local and instrumental." Important here also is the recognition that "An instrumental interpretation makes the absence of a preposition entirely insignificant as a syntactical differentia." An appendix to the chapter on the dative deals with those ablatival genitives which depend neither on a preposition nor on a compound verb, and which are most at home in the dialogue of tragedy.

The section on the syntax of the verb begins with a discussion of voice, occupying only about fourteen pages but containing valuable information on the predilection of poetry for middle inflection of certain verbs which in prose normally appear in active form, along with the question of middle versus passive aorist for deponent verbs. P. 105 includes a discussion of Pind., Ol. 7.15-16 ὄφρα πελώριον ἄνδρα παρ' Ἀλφεῷ στεφανωσάμενον αἰνέσω, where those who refuse to admit passive value for first aorist middle forms must claim that the victorious athlete placed the wreath on his own head. Bers, while citing the behavior of Napoleon at his own coronation, admits that our knowledge of the procedure at the Olympic games is not sufficient to enable us to settle the question. This short chapter is followed by a much longer one dealing with the subjunctive, optative and ἄv. In opposition to earlier scholars, especially Stahl, who sought to eliminate a large proportion of instances of potential optative unaccompanied by ἄv by adding ἄv to the text or by explaining the optative as cupitive, Bers in general accepts the construction, regarding the case against bare potential optatives as largely a priori (129). Somewhat similar to the problem of potential optative without ἄv is that of subjunctive without ἄv in subordinate clauses, and here also Bers takes a conservative position with regard to the transmitted text; at the same time he takes a skeptical view of attempts to find any clear semantic distinction between subjunctive clauses with and without ἄv, preferring to see dialect influence, especially Ionic influence, in the construction without ἄv. When the question of relative frequency of bare subjunctive in the iambic and the lyric portions of tragedy comes under discussion he presents statistical tables for the three tragedians to show that, contrary to the opinion of several commentators and grammarians, the construction is actually more common in iambic than in lyric passages (150-51). Data for anapaestic and trochaic passages also appear in the tables but are included along with the iambic passages in the total for all constructions. The ratio of lyric to non-lyric is 12:44, but if the two examples in anapaestic (Aesch.) and the two in trochaic (Eur.) are deducted, we have a ratio of 12 in lyric to 40 in iambic, which gives lyric a slight edge in view of the 1:4 ratio of lyric to trimeter passages claimed on p. 97 for the whole tragic corpus.

In the chapter on jussive, optatival and exclamatory infinitive Bers is especially concerned with the distinction of the construction with subject nominative/vocative and with subject accusative, and also with the general scarcity of the jussive infinitive in Attic prose, especially the orators. This scarcity he attributes to incompatibility of peremptory tone with Attic urbanity and, in its

negative form, to difficulty in resolving the choice between οὐ, the normal neg-
ative in an apodosis, and μή, the normal negative with an infinitive not in oratio
obliqua.

The chapter entitled *Some Conclusions* is in part a recapitulation of ma-
terial covered earlier but is valuable for its treatment of the provenience of cer-
tain features of poetic style and especially for its discussion of the relative effect
of syntactic as contrasted with lexical differentiae. The three appendices treat
nominal constructions, differentiae in satyr drama, and the differentiae in
fourth-century tragedy. There are a bibliography of principal texts and com-
mentaries, an index locorum (of special value because the critical discussion of
passages not only from Pindar and the tragedians but from many other authors
is among the many merits of the book), and a general index. Misprints are few
and generally insignificant. On p. 96, n. 18, one of the two occurrences of the
local name *Tylissos* is misspelled. On p. 124, fourteen lines from the top, I
believe "taken into the apodosis" was intended to read "taken into the protasis."
On p. 127, n. 11, ὅταν should be ὅτε, since the forms cited in its immediate
context are without ἄν. On p. 145 very near the bottom the parenthesis just
before the words *include Sappho* needs to be reversed. On p. 184 in Aesch.,
*Ag.* 1663, read πειρωμένους.

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ELIZABETH ASMIS. Epicurus' Scientific Method. Ithaca and London, Cornell
    University Press, 1984. Pp. 385. $49.50. (Cornell Studies in Classical Phi-
    lology XLII)

*Epicurus' Scientific Method* has been hailed as "the first extensive treat-
ment in English of basic issues of Epicurean method in fifty years or more"
(David Konstan). There is no doubt that Elizabeth Asmis has conclusively dem-
onstrated in her detailed and careful study that Epicurus did have a coherent
method of scientific inference far beyond anything that classicists and scientists
have hitherto acknowledged. Her aim has been "to show, first, that Epicurus
did propose a unified method of investigation, and, second, that he attempted
to apply this method consistently throughout the development of his physical
doctrines, from the fundamentals of his atomic theory to the explanation of remote
astronomical events" (p. 9). Because the book Κανών, or *Rule*, in which
he worked out his method is lost, valuable information has to be sought and
extrapolated from Sextus Empiricus, Philodemus, Lucretius, Diogenes Laer-
tius, Cicero, and even Plutarch. There are substantial parts to the book. Parts I
and II provide an analysis of Epicurus' two rules of investigation (the require-
ments for initial concepts and observation). Part III continues discussion of Epi-
curus' second rule by examining how observations are used as signs of what is
unobserved. Parts IV and V investigate Epicurus' own scientific inferences with
the aim of demonstrating how consistent his practice is with his theory. Part IV

aims to demonstrate how Epicurus' method of inquiry is related to that of the early atomists. Each part is heavily documented.

*Epicurus' Scientific Method* is well laid out and well argued. It is occasionally but necessarily repetitive and not always easy to follow. The arguments are made with great vigor and the sources are exhaustively squeezed for what they will yield. Elizabeth Asmis's own perceptions are acute, determined, and always consistent. She argues throughout that "Epicurus made it an initial assumption of his investigation that everything that is perceived directly, without the addition of opinion, is a real feature of the world, and that he accordingly admitted everything shown directly by the senses as evidence of his scientific theories" (p. 11). Epicurus demands as rules that we have concepts, corresponding to our utterances, as a means of judging the problem under consideration and that we have observations, in accordance with our perceptions and feelings, for inferring what is unobserved. The first rule is needed prior to the investigation; the second for empirical evidence. It is clear that for Epicurus the general concept of regularity is the initial concept of all scientific inquiry. Presumptions or initial concepts of investigations, Asmis clearly indicates, are concepts whose truths need not be demonstrated, and are empirically formed as a record of perceptual impressions. Scientific investigation commences when the individual attempts to extend these concepts beyond the range of the observed. In Epicureanism each sense has its own proper object of perception, without having any objects in common, with the result that no sense can pass judgement on the objects of any other sense. For Epicurus, it is important to note, there is a continuity between the percipient and the source of perception that makes it possible to know the external source, even though there may be varying degrees of continuity. Epicurus proposed a single criterion of perceptible reality, one in which the response of the perceptual organ to particles is direct. Epicurus makes no distinction between truthful and deceptive presentations; he identifies the external object of perception with the content of a perception. In Epicurus' view the observer obtains observations by the mind directly or from the senses from the outside—presentations that are always real and that are the means of inferring what is not observed. Successive compacting and residue apply to the senses.

The author becomes especially persuasive in showing how Epicurus pairs the affections (or feelings, πάθη) with the perceptions, as providing a basis of inference for what is not observed:

> Epicurus demands that we use the evidence furnished directly by the perceptual
> activity of the senses or the mind, consisting in both external objects of perception
> and inner conditions, as the means of inferring what is not observed. This evi-
> dence must be distinguished from any opinions added to them. Whatever appears
> directly through perception is a real feature of the world; and it serves as the evi-
> dence by which any opinion about what does not appear directly through percep-
> tion is verified or falsified. All scientific knowledge, therefore, depends on taking
> whatever appears directly through perception without exception, as a real feature
> of the world.
>
> (pp. 170-71)

Elizabeth Asmis interpretatively comments that for Epicurus "the phenomena are the uninterpreted facts given to us directly by perception. A scientific theory, therefore, is false whenever it is incompatible with the phenomena; and although Epicurus does not say this explicitly, it seems that scientific theory is true whenever it is in agreement, or compatible, with the phenomena" (p. 178).

Interesting, too, is the observation that Epicurus derived his entire sequence of arguments on the divisibility of the universe from the early atomists, but more interesting and important is his conclusion that the universe is unlimited and the number of atoms for each shape is infinite. Asmis does a remarkable job in retracing the early atomist origin of Epicurus' sequence of arguments and its opposition to the sequence of arguments made by Parmenides. Epicurus' argument against Parmenides indicates that:

1. Nothing is generated from nonbeing and nothing is destroyed into nonbeing, with the consequence that the universe is forever unchanging in what there is.
2. The universe is divided into bodies and void; and the bodies are indivisible and unchanging.
3. The universe is unlimited in itself, and in the number of its bodies and in the extent of the void; and the bodies are incomprehensible in the types of shapes and unlimited in number with respect to each shape.
4. The universe is continually in motion with respect to its bodies; and these movements are forever unchanging with the consequence that the universe is forever unchanging in the combinations that are formed (p. 288).

Epicurus, we learn, follows the early atomists in deducing from the infinite number of atoms in an infinite void that there are infinite worlds. Though some have argued that Epicurus retained a belief in the gods to avoid persecution, in spite of his science, it is right to emphasize, as Asmis does, "that Epicurean theology is, in a sense, the culmination of all of Epicurean physics: by showing how all events occur by a natural process of causation, science at once expels the gods from the world and frees all mankind to pursue a happiness like that of the gods" (p. 317). Further on, the author succinctly summarizes Epicurus on science: "Contrary to Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus maintains that the aim of science is not to move from the confusion of sensory data to precise general principles but rather to supplement observational detail with nonobservational detail in order to achieve as complete a view of each event as possible" (p. 327).

Throughout her thickly packed book Asmis shows that Epicurus' two rules of investigation constitute a single method of inquiry by which what is observed is the basis of what is unobserved. In Epicurus the organ of perception receives the results in the presentation — a feature of the world which is in every case a real feature of the world. For Epicurus the presentation — all perceptions — are true. Put another way, phenomena are true; whatever appears as the direct result of a perceptual act is true. Lucretius used induction and would have agreed that all of Epicurus' doctrines could be formulated as inductions. Even though Democritus had concerned himself with scientific method, Elizabeth Asmis has incontrovertibly demonstrated that the method of using the

phenomena as signs of what is unobserved, "which consists in deducing scien-
tific theories from the facts given directly by sensory experience, formed an im-
portant empirical tradition of scientific inquiry from the time of Democritus to
Epicurus and later, and that ancient atomism is a product of this method of
inquiry" (p. 350).

    *Epicurus' Scientific Method* is a difficult book, but it is nevertheless a
monumental contribution to Epicurean studies that cannot be ignored. It will
stand as a formidable model of the kind of scholarship that joins classicists and
scientists in a common search for a better understanding of a significant figure
in the history of philosophy and science.

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K. W. GRANSDEN. Virgil's *Iliad*: An essay on epic narrative. Cambridge, Cam-
    bridge University Press, 1984. Pp. x + 221.

    The author's purpose, as he himself puts it, is "to try to re-establish the
paramount value of Books VIII-XIII as epic narrative" (p. 1). As the book's
title suggests, this is to be done in large part through a reconsideration of the
relationship between Homer's *Iliad* and the *Aeneid*: "To achieve a true sense of
the meaning of the *Aeneid*, the reader must have a sense—it need not, proba-
bly will not, be complete or precise—of what Homer's *Iliad* meant to the im-
plied reader of the *Aeneid* and to Virgil himself" (p. 2). Those readers familiar
with Virgilian scholarship may at this point be somewhat puzzled in that, after
the work of Viktor Pöschl, W. S. Anderson, Brooks Otis, Michael Putnam, and
W. R. Johnson, it is not clear that either the paramount value of *Aeneid* 7-12,
or the relationship of these books to the *Iliad*, is in much doubt. Gransden does
note, quite correctly, that the last six books of the *Aeneid* are very seldom read
in secondary schools or by undergraduates, and if this is the primary audience
intended for the book, then its aims are more understandable. But it is not at all
clear just what audience Gransden envisions for his book, and indeed this is a
major problem to which I will return below. What *is* new is Gransden's attempt
to see the *Aeneid* from the perspective offered by recent theories of narratology
and reader-response criticism: "There has been a steadily growing interest in
narrative and in the ways in which the reader himself constructs and manipu-
lates narrative; in the 'voice' of the 'implied author' of a narrative; in the struc-
ture and articulation of long texts. At the same time there has been a tendency
to move away from the close analysis of isolated words and phrases, and to be-
come more concerned with larger sense-units and the importance of recurring
themes and motifs" (ix). Gransden is the first to apply this methodology to the
*Aeneid* in a major study, and the results, though mixed, are the most interest-
ing aspect of this rather idiosyncratic book.

    In a short introductory chapter, Gransden insists on the continuity of the
first and second halves of the *Aeneid*, on the centrality in the poem of Virgil's
"redeploying" (p. 4) of the *Iliad*, and on the validity of focussing on the larger

movements and structures in the narrative so as to avoid being slowed down "to a walking pace" (p. 5) by an emphasis on words and phrases. Finally, there is a *recusatio* for the lack of bibliographical references to Virgilian scholarship. There is nothing particularly surprising here, though the insistence on a relatively speedy trip through the *Aeneid* would seem to be risky, given the rich texture of the narrative, and the bibliographical problem is one to which I will return below. There follows a "Prologue" on the *Iliad*, in which Gransden gives a selective synopsis of the poem's plot, and argues for a conception of the *Iliad* as an extremely sophisticated and self-conscious poem. Homerists will not be startled by anything which Gransden says here, and may find some of the assertions about the "necessities" governing the narrative to be somewhat reductive, e.g., "Only in that it brings Achilles back into the fighting is the Patrocleia important; in that it does this, it is the most important passage in the poem" (p. 27).

The bulk of the book is taken up with a running commentary on the last six books of the *Aeneid*. Most of this is, despite references to recent theorists, quite conventional. The conclusions which Gransden reaches about the nature of Aeneas' heroism and about Virgil's view of the Augustan settlement are not new, and do not rest on any new methodology. More often a portentious quote from up-to-date theorists is used to make a rather ordinary point. Thus tragic irony, an important phenomenon in the *Aeneid* but hardly a new concept for scholars, takes on a certain lustre when it appears in Jonathon Culler's formulation: "Narrative presumes that events precede the discourse which reports them" (p. 38). Or consider the following from Barthes, invoked during a discussion of the Teikoskopia in *Iliad* 3:

> The imitation of life is a contingent quality; the function of the narrative is not to 'represent,' it is to provide a display which is still an enigma to us but which can only be of a mimetic order. The 'reality' of a sequence does not lie in the 'natural' succession of the actions of which it is composed, but in the logic which is revealed in it, is risked and satisfied.

As far as I can make it out, this seems to say that a work of art must finally be understood on its own terms, again a useful but not revolutionary concept. When Gransden does attempt to apply new theoretical perspectives in a less superficial way, however, the results are often quite illuminating. These passages show a salubrious awareness of the historical context of the *Aeneid*, and of the difference in the impact of Virgil's anachronisms on ancient and modern readers (e.g., pp. 89–90). There are stimulating analyses, too, of authorial intrusions and what they tell us about the *persona* which Virgil is establishing (e.g., pp. 109–14). Perhaps the strongest example of the potential value of the insights of narratology for an understanding of the *Aeneid* comes at the very end of the book, in a thoughtful conclusion on the meaning of the end of the poem for modern readers (pp. 215–17).

These virtues are, however, outweighed by serious flaws. Though the author chastises classical scholars for not paying enough attention to the "implied reader" of the *Aeneid*, he shows little evidence of having given much thought to

his own intended audience. The needs of students (presumably undergradu-
ates) are invoked in the introduction, but the preponderance, in the notes, of
references to rather advanced theoretical work seems to aim at a more sophisti-
cated audience. Advanced students of the poem, on the other hand, will be
frustrated by the lack of any line references to the *Iliad* or the *Aeneid* (Grans-
den refers more than once to "paragraphs" in the poem, which is misleading for
beginners, who may not know the history of editorial conventions); nor is there
any mention of the edition of the poems Gransden is using. But most telling in
this regard is the use of translations in the book, which follows no discernible
pattern. Sometimes,we are given a translation of the Latin, sometimes only the
Latin, sometimes both. If Gransden means for the book to be accessible to those
who cannot read Latin, then it would seem to be necessary to translate all the
Latin. As it is, only those who know Latin could understand all the quotes in the
book, and that being the case, why have *any* translations?

A related problem is that of bibliography. Time after time, the author
refers to a recent theoretical work on narratology as the authority for observa-
tions made elsewhere, earlier, in standard works of classical scholarship which
anyone working on the *Aeneid* should have read. In a book claiming to offer a
new understanding of Virgil's use of the *Iliad*, there is no mention in the notes
or bibliography of W. S. Anderson's seminal article, "Vergil's Second *Iliad*,"
written in 1957; a discussion of "vatic empathy" makes no mention of Otis' work
on the subjective style in Virgil, nor is the work of that scholar acknowledged in
a discussion of triadic structure within individual books of the *Aeneid*; analysis
of Book 12 makes no mention of Putnam, or of Hunt. Nor is this myopia con-
fined to analysis of the *Aeneid*. Assessing the contribution of Parry to Homeric
criticism, Gransden asserts: "The oral excitement (*sic*) generated by Parry has
worn off, but we are only now beginning to think how to read the text as a piece
of narrative" (p. 9). We will have to interpret "now" pretty loosely to include E.
T. Owen's comprehensive reading of the *Iliad*, first published in 1946.

I am not suggesting that Gransden can be expected to refer to every pre-
vious work of scholarship which might in some way be relevant to his work. But
I do think that it is incumbent upon anyone who claims to be making a new
contribution to our understanding of an important text to show how his work
builds upon and departs from earlier work. This is especially important in the
case of someone claiming, as does Gransden, to be offering a fresh perspective
based on a new methodology. These ideas do not come from nowhere, and un-
less we can see the continuity between old and new perspectives, we are unlikely
to assimilate the new material in any very significant way into our overall under-
standing of the text. The question of Gransden's intended audience is again
germane here. Scholars of the *Aeneid* can fill in the gaps in bibliography, and
so the omissions are only annoying for them. For others who are interested in
the poem but not well-read in the secondary literature, the problem is more
serious. They will be unable to measure Gransden's interpretations against pre-
vious work and may well believe, for instance, that Culler's observation, quoted
on p. 4, that "the meaning of a text depends upon other texts which it absorbs
and transforms," contains an insight into the relationship between the *Iliad*
and the *Aeneid* which no classicist had grasped before the advent in 1981 of
Culler's pronouncements on "intertextuality."

The idea of applying new perspectives offered by narratology and reader-response criticism to the *Aeneid* is a very promising one, and Gransden is to be credited for his willingness to explore this new area. But the potential gains of such an approach are never quite realized because the author's application of it is, as I have said, rather superficial. The new insights which he does provide are tantalizing enough, however, to make one hope for a more comprehensive treatment from this perspective.

<div align="right">THOMAS VAN NORTWICK</div>

OBERLIN COLLEGE

S. R. F. PRICE. Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor. Cambridge University Press, 1983.

During the last two decades scholars have placed increasing emphasis on the local context of religion in the Roman Empire. Much recent work has been done on the oriental religions (e.g., Vermaseren's *EPRO* series), and Macmullen has emphasized the importance of local variation and the dangers inherent in the traditional picture of all empire-wide religions. But an obvious desideratum remains research on the various local manifestations of the cults of the Roman emperors. The only full-scale local study to date is that by Robert Etienne on Spain. However, Etienne, like Duncan Fishwick in his useful *ANRW* survey of the imperial cult in the West, must rely largely on dedications and the bare cursus of priests. There are few literary texts, none of the discursive and descriptive inscriptions that appear in the Greek world, and scanty artistic or architectural remains. Such evidence tells little of the ritual content of these cults.

It is against this background that Simon Price's treatment of the imperial cult in Asia Minor makes its welcome appearance, since the evidence from Asia Minor is particularly rich. Price devotes the first half of his book to establishing the geographical and historical context before turning his attention to the means by which the imperial rituals were evoked: artistic representations, architectural forms, and sacrifices. The author concludes by relating the imperial cult to the prevailing religious and political system.

Price announces early his desire to eschew those "Christian and post-Christian assumptions" which have led most other scholars to seek sentiment and emotion in ancient religion and, when they cannot find them, to dismiss the imperial cult as lifeless and merely political. Price wishes instead to downplay most scholars' "overemphasis" on the political dimension of the imperial cult, and to provide detailed analyses of the rituals, sacrifices and images of the cult in Asia Minor.

His aims are laudable, but the tone and methods of his book cause concern. His frequent summary dismissals of dissenting views ("crude," "naive," "conventional," "unreflective") may be overlooked as merely tasteless, but his use of straw men — Tillemont's 1692 history as a "particularly clear" example of "Christianizing assumptions" and "modernizing categories" — and his gross

oversimplifications of other scholars' views hardly encourage confidence. Price dismisses as "entirely anachronistic" all scholarly assertions that the elite had little belief in the ruler's apotheosis, and uses Freud's theory of jokes to dismiss disparaging remarks by Seneca and Suetonius. Yet Cicero, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, Cassius Dio and Tertullian all provide evidence that this view is not a mere fabrication of modern scholars.

Price often magisterially criticizes the ideas or methods of other scholars, and yet the reader sometimes finds him guilty of the same offenses a few pages later. He wishes to avoid "modernizing observer categories" (p. 52) but soon follows with a model "inspired by the account of gift-exchange given by Bourdieu" (p. 65ff.). He warns against "reification" and the loss of historical context in seeing a continuity in ruler cults from the Hellenistic to the Roman period (p. 24), but he soon refers to the "continuing process of flexible adaptation of the traditional cults" as the Greeks "represent to themselves first the Hellenistic kings and then the power of Rome" (p. 47). He similarly cautions against using comparative studies of sacrifice (p. 230), and yet he makes references to Taiwan, Malta, ancient India, Benin, medieval France, Cambodia and sixteenth-century Italy. Price suggests that it would be "very misleading to present a monolithic picture of the Greek city in which everyone at all levels of society thought the same thing." A ringing caveat, though the paragraph ends with a feeble conclusion: "There were no doubt also individuals whose ideas fell outside of what was acceptable, but such ideas could only be sporadic and insignificant in the overall picture." Are we to believe the bold assertion or the bland and, dare I say, conventional equivocation? Such contradictions pervade the book. "Certainly in the ancient world the old two-tier model is highly questionable, and I shall avoid using it" (p. 108). But he soon backs off: "Even if the old contrast between scepticism of the elite and popular credulity is rejected one might still wish to employ a two-tier model of society" (p. 116). And even the recurrent insistence that the "Christianizing assumption" (that politics and religion are separate areas) must be avoided seems to be ignored in the last sentence of the book: "The imperial cult, along with politics and diplomacy, constructed the reality of the Roman empire" (p. 248).

But the polemical tone and internal contradictions should not obscure the many valuable contributions in Price's work. He examines the imperial cult with a broad view: how the traditional symbolic systems were used to represent the emperor; how the Greeks were able to incorporate the charisma of the emperor through their own traditions and institutions; and how these cults helped to articulate power relationships in the Greek cities. While rejecting the accepted view that the imperial cult in the East was derived from the Greek ruler cult, the author does not reductively attribute these cults to Roman policy. He provides an interesting and subtle picture of Roman direction and Greek adaptation.

The chapters on architecture, images, and sacrifices are, for me, the most compelling in the book. In the first, Price examines religious buildings as an articulation of the ideology of the imperial cult. He relates imperial temples and shrines to the temples of the traditional gods and other religious architecture while demonstrating the role of the imperial cult in the transformation of civic space. In his illuminating chapter on images, Price not only describes and

analyzes various representations of the emperor, but goes further in relating them to ritual and such practices as asylum. He regards these images as products of reciprocity between the inhabitants of Asia Minor and the imperial court in Rome, and he attempts to provide a new conceptual basis for the cult through the use of anthropological material. His discussion of sacrifices in the imperial cult is the first extended treatment of the subject. It is original, learned and stimulating, and this analysis should be of interest to all students of ancient religion.

Price dedicates the book to the memory of his father, a bishop of the Church of England, and alludes in the preface to the effect of "growing up in an Anglican cathedral house." In some way this has rendered the author peculiarly sensitive to "Christianizing assumptions" which he seems to find under every bed. Thus he wisely cautions against privileging ancient mystery religions, because they bear a greater resemblance to modern religious devotion than do most ancient cults. But unfortunately his own religious formation is all too evident: "Imperial festivals . . . may indeed meet with resistance from Anglo-Saxons whose expectations of a religious occasion are nourished by Protestantism. It is the Low Church Victorian Sunday which is now felt to be the norm." Perhaps in Oxford, but elsewhere it will be seen as a narrow, provincial view of Christianity. Other Christian traditions (e.g., Roman Catholic; Orthodox) have continued to treasure ritual and (usually) to value it above sentiment. Price has come to value ritual through his research and his reading in anthropology, but other scholars may have experienced it more directly in a religious context. They can hardly be accused of that low church Victorian Protestantism which Price equates with "Christianizing assumptions."

This, then, is a book replete with insights, assertions, hypotheses and polemics. It is never boring. There is some jargon, but it is always comprehensible. The occasional misprints are not serious, though I treasure the Cappadocian king honored with "crows and incense." The plates and figures are useful additions to the chapters on images and architecture. On the other hand, the six maps leave a great deal to be desired. The regions and provinces are indicated only on a single map, and the single contour map uses 1,500 m. which contributes little. (Would not 1,000 m. have been more useful?) Price also appends an extensive and invaluable Catalogue which includes all testimonia and most of the secondary references on the imperial temples and shrines in Asia Minor.

RONALD MELLOR

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LOUIS H. FELDMAN, Josephus and Modern Scholarship (1937–1980). Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1984. DM 420.

Feldman has produced a work remarkable for its scope and erudition, indeed a work which measures up to his own high standards for a bibliography (p. 18): "completeness, accuracy, and ease of consultation." His reflections on

such matters are, one would presume, the product of earlier bibliographic en-
deavors — *Scholarship on Philo and Josephus (1937–1962)* (Yeshiva University,
*Studies in Judaica* 1 [New York 1963]), selective bibliographies on eighteen spe-
cial topics in *Josephus*, Vol. 9, *Jewish Antiquities, Books xviii–xx* (Cambridge,
Mass. 1965), and *A Supplement to Heinz Schreckenberg's Bibliographie zu Fla-
vius Josephus* (in progress).

Feldman is particularly to be commended for his concern that his work be
useful to others. This is reflected, in the first place, in his choice of a thematic,
rather than alphabetical or chronological, organizational scheme. The book is
logically organized into chapters and subdivisions. An introductory chapter
and a chapter on bibliographic resources are followed by chapters dealing with
the Greek text of Josephus, translations into modern languages, Latin, Syriac,
Slavonic and Hebrew translations or adaptations, Josephus' life and general ac-
counts of his works, his treatment of the Biblical, Post-biblical and Roman pe-
riods, sources, religious movements and issues, archaeology, language and
style, influence in subsequent ages, and, finally, desiderata or work which
needs to be done. The chapters are followed by Addenda which bring the work,
initially completed in 1975, up through 1980 (no explanation of why it was not
published until 1984 is given). The volume concludes with three indices: refer-
ences to specific passages in the works of Josephus; words in Greek, Latin, He-
brew, Aramaic and other languages; and names of modern writers whose works
are listed.

Location of material on a given topic is facilitated by division of the chap-
ters into numerous thematic subdivisions. Each subdivision commences with a
numbered list of relevant works, followed by critical summaries of the entries.
The order and numbering of the entries is somewhat idiosyncratic, but the
large number of subdivisions reduces the length of each list of entries to man-
ageable proportions. Feldman's decision to list items in more than one subdivi-
sion where relevant, rather than resort to a system of cross-referencing, while it
contributes to the length (and expense) of the book, does make for ease of con-
sultation.

This is obviously much more than a bibliography. Scattered throughout
the 975 pages of text is a wealth of additional material — e.g., a summary of
problems in the manuscript tradition (p. 22); enunciation of general principles
of text criticism and a caution about precipitous emendation of Josephus' text
(pp. 26–27); comments on the difference between autobiography and history in
the ancient world (pp. 78–79); factors to be considered in the debate over the
extent of Hellenistic influence in the Jewish settlements of Palestine (pp. 202–
03); an attempt to account for Josephus' scanty coverage of the pre-Maccabean
period (p. 213). On occasion Feldman refines a scholar's thesis, at other times
he responds with a theory of his own. In other words, embedded in the summa-
ries are Feldman's own insights and interpretations of many problems in Jo-
sephan studies. Yet, given its nature and length, it is not a book that one can
simply read. It is to be hoped that much of this material will be more readily
accessible in Feldman's articles on Josephus which are to appear in the *Cam-
bridge History of Judaism* and *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*.

The range of subject matter encompassed by Josephan studies, and there-
fore covered in this volume, is quite large. Not only does Feldman mirror Jo-

sephus in being at home in both the Greco-Roman and Jewish worlds, but he is familiar with the methodologies and concerns of a broad spectrum of disciplines — text criticism, literary criticism, history and historiography, art history, archaeology, and theology. Feldman is consequently in a unique position to survey the entire field of Josephan scholarship, and in the concluding chapter he performs a valuable service by providing many suggestions of avenues for research, thereby helping to coordinate future scholarly efforts.

STEVEN W. HIRSCH

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